Comparing Sources and Patterns of Racial and Ethnic Formation in Taiwan and among Chinese/Taiwanese Americans

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How do ethnic Chinese in Asia and the United States think of issues of race, race relations, and notions of racial equality and justice in their respective homeland? And what is the relationship between the two sets of experiences accrued in societies on both sides of the Pacific? These are the two main research questions of a multi-year project that aims to improve understanding of the changing dynamics of race relations in the United States by studying the formation of racial attitudes of Asian immigrants originated from China and Taiwan. Although my focus in this paper is on immigrants originated from Taiwan, I would often find it necessary to lump together Taiwanese and Chinese (or even Asian) immigrants as whole in describing their racialized experiences in the United States. Nevertheless, when discussing pre-migration socialization in the Asian homeland, my focus is on experiences accrued in Taiwan.

Chinese American voters made the polling news in the 2016 presidential campaign season when a spring survey shows a lofty 63 percent of them, compared to 32 percent of Asian American voters as a whole, believed it to be a bad thing to have *"affirmative action programs designed to increase the number of black and minority students on college campuses"* (Lien 2018). Earlier, they grabbed headlines in the mainstream and ethnic press by organizing a swift and surprisingly strong and successful campaign against a proposed legislation in California Senate (SCA-5) to revive race-based affirmation action in admissions to UC and CSU systems (Lien 2014). The same coalition has been credited with being behind a number of other conservative campaigns, including anti-data disaggregation and the likely Supreme Court case against Harvard University over its alleged biased admission practices against Chinese/Asian American applicants (Hartocollis 2018).

This seems to be a puzzling development from survey-based opinion trends of the recent past where Chinese/Asian Americans appear to align themselves and increasingly so with the Democratic Party presidential candidates and liberal side of politics and policies (e.g., Lien 2001; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong et al. 2011; Le and Su

2017; Masuoka et al. 2018). Has there been a conservative shift in public opinion in the ethnic community? Are Chinese (Americans) racists? The answers to these questions can only be situational or interpreted within a changing context. Lien (2018) reviews survey-based opinion trends from the early 1990s in the Asian/Chinese American community and finds some evidence of conservative leaning in partisanship and ideology in recent elections, but the biggest bloc of Chinese remained "middle-of-the-road." In the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-election Survey (CMPS), whereas less than 1/3 of respondents originated from China and Taiwan thought it "a good thing" to have affirmative action in college admissions and even fewer supported considering applicants' racial/ethnic background, exactly half among Taiwanese (and 2/5 among Chinese) respondents were undecided or had no opinion.

Perhaps only a minority of Chinese/Taiwanese immigrants may be charged with harboring color-blind racism, but a recent publication on evangelicals among Asian American and Latino immigrants expressed concerns that the growing diversity in the American religious landscape may lead to greater intolerance for cultural differences or opposition to progressive policies and politics (Wong 2018). Still, compared to their white counterparts, Wong finds nonwhite evangelicals to be significantly less conservative because their experiences as racial minorities. This project continues the journey of exploration of the intersecting effects of race and immigration on the sources and contours of Asian American political behavior by tracing roots of immigrants' racial attitudes to political socialization in their homeland origins in Asia. Informed by theories of transnationalism and political socialization, this paper focuses on gathering evidence of racialized experiences of US immigrants from Taiwan as well as race-based experiences of residents in Taiwan. In the end, I hope to provide a very preliminary understanding and comparison of the processes of racial formation on both sides of the Pacific as a result.

Race, Racism, and Racial Formation in Asian America

Race and racism are powerful concepts to explain the experiences of most nonwhite Americans. For starters, "race" refers to a perception not just of skin color, but of other perceived groupings of human physical distinction such as hair color and texture, body shapes,

and sometimes cultural differences (Shaw et al. 2014). Because not all races are considered equal, the imbalance in power results in "racism," which means the capacity of a dominant group to maintain political, social, economic, and ideological control over a subordinated group (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967). For Omi and Winant (2015), racism must involve the creation or reproduction of structures of domination based on essentialist ideas of race. They also stress that not all racisms are the same in their exertion of oppressive power. In fact, Omi and Winant are most famous for conceiving the idea that race is not a fixed but a flexible phenomenon whose formation may be subject to changes in the social and political environment and is contingent upon the outcomes of competitions over distribution of goods and resources. In other words, race and racism are products of the ongoing process of social construction.

In a White settler state such as the United States, traditional race-based marginalization has been linked closely to the experiences of impoverished US-born minorities such as Blacks and American Indians as well as most immigrants from Latin America. Under the binary racial scheme of Blacks and Whites, the extension of the racial minority concept to Asian Americans can be a stretch, especially for those arriving in the post-1965 era, when the United States lifted its long term ban of migration from China and other Asian countries but with a preference for highly educated and skilled workers (Lee 2015; Lee and Zhou 2015). There are at least three sets of difficulties in fitting Asians into the bi-racial framework. One is that these immigrants arrived with differences in ethnic origin, homeland socialization, language and culture, and class background. They often carry different--if not clashing--political orientations and memories of the same homeland. They are also found to identify more with their respective ethnic, provincial, or national origin than with being Asian. In fact, "Asian" as a racial group label does not originally exist and itself was a product of panethnic racial formation beginning in the yellow power movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Liu, Geron, and Lai 2008). Over time, the racial concept has been solidified by (pan)ethnic community organizing from the inside and by racial stereotyping and racial prejudice and discrimination from the outside.

The second set of difficulties of fitting Asians is that, despite their profound diversity, the post-1965 immigrants from Asia, including those from Taiwan and Hong Kong (who dominated Chinese migration between 1950s and 1980s) and those from mainland China (who

were not permitted to emigrate until 1980 but has since become the mainstream of Chinese migration), have been viewed as the "model-minority" by their perceived ability to look inward, work hard, and achieve high socioeconomic success without governmental assistance and with few social problems--unlike other US racial minorities. Omitted from this legend is that most post-1965 Asian immigrants arrived with higher education and desirable skills for the US job market. Neglected are those immigrants and their US-born descendants who do not fall into the positive stereotype, especially those with a refugee background. Aiming to improve racial categorization beyond the bi-racial framework, sociologist Bonilla-Silva offers a tri-racial model where East and South Asian Americans are considered (or consider themselves as) White or Honorary White because of their socioeconomic and other stellar achievements, while Southeast Asian Americans are assigned to the collective-Black category because of their disadvantages in socioeconomic class and other factors associated with the forced exile and entry as Vietnam War refugees. Although this theory acknowledges the profound internal diversity within Asian America and is critical of the color-blind ideology that denies the continuing significance of race, it does not challenge the "model minority" assumption for "assimilated" Asian Americans.

A third set of difficulties is that, being considered as neither Black nor White, Asian Americans have occupied an awkward third space in the binary politics of race in the United States (C. Kim 1999; C. Kim and Lee 2001; O'Brien 2008). According to political scientist C. Kim (1999), the racial position of Asian Americans is a triangulated one where they are simultaneously considered as being better off than other minorities by class (hypothesis of relative valorization) and not as desirable as Whites and some racial minorities by culture (hypothesis of civic ostracism). Whereas Black (and Latino) Americans may not be seen as socioeconomically successful as Asian Americans, they have been perceived as being more advantageous in securing cultural and political acceptance by the US mainstream. Chinese and other Asian Americans are considered culturally deficient or unassimiliable to the American civic culture because, regardless of their socioeconomic background and immigration status, they have continued to be seen as the "yellow-peril"--a term that was originally assigned to US laborers from China in the mid-19th century who were considered predatory to the mainstream

economy, culture, and politics until they were banned from entry in 1882. In the post-1965 era, with the large and sustained influx of immigrants from Asia, Asian Americans have had much higher foreign-born rates than any other major US racial and ethnic groups. The predominance of the foreign-born in the present-day population has contributed to the "perpetual foreigner" myth, which is the flip side of the "model-minority" myth.

Racial formation of Chinese/Taiwanese Americans

As told, Asian Americans have endured a prolonged and distinctive process of racial formation which was structured in large part by the experiences of Chinese Americans. The xenophobia sentiment that leads to the passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act would flare up in times of tight partisan competition for control of power in the contemporary era. A case in point is the 1997 congressional investigations of the campaign finance scandal associated with "foreign" money donated to the Democratic Party and collected by Chinese Americans with close ties to Taiwan during the 1996 Clinton-Gore presidential campaign when both candidates were ridiculed as being pro-Communist Chinese. In the 1999 nuclear warhead espionage case, Taiwan-born and naturalized citizen Dr. Wen Ho Lee was wrongfully charged with spying for China. The process of racialization of Chinese from different origins as one suspect group associated with Communist China resembles the process of racialization of Asian Americans. As the U.S. steps up the fight against Chinese theft of U.S. trade secrets and intellectual property, CBS broadcast a 60-minutes report on Chinese Americans wrongly accused of espionage-related crimes. It shows that, since 2012, the Justice Department has won convictions in 14 cases, lost one case, and dismissed 5 cases related to Chinese economic espionage. In the cases of Dr. Xiaoxing Xi of Temple University and Dr. Sherry Chen of the National Weather Service--both naturalized citizens born in China-- more than 40 members of Congress had called on the Justice Department to conduct an independent investigation of whether they were targeted because of race. Although both were found not guilty, only Dr. Xi was able to return to work; Dr. Chen is still waiting for a court decision concerning a rare appeal from the government.

It seems, from the perspective of settler colonialism framework advocated by Glenn (2015), the intersection of race, gender, class, and nation as imagined through the images and constructed ideology of the homeland government would make the Chinese race particularly vulnerable to racial persecution in the U.S., and that the discrimination is bipartisan and applies to immigrants and naturalized citizens from China and Taiwan alike. L. Wang (2007) further explains, from the perspective of the structure of dual domination, that Chinese Americans in both societies of origin (China/Taiwan) and settlement (USA) were expected by governments on both sides of the Pacific to abide by the assimilation/loyalty framework. In the early 1880s, Chinese Americans were considered unassimilable and worthy of racial exclusion. In the early 1980s, Taiwanese American professor Chen Wen-chen and journalist Henry Liu were both considered disloyal and seditious by the Nationalist government whose operatives would harass, intimidate, kidnap/detain, and assassinate them (153). In times when tensions were high between US and PRC China such as in the early 1950s, the US government would consider any pro-Communist China (PRC) stance as disloyal, while granting unrestricted access to the anti-Communist China (ROC) for it to influence the Chinese American community by mobilizing anti-China campaigns. Wang proclaims that "*racial exclusion or oppression and extraterritorial domination converge and interact in the Chinese American community, establishing a permanent structure of dual domination and creating its own internal dynamics and unique institutions*" (155, italics original). The Wilson Center's new report confirms the continued presence of exterritorial control over students and scholars from China (Lloyd-Damnjanovic 2018). However, Taiwan has since been democratized and the government is not expected to engage in practices used by authoritarian regimes to ensure loyalty and suppress dissent.

One would not want to confuse Taiwan with China, but both are largely racially homogenous societies dominated by Han and influenced by Confucian values and practices. Hence, present-day immigrants from both homelands are not expected to be familiar with a multiracial society dominated by a white-supremacist racial order such as the United States and know how to handle sensitive relationships with whites and other nonwhite Americans who are structurally and culturally different. Claire Kim's theory of racial triangulation has been considered one of the most important pieces of scholarship in understanding US race relations

that involve Asian Americans. Yet, by focusing only on what happened in the US, this theory is considered inadequate to interpret the experiences of a community made up mostly of immigrants from post-colonial and/or authoritarian societies. With over two-thirds of the population being foreign-born and mostly from societies that do not share the political ideology and strategic interests of the US nation in the post-1965 era, contemporary Chinese/Asian America is a community highly impacted by international migration and global politics, in addition to domestic racial politics. In the case of Chinese/Taiwanese Americans, their ethnic/racial politics is further complicated by national identity politics in the homeland.

The theory of imperial racialization (N. Kim 2008), which describes the process of transnational racial formation whereby Korean immigrants were exposed to the US racial hierarchy and racist ideology in the imperialized homeland in Asia and formed prejudices against Black and other dark-skinned Americans even before stepping on US soil, provides a more satisfactory framework to help comprehend racial tensions between Blacks and immigrant Chinese/Taiwanese Americans. However, as to be shown, the history and evolution of ethnic relations in Taiwan such as between the two Han groups of mainlanders ("waishenren") and Islanders ("benshenren") as well as racial relations between Han and non-Han peoples of indigenous descent or foreign-birth (and their Taiwan-born offspring) will need to be factored in to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Taiwanese immigrants' pre-migration socialization regarding race and racism.

How much have residents in Taiwan experienced race and racism?

As told, racial ideas and experiences accrued in pre-migration homeland society in Asia can impact Asian immigrants' attitudes toward race and race relations with other groups of Americans after crossing the Pacific. It follows that immigrants arriving from societies structured by racism and other forms of structural discrimination may be more likely to harbor prejudice and discrimination against other racially disadvantaged groups in the host society. Alternatively, the closer the nature of racialized experiences between the societies of origin and settlement, the easier it is for immigrants who experienced discrimination in the homeland to empathize with the racism experienced by other racial minorities in the host society. If at least

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one of these hypotheses seem plausible to explain the Taiwanese American experiences, the following sections shall show that given the convoluted local history and polarized politics, which has been persistently complicated by the China factor, there does not seem to be a consensus on whether if and how serious there are issues of race and racism in Taiwan. Even an answer to the question of who are ethno-racially discriminated against minorities in Taiwan will depend on which context and whose perspective are involved, which may be constructed by both personal encounters and knowledge/observations or memories of ethnic or race-based mistreatments or discrimination and in past or present times.

In contemporary Taiwan, with over 95 percent of the population being Han, there has not been much discussion nor recognition of race-related issues within the population. Instead, ethnic differences based on provincial origin and linguistic tone have been the main fault line in public opinion (Achen and Wang 2017). Yet, when it comes to group-based discrimination either by ethnicity or race, the resulting intergroup tensions and unequal treatment and guilt by association may not be that different. Taking a longitudinal view, this paper posits that people in Taiwan have complex and deep relations with race and racism, even if its origins and consequences can be a subject of dispute. Different groups of residents on the island of Taiwan have experienced various forms of racism and discrimination over time. Moreover, I show that racial or ethnic mistreatment does not end with democratization. Instead, new and continuing forms of racial marginalization exist and are embedded in liberalized laws and policies that intend to exclude the racially and socially undesirable. In particular, racism has intersected with domains of classism and sexism to limit citizenship conception for foreign-born marriage migrants from Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, fear of the yellow-peril has resulted in stricter naturalization requirements for marriage migrants from China. These are evidence of Taiwan's limited commitment to multiculturalism (Ngo and Wang 2011) and the unfinished business of democratization.

In order to comprehend the racial and ethnic formation of residents in contemporary Taiwan, one must begin with a quick recap of Taiwan's history. In an introduction to a newly published edited book on changing ethnic identities in Taiwan, Jacobs (2018) argues that Taiwan's history can best be divided into three large stages. Stage I is characterized by

indigenous sovereignty. It began about 6,000 years ago[1] and continued until 1624, when the Dutch first invaded and imported Chinese for labor. The indigenous (or aboriginal) people of Taiwan were found to have developed strong trading networks with Southeast Asia and living in relatively advanced and egalitarian societies by then. Stage II is characterized by colonization by six consecutive colonial governments ranging from 1624 to 1988, when President Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, passed away. It includes occupation by the Dutch (1624-1662), the Spanish (1626-1642), the Han-Zheng family regime (1662-1683), the Manchu-Qing dynasty (1683-1895), the Japanese empire (1895-1945), and the Chinese Nationalists (1945-1988) who took control of Taiwan after the WWII and retreated to the island after the Chinese civil war. Currently, Taiwan is in the third stage of history which is characterized by democratization. Jacobs maintains that only in this stage when the mainlanders in the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lost reign could thoughts of Taiwan nationalism flourish.

Earlier, Jacobs (2014) borrows ideas from Memmi's (1965) study of the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized that racism is a fundamental element and one of the most significant features of a colonial regime. He proclaims that residents in Taiwan suffered systematic discrimination under all the colonial regimes which all came from outside of Taiwan and asserted themselves as a superior race to power over local residents. To prove that the KMT is also a colonial power, despite doubts raised by the loyalists, Jacobs compares the Chinese Nationalists to the Japanese occupiers in that both involved dictatorships committing systematic discrimination, mass slaughtering in their first years of rule, followed by prolonged period of high oppression, forced assimilation, and subordination of locals as second-class citizens. He argues that, whereas after the withdrawal from the UN in 1971, the KMT was forced to loosen the White Terror reign by opening up leadership ranks to Taiwan-born elite and by hosting regular elections, progress was met with setback when it cramped down anti-authoritarian protests in 1979. Similarly, Gates (1981) makes the point that the KMT inherited and adopted much of the Japanese colonial government's discriminating system against

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[1] However, this date might be an under estimation. According the 2016 Yearbook of Taiwan, "indigenous Malayo Polynesian peoples have lived on the island for millennia, with archeological evidence confirming their presence dating back 12,000 to 15,000 years" (p. 49).
http://ws.ey.gov.tw/001/Eyupload/oldfile/UserFiles/YB%202016%20all%20100dpi.pdf

Taiwanese after 1945. He attributes the early rise of ethnic minority consciousness among Taiwanese in the postwar era to this system of discrimination.

<u>Tensions between Taiwanese and Mainlanders</u>

In Wang's (2018) review of research on ethnic relations mainly between Taiwanese (Islanders) and mainlanders in Taiwan, he begins by saying that this topic has been very controversial in postwar Taiwan. Under the KMT reign, intergroup tensions such as the tragic clash between Taiwanese and mainlanders in 1947 and afterward "was a political taboo to openly talk about, let alone to study," in Taiwan before 1980 (65). Wang explains that "ethnic inequalities from institutional classifications and exclusion of certain ethnic group members were considered politically sensitive issues, because they would be harmful to social solidarity and harmony in public discussion…. The racist ideology of excluding certain groups of people, especially Taiwanese, from equal political or social rights on the basis of their distinct culture or ancestry…was effectively disguised and justified by the Chinese nationalist discourse in Taiwan until the late 1980s, when an alternative Taiwanese nationalist discourse rose up in the public domain" (83).

During the long period of martial law between 1949 and 1987, Ngo and Wang (2011) note that provincial origin was institutionalized in public office-holding, resource distribution, and recruitment of civil servants under the banner of national defense by the KMT to recover the Chinese Mainland. A de facto racist quota was in place when only 5 percent of civil service slots were allocated for Taiwanese who constituted at least 85 percent of the population in the island. The rationale was that the population in Taiwan was only 5 percent of the Chinese population and Taiwan was one of the Chinese provinces. This provincial quota would also give children of civil war migrants retreated to Taiwan from various Chinese provinces an unfair advantage in securing civil service slots and in political representation when allocation of seats in the National Assembly followed the same sino-centric formulae until 1992. Focusing on the development of language policies, Dupre (2017) notes that, in response to the cultural revolution on the Mainland, the ROC government launched the Chinese Cultural Revival Movement and quickly adopted a Mandarin-only policy, which was "seen as a precondition to

the creation of a homogenous Chinese culture" in Taiwan (p. 39). One of the most active opponents to this discriminatory cultural policy was the Presbyterian Church, which romanicized Taiwanese indigenous languages and created a transliteration system for Holko, and was considered a "vocal force for democracy and ethnolinguistic equality" (40).

Well before the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the subsequent democratization in the 1990s, pro-democracy activism such as exercised by the Presbyterian Church and other organized social movements in the 1970s and 1980s played a key role in raising group consciousness and sparking off heated debates in group equality and ethnic identity politics (Ngo and Wang 2011, 2). The Mandarin-only policy was lifted almost immediately after the end of martial law and both the KMT and the DPP parties have since been "compelled to take a positive stance on language pluralism" (Dupre 2017, 47). To Wang (2018), the development of a new concept ethnicity equality by the mid-1980s "became an essential prerequisite in the nation building project" for the anti-KMT force (74). Nonetheless, it was the widespread rising ethnic minority consciousness among the Taiwanese populace in the late 1980s and early 1990s that was the critical factor forcing the ruling KMT regime to abandon the discriminatory quota and for a new concept of ethnic equality under the Taiwan-centric national identity framework (Wang 2014, 104).

Meanwhile, as Chinese national imagination was challenged and the ruling KMT regime tried to placate Taiwanese by promoting more Taiwanese youths to political positions and opening more offices to elections, mainlander youths (or second generation mainlanders) also felt discriminated against by the Taiwanese-only policy and developed their version of minority consciousness as a result. This is despite the fact that they were found to have enjoyed an overall socioeconomic advantages than Taiwanese because of the preferential treatment themselves and/or their parents received from the party-state, and they were overwhelmingly pro-KMT in partisanship. The combination of their advantages in educational attainment, new sense of deprivation in society, and growing anxiety of becoming minorities in a changing Taiwan explained the disproportionally high number of mainlander youths studying abroad and remaining in the United States after graduation in the 1970s when the international status of the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan deteriorated. According to O'Neil (2003), an

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estimated 20 percent of Taiwanese college graduates studied abroad (mainly in the US) but only 8 percent of them returned to Taiwan after graduation. In another estimate, between 1971 and 1986, only about 15 percent of those who left Taiwan for graduate studies in the US returned to Taiwan (Chang 1992). A favorable US immigration policy for highly-educated and skilled labor facilitated these students' ability to secure a good job after graduation and became permanent residents and naturalized citizens in due time. These students turned immigrants and citizens became the backbone of the middle-professional class of Taiwanese Americans. Some participated in the anti-KMT and pro-democracy movement of Taiwan after being inspired by the struggles of African Americans for civil rights and other power movements in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Yet, mainlanders arriving in Taiwan between 1945 and 1956, according to Yang and Chang (2010), is not a homogenous exiled community but "a collectivity of diversities in terms of social class, subgroups, political ideas, and provincial identities" (121). They include aging veterans, military families, exile students from Shandong, Chinese prisoners of war from Korea, and soldiers and refugees stranded in Vietnam and Burma (110). Most of these civil war migrants did not live in privileged positions nor share the same nationalist imagination and wartime memories. They and their Taiwan-born offspring were called waishengren or "people from outside the province (of Taiwan)" even if their relationship with the party-state has been "more complex and less cordial or reciprocal than commonly perceived" (119). For example, Wu (2005) finds that mainlanders accounted for approximately 40% of known "White Terror" victims even if they were no more than 15% of the population in Taiwan in the early 1950s. Many of the involuntarily discharged veterans in the 1950s and 1960s received little state assistance and lived in abject poverty. They remained single or had to marry women at the bottom of the social ladder (Hu 1989). Nonetheless, as a collectivity these civil war migrants remained loyal to the KMT and showed little sympathy for the rising Taiwanese consciousness.

With the cultivation of Taiwan-centered identity and ideology in the process of democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and as sino-centrism was replaced by multiculturalism, the term mainlander was transformed from a denotation of provincial origin of people from outside the province of Taiwan to an ethnic group in multiethnic Taiwan. The

Taiwanese/Mainlander dichotomy began to shift to a multiethnic formation of the "four major ethnic groups" of Mainlander, Taiwanese Holo (or Minnan), Taiwanese Hakka, and Aborigines after 1992, when the provincial origin column was removed from the personal identification card and all members of the Chinese-dominated National Assembly were let go for a more representative legislative body. The dropping of provincial origin in official registration of one's ancestry has resulted in a significant decline in the percentage of self-identified mainlanders in sample surveys from 13% to 10% after 2000 (Wang 2018, 79).

While in opposition, the DPP issued in 1993 an official cultural and ethnic policy that opposed any form of ethnic discrimination and emphasized equal political, economic, and social rights for all ethnic groups (Wang 2018, 75). In 2004, the ruling DPP issued a proclamation that denounced assimilation and integration policies; instead, it pledged to uphold the principle of multiculturalism (Ngo and Wang, 3). Unfortunately, the arrival of multiethnic politics did not mean multicultural harmony in democratized Taiwan. Instead, ethnic tensions have meshed with partisan tensions. And mainlanders, being perceived collectively as the privileged minority, felt being increasingly stigmatized and harassed. The reversal of their social status from dominance to marginalization in the democratization process has triggered the formation of a new identity for civil war migrants and their Taiwan-born descendants. Simon (2006) calls it a diasporic identity, for it allows mainlanders to negotiate a new place of home in Taiwan and for them to become the Chinese of Taiwan. Munyard (2012) summarizes what most of the studies on Taiwan's national identity of the last couple of decades have found that :1) there is a new nation taking shape in Taiwan that is multicultural, multi-ethnic and politically based, 2) a growing portion of mainlanders recognize themselves in this new nation, especially the younger generation, without opposing to Chinese and Taiwanese cultures or rejecting one or the other, but embracing this multicultural national culture that is unique to Taiwan.

Who are the New Racial and Ethnic Minorities in Taiwan?

Historically, residents of Taiwan were treated as an inferior race by colonial powers from outside of the island. Because anti-authoritarian struggles in the 1980s and early 1990s took the form of anti-Chinese domination, ethnicity has meshed with partisanship which has

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tangled with the national identity issue in the democratization and democratic deepening process in Taiwan (Ngo and Wang 2011; Achen and Wang 2017). The widespread acceptance of the new concept of "different but equal" in ethnic origin was pivotal to Taiwan's peaceful transition to democracy, according to Wang (2014). However, this transformation is far from complete and not all ethnic groups are equally impacted by the national identity issue. Certainly, the Chinese-Taiwanese identity complex and their pursuit of equality do not describe the history and struggles of the indigenous peoples or the aboriginals in Taiwan. The primary concern of indigenous peoples is about autonomy and indigenous-state relations, even if their social and political status has arguably been improved in post-reform Taiwan because of efforts made by waves of indigenous rights movement (Simon 2017). However, van Bekoven (2016) comments that Taiwan's laws and regulations are still colored by assumptions and values connected to the colonial past and do not take into consideration indigenous cultures, customs, practices, and views.

The new racial and ethnic minorities in this study refer to those new migrants to Taiwan, a group whose population now comprises more than aboriginals and first-generation mainlanders combined. Chiu, Fell, and Lin (2014) assert that the political significance of new migrants has yet to be realized, as many are either foreign born wives or contract workers, but tend to be viewed as mere spouses or foreigners rather than citizens. Because they were born outside of Taiwan, one would think their experience would be more influenced by their race, gender, national origin, and class, but the national identity issue raises its head when the issue involves spouses who are migrants from mainland China.

Although historically Taiwan has been a settler state, Taiwan is considered an exclusionary migration regime because of its restrictive migration policies and naturalization laws. The landscape began to change in 1991, with the arrival of 3,000 male contract workers from Thailand. By August 2018, statistics from the Ministry of Labor http://statdb.mol.gov.tw/html/mon/c12060.htm shows the total number of foreign laborers in Taiwan to be reaching 700,000, almost all were from Southeast Asia and with 55% being women. Tseng and Lin (2014) comment that Taiwan has adopted a guest worker program over other immigration policies in order to maintain ethnic and cultural homogeneity. The state has

placed heavy restrictions on guest workers, who are not allowed to change their employer or place of residence on their own volition. Due to tight regulations on movement of immigrants, state provisions not only prohibit immigrants from becoming long-term residents, but has led to the creation of a new underclass which, while diverse in international backgrounds, is segregated from the larger population. H. Cheng (2016) critically analyzes Taiwanese mainstream news discourse on migrant workers in Taiwan to discern their relations to the host society. Four themes emerge: objectification of foreign laborers; differentiated and gendered marginalization; multilevel triangulations over migrant bodies; and imperialistic cultural attitudes toward migrant workers. As a result, migrant workers are perceived as living in an impossible position politically, economically, and culturally in Taiwanese society.

In addition to labor migration, many foreign-born women entered Taiwan as marriage migrants to less privileged Taiwanese men. Because Taiwan-born women had become increasingly educated and economically independent, these men would use marriage brokers to find non-Taiwanese women who are expected to be subservient and whose country of origin has a weaker economy than Taiwan. Tsai (2011a) notes that "[t]he marriage migrants not only are classified as having lower social status; they are also racialized as members of an inferior species" (p. 246). This observation would apply particularly to Southeast Asian women who were not familiar with Taiwanese local language and culture and who were considered as unfit mothers for raising the "New Children of Taiwan" regarding their global competitiveness.

With the lifting of travel ban across the Taiwan Strait, more marriage migrants have come from mainland China than elsewhere and the number spiked in 2000-2004. Tsai's (2011a) analysis of the 2004 Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) shows that ethnic nationalism or "anti-foreigner sentiment based on genealogy or presumed descent ties" (250), rather than labor market concerns, plays a key role in determining Taiwanese attitudes toward foreign brides two-thirds of them originated from China and one-fifth from Vietnam. Tsai's (2011) other analysis of the 2005 TSCS shows this hostile attitude to not decrease by increased level of contacts with these women. This finding echoes an earlier study by Chen and Yu (2005) where they show that both ethnicity and national identity have significant effects on people's attitudes toward immigration policies on bride migration; yet party support and ethnic bias only

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affect public attitudes toward immigration policies for brides from China, but not those from Southeast Asian countries. In a recent review of public attitudes toward marriage migrants in Taiwan, Chen and Ng (2017) report a positive trend in people's acceptance of marriage migrants between 2004 and 2014. Still, acceptance of women from China was lower than those from Southeast Asia.

According government statistics, from 1987 to 2016, 75.5% of the total of 152,817 foreign women, mainly from Southeast Asia, as well as 37.4% of 318,338 mainland Chinese women, have resided in Taiwan as spouses of Taiwanese citizens and become naturalized themselves (NIA, 2017). A main reason for the huge disparity in naturalization rates between the two groups of women lies in the differential regulation for them: while foreign spouses have to relinquish their original nationality to acquire ROC citizenship, Chinese spouses are required to cancel their household registration in China. Cheng (2017) notes that discrimination in women marriage migrants from China is rooted in the perceived threat posed by the PRC and reflects the intersection of patriarchy, sexism, nationalism, and classism that characterized Taiwan's naturalization laws. Her point is supported by Fell's (2014) examination of 66 televised political advertisements to gauge party responses and attitudes toward migration from Southeast Asia and China. However, there were partisan differences as the DPP tended to play on fears of Chinese mass migration if Taiwan was to unify with China. Conversely, the KMT tended to show images of ethnic harmony by using a variety of languages in advertisements. Fell concludes that DPP is concerned with how spouses from Mainland China might undermine Taiwan's national identity, while the KMT has adopted an inclusive stance on migrant spouses.

Progress in migrant rights did happen in recent times. Beginning in 2003, the DPP government adopted policies to improve the protection of the interests and welfare of new migrants and their offspring. In the 2008 KMT campaign to regain power, marriage immigrants were included in the party's election manifesto. Tseng, Cheng, and Fell (2014) observe that once KMT regained political control, the financial requirements and annual immigration cap were dropped by the government. Mainland spouses were allowed to be employed without applying for a work permit. Media coverage of these marriage migrants has also shifted from negative to neutral after 2009 (Chen and Ng 2017). Unlike other social movements, Tseng,

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Cheng, and Fell observe that the marriage movement has allied with the KMT. The authors however conclude that the marriage rights movement may be an electoral niche for the KMT. Both parties, fearing that they will lose votes, have failed to fully support spousal rights movements, and Mainland spouses are still assumed associated with Communism, Chinese nationalism, and fraud. An amendment to the naturalization act in 2012 did make it easier for these migrant women to receive citizenship rights. In 2016, the first new migrant and a woman from Cambodia was elected to the national legislature.

Taking from the human rights perspective, Cheng and Momesso (2017) argue that perhaps better protection of migrant women did occur with democratization, for anti-human trafficking legislation was promulgated during the return of the KMT regime after the 2008 presidential election. However, they find the government of Taiwan to be as accountable for the violation of migrants' human rights as the exploitive placement agencies and abusive employers even if human rights abuses. And the reform was a result of multilevel efforts, including US pressure and collaboration between transnational and domestic advocacy groups.

Conclusion

This paper is a preliminary effort to improve understanding of the formation of racial ideas among immigrants from Taiwan by comparing the sources and contours of their racial attitudes formed in the hostland of the United States with those formed in the ethnic homeland of Taiwan. The comparison may seem false, for the major fault line in the two societies seem to fall into different identity categories. However, I argue that when it comes to structural discrimination either by ethnicity or race, the resulting intergroup tensions and unequal treatment and guilt by association may not be that different. A quick review of history suggests that people in Taiwan have complex and deep relations with race and racism, even if its origins and consequences can be a subject of dispute. True to the meaning of racial formation, different groups of residents on the island of Taiwan have different accounts of their experience of racism and discrimination, and group boundaries are situational and in flux. With democratization, the racial order and claim to minority status between mainlanders and islanders have been reversed. Yet, with the arrival of foreign-born migrants that coincides with

the arrival of democracy in Taiwan, I show that racial or ethnic mistreatment does not end with democratization. Instead, new and continuing forms of racial marginalization exist and are embedded in liberalized laws and policies that intend to exclude the racially, socially, and politically undesirable. Ironically, with political liberalization and democratization when the previously oppressed Taiwanese islanders gained power, they have behaved liked American Whites in their fear of the yellow-peril Chinese and condoned or facilitated legal and social discrimination against marriage migrants from Mainland China.

The intersection of race, class, gender, and nation in limiting citizenship to foreign-born marriage migrants from Southeast Asia and China in democratized but politically deeply divided Taiwan is unfortunate. It is not a vice of democracy but symbol of an incomplete transition to a liberal democratic and multicultural state. It is a worrisome development, for the same kind of racism, sexism, classism, and ethnocentrism may have traveled across the Pacific and influenced Taiwanese Americans' attitudes toward other US minorities that are not as socioeconomically resourceful, when in fact immigrants from Taiwan are equally vulnerable as immigrants from China in their marginalization as racial outsiders and to be conveniently mistrusted and denied their US citizenship and equal protection as the yellow-peril in turbulent times in US-China relations.

At the closing of his review of ethnic relations, Wang (2018) asks: "Is a similar kind of racist ideology responsible for the ethnic relations issues faced by new migrants in the democratized Taiwan, and if so, why?" (83). He notes that "unlike past ethnic relations characterized by unambiguous dominations bluntly justified by the Chinese national imagination, the new ethnic dynamics are covertly demonstrated in issues related to the competing national identities" (80). He does not think these new issues can be adequately analyzed by utilizing the typical 'ethnic relations' framework, for it is quite evident that the marriage migrants and guest workers have been victims of ethnic prejudices or racist slurs and institutional discriminations due to their non- or quasi-citizenship statuses in Taiwan (ibid). Instead, Cheng and Momensso (2017) suggest that the intersectionality framework is the way to go. Like Glenn's (2015) analysis of racism and sexism against American Indians and Black, Mexican, and Chinese Americans, I also believe there is a need to engage settler colonialism

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framework and through the intersectionality lens of racism, sexism, and classism to identify possibilities of decolonization and equal and fair treatment of civil war migrants from China and new marriage and labor migrants as well as their descendants in Taiwan. Only by achieving so can we anticipate the development among immigrants originated from Taiwan of a more tolerant attitudes toward racial and other minorities in the United States.

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