

Pathways for Police Cooperation between Brazil and Taiwan¹

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Abstract

This research examines the opportunities for and obstacles to police collaboration between Brazil and Taiwan. The paper outlines the law-enforcement structures in both jurisdictions, with emphasis on police missions, powers, nomenclatures, organograms, and international affairs. It explores the concept and theory of international police cooperation, especially the process of policy coordination. The paper also categorizes international police cooperation into three policy levels (strategic, tactical, and operational). The research identifies the practical mechanisms and tools employed, either officially or unofficially, by the police to conduct international cooperation, notably information exchange and police operations. Finally, the paper offers inputs that policy- and decision-makers in Brasilia and Taipei can utilize to enhance police cooperation between the two jurisdictions.

Keywords: criminal justice, law enforcement, policy coordination, international police cooperation, police operations, information exchange.

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³ Special note for police readers: I used the expression "partner in crime" here merely as a humorous device.

Foreword

The title of this paper may surprise many academics, analysts, policy-makers, and commentators. After all, Brazil and Taiwan are geographically so separated that police cooperation does not make much sense, especially considering the peculiarities of each jurisdiction in terms of its criminality. Furthermore, Brazil and Taiwan does not maintain official diplomatic ties. In fact, Brazil is very careful in its relations with Taiwan in order to avoid friction with mainland China, which regards the self-ruled archipelago as a wayward province subject to eventual reunification, by force if necessary. For years, Beijing has called for reunification to happen under the “one country, two systems” model used in Hong Kong – something that Taipei has repeatedly rejected as unacceptable. Additionally, mainland China has recurrently pressured governments and multilateral fora to deflect requests made by the Taiwanese government to join certain multilateral organizations. In effect, a number of former allies bowed to such pressure from Beijing to the point of severing official diplomatic ties with Taipei. As a result, Taiwan faces growing political isolation: as of March 2019, Taiwan has official diplomatic relations with only sixteen United Nations member states and the Holy See. This state of affairs certainly harms prospects of wider Brazil-Taiwan cooperation.

In fact, even in cases in which there are not immediate political issues at stake, international police cooperation is complex, demanding, and uncertain. In other words, even between allies or neighbor countries, cooperation in general is a complicated issue. It naturally poses many challenges, especially language and technology barriers, lack of reciprocity, individual and organizational resistance to change and innovation, individual and organizational unwillingness to collaborate, and an array of other cultural and behavioral impediments (Balzer, 1996; Wyllie, 2009; Abrahamson and Goodman-Delahunty, 2014). The practical implications of these pitfalls for international cooperation and police agencies must not be underestimated, and the solution lies in determination, effective policymaking, leadership, and innovation.

The aforementioned phenomena thus raise the following questions: Why would one call for greater police cooperation between Brazil and Taiwan? Why should their leaders care about this? Finally, why exactly should police organizations in both jurisdictions invest time, money, and energy into forming partnerships and undertake bilateral actions in the field of law enforcement?

The answer is not simple. However, at least four relevant justifications can be made for police cooperation between Brazil and Taiwan. First, they are like-minded jurisdictions; they value basic principles such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and, therefore, have a moral duty to find a fundamental common ground in terms of criminal justice and law enforcement. Second, both jurisdictions can be either a base, a platform, or a target for transnational crime ventures, which logically require a concerted response regardless of how different or physically distant their law enforcement systems are. Third, criminals are opportunistic and exploit shortcomings in international law enforcement cooperation to profit, what calls for more international police cooperation. Lastly, by cooperating, Brazil and Taiwan can strengthen international stability and contribute to not only their own well-beings but also the security of the international community (through interdependence and transnationalism). After all, among the cornerstones of peace and progress, cooperation stands out.

1. Introduction

Although the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of China (ROC, henceforth "Taiwan") do not maintain official diplomatic ties, the two jurisdictions have engaged in considerable economic and cultural relations. Brazil has long been Taiwan's top commercial partner in Latin America (BoFT-MoEA, 2018), and it was one of the main destinations for Taiwanese immigrants in the second half of the twentieth century (Jye et al., 2009; Silva, 2018). Although a considerable proportion of this immigration was induced by business, substantial cultural effects have been observed in the host communities, particularly Brazil's two largest cities of São Paulo (Tolentino, 2017) and Rio de Janeiro (Shu, 2012).

Despite such significant economic and cultural relations, Brazil and Taiwan have developed limited bilateral collaborative initiatives in other technical, policy sectors. Although a more robust rapprochement with Taiwan may be intentionally circumvented by Brazil to avoid discord with the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), collaboration⁴ between the two jurisdictions has also been limited by Taiwan's unique international status⁵. The self-ruled island is a *de facto* entity that it is not a *de jure* state because of a lack of recognition from the larger international community⁶. Therefore, the two jurisdictions have not fully explored collaborative channels and mechanisms. In particular, there are policy areas—such as public safety and policing—in which cooperation between Brazil and Taiwan may actually benefit (and not necessarily provoke) the PRC.

This research suggests that there is vast potential for growth of the collaboration between Brazil and Taiwan in many technical sectors, despite the lack of official diplomatic relations, through less official or informal, but nonetheless legal, organizations and backchannels⁷, under so-called multitrack diplomacy⁸. It is likely that Brazil and Taiwan have confluent technical problems that could be entirely or partially addressed through collaboration that does not necessarily depend on official interactions. After all, the emergence of concurrent policy challenges could logically encourage joint action and mutual learning. For example, Brazil could draw policy lessons from Taiwan's experience with sustainable development, especially within the realms of "clean industry" (Lee, 2016). In turn, Taiwan could benefit from Brazil's knowledge of conditional cash transfers (Ceratti, 2014). Such knowledge exchange, however, appears to be virtually nonexistent in policy sectors that do not have direct economic interfaces. Moreover, there seem to be certain technical areas that should be immune to eventual PRC objection or pressure because they generate global public goods.

One such policy sector is law enforcement. The disparity between limited state jurisdiction and the nearly unlimited scope of transnational crime activities fosters comprehensive international police cooperation. Within this context, both countries could benefit from each other's best practices in several aspects, such as police technology, training, and intelligence, as well as institutional reform and civil-military relations. For example, Taiwan has a remarkable record of political

⁴ For the purposes of this essay, the terms "collaboration", "cooperation" and "coordination" will be used interchangeably to describe various manifestations of joint international action, given that the difference in nomenclature is not overly significant and refers, basically, to the structure of incentives into play (Keohane and Victor, 2016). To put it simply, coordination and cooperation can lead to collaboration; coordination is not self-enforcing, whereas cooperation is. In coordination, parties do not have incentives to defect but, in cooperation, they do. In either case, collaboration can be attained.

⁵ For a comprehensive discussion about cross-Strait politics, see Chow, P. (2008) *The "One China" Dilemma*, Springer: New York.

⁶ For an interesting discussion about Taiwan's sovereignty, see Driver, S. (2019) *Asia-Pacific and Cross-Strait Machinations: Challenges for Taiwan in the Nascent Phase of Pax-Sino* (Final paper for the Taiwan Fellowship), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Center for Chinese Studies: Taipei.

⁷ As of 2017, Taiwan had a network of 92 unofficial (nondiplomatic and nonconsular) foreign representations abroad to carry out quasidiplomatic or paradiplomatic activities (Pajtinka, 2017).

⁸ For an introduction to the concept of multitrack diplomacy, see the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) website at <http://imtd.org/about/what-is-multi-track-diplomacy/>.

development by means of establishing civil control over the state security apparatus (Fravel, 2002). Brazil, however, has yet to stabilize its civil–military relations properly, notably within the public safety sector. Additionally, Brazil could benefit from Taiwan’s experience with cutting-edge police technology, especially correlation analysis platforms, geographical criminal information systems, photo comparison systems, mobile (telephone) policing platforms, cloud computing systems, forensic technologies, and digital communications (NPA-MoI, 2014).

From the Taiwanese perspective, enhanced police cooperation could be advantageous in many aspects. The Brazilian police, as diverse as the country itself, could offer a plethora of best practices and specialized knowledge to their Taiwanese counterparts. Because of the country’s prominence in Latin America, the Brazilian police agencies and officers can act as facilitators and gateways to the region’s other police organizations. Moreover, Brazil has become a reference for police information exchange. In this regard, enhanced collaboration with Brazil could provide Taiwan with valuable inputs regarding transnational crime and law enforcement. Since its withdraw from INTERPOL in 1984, Taiwan has been compelled to rely on irregular bilateral police cooperation (often informally) for supply of its informational needs (Chang, 2012, 2013; NPA-MoI, 2018d). Thus, enhanced police cooperation with Brazil—one of INTERPOL’s most active members—could offer Taiwan indirect access to the world’s most important police networks and complementary information. Additionally, due to the transnational nature of crime, police cooperation between Brazil and Taiwan may benefit not only the two partners but also the international community as a whole.

Cooperation may also result in mutual benefits, with a potential spillover effect. For example, evidence reveals that the international exchange of information on organized criminal networks is a fruitful approach to addressing human trafficking (UNODC, 2008; USDoS, 2018). Environmental policing seems to be an area of enormous common interest and potential for bilateral cooperation. Accordingly, mutual legal assistance is particularly crucial to control the trafficking of waste and endangered flora and fauna (Spapens, 2010). These crimes simultaneously concern both jurisdictions as well as the global commons. Similarly, many other crimes (such as drug trafficking and digital fraud) affecting both jurisdictions (but with transnational reach) could be more efficiently fought through bilateral police cooperation.

In this context, this research examines the complex and relevant topic of police cooperation between Taiwan and Brazil as well as the potential carriers and pathways of such cooperation. To perform this examination, this paper is organized into three broad sections. The first section presents the policing structures of Brazil and Taiwan. The second section explores the concept, theory and practice of international police cooperation. This section also describes the different levels of management (strategic, tactical, and operational) of international police cooperation as well as the practical mechanisms and tools that police organizations and officers implement to give rise to international police cooperation, either officially or unofficially. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of the potential extraofficial institutional channels for cooperation between the police organizations from Brazil and Taiwan, amid an environment marked by unofficial diplomatic relations and the *sui generis* status of the latter under the international public law. Particular attention is given to multitrack diplomacy and the respective potential actors, elements, sources, and facilitators of police cooperation between Brazil and Taiwan, especially in terms of knowledge and information exchange.

2. Contemporary Policing Systems in Brazil and Taiwan

An objective of this research is to offer elementary information regarding the police structures of these two jurisdictions, as a basis for any future interest from either party in forming bilateral (formal or informal) partnerships. In general, Brazilians and the Taiwanese do not know much about each other and, in particular, have limited knowledge about the peculiarities of each jurisdiction in terms of its criminality – the main social problem behind police work. For example, Brazilians seem to be more concerned about high homicide rates and corruption. Averaging more than 60,000 murders per year since 2014, Brazil has been the most homicidal country in the world in recent years (Darlington, 2018; Dalby and Carranza, 2019), and the country struggles with widespread corruption and its effects on society, including public distrust in government, economic problems, and social inequality (Picanço et al., 2018). The Taiwanese, however, worry more about telephone fraud, cybercrime, and pickpocketing at night markets (Huang and Sun, 2014; NPA, 2018a; OSAC, 2019). Taiwan is regarded as one of the safest places in the world, particularly for women, given the generally low exposure to crime, robbery, and violence coupled with high levels of economic freedom, education, health care, and human development (Lee et al., 2018; OSAC, 2019). Within this context, this section provides a description of the police structures in both jurisdictions, with emphasis on their missions, powers, nomenclatures, organograms, and international affairs.

Brazil

The 1988 Federal Constitution establishes that the public safety function is provided by the following agencies: at a national (federal) level, the Federal Police and Federal Highway Police⁹, and at a state (province) level, the Civil Police and Military Police (Presidência da República, 2010). Consequently, the authority to enforce, organize, and guarantee public safety is shared between the federal and state governments. The Federal Constitution (paragraph 8, article 144) also declares that the municipalities can assign unarmed municipal guards to protect their goods, services, and facilities¹⁰. Therefore, the current Brazilian policing system is organized at several different jurisdictional levels and does not encompass a single style of functioning (Table 1).

The only organizations considered by Brazilian law to be public security forces with police powers are the ones listed in article 144 of the Federal Constitution, namely a) the Federal Police, b) Federal Highway Police, c) State Military Police and Fire Brigade, and d) State Civil Police. Of these, the first two are affiliated with federal authorities. The final two are subordinate and affiliated with state (province) governments. Considering that the Brazilian federation comprises twenty-six states and the Federal District, the country has a total of only fifty-six organizations¹¹ with comprehensive police powers¹². All police institutions in Brazil are part of the executive branch of either federal or state governments¹³.

⁹ The Constitution also mentions a Federal Railroad Police as one of the public safety organizations with police powers. However, this force was dissolved in the early 1990s due to budgetary cuts, and its responsibilities were transferred to federal and state police forces.

¹⁰ According to the Constitution, municipalities in Brazil can have non-armed municipal guards. However, recent legislation (Law 13022/2014) amended the Constitution, and granted municipal guards some police powers (such as the authority of bear arms, make arrests and conduct 'stop and search'). In fact, this is hardly an innovation, since several cities in Brazil passed, throughout the last decades, local laws that allowed their civil guards to have broader police powers. In fact, between 2000 and 2015, more than 500 municipalities have created municipal guards in the country (armed and unarmed).

¹¹ For the sake of precision: apart from the organizations with police mandate found in the Article 144 of the 1988 Federal Constitution, there are also two organizations with police powers in Brazil: the Senate Police and the House of Representatives Police. These organizations are very small in terms of contingent (less than 250 sworn officers as of 2018) and have their powers limited to the perimeter of the National Congress in Brasília.

Table 1 – Organization of law enforcement in Brazil

Jurisdictions	Institutions	Functions
Federal level	Federal Police	Detection, investigation, and registration of federal crimes
	Federal Highway Police	Order maintenance (highway patrolling)
State (province) level	Civil Police	Detection, investigation, and registration of state and local crimes
	Military Police	Order maintenance (especially patrolling)
Municipal (local) level	Municipal Guards	Security of public buildings, auxiliary order maintenance

The public safety system comprises two primary police functions: order maintenance and investigation of offenses defined by the national criminal code (Timo Brito, 2012). In jurisdictional terms, the Federal Police are responsible for the investigation of offenses related to specific laws of federal scope (such as drug trafficking, corruption, and money laundering) and referral of the results of such investigations to the courts¹⁴. The Federal Highway Police does not have judicial police powers, and its main attribution is order maintenance on federal roads using patrols and checkpoints. Its territorial jurisdiction, therefore, comprise only the federal roads and their immediate perimeters, whereas the Federal Police has jurisdiction over all remaining geographical areas of the country (including rivers and borders) (Timo Brito, 2012).

When certain laws of state or local scope are violated (such as interpersonal offenses and speeding), the corresponding state police forces undertake specific law enforcement activities. At the state (province) level, police duties are separated institutionally: the Military Police are responsible for patrolling, whereas the Civil Police are in charge of paperwork and investigations, including the referral of investigation results to state and local courts (Timo Brito, 2012). The Federal Police and state Civil Police are also responsible for temporary detention of suspected criminals pending judicial action.

Both state police organizations report directly to the executive branch of their state governments. The Brazilian equivalent to the police commissioner is the secretary of public security, who directly assists the governor and is responsible for the coordination of public safety policies and programs. The Military Police are not part of the armed forces, but they are organized as such and have a military-based rank structure¹⁵. They are responsible for actual street-level policing and maintenance of public order. Their primary occupation involves daily patrols and

¹² For example, there are about 18,000 police forces in the United States of America. They are organized at several jurisdictional levels (local, county, state, federal and specialized, such as university police departments).

¹³ Established in 2004, the National Force of Public Safety is a police program formed by elite squad officers from the states' Military Police forces. As of 2019, the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety is responsible for the coordination of the National Force. The National Force is activated by the President in situations of emergency that demand greater interference of the public authority or in which is detected the urgency of strengthening the security area (such as police strikes or large-scale events, such as international sports tournaments).

¹⁴ More recently, the Brazilian Federal Police have made international headlines with the Operation Car Wash (*Operação Lava Jato*), which uncovered a vast and intricate web of political and corporate corruption and racketeering, with international connections in the Americas, Africa and Europe. For basic information about Operation Car Wash, see: Felter, C. and Labrador, R. (2017) 'Brazil's Corruption Fallout', *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cfr.org/background/brazils-corruption-fallout>.

¹⁵ The Military Police are not an internal force of the national military, but rather an ancillary force to support the armed forces in case of armed conflicts or other specific situations. Conversely, the Brazilian armed forces can only act in the public safety realm under extraordinary circumstances according to the law.

the pursuit of criminals¹⁶. Military Police commands are divided into police regions (or areas, depending on the terminology adopted by a given state of the federation) in which battalions and companies are deployed. The Civil Police are responsible for the investigation of criminal offenses and the referral of the results to the courts. Therefore, Civil Police forces are responsible for judicial processes of criminal nature, with the exception of military offenses and those under the jurisdiction of the Federal Police. The territorial jurisdiction of Civil Police forces is organized as follows: cities are divided into precincts in which the Civil Police¹⁷ operate, using methods familiar to police squads in most Western countries.

In general, Brazilian policing is incident related and reactive, rather than intelligence led and preventive (Sapori, 2007; Timo Brito, 2012; Riccio and Skogan, 2017). The use of day-to-day cutting-edge police technology (such as closed-circuit television [CCTV], onboard cameras, and nonlethal weapons) is not prevalent, and expertise in certain police sectors coexists with backwardness in other areas. Community policing—or any cognate, proactive model—exists only in secondary programs, experiments, or pilot projects and is extremely narrow in scope (Timo Brito, 2012; Oosterbaan and Wijk, 2015). Volunteer programs are virtually nonexistent. Civil police forces are bureaucratic and service oriented in nature (Soares, 2001, 2007; Dantas, 2009; Timo Brito, 2012). Military Police forces are responsible for patrolling duties and are commonly considered extremely violent (especially those units with jurisdiction over poorer neighborhoods) (Mesquita Neto, 1995, 1997; HRW, 2009; Timo Brito, 2012). Despite their usually negative reputation, state police forces, by definition, are powerful organizations in their states because municipal (local) police forces are limited in scope and reach (Timo Brito, 2012; Riccio and Skogan, 2017).

The mutual dependency and the division of policing duties between the Civil Police and Military Police have been identified as the most detrimental strategic and organizational deficiencies in the contemporary Brazilian public safety system. This division is understood to be the main cause of friction between police agencies, rivalry among police departments, work duplication, reciprocal criticisms, political disputes, police malpractice, inefficiency, and deleterious competition for scarce resources (Cortês, 2007; Junior et al., 2011; Riccio and Skogan, 2017). In most states, the police areas or regions of the Military Police and the police precincts of the Civil Police do not converge and are not symmetric. Some have argued that this asymmetry usually results in inefficiency and disorganization in the provision of public safety and crime control (Cruz and Batitucci, 2006; Souza, 2009; Peixoto et al., 2011; Salem, 2017).

Intrastate and interstate police cooperation in Brazil is irregular and limitedⁱⁱ. In practice, police forces endeavor to protect their respective “turfs” from interference from other organizations and governmental agencies (Timo Brito, 2012; Riccio and Skogan, 2017), whether at the intrastate level or with neighboring states. Among state police organizations, competition for federal resources and influence and a lack of trust have hindered collaboration and mutual aid, which is often case specific, demand driven, and sporadic. Police academies within various police organizations invite their local, state, and federal

¹⁶ Firefighting and transit police used to be functions of the Military Police forces until the end of the XX Century. More recently, however, they have become adjacent organizations to the state police forces. Firefighters are organized in separate battalions that keep no direct correspondence to the normal Military Police battalions. State traffic police are called either ‘State Highway Police’ or ‘Transit Police’ in larger cities. Both used to be part of the state Military Police and sometimes shared responsibilities with municipal guards in issues related to traffic control (Timo Brito, 2012).

¹⁷ Civil Police chiefs are called *delegados*, and the Civil Police is usually commanded by a *delegado geral*, whose rank is equal to that of the commandant of the Military Police. A *delegado* must have a law degree, and is selected by public examination. Lower-ranking officers are known as investigators or as agents. Promotion to the higher ranks of the Civil Police usually requires a law degree (Timo Brito, 2012).

counterparts from other jurisdictions to participate in courses; nevertheless, the networking established in these courses seldom leads to official projects and programs (Timo Brito, 2012).

According to a recent survey, police organizations do engage in information exchange, but it is often on demand, lacking systematic routine and assessment, and conducted through personal, informal networking among police officers based in different jurisdictions (Dantas and Júnior, 2018; Dantas e Mendonça, 2019). Few state and local police agencies have permanent international offices. In these scenarios, international affairs, at the state and local levels, mostly refer to tourism police and police liaison with diplomatic organizations. In cases that require any form of international police relations—whether inward or outward—cabinets of state governments usually act as recipients and managers of such relations.

International police cooperation is practically monopolized by the Federal Police, which has hosted INTERPOL's National Central Bureau (NCB) for Brazil since 1953. The NCB coordinates twenty-seven regional offices in the states of the Brazilian federation and in the Federal District. Additionally, the Federal Police has been authorized by law to deploy police attachés and official liaisons abroad since 1995 as a means to facilitate information exchange with agencies of host countries and to assist the Brazilian authorities in fighting international crime. As of 2018, the Federal Police has international offices in twenty countries, mostly in the Americas and Europe, including an office at the INTERPOL headquarters in Lyon, France (PF, 2019). In Asia, the Federal Police has an official liaison stationed at the Brazilian Embassy in Singapore (PF, 2019). However, the question remains whether state and local law enforcement agencies and security services in Brazil have truly benefited from the international network headed by the Federal Police.

Other government institutions, organizations, and agencies may play subsidiary roles in the international affairs of the Brazilian police. In this regard, the Department of Justice (within the Brazilian Ministry of Justice and Public Safety) and the federal public prosecutor's office stand out. They have played a vital role in recent probes of relatively sophisticated crimes such as corruption, money laundering, and various forms of transnational trafficking (including drugs, people, and weapons). These institutions have engaged with their counterparts in other countries through the exchange of information, technologies, and best practices. These exchanges are conducted under task forces, in such a way that a plethora of agencies—e.g. the Federal Courts and the federal public prosecutor's office—can jointly have access to the products of international cooperation. Therefore, their work has helped to advance specific police investigations. Yet, it is probable that state police agencies make little use of contributions offered by international police cooperation because they are just very insulated and closed to foreign inputs.

Taiwan

The Taiwanese police system is organized in accordance with the National Police Agency Organization Act (2013-08-21). In accordance with the Act, the National Police Agency (NPA) is the central police authority responsible for the command, coordination, supervision, and execution of policing tasks of all subordinate police organizations in Taiwan. Therefore, the NPA is the strategic agency that enforces laws made by, or under, the authority of the Legislative Yuan¹⁸, the unicameral legislature of Taiwan (NPA-MoI, 2018a). As a national agency, the NPA formulates law enforcement programs and projects, conducts police operations related to cases involving national public safety, and undertakes the administration of matters that form the foundation of police activities (such as

¹⁸ The Legislative Yuan is equivalent to a parliament in other democratic jurisdictions.

police education and training, police communications, criminal identification, and the development of administrative processes and tools, notably digital systems) (FAS, 2019). The NPA is headed by a director general who, under the direction of the Taiwanese minister of the interior, oversees the agency's operations and manages all relevant matters (NPA-MoI, 2018b)¹⁹.

The NPA's main structure and mandate comprises thirty-eight units and organizations. Eighteen internal units are organized in either divisions²⁰ or offices²¹, which are responsible for tasks related to the planning, supervision, and evaluation of national police functions. Additionally, twenty subordinate agencies are responsible for various specialized police functions, which vary from order maintenance and harbor security to criminal investigation and forensics²². In addition to usual law enforcement duties, the Taiwanese police are responsible for some other unusual assignments, such as collecting census data and overseeing immigration-related (i.e., visa-related) issues (NPA-MoI, 2018a).

The NPA also acts as the central authority for local police departments, which are responsible for planning and performing day-to-day police functions, including highway patrol, within local jurisdictions (FAS, 2019). As of 2018, there are twenty-two city and county police departments. Under these departments, there are a total of one hundred and fifty nine police precincts in Taiwan, which are aided by several police brigades and civil defense control centers (NPA 2018b). Each police precinct oversees several police stations, "which can be divided into police beats that form the basic unit of police duties" (NPA-MoI, 2018a:13). Currently, Taiwan has more than one thousand and six hundred police stations (NAP-MoI, 2018a).

The police in Taiwan have a military-based rank structure associated with hierarchical leadership that favors top-down supervision, thus forming a solid chain of command and control. According to the Police Duty Act, police duties can be classified into six types: 1) household visit, 2) patrol, 3) stop-and-search, 4) guard, 5) call-responding at a duty counter, and 6) stand-by. Accordingly, the police are empowered to investigate not only criminal code offenses but also illegal acts punishable under Taiwan's judicial system (MoI-RoC, 2018). Most cases are investigated by the police and referred to the public prosecutor's office for prosecution. Although public prosecutors²³ are also empowered to conduct investigations, their investigations are generally supplementary (MoI-RoC, 2018; NPA-MoI, 2018d).

¹⁹ Amongst the attributions of the Director-General, these stand out: decisions regarding personnel rotation and transfer, as well as administrative commendations and reprimands over top ranking police officers (with the exception of the head of the Police College) (NPA-MoI, 2018b).

²⁰ There are nine divisions within NPA, as follows: 1) Administrative Affairs Division; 2) Internal Affairs Division; 3) Public Order Division; 4) Education Division; 5) International Affairs Division; 6) Traffic Division; 7) Public Security Division; 8) Prevention and Control Division; and 9) Command and Control Division (NPA-MoI, 2018a).

²¹ There are nine offices within NPA, as follows: 1) Internal Affairs Office; 2) Public Relations Office; 3) Secretariat Office; 4) Personnel Office; 5) Civil Service Ethics Office; 6) Accounting Office; 7) Statistics Office; 8) Legal Affairs Office; and 9) Information Management Office (NPA-MoI, 2018a).

²² As of October 2018, NPA's twenty subordinate agencies are as follows: 1) Criminal Investigation Bureau; 2) Aviation Police Bureau; 3) National Highway Police Bureau; 4) Railway Police Bureau; 5) Special Police First Corps; 6) Special Police Second Corps; 7) Special Police Third Corps; 8) Special Police Fourth Corps; 9) Special Police Fifth Corps; 10) Special Police Sixth Corps; 11) Special Police Seventh Corps; 12) Keelung Harbor Police Department; ; 13) Taichung Harbor Police Department; 14) Kaoshiung Harbor Police Department; 15) Hualien Harbor Police Department; 16) Police Communication Office; 17) Civil Defense Office; 18) Police Broadcasting Service; 19) Police Headquarters Maintenance Plant; and 20) Taiwan Police College (NPA-MoI, 2018a).

²³ The primary duty of the public prosecutor is to determine case dispositions and prosecute suspects (NPA-MoI, 2018d).

Cognizant of their historical roots, especially the influence of Japanese colonization (Alarid and Wang, 2000; Mon and Liang, 2012; Cao et al. 2014), the Taiwanese police place great value in community inputs and partnerships in what has been defined as “collaborative governance” (Cao and Dai, 2006; Martin, 2007; Kuo and Shih, 2018; NPA-MoI, 2014, 2018a). In this vein, police service favors crime prevention, problem solving, and emergency response, in addition to handling of lost and found articles, guidance of juveniles, assistance during natural disasters, care for lost children and runaways, and community counseling on matters related to public safety (NPA-MoI, 2014; Kadarudin et al., 2018; MoI-RoC, 2018). Patrols and household visits are considered the “backbone of police duties” (NPA-MoI, 2014:31). The NPA has also implemented standard operating procedures for crime reporting as a means of reducing “complaints against police attitude or inaction” (NPA-MoI, 2014:37). Accordingly, police responses to calls observe two nationwide principles: 1) a “one-stop shop” (or “booth” or “counter”) and 2) “full service upon case acceptance” (NPA, 2018b). The handling of such cases gives special consideration to victims’ rights and expectations (MoI-RoC, 2018). Furthermore, the Taiwanese police operate several volunteer programs, through which citizens assist with police work in tasks such as patrolling of unarmed street beats (which resembles a more active version of the neighborhood watch in many countries), transit management, office work at police stations, and civil defense and rescue in the event of natural disasters (NPA-MoI, 2018a).

In this context, technology has played a major role in police–community relations in Taiwan²⁴ (Lai and Zhao, 2018; Wu et al., 2018). Known for its widespread use of CCTV²⁵, the Taiwanese police have also employed several other cutting-edge technologies to provide accessible and cost-efficient services (NPA-MoI, 2014; NPA-MoI, 2018a). Offenses can be reported through various digital and web-based platforms, including cloud video and online reporting systems, in addition to more traditional methods (police hotlines, in person at a duty counter, or directly on the scene). Taiwan also offers a police service app that can be downloaded for free onto smartphones, through which citizens may report occurrences via text message or instant image sharing²⁶. In particular, the NPA has developed in-house a number of digital technologies that fit squarely within their mandate. For example, the Digital Inquiry Parking System is connected to parking management databases and allows inspectors to identify stolen vehicles by their license plates. The Correlation Analysis Platform utilizes matching software (for cross-referencing and phrase comparison) to process big data into associative information suitable for investigations. The M-Police Mobile device is equipped with useful applications for routine police work, such as integrated search engines, real-time information, individual and vehicle databases, and multimedia content transmission. The Taiwanese NPA has also developed a nationwide digital communication system that utilizes 1) wired telephones, 2) microwave transmissions, and 3) wireless connections (NPA-MoI, 2014).

International affairs occupy a prevalent position in Taiwanese policing. On the operational level, most police units have a foreign affairs team staffed with officers that speak second languages (NPA-MoI, 2016, 2018a, 2018c). Their main duties are related to immigration law enforcement and various affairs concerning foreign visitors and residents²⁷. At the tactical level, the NPA has an International

²⁴ This is hardly a new feature of the Taiwanese police. For example, Taiwanese authorities established the Police Broadcasting Service (PBS) in 1954. It remains the only radio station in the world operated by a law enforcement institution (NPA-MoI, 2014:67).

²⁵ According to Taiwan 2018 Crime & Safety Report (OSAC, 2018), there are approximately 25,000 cameras in Taipei, 24,000 in Kaohsiung, and 34,000 in New Taipei City. Such an extensive coverage plays a significant role in deterring the majority of criminal activity, thus rendering Taiwan as a generally very safe place.

²⁶ Such technologies facilitate, furthermore, the reporting by individuals who have difficulties in hearing or speaking.

²⁷ Within the NPA, the declared main tasks of the foreign affairs police are “to protect the foreign population and to actively crack down on human trafficking” (NPA-MoI, 2018c).

Affairs Division within its core structure (NPA-MoI, 2016). The division is the main NPA unit responsible for police diplomacy and for the coordination of all foreign relations-related issues as well as collating information pertaining to all foreign bilateral police affairs and engagements. At the strategic level, the NPA engages in international public law by signing international acts, especially extradition agreements (NPA-MoI, 2014:90). The NPA also relies on the provisions of Article 7 of the National Police Agency Act, which states that “to meet the requirements of their functions, the Agency may post its officers overseas if approved by the Executive Yuan pursuant to the Organization Act of Diplomatic Missions” to enhance international police cooperation and maintain close working relationships with foreign counterparts. Accordingly, Taiwan has stationed police liaison officers in several Asian countries²⁸, as well as in South Africa and the United States. Such officers are intended to “fortify Taiwan’s security front lines by strengthening its capabilities in investigating transnational crime, international police cooperation, and other missions” (NPA-MoI, 2018c:1). Additionally, as a means to actively foster stronger bonds with foreign crime-fighting, law enforcement agencies²⁹, and educational institutions³⁰, the NPA has signed several memoranda of understanding with foreign partners and has hosted and participated in various international professional and academic activities and events³⁰ related to law enforcement, public safety, and security (NPA-MoI, 2018a, 2018d).

Taiwan was an INTERPOL member country until 1984, when the PRC was admitted to the organization and Taiwan was compelled to withdraw from the group. Since then, INTERPOL has considered the PRC the sole Chinese representative in the organization. Consequently, Taiwan does not have a national central police bureau responsible for anticrime communication among the organization and its members. Contacts between Taiwan and other jurisdictions within INTERPOL’s realm are facilitated by Japan’s NCB in Tokyo (NPA-MoI, 2018d). For several years, Taiwan has unsuccessfully sought to acquire at least an “observer” status in the organization’s general assemblies and activities, including access to global criminal databases via INTERPOL’s I-24/7 global police communications platform³¹ (Chen, 2002; NPA, 2018d; INTERPOL, 2019).

²⁸ Indonesia, Japan, Macau, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam.

²⁹ Taiwan signed the Preventing and Combating Serious Crime Agreement with the United States in 2011 to ensure collaboration on judicial inquiries, investigations and fighting crimes along with being a recipient of various international crime notifications from the INTERPOL. Also in 2011, NPA signed the Joint Fight against Crime Agreement (Arrangement) with various ASEAN nations to boost cross-border intelligence exchange and law-enforcement collaboration efficiency. In 2012, Taiwan signed the Agreement on the Cooperation in Preventing and Combating Crime with Vietnam and, in 2013, it signed the Arrangement on Cooperation in Combating Transnational Economic Crime and other Related Crimes with Thailand. In 2016, Taiwan and Singapore signed *Memoranda of Understanding on Combating Cross-Jurisdictional Crime and Developing Police Cooperation* via, respectively, the Singapore Trade Office in Taipei and the Taipei Representative Office in Singapore. In September 2018, the NPA and the Nauru Police Force (NPF) signed an “Agreement on Police Cooperation” to jointly combat cross-border crime. Addressing the occasion, the NPA’s Director-General Chen Ja-chin said the two jurisdictions would “step up two-way exchanges on intelligence, enhancement of professional skills and technical assistance, in an effort to more effectively fight increasingly diverse cross-border criminal activities” (OCAC, 2018). In fact, since 2016, Taiwan has signed similar agreements with a number of its diplomatic allies including Swaziland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Palau, Belize, the Solomon Islands and Saint Lucia (NPA-MoI, 2018d).

³⁰ The NPA is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (AGP) and the Egmont Group. Additionally, the NPA has engaged in major activities held by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the International Association of Airport and Seaport Police (IAASP), the World Police and Fire Games, and the *Law Enforcement Torch Run for Special Olympics*. Within the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan has joined and/or become an official member of many important international networks, such as ARIN-AP, APEC, ACT-NET, APEC’s Expert Group on Illegal Logging and Associated Trade (EGILAT), APEC’s Anti-Corruption and Transparency Working Group conference, APEC’s Electronic Commerce Steering Group (ECSG), and Global Internet and Jurisdiction Conference (NPA-MoI, 2018c).

³¹ The platform is available to countries that are full members of the organization and have established a National Central Bureau (INTERPOL, 2019).

Within the NPA, some units and organizations deal with specific aspects of international police affairs. Among these, the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) is particularly involved because its principal functions are deeply embedded in international police cooperation, notably in the combat of transnational organized crime (Chin, 2016; CIB, 2018), especially at the tactical and operational levels. The CIB is responsible for communicating with other international law enforcement agencies, conducting investigations on transnational and foreigner-related crime, and supervising Taiwanese police liaison officers abroad (NPA-MoI, 2018c). CIB officers routinely attend international police conferences, which offer Taiwanese police officers access to relevant ideas, methodologies, technologies, and innovations in the field³². The CIB has also been actively involved with antiterrorism efforts through the implementation, mobilization, and participation of task forces responsible for counterattack, hostage rescue, suspect arrest, and related antiterrorism missions (CIB, 2018).

Outside the NPA, the Department of International and Cross-Strait Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Justice plays a major role in the ROC's foreign police relations; this is because it is the central authority for international mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (MoJ-RoC, 2018; NPA-MoI, 2018d). Therefore, the Department manages all formal (inward and outward) processes for bilateral legal assistance in accordance with the proper legislation and any applicable mutual legal assistance (MLA) agreement. However, in these cases, the cooperation not only is official but also must follow several formalities, including the involvement of the proper diplomatic channels, except in the case of an emergency (when requests may be filed directly with the Department). The other formalities are as follows (MoJ-RoC, 2018):

- a) The counterpart (central authorities or other competent government agencies of the requesting state) shall present an issue statement/undertaking of reciprocity to Taiwan;
- b) All requests to Taiwan shall be in traditional Chinese;
- c) In Taiwan, the dual criminality principle³³ is required for coercive measures such as the search, seizure, immobilization, and confiscation of assets as well as the collection of values and restitution of proceeds of crime; and
- d) The evidence provided by Taiwan pursuant to an MLA request must only be used for the purpose stated in the original request.

In general, Taiwan's police cooperation can be divided into two basic types. First, there are official relations between organizations from the Taiwanese criminal justice system and organizations from other states with which Taiwan has established diplomatic relations, as well as police-related international intergovernmental organizations in which Taiwan holds membership in any capacity (such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, IACP). Second, there are unofficial, quasi-diplomatic, or paradiplomatic activities that organizations from the Taiwanese criminal justice system carry out in relation to states with which Taiwan does not maintain diplomatic relations (and

³² The CIB has recently undergone considerable restructuring to adapt more effectively to the contemporary crime trends and climate. For example, in 2015, the CIB established a Drug Enforcement Center to comprehensively tailor antidrug crime measures and promote the exchange of human resources, work experience, expertise, and intelligence with foreign law enforcement organizations. In 2016, the CIB created the Anti-Fraud Command Center to achieve cross-ministry, cross-agency, and cross-field collaboration in order to implement multifaceted task forces to prevent, identify, and combat fraud and protect private property (NPA-MoI, 2018a).

³³ The dual-criminality principle states that an individual may be the subject of certain provisions of the international public law only when his/her actions constitute an offense in both a requesting and a requested jurisdiction. International criminal law employs a range of "double conditions", the common denominator of which is the requirement that two legal systems share a certain set of values or legal prescriptions. In addition to double criminality, international law uses such terms as "double punishability", the "double possibility of criminal proceedings" and the "double possibility of the execution of penal judgment". Among these concepts, double criminality is the most important and universal condition applied in the basic institutions of international criminal law, such as extradition, the transfer of proceedings, and the execution of foreign penal judgments (Gardocki, 1993).

organizations in which Taiwan does not hold membership in any capacity). According to Pajtinka (2017), in practice, the variances between these two types are rooted mainly in their formal and “protocolar” aspects, whereas from the viewpoint of organizational and practical performance, ‘the differences are minimal’ (p. 55).

In relation to the PRC, numerous mechanisms of quasi-formal and informal cooperation exist between Taiwan and the PRC in the criminal justice sphere³⁴. Among these, the prominent mechanisms are outlined as follows: “The Kinmen Agreement,” signed in 1999; “The Agreement on Cross-Strait Mutual Assistance in Crime Matters,” signed in 2009; and various forms of police-to-police communication (Chang, 2013). The general perception is that these mechanisms function efficiently, increasing the control of cross-border crimes across the Taiwan Strait, despite the fact that they do not entail international acceptance of Taiwan as a state. In such mechanisms, convention is replaced by representation (Pajtinka, 2017). Mon (2014) contends that the 2009 Agreement is more detailed than its precursor, incorporating more specific content such as the scope of mutual cooperation and specific contact processes and channels between the parties. The author also notes that:

In the process of cooperating, some difficulties need to be solved. Affected by sovereignty disputes, cross-strait law enforcement cooperation still targets problems in investigations, technical exchanges, crime prevention and the repatriation of criminals. And authorities in both regions should build more mutual trust and adjust the law system to make the agreement become more useful and practical. This paper explores the contents, achievements, challenges and prospects of the cooperation mechanism (p. 41).

Taiwan’s unique international status implies equally exceptional efforts to establish collaboration with foreign partners as well as with the PRC itself on matters of criminal justice policy. Within this context, policy- and decision-makers in Taiwan are compelled to invest additional efforts to establish legal and institutional foundations on which partnerships can be formed (Chen, 2002; Pajtinka, 2017). In this process, Taipei faces obstacles created by the PRC and resistance from potential partners attempting to avoid disharmony with Beijing. This paper argues that the Taiwanese government should continue its efforts to establish police arrangements with other jurisdictions. The next section explores the central conceptual and theoretical elements related to international cooperation.

³⁴ The lack of formal agreements between the PRC and Taiwan is especially problematic in relation to the transfer of crime suspects. For a discussion about this problem in the context of the relations between Hong Kong and other parts of the PRC, please see the South China Morning Post Editorial of 13 February 2019, under the title “More than quick fix needed on cross-border transfer of crime suspects”, available at: <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2186026/more-quick-fix-needed-cross-border-transfer-crime-suspects>.

3. Concept, Theory and Practice of International Police Cooperation

Concepts and theories makes the world and human interactions with it more intelligible, as correctly noted by Viotti and Kauppi (2010:5). In fact, concepts and theories have helped police practitioners to understand, describe, explain, and predict phenomena related to the international coordination of law enforcement efforts. Accordingly, in the specialized literature on joint international action, cooperation is commonly defined as the episodes or set of mutual adjustments made in conditions of discordance in which the protagonists adapt their behavior to others' current or anticipated preferences by means of a process of policy coordination (Keohane, 1994).

Therefore, a fundamental component of international joint action is the effective coordinationⁱⁱⁱ of intragovernmental and intergovernmental public policies^{iv} initiated from decision-making processes that take into consideration diffuse expectations (Milner, 1992). Such coordination does not require integral alignment between parties nor must policies converge in all components³⁵ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Keohane and Victor, 2016). The main alternatives to cooperation are unilateral behavior, competition, and conflict. Cooperation, thus, involves "goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be" (Milner, 1992: 468).

Therefore, coordination possibilities can be located within a complexity spectrum³⁶ whose endpoints range from maximum possible convergence, in which actors autonomously and intentionally make mutual policy adjustments in an attempt to solve mutual technical problems, to minimum possible convergence, characterized by accidental collaboration (to crudely illustrate the extremes). Between the endpoints, it is possible to identify several negotiated processes of cooperation that have both voluntary and involuntary elements, in different concentrations. Moreover, cooperation can manifest itself as a result of active coordination between partners or passive collaboration, in which actors may or may not consider other countries' policy orientations.

In the policing realm, the "voluntary", active endpoint includes multilateral systems such as INTERPOL³⁷, whereas the "accidental" endpoint comprises the provision of service or information to meet demand (often asymmetrically and unintentionally through transparency channels such as institutional portals on the Internet). Examples of hybrid manifestations of international police cooperation are obligatory collaborations (such as cooperation resulting from international


³⁵ Public policies can be either processes or products. As a product, a policy may be analyzed as a collection of components that form any given plan intended to guide the provision of a certain public service. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) highlight eight distinct policy components: goals, contents, instruments, programs, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes, and negative lessons. These distinct policy components suggest a rather broad view of public policies. The analysis of these formative policy components may provide useful insights about international policy coordination. Additionally, public policies may also be analytically examined in terms of distinct *levels* or *stages*, in addition the above mentioned formative components. Pollitt (2001:938-939), for example, argues that policy convergence between two or more jurisdictions can take place at four different stages or levels: "debate", "decisions", "practices" and "results". The author claims that policy convergence often ends before there are appropriate actions delivering desired results (p.945). Jones and Newburn (2007:23), informed by Brunsson (1989) and Pollitt (2001), claim that the understanding of the complexity of public policy requires the researcher to consider three analytical levels of a policy: 1) ideas, rhetoric, and symbols; 2) content and instruments; and 3) implementation (Timo Brito, 2012).

³⁶ Based on Dolowitz and Marsh (1998) and Timo Brito (2012).

³⁷ In terms of number of members, INTERPOL is the world's largest international police organization, with 194 affiliated countries. Until 1956, the Organization was known as the International Criminal Police Commission. Since then, the Organization's official name is ICPO-INTERPOL (with ICPO standing for 'International Criminal Police Organization' and the acronym INTERPOL being a contraction of "international police", as the telegraphic address chosen for the organization in 1946. The organization, whose aim is to enable police around the world to work together, has three core functions: 1) to assist global police communications; 2) to provide operational data services and databases for law enforcement; and 3) to provide operational police services for member countries (INTERPOL, 2019).

treaty provisions) and those conducted voluntarily but driven by perceived necessity (such as the desire for international acceptance). In this context, Jones and Newburn (2007: 28) state that “European Union directives may be coerced in the sense of being compulsory, although voluntary, in the sense that individual nation states have voluntarily chosen to be part of the EU”. Figure 1 presents the dimensions of international police cooperation vis-à-vis the degree of convergence of law enforcement policies and coordination among jurisdictions. Notably, this continuum should be treated merely as a heuristic device, and the categories should not be interpreted as equidistant.

Figure 1: Dimensions of international police cooperation



Adapted from Dolowitz and Marsh (2000)

Among the negotiated (voluntary and consensual) processes of cooperation, the idea of partnerships³⁸ is prominent. In the law enforcement arena, partnerships are cooperative relationships between two or more organizations (usually police agencies) to achieve a common goal. Partnerships can be divided into two types (PERF, 2000). The first type is contingent on high policy coordination and involves collaboration and joint work among police agencies from different jurisdictions in all phases of a given activity. The second type of partnership entails the mere involvement of parties and rests on less sophisticated forms of policy coordination. The fundamental difference between these two types is the role of the stakeholders, usually police officers and other law enforcement officials. In a collaborative, joint effort, the stakeholders work as international partners in assessing situations, identifying common problems, setting priorities, implementing and monitoring responses, and evaluating results and performance. Partnerships that involve merely the participation of police agencies and officers from different jurisdictions tend to be short lived and narrow in scope. They usually include basic information exchange³⁹ and other forms of ordinary communication between counterparts in different places.

The more sophisticated forms of international cooperation tend to involve or result in institutional and normative association and integration (Diez and Wiener, 2018) as well as in international regimes⁴⁰, such as the rules, principles,

³⁸ Partnerships are a fundamental element of community policing, the official public safety model endorsed by the governments of Brazil and Taiwan (Timo-Brito, 2012; Cao, Huang and Sun, 2014; Kuo and Shih, 2018).

³⁹ Hollywood and Winkelman (2015) contends that law enforcement information-sharing architecture is complex due to the multiplicity of system interfaces. The authors argue that only a fraction of these interfaces are covered by standards which often overlap and conflict with each other, and the infrastructure for developing and testing standards is incomplete.

⁴⁰ For Krasner (1983), international regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (pp. 29). According to this view, international regimes "empower governments by creating decision-making environments that decrease uncertainty and increase information, thereby making it possible for governments to overcome 'market failures' and enter into mutually beneficial agreements even in the absence of a hegemon" (Herbert, 1996:229).

and standards designed to reduce the risk of money laundering in the international financial system under the Financial Action Task Force. These forms of cooperation can involve the formation of alliances, coalitions, and groupings; provision of material, technical, and financial assistance; exchange of knowledge and information; development and implementation of joint programs and projects; and employment of task forces, among other forms of mutual support and help in the diplomatic and technical domains (Keohane, 1994; Weinthal, 2002; Schneider and Urpelainen, 2014; COPOUS, 2015). In general, manifestations of international cooperation comprise deliberate bilateral and multilateral development of policy activities to enable potential or actual joint work, problem solving, and mutual benefit.

Because of recent worldwide concerns about transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and terrorism, international police cooperation has been the orthodoxy of multijurisdictional law enforcement efforts⁴¹. At the core of international police cooperation is the belief that the reduction and prevention of transnational crime require the coordinated, concentrated effort of states, governments, agencies, and communities that are affected by and concerned with such problems. Because transnational criminal organizations usually operate in multiple manners, forms, and locations, crime fighting must be equally multifaceted and cannot be accomplished by the police acting on unilateral, local, and bureaucratic bases. Unilateral law-enforcement usually allows offenders to explore diplomatic and legal loopholes to escape justice. This entails not only intricate normative developments but also challenging organizational changes and efforts. Schafer (2014) captures this complexity by stating that:

Nations differ in the structure and procedures associated with their justice systems; in effect, they have differing standards and rules for how their justice systems work. Nations have different cultural values regarding human rights, civil liberties, the role of government in the lives of the citizenry, and the nature of police operations and interactions with the public. Nations have varied political systems for creating and enforcing laws. Nations have varying levels of professionalisms within their policing systems and differing economic capacities to fund public safety and national security operations. At the most fundamental level, nations at times differ in what behaviors constitute a violation of criminal law. All of these factors complicate developing effective international cooperation among nations, even when there is a predisposition to unite. The challenges are further enhanced by the introduction of nationalism, historical regional conflicts, and the varying personalities and egos of those charged with representing the policing interests of their respective nations (pp. 1).

This is true in the case of Brazil and Taiwan. The jurisdictions share little in common in terms of traditional comparative criteria (such as population and territory size, geographical location, cultural and historical background, and economic and political interdependence). They also face additional obstacles to cooperate due to Taiwan's extraordinary international status. Nonetheless, Taiwan and Brazil can find common ground in the challenges posed by transnational crime. In this context, the concurrent emergence of shared problems (such as drug trafficking and money laundering) logically requires collaborative responses from the two states (Mitrany, 1975).

Schafer (2014) relevantly mentioned the following: "Despite these many obstacles, there are examples of effective efforts by nations and police forces to cooperate in the furtherance of law enforcement and national security objectives" (p. 1). Similarly, Evans (2004:3) argued that "Public organizations... do not always possess the expertise to tackle the problems they confront and increasingly look outside the organization to other governments or non-

⁴¹ Mackenzie (2017) notes that the increasing tendency of governments to frame transnational crime as a security issue is a central driver of international police cooperation. Thus, police cooperative efforts are not simply a response to a growth in transnational crime, but involves broader sociopolitical dynamics.

governmental organizations for the answers to problems". These observations suggest that incidences of isolation or insulation in contemporary law enforcement and policing are inappropriate and disadvantageous. Furthermore, Bennett (1991) states that:

There is always a finite repertoire of possible responses to emerging policy problems. There is a natural tendency to look abroad, to see how other states have responded to similar pressures, to share ideas, to draw lessons and to bring foreign evidence to bear within domestic policy-making processes (pp. 220).

This rationale assumes that when facing a transnational crime problem, stakeholders initiate an active search for information that can produce a solution. Occasionally, policy- and decision-makers achieve their objectives by drawing lessons from other jurisdictions. In general, however, policy- and decision-makers from different jurisdictions realize that collaborative joint work—that is, cooperation—is preferable to simply emulating experiences from abroad. The choice between policy transfer and cooperation seems to depend on politics, cost, timing, context, and opportunities. When stakes are higher, cooperative processes are typically more complex, hardly following a straightforward trajectory, and involve more stakeholders, assumptions, and expectations.

Consequently, practical manifestations of police cooperation through policy coordination are diverse and flexible in form and substance, and they come in many shapes, sizes, and names: official and extraofficial; formal and informal; high level and working level; multilateral and bilateral; international, regional, and intraregional; and legally binding and legally nonbinding, among numerous other taxonomic possibilities. The legal formats of international agreements in this field are manifold and include treaties, covenants, pacts, accords, protocols, memoranda of understanding, letters of intent, pledges, consultations, and official correspondences (COPOUS, 2015).

Similarly, this multiplicity also manifests itself in terms of police functions and areas under cooperation, such as patrolling, investigation, intelligence, training, and peacekeeping. However, one specific aspect of international police cooperation is usually constant and has extremely limited diversity: the stakeholders. Police agencies and officers tend to be the main drivers of the processes of international police cooperation. Nevertheless, there is space, albeit slim, for the action of other actors (state and nonstate) concerned with law enforcement (e.g., armed forces, environmental protection agencies, academics, nongovernmental organizations, and private companies), whether direct or indirect.

Amid such complex and adverse settings, to coherently present the distinct routes through which international police cooperation can occur between jurisdictions, this paper identifies three policy levels⁴² for joint action: strategic, tactical, and operational. Table 2 offers a framework of selected cases at these three levels.

⁴² According to an often-cited article by David Singer (1969), different analytical levels tend to emphasize different actors and process, thus providing a more accurate description or interpretation of a particular phenomenon. The application of this framework, therefore, permits the researcher to examine a given process of policy making with more precision, through a multi-dimensional perspective that focuses on coordination patterns. This categorization, however, should be interpreted cautiously. The three policy levels should be viewed as ideal types; that is, each emphasizes the apparent commonalities among seemingly diverse mechanisms for joint international action. They are also not mutually exclusive; information exchange, for example, may be interpreted simultaneously as a strategic, tactical, and operational manifestation of international police cooperation. Therefore, the boundaries among these three levels are not impregnable; they are permeable, and in exceptional cases such as the deployment of police forces within peacekeeping operations, they may involve an overarching multilevel reach. In fact, the three policy levels for joint action are merely categories of knowledge, and their value depends on their ability to facilitate the understanding of the complex interplays within international police cooperation.

Table 2: Examples of strategic, tactical, and operational police cooperation

Level	Examples
Strategic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) - United Nations Police (UNPOL) - United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) - European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL) - Police Community of the Americas (AMERIPOL) - African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) - International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) - TREVI Group
Tactical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (UNODC, 2008) - U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group (HLCG) (Arzt, 2010) - Finnish <i>Ankurru</i> (Anchor) Teams (Lenos and Keltjens, 2016) - International Squadron in Crete (1897-1908) (Marenin, 2007) - Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (UNODC, 2008) - Int'l Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (USDoJ, 2019) - Supplementary Info. Request at the National Entries (SIRENE) (EC, 2019) - Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) (EU, 2018) - European Money Mule Action (EMMA) (EUROPOL, 2018) - Int'l Program for Police Cooperation in Airports (INTERCOPS) (UNODC, 2016) - Cross-Channel Intelligence Conference (CCIC) (Sheptycki, 1998) - Political and Security Program of Pacific Island Forum Sec. (UNODC, 2008) - LinguaNet System (Hansen and Sørensen, 2002) - PoliceSpeak (Johnson et al., 1993) - "Fusion Centers" within the European Union (Farrell, 2016) - Sino-Italian Joint Patrol Program (BBC, 2016; MdI, 2018)
Operational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operation Eagle (UNODC, 2018) - Operations Pangea, Mamba, Storm, Giboia, and Porcupine (INTERPOL, 2018) - Operations Trigger II and Balkan Trigger (INTERPOL, 2017) - Operation Santa Lucia (EUROJUST, 2017) - Operation Trident (BBC, 2006; Metropolitan Police Service, 2019)

Strategic police cooperation occurs when the mandates of police organizations from different jurisdictions converge. At this level, deliberate law enforcement initiatives from different countries foster sophisticated manifestations of security policy coordination. They occur in the form of international policing regimes, such as the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, also known as the Palermo Convention (Tryfon, 2014); multilateral policing organizations, such as INTERPOL (Greilsamer, 1997; Deflem, 2002a) and EUROPOL^v (Lewington and Olsen, 1994; Gregory, 1998; De Hert and Vandamme, 2004; Monar, 2012; NPA-MoI, 2018d); or the assembly of police contingents for deployment in peacekeeping missions (Doucet, 2017; Sanchez, 2018). Perhaps the most sophisticated manifestation of this particular form of police cooperation is found in the supranational policing arrangements observed within the European Union, especially EUROPOL, which aim at engaging national police forces in a more plural and deeper manner than even the INTERPOL itself, due to this organization' rather specific reach⁴³.

⁴³ Although INTERPOL has been commonly identified as the organizational orthodoxy for cross-border international police cooperation, in fact the organization is very specialized in (and limited to) information and knowledge exchange, covering only a fraction of the possibilities for joint work in the realm of international police cooperation. According to the organization's website, "While it can issue international alerts for wanted persons, it does not have direct power to issue arrest warrants (red notices – requests to provisionally arrest a suspect pending extradition)". Opportunely, Deflem (2002b, as cited by Sullivan, 2004:374) notes that INTERPOL is much discussed but little understood, and that the writing about its history is often "either informed but uncritical or critical but uninformed" (pp. 125). Sullivan (2004) adds that "the sources that would be most useful for bringing this history more close (sic) to the present seem to be either published by INTERPOL itself, e.g., International Criminal Police Organization, INTERPOL: 75 Years Of International Police Co-Operation (1998), or not in English, e.g., Greilsamer, Laurent, INTERPOL: Policiers Sans Frontieres (1997)" (pp. 374-375). More information on INTERPOL may be found in the organization's entry at Greene, J. (2007) The Encyclopedia of Police Science. Routledge: New York. For information about the advent of the Conference of Australian Police Commissioners, see: Finnane and Myrtle (2011).

In tactical terms, international police cooperation encompasses mostly the establishment of international police missions⁴⁴ as well as the designing, planning, monitoring, and assessment of a plethora of joint policing programs and projects. Furthermore, it involves the establishment of direct channels for knowledge and information sharing, a practice that has been generally termed “police diplomacy,” through the appointment of police attachés (and liaisons) and the signing of agreements. Among these, the establishment of MLA agreements is notable. According to Bullwinkel (2005, as cited by Chang, 2013), “Bilateral mutual assistance agreements are regarded as providing a more efficient and reliable basis for cooperation in crime matters than multilateral agreements” (p. 544). Therefore, tactical cooperation involves the establishment of direct communication channels between police organizations and relevant stakeholders from different national jurisdictions as well as the interchange of policing resources, training, and experience. Police diplomacy processes relate to the direct strengthening of relationships between a given police organization and its foreign partners—both police and nonpolice organizations (such as higher education institutions)—through various platforms of interinstitutional and diplomatic engagements.

The operational forms of international police cooperation are numerous and diverse and range from the execution of specific joint operations to the development of pilot projects and person-to-person exchange of knowledge and experience. In fact, the Western history of international police cooperation^{vi} reveals many emblematical examples of operational cooperation, such as interinstitutional communication through periodical bulletins on wanted persons and their *modi operandi*, a practice that dates back to the Austrian police in the nineteenth century (Gerspacher and Dupont, 2007). In addition, police forces and officers from different countries have a long record of informal and autonomous exchange of information, probably as old as the emergence of the modern police (Deflem, 2002b). Recently, as cities grew, communities became more complex and heterogeneous, and people intensified their external contacts, police organizations were compelled to engage in foreign affairs in innumerable practical manners⁴⁵. To illustrate, a contemporary and innovative manifestation of operational cooperation is the deployment of Chinese police officers to conduct joint police patrols in Italian cities as part of an experiment of bilateral collaboration in tourism policing (Ge, 2016; Yardley, 2016; CGTN, 2018).

Major organizations dedicated to international police cooperation at the strategic and tactical levels (such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL) also act at the operational level through a plentitude of (overt and covert) police operations and other tangible activities in the field, in association with local police agencies. In fact, police operations are a key feature of contemporary cross-border law enforcement that can be conducted at regional, national, and international levels. International police operations are concrete law enforcement actions on the ground. They have been utilized to achieve various objectives, such as investigation and collection of evidence related to transnational crimes, disruption of criminal networks involved in transnational crimes, interruption of diverse forms of trafficking (particularly drugs, arms, and persons), seizure of criminal assets, and bringing of criminals to justice. International operations require excellent planning and implementation and involve a higher degree of trust, secrecy, discretion, and tempo as well as more resources (and more sophisticated intelligence) than does routine police work.

⁴⁴ According to Marenin (2007:697), “international police missions (IPMs) can be defined broadly as involving any situation in which the police of one or more countries are sent to another country or region to perform police duties (...).”

⁴⁵ Gerspacher (2008) argues, nonetheless, that “Police cooperation has gone through cycles, however: the political motivation that originally encouraged foreign police agencies to share information on alleged perpetrators and their activities in due course took second place to specifically criminal investigations, but in today's security-driven policy environment the political dimension is once again on the rise, as police strategies are aimed at terrorist groups” (pp. 189).

4. Policy and Practice Implications

Information and knowledge exchanges constitute the core of all levels of police cooperation, whether strategic, tactical, or operational. According to Sonnenwald (2006), such exchanges involve a set of activities through which information is provided to other parties (individual, organizational, or technological), either proactively or upon request, in positive-sum interactions. Information exchange became conspicuous after the September 11 attacks, when public opinion criticized the US homeland security apparatus for failing to circulate information that could have prevented the attacks in New York City (Zelikow et al., 2004). Since then, information sharing has become the most straightforward mechanism through which law enforcement and intelligence agencies collaborate, particularly within so-called fusion centers (USDoJ, 2005). Joyal (2012) contended that “there have been many positive strides with respect to information sharing and interagency collaboration; however, interpersonal relationships and trust lie at the core of true change” (p. 357).

Such rapprochements can occur in the margins of any binational or multinational agreement through discreet, creative, and informal—but nonetheless legal—channels involving processes that rely little on rigid diplomatic relations. In fact, international police cooperation does not need to be official or formal to be effective. In his analysis of cross-strait anticybercrime^{vii} initiatives, Chang (2013) highlighted the relevance of informality in international cooperation. He explained that informal relationships between police officers from Taiwan and China are captured by the notion of *guan-xi* (關). Yang (1988, as cited by Chang, 2013) explained that *guan-xi*, “which literally means ‘relationship’, resembles the idea of social capital (and) plays a very important role in different aspects of Chinese society” (p. 543). According to the author:

Guan-xi has the sense of social connections, connections which must be carefully initiated, preserved and renewed through the giving and receiving gifts, favours and dinners or banquets’. *Guan-xi* between people also represents trust between them. Based on *guan-xi*, police from both sides can build *mo-chi* (默契, unspoken consensus) which facilitates crime investigation across the Taiwan Strait. Despite the special political situation which makes mutual cooperation difficult, both Taiwanese and Chinese police are still under pressure from the public opinion to clear crime cases. In order to achieve outcomes, *guan-xi* and *mo-chi* – informal police-to-police relationships – can sometimes be helpful, at least in crime investigation. (...) This *guan-xi* between Taiwanese and Chinese police is unofficial cooperation and can only be used in certain types of criminal cases ‘under the table’. Because this kind of collaboration needs assistance from other government agencies, it cannot be used for routine work. Only when a serious event has occurred, they will try to use their *guan-xi* to help the government collect information (Chang, 2013:543).

These reflections highlight the importance of informal, unofficial connections for police collaboration and the achievement of mutual objectives^{viii}. In fact, joint action usually involves multiple, often unclear processes that are difficult to coordinate in any meaningful manner. Thus, international police cooperation requires extensive work, resources, and investments (less money than leadership, time, and organizational energy). It also involves the amalgamation of various understandings, alignment of conflicting political motivations, translation of different ideas, and invention of new concepts and strategies. Therefore, cooperators must realize that connections occur amid constantly shifting networks of relationships. This indicates that police cooperation is also political and technical. In addition to carrying out typical top-down initiatives, decision-makers should encourage bottom-up efforts toward greater police cooperation with partners abroad. Such relationships can include governmental and nongovernmental as well as individual and organizational actors.

Nonetheless, there are a few hurdles to surmount within the processes of international police cooperation. For one, most countries place disproportional

weight in the strategic and tactical level of international police cooperation by joining multilateral and regional organizations and signing international agreements, memoranda of understanding, and other binding and nonbinding legal mechanisms. This often results in symbolic multilateral and bilateral initiatives with little substance and efficacy (Raustiala, 2005; Boister, 2018) and rarely engenders concrete operational actions and outcomes. Repeatedly, agreements are signed for the sake of appearances and to gain leverage within the public opinion. They end up making no real difference in terms of fostering coordination and joint police work in the field. Insofar as agreements may indeed generate practical outputs^x, they ultimately depend on political will to be effective (Přibáň, 2013; Roozendaal, 2017). This is certainly the case of international police cooperation today. In other words, contemporary international police cooperation displays the “organized hypocrisy” that characterizes a considerable portion of international relations (Brunsson, 1989; Krasner, 1999; Goldsmith and Posner, 2005).

Potential explanations for this disproportionate prevalence of strategic and tactical expressions of international police cooperation (vis-à-vis the more tangible, operational manifestations) may be found in police culture and diplomatic culture. In fact, three universal elements^x of police culture are suspicion, isolation, and pragmatism⁴⁶ (Fielding, 1988; Holdaway, 1989; Chan, 1997; Waddington, 1999; Reiner, 2000; Campeau, 2015). These elements recurrently create an environment in police agencies characterized by a lack of trust, internal processes that impede information sharing, and individual or organizational unwillingness to collaborate, especially with potential overseas partners. In relation to diplomatic culture, diplomats rarely understand the intricacies of police work at the street level. They almost certainly do not reach out to the service ranks of police organizations when negotiating international agreements in the field. Consequently, international cooperation between police organizations often fails to generate concrete outcomes.

Trust (or the lack thereof) remains one of the most problematic challenges of police cooperation. It manifests itself among police officers, between police officers and police organizations, and among police organizations (within the same or different jurisdictions). Bayer (2002), however, argued that police personnel have a unique ability to draw on trust and a common culture with their counterparts in other countries, possibly resulting in a regular informal interchange of useful information. The author highlighted the particular advantage that the police enjoy by virtue of their professional autonomy and relative independence from the centers of political decision-making. Moreover,

⁴⁶ In relation to suspicion, this is an element of police culture that is sowed early on in the police careers in to the minds of new police recruits (Reiner, 2000). The police only trust themselves and do not listen much to what ‘civies’ have to say (Waddington, 1999). Connell (1961, as cited in Skolnick, 1966) mentions that an officer should become familiar with his area in order to understand the normal behavior. Only this way will he be able to catch suspicious behavior. Banton’s seminal study about the British police found isolation to be a key characteristic of the police force (Banton, 1964). The author stated that officers often felt isolated in the general population because of the job. The social isolation leads to more solidarity within the ranks. The isolation is further illustrated when public polls show the decreasing levels of satisfaction that exist towards the police. Such hostility towards the police leads officers inwards and place a lot of dependency on one another for support and encouragement (Skolnick, 1966). The isolation that officers feel has to do with the authority role their job entails. Due to this, only other officers know what they are going through and feel, hence the solidarity element. Police officers (mainly the ‘rank and file’ officers) are less concerned about research and changing practices, and more concerned with getting the job done. Front line officers prefer the ‘good old days’ to policing, and do not like it when ‘pen pushers’ want to change practice (Reiner, 2000). Chatterton (1979) mentions the value that ‘front line’ officers place on common sense. The researcher is seen like a ‘bookman’ who fails to see the complicated world in which the police work, and therefore any changes would take away the common sense element to policing. Although more police research has been carried out worldwide in the last few decades, and the police forces themselves are investing more and more in research, some commentators have argued that a radical reformation of the role of science in policing will be necessary if policing is to become an arena of evidence-based policies (Weisburd and Neyroud, 2015).

public trust in the police is a fundamental element in democratic societies. Wu, Poteyeva, and Sun (2012) identified crucial linkages between macroeconomic context, trust in the police, and the perspective of support for international police cooperation. According to the authors, public trust has become a critical issue in transitional societies, where the legitimacy and accountability of the government (generally), and legal authorities in particular, have been frequently scrutinized^{xi}. This calls for greater attention to both police-to-police interactions and public partnerships during the design and implementation of initiatives of international police cooperation.

When designing cooperation programs, policy-makers must consider these shortcomings^{xii}. Jurisdictions must pass legislation that encourages foreign engagement within law enforcement at all policy levels. Police leaderships should become more involved in policymaking. If they do, they can facilitate the creation of normative ecosystems conducive and favorable to international relations. Prospective partners can identify common problems related to criminal justice, law enforcement, and policing (such as telephone and Internet fraud and various forms of trafficking in the case of Brazil and Taiwan). This can be accomplished through joint research without necessarily involving official exchanges, thus avoiding any form of moderation by the PRC. After the identification of common problems, both jurisdictions can engage in the design and implementation of a coordinated plan of action. Nevertheless, stakeholders must consider that cooperation is not always the product of a sequence of steps and does not always follow a linear trajectory because of several reasons that are related to both agency and structure. Joint action can also present risks⁴⁷.

In this vein, policy-makers and stakeholders must acknowledge the generally inconsistent foundations upon which contemporary international policing is based: ineffective international legal frameworks as well as faulty information and knowledge sharing (Přibáň, 2013; Abrahamson and Goodman-Delahunty, 2014; Roozendaal, 2017). They must also recognize that cooperation processes are restricted by bounded rationality^{xiii}, meaning that the relevant actors tend to satisfice⁴⁸ in contexts of uncertainty and limited time, information, and power. During the process of satisficing, a particular group of actors plays a fundamental role. Rose (2005) called this a community of experts, a concept drawn from Haas' (1992) idea of epistemic communities. For the author, epistemic communities are networks of knowledge experts or groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain of their expertise. Members of these groups are not necessarily driven by the same ideology or political beliefs, but they share an understanding of the technical language of a given law enforcement subfield (e.g., policing, investigation, and patrolling) and convergent professional interests. Most importantly, this particular type of actor seems to be able to facilitate the flow of information among the three policy levels (strategic, tactical, and operational).

The public safety field comprises numerous specific groups of experts (patrollers, investigators, crime analysts, and forensics professionals) as well as broader and more sophisticated communities, such as the policing leadership that gathers under the IACP. These communities are not formed entirely by law enforcement

⁴⁷ Police corruption and information leakage are two of the most common risks faced by police cooperation initiatives. Farrell (2016) furthermore argues: "National policing activities are often highly sensitive because they are so closely tied with the notion of state sovereignty. Max Weber famously defined the state as the organization that had a monopoly on legitimate violence in a given territory. In other words, the sovereign state is the organization that is able to use violence to enforce its rules and have its violence accepted as legitimate by its population. When states cooperate over policing matters, they are pooling a key aspect of sovereign power and, in effect, weakening their control over violence".

⁴⁸ The term "satisfice" was coined by Simon (1956: 129-138) to describe a strategy that attempts to reach an "adequate" rather than optimal solution for a given problem; however, adequacy may be optimal in certain (exceptional) circumstances. Thus, a satisficing decision considers not only the limitations of professionals in "maximizing" the utilization of complex information but also the costs of obtaining and processing such information.

professionals but include politicians, researchers, activists, and many other stakeholders. Many factors bind the community members together, and they usually comprise a common set of causal beliefs and shared notions of validity, which are based on internally defined criteria for evaluation, common policy projects, and shared normative commitments (Rose, 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). For Haas, epistemic communities examine “the cause and effect relationships of complex problems, helping states to identify their interest, from issues of collective debate” (1992: 2). Therefore, one powerful vehicle for police cooperation is the experts, and one avenue for police cooperation between Taiwan and Brazil is the involvement of police officers from both jurisdictions with professional networks within the law enforcement landscape.

International conferences constitute a particularly powerful conduit for international police cooperation at the operational level, with possible tactical and strategic significance. In general, such events are not only a place for the unilateral presentation of ideas, projects, and research. In fact, international police conferences play a vital role in the global circulation of innovation, and they entail extremely valuable opportunities for mutual learning and refinement of ideas through expert brainstorming as well as peer-to-peer mutual learning and networking. This frequently involves or results in face-to-face and virtual connections that lead to new ideas and approaches, joint work, and funding for new research. Police officers who attend international meetings and professional events are the single most important cross-border bearers of police data, information, and knowledge. Raustiala and Slaughter (2002) specified that informal networks of cooperating law enforcement agencies have the unique ability to collect information about local conditions and communities that may prove crucial in law enforcement. The communication between police officers and their counterparts in other countries can occur through conferences, professional networks, epistemic communities, and social media.

Accordingly, identifying certain actors and places that can facilitate such communication is crucial. As a concrete example, strategic police rendezvous between Brazil and Taiwan could take place in Singapore because both the Brazilian Federal Police and the Taiwanese National Police Agency have liaisons stationed in the city-state. Furthermore, the National Police Academy in Brasilia and the Central Police University in Taoyuan City can consider exchanging material and mutual participation in events. Nongovernmental organizations can also act as reliable conduits of international police cooperation through the arrangement and funding of meetings and visits and through the establishment and maintenance of networks. Additionally, Japan can act as a bridge between Brazil and Taiwan, given the countries’ shared interests in the criminal justice realm. Japan and Taiwan already collaborate extensively within INTERPOL, and programs between Japan and Brazil intend to implement the Japanese *koban* model in the state of São Paulo. This means that Japan is a common partner of both jurisdictions and can eventually act as the node for a trilateral initiative.

Finally, yet importantly, initiatives at the tactical level cannot disregard the positive prospects presented by mutual learning and lesson drawing. For example, Brazilian state police forces could learn from the Taiwan police’s largely successful experience in deploying conscripts, who may choose to fulfill their mandatory twenty-month national service requirement with the police (instead of the armed forces). After basic training, conscripts are typically deployed to assist local officers in functions such as traffic control, riot control, secretarial work, and basic patrol. Conscripts serving in the police force are generally not issued firearms (NPA-MoI, 2018a).

5. Concluding Remarks

Brazil and Taiwan are nearly antipodes, located on almost diametrically opposite points on the earth's surface. Both the Taiwanese population in Brazil and number of Brazilians living in Taiwan are small. Brazil does not recognize Taiwan as a state, and the two countries do not maintain official diplomatic relations. Whereas Taiwan has a modern, dynamic, and highly internationalized economy, Brazil is yet again witnessing prolonged stagnation after a short-lived period of growth and exuberance. In social terms, they could not be more dissimilar, displaying distinctive languages, cultures, religions, and—in general—family structures, ethics, and aesthetics. Accordingly, Brazil and Taiwan are so far apart and different in so many aspects that they seem to have the perfect excuse to ignore each other in the grander international game (Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012). This is especially true in the public safety arena because bilateral police cooperation can be restrained by immense political, legal, organizational, and operational difficulties, in addition to unique crime patterns and trends.

Nonetheless, Taiwan and Brazil have strong reasons to cooperate, despite the many reasons not to. First, advances in communication and transportation have lowered the cost of transmitting information and resources across borders, thus facilitating cross-national ties, which consequently have become more extensive and intensive. Second, although dissimilar in so many aspects, Brazil and Taiwan retain numerous pertinent parallels, such as colonial history, recent democratization, economic convergence (and complementarity), and mutual cultural admiration. These common and convergent traits facilitate joint work and have already fostered relevant bilateral economic relations, and potential for further cooperation seems to grow constantly. In the public safety realm, both jurisdictions have been threatened by the globalization of crime, and they should work together, as members of the global village, to control and prevent these threats. Third, international police cooperation is usually synergistic, and it increases benefit while reducing cost; this speaks volumes to the governments and police organizations in both jurisdictions. Furthermore, the lack of police cooperation between Brazil and Taiwan can be a source of vulnerabilities to be exploited by criminal networks, with negative consequences to both societies and the world community as a whole.

To establish successful and productive collaboration in the law enforcement realm, the two jurisdictions will need, first, to form closer ties. Decision- and policy-makers, diplomats, police officers, and academics from Taiwan and Brazil should engage in more frequent and thorough exchanges and mutual learning. Despite the limitations presented by the lack of official diplomatic relations, the two jurisdictions can explore unofficial pathways for joint action through the involvement of state and nonstate actors. After all, the mechanisms for international police cooperation are diverse in form and substance. Official government relations presume a higher degree of trust, and police organizations tend to favor formality. However, given the unusual situation of Taiwan in diplomatic terms, it could fruitfully invest in creativity and innovation, even if the risks are seemingly high. Police from both Taiwan and Brazil may notice, nevertheless, the inconvenient truth that official diplomatic ties do not always entail reliable and fast collaboration and do not result in automatic facilitation. In general, unofficial and extrapolice interactions with multiple social actors abroad provide exactly what is required to fight crime and ensure public safety.

Within this context, Taiwan is in a favorable position to create informal networks for police exchange and interaction as part of an all-encompassing exercise of soft power. It should not, however, ignore safety and counterintelligence, even in collaborative processes, because of the specific risks posed by various forms of threats, including cyberattacks and espionage (which can use cooperation channels to come about). Brazil is also undergoing a time in which to welcome police cooperation. Because of its severe crime problems, Brazil needs all the

help it can get from abroad to enhance its law enforcement capabilities in order to provide greater public safety. At the tactical and operational levels, there exist considerable space and opportunities for police cooperation by means of information exchanges, joint operations, and the establishment of bespoke programs and projects, tailor-made by each jurisdiction according to needs and capabilities. Regardless, productive police cooperation will ultimately depend on the willpower of individuals concerned with improving public safety locally and globally; that is, police professionals with purpose and altruism.

In this vein, this research isolates several measures that can be employed to overcome the obstacles to international police cooperation at the three policy levels^{xiv}. These measures include a) investment in paradiplomatic and international interinstitutional relations; b) involvement of nonstate actors such as policy experts, academics, and international nongovernment organizations in cooperation arrangements; c) provision of budgetary allocation for cooperative programs and projects; and d) provision of support for the participation of officers in diffuse and informal international networks of police, notably through participation in international meetings and conferences.

Furthermore, Brazil can consider pushing for more cooperation with Taiwan despite the PRC's attempts to isolate Taiwan from the international community or to block rapprochements. This cooperation should be pragmatic and based more in shared principles and values, and less in eventual economic or electoral interests. Especially in the field of policing, but also in the fields of health and environment, the international community should not readily accept Taiwan's isolation⁴⁹ induced by the PRC. Resistance should be made on grounds of transnationalism of common global goods, since the underlying issues (crime, health and environmental threats) are global in nature and they can affect negatively the entire international community.

In accordance to this view, the safety of individuals should be the overriding concern of international relations. In this context, these issues should be considered as meta-diplomatic and should be pursued harmoniously by international leaders. There should be a concerted effort from Taiwan, its potential partners and other members of the world's democratic community to place these three fundamental issues above and beyond cross-Taiwan Strait clashes, transcending ideological and political bickering through the establishment of 'bespoke' arrangements. This kind of initiative depends on multilateral political will and diplomacy. Given the worsening of tensions across the Taiwan Strait in recent times despite much diplomatic activity, politicians and diplomats alike should realize that pushing for the establishment of these three metadiplomatic welfare issues could be innovative and successful, resulting in the improvement of regional (and global) stability. This needs to be done by leaders with a real intent to create concrete and sustainable collaboration, not only opportunistic diplomatic highlights.

⁴⁹ A concrete example of this kind of strategy is an eventual concerted international effort for the acceptance of Taiwan as an observer at INTERPOL. This can be specially opportune after the confused and disorderly resignation of Meng Hongwei, the organization's Chinese president, in October 2018. The muddled way in which the PRC conducted the case was largely seen as a snub from the PRC in relation to INTERPOL's core values of respect to and promotion of due process. Actually, it should be pointed out that Taiwan's participation as an observer in INTERPOL does not duel on the Chinese claim that Taiwan is not a state and, at the same time, fill an important gap in global law enforcement.

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ⁱ For the sake of precision, this paper acknowledges the subtle difference between the terms 'official' and 'formal'. Here, the term 'official' will refer to relations pertaining to an office, position, or trust, that are invested with jurisdictional powers. The term 'formal' will be applied both to relations prescribed by and to entities observant to custom, not necessarily invested with jurisdiction. However, at times, both terms may be used interchangeably and seem synonymous, due to the overly delicate difference them. For a broader analysis about the idea of 'officiality' (within the context of US-Taiwan relations), please check Lawrence and Morrison's 'Taiwan: Issues for Congress', CRS Report, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. Retrieved from: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44996.pdf>.

ⁱⁱ A notable exception for this rule happened when Brazil hosted major events in 2014 and 2016 (FIFA World Cup and the Rio Olympic Games, respectively). Special legislation established a centralized command and control system responsible for coordinating public safety related activities in the host cities, with the participation of police organizations from all jurisdictions, as well as other government agencies and the military. Exception to the rule also manifests itself in interinstitutional training and task forces. Evidence shows that police academies within the various police organizations do invite their local, state and federal counterparts from other jurisdictions to participate in courses. Also, police organizations do engage in information exchange, but it is often on demand, lacking systematic routine and assessment. Apart from these exceptions, intra-federative police cooperation in Brazil is episodic and unsystematic.

ⁱⁱⁱ According to Keohane and Victor (2016), collaboration is the most encompassing concept to describe joint international action to achieve mutual gains. Collaboration can take many forms along a continuum from coordination to cooperation. In situations of coordination, agreements are self-enforcing: that is, once an agreement has been made, the parties do not have incentives to defect from it. For instance, once everyone in the United States understands that Americans drive on the right-hand side of the road, no rational driver has an incentive to drive on the left; and vice-versa for drivers in the UK. Cooperation, by contrast, is not self-enforcing.

^{iv} A review of the concept in the specialized literature demonstrates that there are at least two notions that can be used for understanding the meaning of public policy. The first refers to the course or method of action, selected from alternatives and in the light of certain conditions, with the purpose of making inputs into present or future decision-making (Easton 1965, 1970; Schmitter, 1979; Rua, 1995). The second notion of public policies refers to the high-level plans that include general objectives and acceptable procedures within the scope of a governmental body (Rua, 1995; Birkland 2001). Rua (1995) asserts that public policy is a product of political activity, involving a set of formal and informal procedures that express power relations and that are destined for the pacific resolution of conflicts concerning public goods. Peters (1986:6) offers a more practical definition by arguing that "public policy is the sum of the activities of governments, whether acting directly or through agents, as it has an influence on the lives of citizens". These activities are relevant for the course of events and do cause important impacts in the lives of individuals (Timo Brito, 2012).

^v Schafer (2014) informs that “reflecting the priorities and concerns of the time, EUROPOL was initially focused on organized crime (...). Over time, however, EUROPOL has taken a broader focus to include issues of crimes against children (...)”.

^{vi} Gerspacher (2008) informs that, in the beginnings of international police cooperation in the West, efforts were largely rooted in anti-anarchist policies pursued by European governments in order to protect the status quo. Police collaboration largely halted during the world wars, but the second half of the twentieth century witnessed an explosion of international cooperation mechanisms in policing as most states came to recognize the importance of multilateral action against transnational crime. Deflem (2002a) examines the forces and factors leading to the rise of INTERPOL in the years before World War II, including consideration of the role of the Nazi regime in establishing police cooperation in Europe.

^{vii} Notably, cooperation for the combat of cybercrime is potentially more sensitive for governments than more conventional crimes due to the novelty of this particular kind of lawbreaking and because stakes are higher.

^{viii} Chang (2013) nonetheless describes that, “there are defects that diminish the effectiveness of informal police-to-police cooperation. One is that *guan-xi* is usually exclusive to the persons who build it and it does not usually last long. It is difficult to pass to others. Therefore, *guan-xi* might not work if the person changes position or leaves his job. (...) That is, *guan-xi* is not workable when relations between Taiwan and China are poor. Despite the special political situation, we can see there are still possibilities for crime investigators from both sides to cooperate. If crime investigators from both sides can maintain a good relationship, cooperation in crime investigation against cybercrime will be facilitated” (pp. 543-544).

^{ix} Including provisions that create institutional infrastructures for international police cooperation.

^x These elements, or characteristics, of police culture appear to be universal (Skolnick, 1966; Bayley, 1985; Reiner, 2000). Studies also have pointed out that policewomen and black officers have the same characteristics in their sub cultures (Skolnick 1966; Bayley, 1985; Reiner, 2000).

^{xi} They conclude that PRC citizens have higher levels of trust in the police than the Taiwanese do. The higher level of trust in the PRC largely derives from greater confidence in macroeconomic conditions and satisfaction with government responsiveness. In any case, Cao and Dai (2006) found that Taiwanese “confidence in the police was reasonably good for a society experiencing democratic transition. Although lower than more mature democratic societies such as Finland and the USA, confidence in the Taiwanese police is among the top one-third of fifty countries and is significantly higher than those found in other Asian and European countries that also experienced democratic transition” (p. 76).

^{xii} Schafer (2014) opportunely points out that “though the need for international cooperation is apparent, bringing about successful cooperative schemes is a difficult process. Nations differ in the structure and procedures associated with their justice systems; in effect, they have differing standards and rules for how their justice systems work. Nations have different cultural values regarding human rights, civil liberties, the role of government in the lives of the citizenry, and the nature of police operations and interactions with the public. Nations have varied political systems for creating and enforcing laws. Nations have varying levels of professionalisms within their policing systems and differing economic capacities to fund public safety and national security operations. At the most fundamental level, nations at times differ in what behaviors constitute a violation of criminal law. All of these factors complicate developing effective international cooperation among nations, even when there is a predisposition to unite. The challenges are further enhanced by the introduction of nationalism, historical regional conflicts, and the varying personalities and egos of those charged with representing the policing interests of their respective nations”.

^{xiii} Weyland (2009) states that a distinctly form of rationality prevails in cross-national policy diffusion. The author argues that, when searching for solutions, policy makers often apply inferential shortcuts, given the “lack of time and the informational, computational, and financial resources to follow the ideal-typical norms of comprehensive rationality” (pp.6). Weyland explains that three main inferential shortcuts – termed by Psychologists as “heuristics of availability”, “representativeness” and “anchoring” – shape the spread of innovations and diffusion of public policies (2009:5-11). He adds that these shortcuts are required for processing the flood of information faced by policy makers but create “the risk of significant distortions and biases” (Weyland 2009: 8). He concludes that decision makers do have choices, but “they make those choices guided more by interest than by legitimacy considerations” (Weyland 2009:11).

^{xiv} In general, the manifestations of police cooperation at these three levels (strategic, tactical and operational) are as diverse and profound as the collaborative willingness of the parties. Despite this logic assumption, the current international police cooperation agenda appears to be disproportionately concentrated in formal multilateralism, largely ignoring alternative cooperative pathways such as direct police-to-police contact. Ironically, issues of direct contact between and among police organizations from different national jurisdictions are prominently absent in many discussions of international police cooperation.