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The Ukraine Crisis in the Northeast-Asian Comparative Perspective (Report under the Taiwan Fellowship-2019 for Scholars)



*There is no East, and there is no West.
There is no end to the sky.
There is no East, and there is no West,
Father has two sons.
There is no East, and there is no West,
There are sunrise and sunset,
There is a big word — EARTH!*

*Olzhaz Suleymenov¹
From "The Sunny Nights" collection (1962)²*

INTRODUCTION

In one of his latest appearances in media in the early 2017 one of America's main foreign policy strategists, Zbigniew Brzezinski, pointed out with much anxiety that "strategic insecurity is now a fact of life on a scale heretofore not experienced by the now increasingly vulnerable humanity"³.

Structural shocks in the geopolitical, institutional, socio-cultural and security architectonics of the Eastern European and post-Soviet space which have occurred with epicenter in Ukraine, have sharply delimited and polarized the regional transformation and integration processes. The extreme aggravation of the Ukraine-Russia relations as a result of Euromaidan's victory in Kyiv, followed by Russia's annexation of Crimea and the hybrid armed conflict in Donbas⁴, has exposed deep

¹ Olzhaz Suleymenov is National Writer of Kazakhstan, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to UNESCO in 2002-2018.

² English translation made by Igor Piliaiev from the Russian original.

³ Brzezinski, Z. How To Address Strategic Insecurity In A Turbulent Age. *HuffPost*. January 3, 2017. Retrieved from: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-china-russia-relations_us_586955dbe4b0de3a08f8e3e0?section=us_world (Last accessed: 10.10.2018).

⁴ The latter's toll has already amounted, according to Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine' data on February 5, 2019, more than 10.000 killed, 30.000 wounded and 1.36 mln. internally displaced persons. Besides, the number of refugees from the armed conflict zone to the territory of Russia amounted 1.1 million pers (see: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2016). Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine. 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016. P. 7. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_13th_HRMMU_Report_3March2016.pdf

axiological splits across the post-Soviet space. In this regard, taking into account the apparent failure of another, now post-Communist, Russian modernization, an actual task for social sciences is to identify the nature of state in contemporary Russia as well as the historically determined dominants of its development that would influence Eurasia in the foreseeable future.

Huge risks for Eurasian security lie in the lines of political, military tension and ideological faults between the West and its allies, on the one hand, and Russia and mainland China, on the other hand.

Great strategic conflicts between the world still dominating superpower (the USA), on one part, the former second superpower's successor (Russia) and the rising superpower (mainland China), on the other part, "brought about two strategic fault lines, one cutting across East Asia and the other eastern Europe."⁵

With regard to the Ukraine crisis (in and over Ukraine), so far the efforts of the international community have not brought real progress in a political and long-term geopolitical resolution of the crisis. The crisis is in simmering state creating a permanent threat of explosion and undermining security throughout the Eurasian megacontinent.

One of the key reasons for the lack of progress in resolving the crisis is that it occurs in the space of post-Soviet Eurasia, while European and Euro-Atlantic actors are mediators in resolving it. There are no intermediaries from East Asia, although the crisis directly affects their security, political and economic interests.

Despite the seeming (for an outsider) standstill in the development of the conflict over Taiwan, in fact, the increasing power and influence of mainland China is respectively boosting its great-power ambitions and temptations, and hence the risk of a radical escalation of the conflict, the latter's transition to the hot phase. According to Michael Mazza's apt comparison, "China and Taiwan are looking more and more like an unstoppable force and an immovable object, separated by only 100 miles of open water"⁶.

World political scientists mostly analyze the Ukraine crisis in terms of Realpolitik, as an element of the "zero sum game" Russia and China are playing against the West for geopolitical dominance in Eurasia.⁷ In our opinion, it would be

f). The huge detrimental consequences of the Ukraine crisis may be illustrated by such a fact: in five years after the crisis had broken out the Ukraine-China trade is planned to be brought to the level of 2013 only in 10 years (!). (Source: Україна та Китай наростили товарообіг між країнами до \$8,8 мільярда — Кубів [Ukraine and China Increased Bilateral Trade to \$8.8 Billion – Kubiv]. *Business.ua*. 25 January 2019. Retrieved from: <https://business.ua/news/item/4547-ukraina-ta-kytai-narostyly-tovaroobih-mizh-krainamy-do-usd8-8-miliarda-kubiv>).

⁵ Wu, Yu-Shan (2017). *Pivot, Hedger, or Partner Strategies of Lesser Powers Caught between Hegemons*. In: Dittmer, L. (ed.), *Taiwan and China*. California University of California Press. Pp. 197-220. P. 214.

⁶ Mazza, M. (2018). Is a Storm Brewing in the Taiwan Strait? Tensions Are Rising Between Beijing and Taipei. *Foreign Affairs*. July 27, 2018. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2018-07-27/storm-brewing-taiwan-strait>

⁷ See: Haran, O. (2015). Ukrainian-Russian Conflict and Its Implications for Northeast Asia. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*. Vol. 24, No. 3, 2015, 125–158; Lee Seong-

more constructive to analyze the above crisis in terms of the East-West civilizational dialogue (based, in particular, on rational European and Confucian values), bridge-building diplomacy, trans-Eurasian and global economic convergence involving the West, the post-Soviet space and Northeast Asia. The crisis comprehensive settlement prospects would broaden through adapting the Northeast-Asian experience, especially in dealing with regional territorial conflicts.

It is indicative that in light of the Ukraine crisis the “Greater Europe” concept has been to considerable extent replaced in the political discourse by the “Greater Eurasia” concept. That implies an inclusive vision of the New Silk Road integrative initiatives for Eurasia declared by China and the ROK.⁸ It seems especially vital in view of the pro-independence DPP’s victory at Taiwan elections on January 16, 2016, since it might increase the great powers’ integration formats rivalry in Northeast Asia and in Eurasia on the whole.

OBJECTIVES

hyon, “*The Korean Angle on Crimean Fallout: America’s Perception Gap*,” (The National Bureau of Asian Research, April 22, 2014), <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=423>; Karaganov, S. A. The Turn to the East: Results and Tasks. *Rossiyskaya gazeta [the Russian newspaper] (the Federal issue)*. No. 6595(24) dated February 6, 2015. Retrieved from <http://karaganov.ru>; Klymenko, V., & Pashkova A. (Eds.). (2017). *Trajectory of the Conflict: The Model of Ukrainian-Russian Relations in the Near-Term Outlook. Information Materials for the Trilateral Expert Meeting, 20-23 August 2017, Cadenabbia, Italy*. Kyiv: Razumkov Centre; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Office in Ukraine; Lukin, A. Russia, China and the Korean Peninsula: A Post-Ukraine Assessment. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*. Vol. 24, No. 3, 2015, 67–100; Lukin, A. V. (2014). *Povorot k Azii. Rossiyskaya vneshnyaya politika na rubezhe vekov i yeye aktivizatsiya na vostochnom napravlenii [Pivot to Asia. Russian Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Centuries and its Activation in the Eastern direction]*. Moscow: Ves' Mir. – 640 pp. (in Russian); Makarov, I.A.(Ed.) (2016), *Povorot Na Vostok: Razvitie Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka v usloviakh usileniya aziatskogo vektora vneshnei politiki Rossii [The Turn to the East: Development of Siberia and the Russian Far East under Strengthening the Asian Direction of Russian Foreign Policy]*. – Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2016. – 448 pp. (in Russian); Pikulicka-Wilczewska, A. & Sakwa, R. (Eds.) (2015). *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*. Bristol, UK: E-international Relations Publishing, 278 pp.; Toloraya, G., Vorontsov, A. Russia’s “Turn to the East” Policy: Role of Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*. Vol. 24, No. 3, 2015, 31–66; Yen, Chen-Shen (May 2014). The Implication of the Ukrainian Crisis to Taiwan. *Defense Security Brief*, 4(2), 11-15.

⁸ Remarks by President Park Geun-hye at the 2013 International Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia (October 18, 2013). Cheong Wa Dae. Retrieved from: [http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/speeches.php?srh\[text\]=Remarks+by+President+Park+Geun-hye+at+the+2013+International+Conference+on+Global+Cooperation+in+the+Era+of+Eurasia&srh\[view_mode\]=detail&srh\[seq\]=2636](http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/speeches.php?srh[text]=Remarks+by+President+Park+Geun-hye+at+the+2013+International+Conference+on+Global+Cooperation+in+the+Era+of+Eurasia&srh[view_mode]=detail&srh[seq]=2636); Komarov, D. (25 March 2015). Novyy Shelkoviy put': kak Kitay izmenit ekonomicheskuyu kartu mira [The New Silk Road: How China will change the economic map of the world]. *Yuzhnyy Kitay: Osoby vzglyad. [South China: Special View]*. Hong Kong. Retrieved from <http://south-invest.com/shelk?language=ru>; Marmazov, V., Goropakha, S. (2016). Eurasian Initiatives of the Republic of Korea and the PRC: Prospects for Ukraine’s Involvement. *Zovnishni Spravy (Foreign Affairs)*, No. 1, pp. 22-25 (in Ukrainian).

Through the inter-disciplinary approach, in light of recent achievements of synergetics discovering the world's fractal regularities⁹, the neo-modernization and other non-linearity approaches to social history, politics and economy¹⁰, applying the postmodernism's and the postnonclassical concept's, the civilization and the political transformation theories' tools we shall:

- analyze the historical background and the nature of the Ukraine crisis;
- define the historical, civilizational, and ethno-cultural nature of the Ukraine crisis and compare it with that of the conflicts over Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula;
- study the Northeast-Asian experience of tackling regional conflicts with a view to finding ways for the Ukraine crisis complex solution;
- analyze repercussions and systemize lessons of the Ukraine crisis for prospects and ways of settling the Taiwan and the Korean conflicts;
- recommend political and institutional ways for settling the value conflicts on the Eurasian megacontinent through bridging the traditional East-West dichotomy and building in the near future a sustainable trans-civilization society of common values.

METHODOLOGY (THEORETICAL TOOLS PARADIGM)

Postmodernist thinkers of the last quarter of the XX century tried to present some kind of anarchic picture of the world and society generated in the will to overcome the detrimental and bloody legacy of the totalitarian regimes.

Rhizome (rootstock) is one of the key concepts of the philosophy of poststructuralism and postmodernism, introduced by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in the 1976 eponymous book and intended to serve as the basis and form of

⁹ Christian, D. (2004). *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History*. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press; Grinin, L. E., Korotayev, A. V., Rodrigue, B. H. (Eds.) (2011). *Evolution: A Big History Perspective*. Volgograd, Russia: Uchitel' Publishing House; Afanas'yeva, V. V., Kochelayevskaya, K. V., & Lazerson, A. G. (2013). *Prostranstvo: noveyshaya ontologiya [Space: the newest ontology]*. Saratov, Russia: Izdatel'skiy Tsentr «Nauka» [Nauka Publishing Center].

¹⁰ Müller, K. (1998). *Postsozialistische Krisen [Post-socialist crises]*. Im K. Müller (Hg.), *Postsozialistische Krisen: Theoretische Ansätze und empirische Befunde [Post-socialist crises: theoretical approaches and empirical findings]* (S. 177-249). Opladen, Germany: Leske + Budrich; Spier, F. (2005) How Big History Works. *Social Evolution & History*. 4(1), 87-135; Yefimchuk, I. V. (2010). Fraktal'nost' istorii [Fractality of history]. *Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost' [Social Sciences and Modernity]*, 5, 146-156.

these authors' "nomadological project".¹¹ The rhizome concept is intended to resist the unchanged linear structures (both of being and thinking), which, in their opinion, are typical of classical European culture. The rhizome's intrinsic "multiplicity" is a negation of the tree's properties which is manifested at all levels in the absence of any main stem or main root. In this case, it turns out to be obvious that it is not possible to impose a demand on the rhizome structure of society to a single common denominator, to a single general property, be it liberal democracy or a free market or, on the contrary, a paternalistic empire or a nationalized economy.

According to Michel Foucault, any power is not simply possessed or not possessed by somebodies but, instead, functions only in the form of a *chain*, being exercised through the network of institutions.¹²

In his book *The Selfish Gene*, British biologist Richard Dawkins coined the term *meme* to describe a unit of culture.¹³

Susan Blackmore claims that ideas, habits, beliefs, and other "memes" as units of culture are reproduced, mutate, and are selected to carry forward culture.¹⁴ According to R. Brody's working definition, a meme is a unit of information in consciousness, whose existence influences events in such a way that a large number of its copies arise in the consciousness of other personalities.¹⁵

The whole Eurasian megacontinental space is just like a rhizome, where a multitude of "orchids and wasps"¹⁶, as an allegory of one of the innumerable variants of interaction between East and West, is a dynamic set of fractal type. This is not opposing alien civilization phenomena, but fertilizing ("pollinating") all-penetrating into all levels of international, national, regional, local communities, dynamic interaction, and in different proportions (conventionally two wasps - one orchid, five wasps - ten orchids and etc., with the role functions of wasps and orchids changing places in this interaction). And the set itself is generated not by any one (actor), but by the conflict of flows (powers) in its non-linear processuality.

On the contrary, the fractal methodological approach to the universe, world and society is rooted in and grounded on some progressive theoretical break-throughs and achievements of the last quarter of the XX and the start of the XXI centuries.

The post-nonclassical epistemology, which has been winning more and more positions among intellectuals, organically combines methods of scientific,

¹¹ Deleuze, J. & Guattari, F. (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translation and Foreword by B. Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pp. 3-25.

¹² Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977* (C. Gordon, Ed.). Herfordshire, England: The Harvester Press.

¹³ Dawkins, R. (2006). *The Selfish Gene: 30th Anniversary edition*. Oxford University Press. xxiii, 359 pp.

¹⁴ Blackmore S. *The Meme Machine*. Oxford: OUP, 1999.

¹⁵ See: Frolov D.A. Меметика: к вопросу о культурных генах [Memetics: on the issue of cultural genes]. Орапёв-online [Ogarev-on-line]. URL: <http://journal.mrsu.ru/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Frolov.pdf>

¹⁶ Deleuze, J. & Guattari, F. (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translation and Foreword by B. Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. P. 10.

philosophical, religious, artistic cognition and the corresponding pictures of the world¹⁷. In particular, as a result of the interdisciplinary research boom, it became clear that the fractality (i.e. self-similarity of part(s) to the whole across different scales) is, along with the nonlinearity, a typical property of nature and society¹⁸.

Fractality, as a determining feature of the postnonclassical vision of the world, essentially overcomes the nomadological (anarcho-"nomadic") picture of the universe, which was proposed in the 1970s, later called poststructuralism and became the "mainstream" of European and, in general, Western philosophy in the post-bipolar era of the 1990s. One of the key concepts and symbols of nomadology - the rhizome is a metaphor of postmodern consciousness - a network of multiple non-linear anti-hierarchical connections opposite to the linear structures of being and thinking. While the root (or pivot) —the key concept of structuralist binary thinking — has a center and goes deep, the rhizome is a structure with a missing semantic center, growing in breadth. Rhizome, as a kind of "body without organs", is not responsible for any structural or generative model, it is alien to any idea of the genetic axis as a deep structure. Reflecting the factors of nonlinear multiplicity and stochasticity inherent in natural and social phenomena (which made it possible to create, for example, a quantum computer) in the early XXI century, nomadism, or poststructuralism, loses (together with binarity as a tool of cognition) loses generative cognitiveness (knowability) as organic quality and stimulus of development of the scientific picture of the world. Nomadism fundamentally denies causation and the very desire to harmonize being (individual, society and the surrounding world), the knowledge of its deep integrity and unity. At the socio-psychological, national and international level, such a worldview actually contributes to the "deconstruction" of political will to build and maintain sustainable development systems based on the principles of peace and collective security, multilateral cooperation and integration. Such intellectual anarchism is fraught with chaos, social alienation and pessimism, an ego-war of "all against all" and, ultimately, the advent of a geopolitical "attractor" that establishes its external dictates over the society which lost its foundation and goal setting.

In the light of the latest achievements of synergetics reviving, already at the scientific level, the holistic worldview (previously inherent to the mythology and religion) based on universal regularities and patterns, the issue of trans-civilizational dialogue and integration looks particularly vital. This, in turn, determines relativism of dichotomous thinking characteristic of the bipolar and the post-bipolar worlds.

¹⁷ Prigogine, I. (1991). *Filosofiya nestabil'nosti* [Philosophy of Instability]. *Voprosy filosofii* [Problems of Philosophy], 6, 46-52. P. 51.

¹⁸ Afanas'yeva, V. V., Kochelayevskaya, K. V., & Lazerson, A. G. (2013). *Prostranstvo: noveyshaya ontologiya* [Space: the newest ontology]. Saratov, Russia: Izdatel'skiy Tsentr «Nauka» [Nauka Publishing Center]; Yefimchuk, I. V. (2010). *Fraktal'nost' istorii* [Fractality of history]. *Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost'* [Social Sciences and Modernity], 5, 146-156.

Thus, from the postmodern understanding of the world, we take the concept of rhizome, and from the postnonclassical one we take the universal property of fractality.

The fractal-synergetic approach permits, behind the empirical accumulation of multi-dimensional, non-linear trajectories of contradictions and conflicts that characterize the present day of structural shocks in the political and security architecture of Eastern Europe, to distinguish certain universal paradigms determining the genesis, development and prospects of settling the hybrid armed conflict in the East of Ukraine and the Ukraine crisis on the whole.

From this viewpoint the historically, linguistically, confessionally and culturally diverse Ukraine is fundamentally not divisible into clearly discrete parts but represents and should be analyzed as a continuum of fractal differences and oppositions from the national to local levels.

As Ilya Prigogine (1991) fathomed, against the background of Fukuyama's then triumphant "End of History": " <...> a more general understanding of science and knowledge in general, an understanding that meets the cultural traditions of not only Western civilization, is emerging"¹⁹ . Apparently, in this progress towards a multivariate vision of the world, its spatial and temporal dynamics one may foresee emerging new trans-civilizational intellectual currents and socio-political initiatives aiming to reconcile the traditional East-West dichotomy through the global synthesis of different civilization views of religion, ethics, metaphysics, science and art.



THE CONFLICT'S NATURE: THREE LEVELS OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS' ANALYSIS

Geopolitics, the World & Regional Order and Security Crisis of the World and Regional Political Climate

The modern political science literature devoted to the conflict in the East of Ukraine is dominated by the neorealist vision of the conflict through the prism of geopolitics, contradictions of respectively the world, the megacontinental and macroregional order, as a "great strategic crisis"²⁰ of international security, Europe's (straiter, Eastern Europe's) and the post-Soviet space' political and institutional architecture.²¹

¹⁹ Prigogine, I. (1991). *Filosofiya nestabil'nosti* [Philosophy of Instability]. *Voprosy filosofii* [Problems of Philosophy], 6, 46-52. P. 47.

²⁰ Wu, Yu-Shan (2017). Pivot, Hedger, or Partner Strategies of Lesser Powers Caught between Hegemons. In Dittmer, L. (ed.), *Taiwan and China*. California University of California Press. Pp. 197-220. P. 197.

²¹ Bacevich 2002: 114–116; Kagan 2003; Kalb 2016: 9). Bacevich, Andrew J. (2002) *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Kagan, Robert (2003) *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.; Zajac (2016), p. 137; Lukin, A. *Russia, China and the*

Following leading US political realist scholars such as Robert Kagan, John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Robert Kaplan and Andrew Bacevich and others who have argued that the new world order will continue to resemble the great power struggles, wars and conflicts of the past, while refuting Francis Fukuyama and other neoliberal institutionalists' 1990s views about the end of the global rivalry for influence²², the triumph of democratic liberalism and "democratic peace"²³, Justyna Zając in her sceptical view "from Warsaw" asserts:

"The 21st century saw a return to the geopolitics of the 19th century—to the power of states, the concert of powers, political and military rivalry, and the division of the world into spheres of influence."²⁴

At this level of political analysis, the Ukrainian crisis is the result of the unresolved geopolitical contradictions between the West and Russia after the collapse of the USSR and the former bipolar world order with two global superpowers supporting the geopolitical and military-strategic balance - the USA and the USSR. In institutional terms, this geopolitical contradiction is expressed in the conflict of the normative orders (regimes) of the Euro-Atlantic hierarchy (which the Kremlin considers "the substitution of international law for the NATO-centric but not the universal rules"²⁵) and the Russia-controlled (relying on its strengthened economic

Korean Peninsula: A Post-Ukraine Assessment. International Journal of Korean Unification Studies. Vol. 24, No. 3, 2015, 67–100; Lukin, A. V. (2014). Povorot k Azii. Rossiyskaya vneshnyaya politika na rubezhe vekov i yeye aktivizatsiya na vostochnom napravlenii [Pivot to Asia. Russian Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Centuries and its Activation in the Eastern direction]. Moscow: Ves' Mir. – 640 pp. (in Russian); Makarov, I.A. (Ed.) (2016), Povorot Na Vostok: Razvitie Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka v usloviakh usileniia aziatskogo vektora vneshnei politiki Rossii [The Turn to the East: Development of Siberia and the Russian Far East under Strengthening the Asian Direction of Russian Foreign Policy]. – Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 2016. – 448 pp. (in Russian); Song LILEI. The Ukraine crisis: a multidimensional analysis in China. EASTERN JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES. Volume 6, Issue 2, December 2015: 159-175. P. 173; Lora Saalman, the Director of, and Senior Researcher at, the China and Global Security Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Little Grey Men: China and the Ukraine Crisis. Survival. Vol. 58. No. 6. December 2016–January 2017. pp. 135–156; Bogdanov CHAPTER 3 Preserving Peace Among the Great Powers: Russia's Foreign Policy and Normative Challenges to the International Order Alexey Bogdanovp. 39-40; John Berryman. CHAPTER 8 Russia and the European Security Order: Impact and Implications of the Ukraine Crisis. In: Roger E. Kanet Editor The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment. P. 167-188; James Hughes & Gwendolyn Sasse, "Power ideas and conflict: ideology, linkage and leverage in Crimea and Chechnya", East European Politics, 2016, Vol.32, No.3, pp.314-334; Gwendolyn Sasse, "International linkages and the dynamics of conflict: revisiting the post-Soviet conflicts", East European Politics, 2016, Vol.32, No.3, pp.289-296;

²² Justyna Zając (2016). Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order. Palgrave Macmillan. 226 pp. - p. 178.

²³ Berryman, J. Chapter 8. Russia and the European Security Order: Impact and Implications of the Ukraine Crisis In: Roger E. Kanet Editor The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment. P. 167-188. P. 178.

²⁴ Justyna Zając (2016). Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order. Palgrave Macmillan. 226 pp. - p. 192-193.

²⁵ Лавров С.В. (2019). Выступление и ответы на вопросы СМИ в ходе пресс-конференции по итогам деятельности российской дипломатии в 2018 году (16 января 2019 года). *Российско-*

power) hierarchy (Eurasian Economic Union, Customs Union, CIS, CSTO)²⁶. According to dominant political analysts in mainland China, “As one of the most serious geopolitical crises since the end of the Cold War”²⁷ “The Ukraine Crisis, in essence, embodies competition and mutual confrontation between the EU and the Eurasian Union,”²⁸ ” and “is seen as a clash between the West and Russia.”²⁹. At the same time, some political analysts, not only Russian and Chinese but also Western ones, lay the blame primarily on the West. Among the main arguments put forward by critics of the West there are the failure to comply with the political assurances of non-expansion of NATO to the East given to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev by the then US leadership at the turn of 1989-1990 and the alleged “hypocrisy in US policies on Ukraine versus Kosovo: Washington argued for elections in Kosovo under the guise of human rights, while denouncing elections in Crimea under the argument of sovereignty”.³⁰

Certainly, such accusations are likely to only intensify after the recognition by U.S. President Donald Trump on March 25, 2019 Israel's 1981 annexation of the Golan Heights, i.e. Israeli sovereignty over Golan Heights. Earlier, on December 6, 2017 President Trump officially recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The EU and the European great powers are against such steps by the incumbent U.S. President.

The other part of political scientists lay the blame for undermining the world and the European normative order, the Helsinki principle of inviolability of borders and the entire system of regional, continental and global security on Russia and, indirectly, on the PRC (for getting closer with Russia on the basis of rivalry with the USA)³¹ or, less common, take a neutral (equidistant) position³².

украинское обозрение. Киев: Издание Посольства Российской Федерации в Украине. С. 2-26. С. 13.

²⁶ Bogdanov Alexey. CHAPTER 3 Preserving Peace Among the Great Powers: Russia's Foreign Policy and Normative Challenges to the International Order. In: Roger E. Kanet Editor The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment. P. 39.

²⁷ Song, L. The Ukraine crisis: a multidimensional analysis in China. *Eastern Journal of European Studies*. Volume 6, Issue 2, December 2015: 159-175. P. 159.

²⁸ Song, L. (December 2015). The Ukraine crisis: a multidimensional analysis in China. *Eastern Journal of European Studies*. Volume 6, Issue 2: 159-175. P. 173.

²⁹ Zając, J. (2016). Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order. Palgrave Macmillan. 226 pp. - p. 137.

³⁰ Salman, L. (2017). Little Grey Men: China and the Ukraine Crisis. *Survival*. Vol. 58. No. 6. December 2016–January 2017. Pp. 135–156. P. 138.

³¹ Loftus, S. & Kanet R.E. (2017). Growing Confrontation Between Russia and the West: Russia's Challenge to the Post-Cold War Order. Pp. 13-36 In: Roger E. Kanet Editor The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment; Yermolenko, V. Ukraine is the result of the expansion of the West to the East - historian Yaroslav Hrytsak. February 14, 2019. Retrieved from: <https://hromadske.ua> ; John Berryman. CHAPTER 8 Russia and the European Security Order: Impact and Implications of the Ukraine Crisis. P. 167-188. - P. 180. Alexander J. Motyl, “Putin's Trap: Why Ukraine Should Withdraw from Russian-Held Donbas,” *Foreign Affairs*, 1 September 2014. - P. 82; Sotiris Serbos and Georgios Anastasiadis. REVISITING EUROPE'S GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE AFTER THE UKRAINE CRISIS: AMERICA'S BALANCE OF

As Ana Maria Costea (Ghimis) points out, the Kremlin's "constant antagonism vis-à-vis the West and the expansion of the EU and NATO in Russia's own backyard" created

"the preconditions of a war that would lead to a frozen conflict on the Ukrainian territory that ultimately would freeze Kiev in a grey zone in which is neither with Russia, nor with the EU/NATO. Taking all these into consideration, we should acknowledge also the West's responsibility in playing in the Russian backyard and not reacting sooner and in a more constant manner."³³

In this regard, from the global and continental perspective the Donbas armed conflict might be seen also as a proxy war³⁴ between the world biggest nuclear

POWER STRATEGY. Democritus University of Thrace and American College of Thessaloniki; IRENEUSZ PAWEŁ KAROLEWSKI, The Willy Brandt Centre for German and European Studies, University of Wrocław, & MAI'A K. DAVIS CROSS, Northeastern University and the ARENA Centre for European Studies. The EU's Power in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis: Enabled or Constrained? *Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS)*. 2017. Volume 55. Number 1. pp. 137–152. - p. 150. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12446 saloniki // Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal, N° 46 (Enero/January 2018) Pp. 177-195. Alexander Duleba, "Russian-Ukrainian crisis: what next for the Eastern Partnership?," *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. XXIII, No. 3–4, 2014, pp. 57–70.). Haran, O. (2015). Ukrainian-Russian Conflict and Its Implications for Northeast Asia. *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*. Vol. 24, No. 3, 2015, 125–158. Yekelchik, Serhy (2015). *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*. 2015. xix, 186 pp. Gorbulin, V. P. (2015) *Ukraine and Russia: the Ninth Wave or the Chinese Wall* / V. P. Gorbulin, O. S. Vlasyuk, S. V. Kononenko. Kyiv, the National Institute of Strategic Studies. - P. 23; Trilateral Commission (May 15, 2014). *U.S. Interests. Summary of North American Chapter / Engaging Russia: A Return to Containment? The Trilateral Commission 2013/2014 Task Force Report*. 37 pp. P. 12. Retrieved from: http://trilateral.org/download/doc/TF_Russia_for_WEBSITE_final_15_May_2014.pdf Radziyevska Svitlana, Us Ivan, Pokryshka Dmytro. Global dominates of China's development. *The International Economic Policy*. Vol. 1, no. 26 (2017): 134-163). Alexander J. Motyl, "Putin's Trap: Why Ukraine Should Withdraw from Russian-Held Donbas," *Foreign Affairs*, 1 September 2014. - P. 82.

32 Helena Rytövuori-Apunen. The Depth of Borders Beyond the State: Analytical, Normative and Epistemic Challenges of Study. In: Cengiz Günay & Nina Witjes, Editors (2017). *Border Politics. Defining Spaces of Governance and Forms of Transgressions*. Vienna; Munich: Springer. Pp. 175-193; Maria Raquel Freire. Chapter 9. Ukraine and the Restructuring of East-West Relations. Pp. 189-210. - P. 205; Wu, Yu-Shan (2017). Pivot, Hedger, or Partner Strategies of Lesser Powers Caught between Hegemons. In Dittmer, L. (ed.), *Taiwan and China*. California University of California Press; Arakelyan L. A. Chapter 4. *EU-Russia Security Relations: Another Kind of Europe*. In: Kanet, R. E. (Ed.) (2017). *The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment*. Palgrave Macmillan. P. 61-80; Ana Maria COSTEA (GHIMIS). THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS - AN UNPREDICTABLE EVENT? *CES Working Papers*. Volume VIII, Issue 3. Pp. 333-347. - P. 345.

33 Costea (Ghimis), A.M. The Ukrainian Crisis - an Unpredictable Event? *CES Working Papers*. – Volume VIII, Issue 3. Pp. 333-347. - P. 345.

34 Mumford, A. (2013). Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict. *The RUSI Journal*. Vol. 158 (2), 40–46; Minasyan, S. (2014) The Last Post-Soviet Conflict. The Military and Political Dimension of the Ukraine Crisis. *Rossiia v global'noy politike [Russia in Global Affairs]*. Issue 5. URL: <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Poslednyaya-postsovetskaya-voyna-17098> (in Russian); Lora

powers and major geopolitical actors in Eurasia that has much in common with the Korean War, the ongoing confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and the strategic conflict over Taiwan. From this point of view, along with Russia's direct military intervention in the armed conflict in Ukraine there takes place another great power's active involvement as a security protector. In this case, like in the Taiwan conflict, there are the USA. As a Taiwanese political thinker Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang emphasizes, "Taiwan is more like the rest of Ukraine, dangerously and unfortunately situated in a competition between great powers and simply trying to survive".³⁵ Thus, we may agree with Academician Yu-Shan Wu's opinion that along with "the main geopolitical fault line for Sino-American competition found in East Asia", "another great strategic conflict in today's world is between the West and Russia over Ukraine. The lesser powers in eastern Europe are in a situation similar to that of their counterparts in East Asia: both are caught in a competition between two great powers."³⁶

The extreme aggravation of the Ukraine-Russia relations as a result of Euromaidan's victory in Kyiv, followed by Russia's annexation of Crimea and the hybrid armed conflict in Donbas,³⁷ has exposed deep ideological splits across the post-Soviet space, polarized the regional transformation and integration processes.

As British political scientist rightly points out Richard Sakwa: "The Ukrainian crisis is only the latest symptom of the long-term failure to reconcile the various interests on the European continent."³⁸ This is eventually a continental crisis, reflecting fundamental problems in the East-West relations of the post-Unipolar epoch. Sakwa sees the root of the Ukrainian crisis in the fact that after the Berlin Wall's fall "unlike at Yalta, there was no Winston Churchill to speak on behalf of Europe"³⁹. As a result, at the Maltese summit of the leaders of the USSR and the USA, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, held on December 2-3, 1989, less than a month after the Berlin Wall had fallen, there was no substantive talk about Greater Europe:

"The tragedy of the Malta Summit is that Gorbachev was not talking about these ideas with European leaders, but with the president of the United States. <...> Not surprisingly, the idea of a Greater Europe was the last thing that Bush wished to talk about, since it would signal precisely

Saalman. Little Grey Men: China and the Ukraine Crisis. *Survival*. Vol. 58. No. 6. December 2016–January 2017. pp. 135–156. P. 135.

35 Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang Taiwan Is No Crimea, But... April 22, 2014.

36 Wu, Yu-Shan (2017). *Pivot, Hedger, or Partner Strategies of Lesser Powers Caught between Hegemons*. In Dittmer, L. (ed.), *Taiwan and China*. California University of California Press. Pp. 197-220. P. 197.

37 Marmazov V. We are looking into the future of Ukraine with optimism, no matter what hardship we are suffering. *Diplomacy*. Vol. XVI, No. 8-9. P. 40-41.

38 Richard Sakwa (Professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, Great Britain). The Deep Roots of the Ukraine Crisis. To Forge a Lasting Peace in Europe, We Must Rethink the Post–Cold War Security Order. *The Nation*. May 4, 2015. Pp. 31-32.

39 Richard Sakwa (Professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, Great Britain). The Deep Roots of the Ukraine Crisis. To Forge a Lasting Peace in Europe, We Must Rethink the Post–Cold War Security Order. *The Nation*. May 4, 2015. Pp. 31-32.

what America had long feared: a split between the European and American wings of the Atlantic alliance. <...>

Thus, Malta turned out to be not just a lost opportunity but a political disaster.”⁴⁰

While in 1989-1990 Germany and in the early 1990s Poland claimed the role of a bridge between East and West⁴¹ and then this role - before the above crisis - passed to Russia and Ukraine, now there is no country playing such a role. After the dissolution of the USSR the Washington's and Brussels's policy towards the CIS new independent states has been fundamentally different from their course towards Russia stipulating the strong foundation for strategic conflicts.

Meanwhile, a part of political scientists in the context of the Ukrainian crisis note its destructive consequences⁴², while the other part actually support the black-and-white логики of the zero sum (“either-or”⁴³) geopolitical game⁴⁴.

Back in the mid-1990s, Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out the key geopolitical role of an independent Ukraine as a pivot between the West and Russia:

“Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state [...]”.⁴⁵

Nowadays, this conviction and its corresponding arguments are still rather a mainstream among American political scientists engaged in Ukraine studies, although

40 Richard Sakwa (Professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, Great Britain). The Deep Roots of the Ukraine Crisis. To Forge a Lasting Peace in Europe, We Must Rethink the Post–Cold War Security Order. *The Nation*. May 4, 2015. Pp. 32.

41 Justyna Zajac (2016). Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order. Palgrave Macmillan. 226 pp. - P. 186-187.

42 Arakelyan L. A. Chapter 4. EU-Russia Security Relations: Another Kind of Europe. In: Kanet, R. E. (Ed.) (2017). *The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment*. Palgrave Macmillan. P. 61-80; Helena Rytövuori-Apunen. The Depth of Borders Beyond the State: Analytical, Normative and Epistemic Challenges of Study. In: Cengiz Günay & Nina Witjes, Editors (2017). *Border Politics. Defining Spaces of Governance and Forms of Transgressions*. Vienna; Munich: Springer. Pp. 175-193; Maria Raquel Freire. Chapter 9. Ukraine and the Restructuring of East-West Relations. Pp. 189-210. - P. 205; Richard Sakwa (Professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent, Great Britain). The Deep Roots of the Ukraine Crisis. To Forge a Lasting Peace in Europe, We Must Rethink the Post–Cold War Security Order. *The Nation*. May 4, 2015. Pp. 31-32. - P. 31. Zajac (2016). *Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order*. Palgrave Macmillan. 226 pp.; Bock, Andreas M ; Henneberg, Ingo ; Plank, Friedrich. “If you compress the spring, it will snap back hard”: The Ukrainian crisis and the balance of threat theory. *International Journal. Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, March 2015, Vol.70(1), pp.101-109.

43 Arakelyan L. A. Chapter 4. EU-Russia Security Relations: Another Kind of Europe. In: Kanet, R. E. (Ed.) (2017). *The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment*. Palgrave Macmillan. P. 61-80

44 Baev P. K. Three turns in the evolution of China–Russia presidential pseudo-alliance. *Asia Pac Policy Stud*. 2019; 6:4–18. <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.26318BAEV>

45 Brzeziński, Zb. (1997), *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books. P. 46.

such views are not always expressed in an explicitly neorealist form. In this regard, John Berryman's avowal in the context of the Ukraine Crisis' impact and implications analysis is of particular interest:

"Nonetheless, it remains clear that a combination of American military power and the contribution of other regional powers will be necessary to prevent the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon – the central aim of US grand strategy."⁴⁶

Suzanne Loftus and Roger E. Kanet, in fact from the position of offensive realism, directly link the potential realization of Russia's aspiration "to reestablish itself as a world power and sustain its rebellious attitude" towards the Post-Cold War order with the capacity "to support its loud barks with substantial economic strength".⁴⁷

Authors of North American *Chapter* of the Trilateral Commission's report released on May 15, 2014 and devoted to the current state and prospects for the West – Russia relationship in the context of the Ukraine crisis are extremely frankly as well:

"Putin's Russia is an adversary, bent on pursuing regional hegemony and challenging the western-led international system.

<...> Above all, Russia affects the United States' ability to <...> ensure a favorable balance of power in critical regions that enables continued U.S. global leadership".⁴⁸

Characteristically, the Brzezinski concept applies in this context not only to Russia but also to China as the emerging Eurasian and world superpower. Meanwhile, such a the 'win-lose' framework is logically opposed to the conflict peaceful (diplomatic), not to mention consensus-finding, resolution.

Pavel Baev is sceptical about the efficiency of the China-Russia alliance in doing away with the U.S. dominance:

"Instead of a cordial arrangement for complementary efforts at cutting short the U.S. dominance, the China–Russia pseudo-alliance has turned into a mutually irritating duress, in which Beijing seeks to prevent Moscow from spoiling its difficult deal making with Washington, and Moscow resents the short leash—and needs to escape from the path of a designated loser".⁴⁹

On the contrary, a Chinese contributor to East-Asian Chapter of the Trilateral Commission's above-mentioned report argued:

"From a [mainland] Chinese perspective, the Ukrainian crisis is the product of residual Cold War mentality. <...> What western media called "a new Cold War" triggered by the Ukraine crisis is in no one's interest. If Ukraine at this point is forced to choose between the U.S./Europe and Russia,

46 John Berryman. CHAPTER 8 Russia and the European Security Order: Impact and Implications of the Ukraine Crisis. In: Roger E. Kanet Editor The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment. P. 167-188. - P. 180.

47 Suzanne Loftus & Roger E. Kanet. Growing Confrontation Between Russia and the West: Russia's Challenge to the Post-Cold War Order. In: Roger E. Kanet (Editor). The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment. Pp. 13-36. - P. 29.

48 Trilateral Commission (May 15, 2014). *Engaging Russia: A Return to Containment? The Trilateral Commission 2013/2014 Task Force Report*. 37 pp. P. 12. Retrieved from: http://trilateral.org/download/doc/TF_Russia_for_WEBSITE_final_15_May_2014.pdf

49 Baev P. K. Three turns in the evolution of China–Russia presidential pseudo-alliance. *Asia Pac Policy Stud.* 2019;6:4–18. P. 13. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.26318BAEV>

the situation will be further destabilized and the country risks another round of disintegration after it lost Crimea, and if the EU breaks with Russia for supporting Ukraine and the two end up in a new Cold War, the interests of both sides will be jeopardized as the costs far outweigh the gains.”⁵⁰

In the European Union member states, where there are strong fears of a revival of German imperialism and revanchism, the recommendations to use the Ukrainian crisis to contain the German-Russian relations and prevent their transformation into a close strategic partnership (a nightmare for both American strategists and many politicians from countries that survived the German and / or Soviet occupation in the XX century) are noteworthy. For example, Greek scholars Sotiris Serbos and Georgios Anastasiadis⁵¹ emphasize:

“We argue that U.S. strategy favoring a united Europe can exploit events in Ukraine and security fears in Eastern Europe to contain the German-Russian relation, leaving Germany with no better option than commitment to lead EU integration”.⁵²

In an effort to preserve for an indefinitely long time a tough confrontation between Ukraine and Russia in the U. S.' strategic interests, some American political analysts, in the midst of the armed conflict were proposing a direct Machiavellian strategy with regard to the particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts not controlled by Kyiv:

“The goal would be to turn them not into autonomous federal units within a weak Ukraine, as Putin desires, but into an independent entity, as he pointedly does not.”⁵³

In this regard one may dispute about the expediency of the West's decision to fully include into the decision-making regarding the EU-Russia relationship the Central and Eastern Europe states, whose relations with Russia were burdened with the Modern time conflicts and problems, such as the occupation of the Baltic States, events in Hungary in 1956, the Prague Spring, very painful Poland-Russia relations historical memory, etc.

Poland and the Polish politicum are the classic zero-sum player in relations with Russia. In Poland some prominent politicians not only actively supported providing Ukraine with defensive weapons but “entertained a possibility” of armed intervention in Ukraine by using NATO forces.⁵⁴ At the same time, politicians and political forces aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis taking into account the interests not only of the West, but also of Russia, receive even in the scientific literature of the countries of the former “sanitary cordon” against the USSR the

50 THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION. ENGAGING RUSSIA: A Return to Containment? 2013/2014 TASK FORCE REPORT RELEASED ON MAY 15, 2014. Retrieved from: http://trilateral.org/download/doc/TF_Russia_for_WEBSITE_final_15_May_2014.pdf 37 pp. P. 27.

⁵¹ It is noteworthy that Georgios Anastasiadis works at the American College of Thessaloniki.

⁵² Serbos, S. and Anastasiadis, G. (January 2018). Revisiting Europe's Geopolitical Landscape after the Ukraine Crisis: America's Balance of Power Strategy. *UNISCI Journal*. N° 46. Pp. 177-195. P. 178.

⁵³ Alexander J. Motyl, “Putin's Trap: Why Ukraine Should Withdraw from Russian-Held Donbas,” *Foreign Affairs*, 1 September 2014. - P. 82.

⁵⁴ Zając, J. (2016). Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order. Palgrave Macmillan. 226 pp. - P. 168.

name of “Trojan horses”⁵⁵, that is, direct agents of the Kremlin. All this is very reminiscent of the aggressively derogatory rhetoric of the Cold War worst times. Naturally, with such a rhetoric “Donbas is likely to remain an unresolved conflict”⁵⁶.

At the same time, a number of prominent American political scientists are well aware of the danger of a global and continental US confrontation on two fronts — both against Russia and China. Rory Medcalf as early as in April 2014 wrote: “Is it fanciful fearmongering to start thinking of the prospect of a future double Cold War, with U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations in the freezer at the same time?”⁵⁷

Soon after Donald Trump's election as President of the USA Graham Allison and Dimitri Simes addressed him with a blueprint wherein they argued that for the USA “closer relations with Russia could provide counterbalancing to China”.⁵⁸

Serbian political scientist Srja Trifkovic also stresses the above need if one takes the viewpoint of the US geopolitical interests:

“In the early 1970s, Dr. Henry Kissinger was really wise to consider the benefits of the discovery of the United States for China <...>.

<...> Then the Soviet Union was much more powerful than China, so the United States had a logical connection with the weaker side of the triangle. However, today China is economically and demographically much stronger than Russia, and for the United States the best strategy would be to strive for good relations with Moscow as a weaker side in the same triangle.”⁵⁹

In this regard, it is necessary to note the opinion being widespread in the scientific and expert community of Ukraine about the country's special place and role in relations between the West and the East. Thus, a famous Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Gritsak from the traditionally pro-Western region of Galichina argues that “Ukraine is the result of the expansion to the East.”⁶⁰

55 IRENEUSZ PAWEL KAROLEWSKI¹, The Willy Brandt Centre for German and European Studies, University of Wroclaw, & MAI'A K. DAVIS CROSS, Northeastern University and the ARENA Centre for European Studies. The EU's Power in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis: Enabled or Constrained? Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS). 2017. Volume 55. Number 1. pp. 137–152. - p. 150. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12446

56 IRENEUSZ PAWEL KAROLEWSKI¹, The Willy Brandt Centre for German and European Studies, University of Wroclaw, & MAI'A K. DAVIS CROSS, Northeastern University and the ARENA Centre for European Studies. The EU's Power in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis: Enabled or Constrained? Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS). 2017. Volume 55. Number 1. pp. 137–152. - p. 150. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12446

57 Medcalf R. Crimea. A Silver Lining for the United States' Asian Allies? April 22, 2014. URL: <https://www.nbr.org/publication/crimea-a-silver-lining-for-the-united-states-asian-allies/>

58 Allison G., Simes D. A Blueprint for Donald Trump to Fix Relations with Russia. A Policy Memo to the President-Elect. Priority: high. The National Interest. December 18, 2016.

59 Трифкович С. ГЕОПОЛИТИЧКА ПОЗАДИНА УКРАЈИНСКЕ КРИЗЕ [THE GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS] II. 11-27 “Политеиа”, бр. 8, Бања Лука, децембар 2014. С. 21-22 (In Serbian).

60 Yermolenko, V. Ukraine is the result of the expansion of the West to the East - historian Yaroslav Hrytsak. February 14, 2019. Retrieved from: <https://hromadske.ua>

Ukrainian political scientist Olexiy Haran debatably posits in a prestigious Korean journal that “since the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Moscow and Kyiv held opposite views of its future — “reintegration” and “civilized divorce” respectively”,⁶¹ while not mentioning the actual split in the ethno-culturally heterogeneous Ukrainian society regarding the country's geopolitical choice.⁶²

Meanwhile, contemporary Ukraine's foreign policy was distinguished for many years by the geopolitical inconsistency and uncertainty. For instance, in 1993 President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk announced Ukraine's intention to become an associate member of the CIS states' intended Economic Union.⁶³ In 2003, another Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed the Yalta Agreement of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan on Forming the Common Economic Space envisaging a supranational body on tariffs and trade. The Agreement was ratified by Parliament of Ukraine in April, 2004⁶⁴ but its implementation was blocked soon by the Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, Ukraine, unlike Georgia, despite the armed conflict with Russia, had not withdrawn from the CIS' coordination bodies until February 2019⁶⁵.

Turning (by exploring and explaining) to the issue of blame for the conflict in the east of Ukraine, one may logically move to a second, deeper level of analysis of the conflict associated with confrontation and direct clash between different value-identity and political-normative orders on the Eurasian megacontinent. One part of political scientists are limited to a purely political modernization approach, appealing to the contradictions and dynamics of democratization in the modern world in general and in Eurasia and in the post-Soviet space in particular. Another part analyze the conflict at a deeper level of cultural identities, historical & cultural patterns and values of respective countries and regions. Such a political and cultural analysis goes as back as to Nikolai Danilevsky, the founder of civilization theory, and his book titled "Russia and Europe. A look at the cultural and political relations of the Slavic world to the German-Roman" first published in Russian in 1869. The problem, however, is that the overwhelming majority of these political scientists consider civilizational and cultural differences and contradictions as given in the context of the independent, separate development logics of each civilization. In this context, each of the civilizations and the historical cultures that determine them is self-valued, while convergent trans-civilization trends are actually ignored.

61 Haran, O. (2015) Op. cit. – P. 127.

62 Haran, O. (2015).Op.cit.

63 The CIS States' Treaty of 24.09.1993 on Establishment of the Economic Union. Retrieved from <http://lawru.info/dok/1993/09/24/n114222.htm> (in Russian)

64 The Agreement on the Common Economic Space of September 19, 2003. *Ofitsiynny visnyk Ukrayiny* [Official Bulletin of Ukraine]. 16 July 2004. – No. 26, p. 244 (in Ukrainian).

65 Украина вышла из координационных органов СНГ. 06.02.2019. Украина.ру <https://news.ukraina.ru>

Meanwhile, throughout *Achsenzeit* ("Axial Age") of humanity that is, since about the 5th century BC⁶⁶, we may observe the East-West dichotomy within the Eurasian megacontinental space.

***Conflict of Political Regimes
in the context of Political/Economic Transformation/Modernization
in the Post-Soviet, the Post-Communist and the Continental spaces***

The second level of analysis of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine considers the latter as a conflict of institutional value-normative orders or political regimes through the context of political/economic transformation/modernization in the Post-Soviet, the Post-Communist and the Eurasian megacontinental spaces. Thus, the clash between different political doctrines and political regimes in the post-Soviet space is represented as tending either to Western-style pluralist democracy and integrating to the European/Euroatlantic community, or to strong authoritarianism (also including paternalism and the post-Soviet nostalgia), accepting Russia's strategic interests and clout in the post-Soviet space.⁶⁷

Such an analysis is based on the normative and value content and qualities of the respectively Western (Euro-Atlantic, the European Union's) democratic and, as alternative, Russian (pro-Russian, pro-Soviet, pro-Horde, neo-Politar⁶⁸) authoritarian political regimes reflected in the Ukraine conflict at its various levels: international, national, subnational, etc. At the same time, conflict, even antagonistic, differences in political regimes are emphasized - in the context of modernization and globalization - in the countries one way or another involved in the conflict, primarily in Ukraine, Russia and Ukraine's Western partners. The main contradiction (conflict) here is seen between the authoritarian monopoly (in Russia and in the particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts not controlled by the Ukrainian government) and the plural pro-Western, appealing to the principles of Western democracy (in Kyiv-controlled Ukraine), opposing political regimes.

As Verena Fritz emphasizes:

⁶⁶ Jaspers, K. (1953). *The Origin and Goal of History*. translated by Michael Bullock. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

⁶⁷ Yekelchuk, Serhy (2015). *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*. 2015. xix, 186 pp.; James Hughes & Gwendolyn Sasse, "Power ideas and conflict: ideology, linkage and leverage in Crimea and Chechnya", *East European Politics*, 2016, Vol.32, No.3, pp. 314-334. Mark Teramae (University of Helsinki). *Subnational Authoritarianism under the Party of Regions and post-Maidan Boundary Control* // *Journal of Conflict and Integration*. Vol.1 No. 22017.12 98 - 123 (26 pp.); Bogdanov, A. Chapter 3. Preserving Peace Among the Great Powers: Russia's Foreign Policy and Normative Challenges to the International Order.

⁶⁸ See: Piliaiev I. Contemporary Russia as the Palace-Neopolitar State and Economy. *Economic Annals-XXI*: Volume 156, Issue 1-2, P. 4-8, 2016.

“The Ukrainian ideology is <...> gradually missing due to the development of the multi-party system. The small political party system and the diversified political concept market have made it difficult for the Ukrainian national elite to control the political situation.⁶⁹

Fritz's conclusions have been fully verified during the post-Euromaidan 2014 and 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections: no one distinct ideology party (in contrast to populist or charismatic leader's ones) either won (overcome the 5% entrance barrier) at the parliamentary elections or got at least 5% voter's support for their representatives at the presidential elections. Moreover, among 5 political parties which won seats in the Verkhovna Rada at the July 21, 2019 parliamentary election (“Servant of the People”, “The Opposition Platform – For Life”, “Bat’kivschina” /*Motherland*/, “European Solidarity” and “Holos” /*Voice*/) only two (“Bat’kivschina” and the “Petro Poroshenko’s Block” rebranded in May 2019 into “European Solidarity”) took part in the previous 2014 elections. And representatives of the newly elected President Volodymyr Zelensky’s classically populist “Servant of the People” Party (established just in 2018) won the absolute majority of parliamentary seats.

Serhy Yekelchik argues that the 2013-14 Ukrainian revolution presented authoritarian powers in Russia with both a democratic and a geopolitical challenge”.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, he characterizes Ukraine’s socio-economic system as “crony capitalism”⁷¹ while recognizing the extreme right’s significant role in the Euromaidan mass protests.⁷²

Since the victory of Euromaidan in Ukraine, there clearly delineated and intensified during President Poroshenko’s five-year cadence the tendency to build a state based on the radical ideology of Ukrainian "integral nationalism" worked out by a Ukrainian nationalist writer and political thinker Dmytro Dontsov. In its turn, the above ideology with its credo "Ukraine above all" is "based on samples of Nazism"⁷³, as well as Italian fascism⁷⁴ and was taken into service by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) during the Second World War. This totalitarian ideology in its essence and origin is characterized by the primacy of the state over a

69 Fritz, V. *State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia*, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2006, pp.114-115.

70 Yekelchik, Serhy (2015). *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*. 2015. xix, 186 pp.

71 Yekelchik, Serhy (2015). *Op. cit.* P. 77.

72 Yekelchik, Serhy (2015). *Op. cit.* P. 105.

73 Spil’nyy vysnovok ukrayins’kykh ta pol’s’kykh istorykiv za pidsumkamy ikh-kh mizhnarodnykh naukovykh seminariv (Varshava, 5-11 lystopada 2001 r.) / Dokumenty z vidznachennya 60-yi richnytsi trahichnykh podiy na Volyni 1943 roku (zvernennya, zayavy, lysty) [Joint conclusion of Ukrainian and Polish historians according to the results of the IX-X international scientific seminars (Warsaw, November 5-11, 2001) / Documents commemorating the 60th anniversary of the tragic events in Volyn in 1943 (appeals, statements, letters)]. *Voyenna istoriya [Military History]*. 2003. – №№ 3-4. (In Ukrainian). Retrieved from: http://warhistory.ukrlife.org/3_4_03_2.htm

74 Kvit S. (2013). Dmytro Dontsov: ideolohichnyy portret. Vydannya druhe, vypravlene i dopovnene [Dmytro Dontsov: ideological portrait. Second edition, corrected and supplemented]. Lviv: Галицька видавнича спілка [Galician Publishing Union], 2013. 192 p. P. 157-158. (In Ukrainian).

citizen, the subordination of human rights to the ideological doctrine of a monolithic ethnic nation⁷⁵.

A modern Ukrainian researcher of political radicalism and extremism, Eugene Vasilchuk, based on a thorough study of the array of facts, concludes that in recent years the growing popularity of right-wing ideas and practices in Ukraine⁷⁶ has become an important trend of social and political life in Ukraine⁷⁷. Over the last five years, the radical right-wing ideology has penetrated widely into all levels of the national establishment (political elite)⁷⁸. The actions of the right-wing radicals become more aggressive and brutal, in their ideology and tactics there is a transition from radical statements using definitions of “biological” or “cultural” racism⁷⁹ to “extremist and sometimes terrorist forms and activities”⁸⁰. “Against the background of the ongoing military-political conflict in eastern Ukraine, under the slogans of the struggle against separatism and “Russian influence”, where any excesses are unambiguously explained by the infernal image of the Russian Federation <...>, right-wing radicals openly carry out activities accompanied by acts of violence and terror against all dissenters”⁸¹. This is happening against the background of a number of clashes between right-wing radicals and police officers. At the same time, alarmist sentiments in the Ukrainian society have been growing, since “law enforcement agencies are not able to control the situation”⁸². It is characteristic in this context that Y. Vasilchuk, who consistently adheres to pro-European positions, agrees with the opinion of another Ukrainian political scientist Mikhail Pogrebinsky, well-known for his sympathies for Russia, that the right-wing radicals “actually control the street, and the authorities do nothing to oppose them. <, ...> The authorities sympathize with them, use them to their advantage and do not intend to resist them”⁸³.

Mark Teramae (University of Helsinki) sees the causes of the secessionist armed conflict in Donbas in the phenomenon of Subnational Authoritarianism, which flourished there in the 2000s after consolidation of regional power in the hands of the

⁷⁵ See: Eco, U. Ur-Fascism (June 22, 1995). *The New York Review of Books*. Retrieved from: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1856>

⁷⁶ Vasilchuk, E. (2018). *Pravyi radykalizm v Ukrayini: monohrafiya. [Right-wing radicalism in Ukraine: a monograph]*. Cherkasy: Publisher: Oleksandr Tretyakov. 264 pp. P. 216. (In Ukrainian)

⁷⁷ Vasilchuk, E. (2018). Op. cit. P. 219.

⁷⁸ Vasilchuk, E. (2018). Op. cit. P. 217.

⁷⁹ Vasilchuk, E. (2018). Op. cit. P. 218. It is important to note that, along with the preservation of neo-fascist elements, some very revealing “innovations” are observed in the Ukrainian extreme rights' ideology. As Evgen Vasilchuk notes: “The “building national united state” is recognized in the pathos of modern far-right theorists as merely an intermediate goal of activity. Instead, the idea of a global civilizational and geopolitical project of White Europe, or White Eurasia, based on the principles of imperialism, social nationalism and racial segregation, is quite actively being discussed”. (Vasilchuk, E. (2018). Op. cit. P. 217).

⁸⁰ Vasilchuk, E. (2018). Op. cit. P. 9.

⁸¹ Vasilchuk, E. (2018). Op.cit. P. 13.

⁸² Vasilchuk, E. (2018). Op. cit. P. 14.

⁸³ Vasilchuk, E. (2018). Op. cit. P. 15.

Party of Regions based there and having been expressing the interests of the regional oligarchy headed by billionaire Rinat Akhmetov. The Party nominated his protege Viktor Yanukovych to the post of Governor of the Donetsk region, then Prime Minister of Ukraine (2002-2004 and 2006-2007), and then President of Ukraine (2010-2014). It is noteworthy in this regard that in interpretation by most of mainland China's political scientists and experts Russia's role in the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine may be understood rather as the catalyst and support force of the regional secessionism⁸⁴.

It is demonstrative that the Ukrainian billionaire of Jewish origin, Igor Kolomoisky, who held the post of Governor of the Dnepropetrovsk region since March 2, 2014 just after the victory of Euromaidan until March 24, 2015 and, through a conflict of business interests with President of Ukraine and billionaire Petro Poroshenko, was forced to emigrate temporarily from Ukraine (resided in Switzerland and Israel, returned to Ukraine in mid-May 2019 shortly after Volodymyr Zelensky's presidential victory), in his recent interview emphasized that the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine is an "internal civil conflict <...> inspired by nobody, no Russia", whereto they came from Russia "just as they came to us from another side, from Western Europe and the United States, to fulfill international duty too".⁸⁵

It should be noted in this regard that joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine by high representatives of the European Union, the United States, Ukraine and the Russian Federation (at the level of Foreign Ministers) issued on April 17, 2014 provided the following political commitment by the Ukrainian government:

"The announced constitutional process will be inclusive, transparent and accountable. It will include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue, with outreach to all of Ukraine's regions and political constituencies <...>"⁸⁶

Article 7 of the Minsk Protocol signed by representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), and the self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) on 5 September 2014 under the auspices of the OSCE also provides "to continue the inclusive national dialogue"⁸⁷ that clerly demonstrates the civil component of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine.

⁸⁴ Lilei, S. The Ukraine crisis: a multidimensional analysis in China. *Eastern Journal of European Studies*. Volume 6, Issue 2, December 2015: 159-175; Salman, Lora. Little Grey Men: China and the Ukraine Crisis. *Survival*. Vol. 58. No. 6. December 2016–January 2017. pp. 135–156.

⁸⁵ Milliarder, kotoryy smeyetsya. Interv'yu Igorya Kolomoyskogo NV — pervaya chast' [A billionaire who laughs. Igor Kolomoisky' interview to NV - the first part]. July 4, 2019. NV magazine. (In Russian). Retrieved from: <https://nv.ua/ukraine/politics/igor-kolomoyskiy-intervyu-nv-novosti-ukraina-50030191.html>

⁸⁶ Geneva Statement on Ukraine by representatives of the European Union, the United States, Ukraine and the Russian Federation (at the level of Foreign Ministers) issued on April 17, 2014. Retrieved from the MFA of Ukraine official website: https://mfa.gov.ua/mediafiles/sites/japan/files/Geneva_Statement_on_Ukraine.pdf

⁸⁷ OSCE Secretariat. *Chairperson-in-Office welcomes Minsk agreement, assures President Poroshenko of OSCE support*. Bern. 5 September 2014. Retrieved from: <https://www.osce.org/cio/123245>

Meanwhile, in the post-bipolar era Western countries, unlike the post-Soviet states, proved to peacefully cope with secession challenges due to mature democratic institutions (that is testified by a successful democratic control of separatist movements in Northern Ireland (since the 1998 Belfast Agreement) and Scotland (the both of Great Britain), Quebec (Canada), Basque Country and Catalonia (the both of Spain), Corsica (France), the Flemish region of Belgium, etc.) while the central authorities manage to efficiently control the problematic region thereby discarding chances for both the separatist elites' full capture of the regional power and intervention from abroad.

However, Ukraine's political regime before and after Euromaidan is far different from those of the country's Western partners. Ukrainian political scientist Yuriy Matsiyevsky, having analyzed the political regime in his country for the last three decades, comes to a conclusion that after independence proclaimed in 1991 "the regime in Ukraine changed only once and this change lasted from the late 80's to the mid 90's. Since that time, the political regime in Ukraine has been hybrid."⁸⁸ He admits thereby that the crises of power in Kyiv widely-known as the 2004 "Orange Revolution" and the 2013-2014 "Revolution of Dignity", or Euromaidan, were not real social revolutions and no actual changes of political regime in Ukraine.

In contrast to today's Ukrainian economy (being predominantly neo-feudal but with a dynamically developing segment of capitalist relations of the European kind), in Russia under Putin one can observe the phenomenon of two-tier property, characteristic of politar societies: while this property is officially registered to legal entities and individuals, its supreme owner and arbiter is actually the top-brass of the federal bureaucracy acting on behalf of the entire ruling class. Thus, the socio-political and economic system of contemporary Russia may be identified as palace-neopolitar – wherein the top bureaucratic oligarchy has usurped power controlling and redistributing, with the purpose of its own utmost enrichment, the core economic resources and assets of the country. Moreover, due to escalation of the systemic conflict of Russia with the West and, more broadly, with the world of modernity, further consolidation of the palace-neopolitar power and economy is taking place bringing under control and increasingly distorting the segment of competitive market relations.⁸⁹

The analysis of the quality and characteristics of political regimes allows one to substantially explain the behavior of subjects representing them (regimes) in the international arena, which is beyond the power of political-realistic analysis. This is well illustrated by an example given by Taiwanese leading political thinker Academician Yu-Shan Wu: "a major difference between Russia and China: the lack

⁸⁸ Matsiyevsky, Yu. (2018). Revolution without regime change: The evidence from the post-Euromaidan Ukraine. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. Issue 51. Pp. 349-359. P. 357.

⁸⁹ Piliaiev, I. (2016). Contemporary Russia as the Palace-Neopolitar State and Economy. *Economic Annals – XXI*. Vol. 156. Issue 1-2, pp. 4-8.

of electoral competition and hence the need to whip up anti-Western sentiment in China”.⁹⁰

However, the normative order and political regime approach does not take into account the actual patterns of current development of the global and Eurasian continental systems. The relativism of such a conceptual approach is clearly visible from the reverse dynamics of democratization (in the Western liberal sense) in the nowadays world: as of 2018 compared with 2013, the number of full democracies in the world (of 167 countries ranked) has decreased from 25 to 20.⁹¹

The international globalized community is to move away from the doctrinal and messianic thinking (including the belief in the global triumph of liberal democracy and the alleged “end of history”) - the legacy of the two World wars, Cold War and the Unipolar world.

Ukraine, Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states have passed less than 30 years of independence since the Communist regime’s fall – still a very short historical period for peaceful cardinal social transformations’ scale.

Let us ask ourselves how many years in their history some successfully modernized present leaders of the democratic community have lived under pluralist democracy:

East Germany, including the Eastern part of Berlin – less than 45 years;

South Korea – about 40 years;

Taiwan – about 40 years (meanwhile, in 1949-1987, or for 38 years, the strongly authoritarian rule took place).

For comparison - the average age of Taiwan’s population – 39.6 years, the average age of Germany’s population – 45.9 years (April 2019, source: United Nations Population Division)

It means that for today approximately a half of the Taiwanese population were born under the authoritarian rule, and more than a half of Germany’s population are older than the total age of democracy in the East of their capital and their country. Even in terms of common sense it is evident that the duration of the transformation period from strongly authoritarian rule to real democracy in the island of 23.5 mln. population with the 5 centuries written history (approximately as long as the history of Reformation, Modernity or Westernization) and in the mainland with 1.35 bln., i.e. 57.5 times more, and with the 5 millennia history can not be chronologically and qualitatively quite similar. The latter process (in mainland), given its huge parameters and challenges, can not be linear and should be estimated not from the viewpoint of last 70 or 100 years but rather from the viewpoint of the 5 thousand years Chinese civilization.

Let us recall herein that The Political Guardianship Program (as part of the 1928 Constitution of the Republic of China adopted under Chiang Kei-Shek)

90 Wu, Yu-Shan (2009). Russia's Foreign Policy Surge: Causes and Implications. *Issues & Studies*. 45(1):117-162.

91 Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2018 - World Democracy Report. The retreat of global democracy stopped in 2018. Or has it just paused? Jan 8th 2019. URL: <https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index>

developed Sun Yatsen's ideas about the three stages of China's revolutionary transition to democracy, namely:

1. the stage of military rule, which is necessary to get rid of foreign dependence and political fragmentation, to unite China into a single sovereign state;

2. The period of political tutelage, during which the Chinese society under the control of a national sovereign state being gradually democratized is prepared for participation in political life;

3. The period of constitutional rule being in fact the Chinese democracy which also contains the European features of constitutionalism and parliamentarism and takes into account the Chinese specifics.⁹²

In fact, the Republic of China under Sun Yat-sen and Cheng Kei-shi passed only the first two periods so that the transition to pluralist liberal democracy took (since 1911) nearly 80 years.

Thus, the first approach, ignoring significant political regime, normative-value, cultural and civilizational differences among countries, analyzes the purely mechanical balance of forces (economic, military, sometimes taking into account "soft power") between states or their alliances (wherein great powers dominate)⁹³, and the second analyzes the conflicting parties' normative-value orders (hierarchies)⁹⁴ and political regimes without a comprehensive sheet of the balance of power and interaction among respective regimes (orders) advancing, for instance, by axiom the West-centric (Euro-Atlantic) order as a system of neoliberal values.⁹⁵ The second approach is inclined as well not to take into consideration historical, cultural and civilizational foundations of the normative and value orders.

As we indicated above, the Ukrainian crisis is mainly assessed from the viewpoint of a geopolitical "zero-sum game" on the "Big Chessboard" (the well-known term by Zbigniew Brzezinski), etc. At the same time, that crisis cannot be understood without the civilizational and cultural analysis of factors of interaction between the East and the West in the Eurasian megacontinental space. In particular, within the framework of neo-realistic concepts, we are talking about categories of hegemony, balance of forces, buck-passing, revisionism, but nothing is said about value, cultural and civilizational roots, underlying reasons, motivations of modern, predominantly value, rather than ethnic or religious conflicts. In our opinion, it is the West's aspiration to mechanically move the civilizational boundaries, the cultural-value delimitation between conditionally West and East, Europe and Eurasia on the

⁹² Selections from a Program of National Reconstruction: "The Three Stages of Revolution" (1918) by Sun Yat-sen. *Asia for Educators*. Columbia University. Retrieved from: <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu>

⁹³ Waltz, K. (2010) *Theory of International Politics*. Longrove, IL: Waveland Press. P. 114.

⁹⁴ Cooley, Alexander (2005) *Logics of Hierarchy. The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations*. New York: Cornell University Press. Cooley 2005. P. 33.

⁹⁵ See: Bogdanov, A. (2017). *Chapter 3. Preserving Peace Among the Great Powers: Russia's Foreign Policy and Normative Challenges to the International Order*. In: Kanet, Roger E. (Ed.) *The Russian Challenge to the European Security Environment*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 39-40.

post-Soviet and, more broadly, post-communist space of Eastern and South-Eastern (former Yugoslavia, Balkans) Europe and is the quintessence of the conflict. In this understanding, the Ukraine crisis cannot be settled since Ukraine, according to the concept of fractality and the fractal nature of society, represents a certain balance (dynamic, geographically and value-varied in space) between East and West. Transforming Ukraine into a “pure East” or into a “pure West” without destroying the “polluting” parameters of the East-West dichotomy organically is not possible. That is why the one-sided intervention of Western power factors in Ukraine would not bring the desired result, just as it did not bring it in the course of “humanitarian interventions” in Iraq or Syria.

But the problem is that civilizationists (from N. Danilevsky, O. Spengler, A. Toynbee to S. Huntington, A. Panarin⁹⁶, Y. Pavlenko⁹⁷) considered the problem of the conflict of cultural orders from the viewpoint of a certain isolated logic of development and even antagonism of individual civilization-cultural worlds (systems). In contrast, we consider cultural, value and civilizational dichotomy in its fractal reifying, in close historical interaction and complementarity of the East and the West at all levels – from macro-regional to local and individual.

The value (axiological) conflict of cultures/civilizations/historical modes of life

Meanwhile, a number of scientists are trying to get to the root causes of the conflict, and therefore are not inclined to lay the blame for the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine on only one of its parties.

In addition to the geopolitical conflict of the regulatory regimes of integration groupings in Eastern Europe, **Helena Rytövuori-Apunen** from the Tampere Peace Research Institute (University of Tampere, Finland) sees causes of frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and the simmering conflict in Donbas in the “normative dualism embedded in the concept of the state border” since the latter has become increasingly contested starting from the 1999 NATO’s military intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁹⁸ That loosens the fundamental principle of the inviolability of borders (agreed in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and further implemented in various international treaties between European/Eurasian states) under the pretexts of blatant and/or mass human rights violation through international “humanitarian

⁹⁶ Panarin, A. S. (2002). *Iskusheniye globalizmom [The temptation of globalism]*. Moscow: Eksmo-Press. 416 p.

⁹⁷ Pavlenko, Y. V. (2002). *Istoriya mirovoy tsivilizatsii. Filosofskiy analiz [The History of World Civilization. The Philosophical Analysis]*. Kyiv: Naukova Dumka [The Academic Thought]. 760 pp. (in Russian).

⁹⁸ Helena Rytövuori-Apunen. The Depth of Borders Beyond the State: Analytical, Normative and Epistemic Challenges of Study. In: Cengiz Günay & Nina Witjes, Editors (2017). *Border Politics. Defining Spaces of Governance and Forms of Transgressions*. Vienna; Munich: Springer. Pp. 175-193. P. 180.

interventions”, “peace-forcing” missions, self-declared separatist referendums, etc. Having been referring to the Kosovo precedent (including the eventual recognition in February, 2008 by Western great powers Kosovo’s self-declared independence from Serbia), Russia, as Rytövuori-Apunen emphasizes, “used a similar argumentation in its recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, as well as in its annexation of Crimea in 2014”.⁹⁹

Referring to John W. Burton who, on the eve of the crisis of detente in Europe and a new arms race, warned that the ‘win-lose’ framework logically contradicted to conflict resolution¹⁰⁰, Helena Rytövuori-Apunen sees in such a ‘(quasi)legal approach’ creating the categories of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ a dangerous trap for efforts to settle border-related conflicts and the traditional way to freeze them without settling real fundamental contradictions which gave rise to these conflicts.¹⁰¹ One might draw an analogy with the League of Nations’ politically instrumental (actually disguising particular interests) insistence which finally led to exclusion of all great powers, save Great Britain, from that UNO forerunner institution – on the grounds of accusing them in aggression against other member states or in collaborating with an aggressor (the Vichy France case) – that, at last, made the collective security system institutional order at the European and global levels absolutely ineffecient and virtually promoted clearing the way to the Second World War.

Especially to the point referring to the trajectory of the Ukraine crisis, Rytövuori-Apunen argues:

“<...> the conflict in Eastern Ukraine became deadlocked when the Ukrainian parliament in January 2015—subscribing to a practice that already existed in the government—defined the insurgents and separatists in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics as ‘terrorists’ and thereby criminalized not only their military methods but also their voices concerning the issues that had ignited the conflict”.¹⁰²

The same concerns, in fact, the position taken by the post-Euromaidan delegation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) towards non-admittance of the Russian parliamentary delegation to the PACE that durably prevented any inter-parliamentary format

99 Helena Rytövuori-Apunen. *The Depth of Borders Beyond the State: Analytical, Normative and Epistemic Challenges of Study*. In: Cengiz Günay & Nina Witjes, Editors (2017). *Border Politics. Defining Spaces of Governance and Forms of Transgressions*. Vienna; Munich: Springer. Pp. 175-193. P. 180.

100 Burton, J. (1979). *Deviance, terrorism & war: The process of solving unsolved social and political problems*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.

¹⁰¹ Rytövuori-Apunen, H. (2017). *The Depth of Borders Beyond the State: Analytical, Normative and Epistemic Challenges of Study*. In: Cengiz Günay & Nina Witjes (Editors). *Border Politics. Defining Spaces of Governance and Forms of Transgressions*. Vienna; Munich: Springer. Pp. 175-193. P. 180.

¹⁰² Rytövuori-Apunen, H. (2017). *The Depth of Borders Beyond the State: Analytical, Normative and Epistemic Challenges of Study*. In: Cengiz Günay & Nina Witjes (Editors). *Border Politics. Defining Spaces of Governance and Forms of Transgressions*. Vienna; Munich: Springer. Pp. 175-193. P. 180.

dialogue on possible ways of settling the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine and, after all, resulted in June 2019 in confrontation between the 2015-2019 composition of the Ukrainian delegation, on one part, and the majority of the Assembly and the Council of Europe's leadership, on another.

In this regard, a number of researchers of the Ukrainian crisis are turning to its cultural roots, moving from a comparison of conflicting normative orders to deeper historical, cultural, and mentally-valuable root causes that gave rise to them (the orders). Thus, we are talking about the role and influence of cultural phenomena and instruments on regional and continental geopolitics, especially in the East of Ukraine as a new (the post-Cold war) border region of Eurasia.¹⁰³

The third, the most profound level of analysis dealing with cultural grounds and causes of conflict, of course, implies and integrates the levels of politico-(neo)realistic, normative-ordinal and politico-regime analysis, since "culture controls everybody" 104.

The conflict in the East of Ukraine clearly highlighted that, as Lev Gumilyov (2004) emphasized, the commonality or similarity of the cultural tradition, the heredity and continuity of certain memorial-museum forms do not in any way determine the unity of the behavior of living people, as evidenced, for example, by the opposite models of behavior and values of Muscovy and Veliky Novgorod of the XV century.¹⁰⁵ This conclusion is important for understanding the essentially different patterns of behavior during Euromaidan of widely Russophone but strongly pro-European Kyiv, on the one hand, and Donetsk or Lugansk, on the other.

As Lilia A. Arakelyan points out, "mentality was always present in Western powers' relations with Moscow even before the annexation of Crimea".¹⁰⁶ Cheng-Chi Kuang and Jenn-Jaw Soong consider the traditional culture, especially the political culture, approach to Russian history and present politics as "an important instrument for the comprehension of some salient factors behind Russia's changing priorities and behavior in the international arena"¹⁰⁷, emphasizing that "the "political culture" approach to studies of Russian foreign policy becomes increasingly popular"¹⁰⁸.

Rytövuori-Apunen quite accurately indicates the socio-psychological roots of the conflict which lie deep in the layers of spiritual and material culture, the generations' historical memory experience and mode of life and, again, goes to the

103 Matsuzato Kimitaka. Cultural Geopolitics and the New Border Regions of Eurasia. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 2010, No.1, pp. 42-53.

104 Wu, Sh. (September 2015). Politicisation and De-Politicisation of Confucianism in Contemporary China: A Review of Intellectuals. *Issues & Studies* 51. No. 3: 165-205. P. 191.

105 Gumilyov, L. N. (2004). *Ot Rusi k Rossii [From Rus to Russia]*. Moscow: AST. P. 377.

106 Lilia A. Arakelyan. Chapter 4. EU-Russia Security Relations: Another Kind of Europe. P. 80.

107 Cheng-Chi Kuang & Jenn-Jaw Soong. An Exploration of the 2013-2014 Ukrainian Crisis and its Presidential-Parliamentary Election. *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*. Volume XIX Number III January 2016. Pp. 73-124. - P. 75.

108 Cheng-Chi Kuang & Jenn-Jaw Soong. An Exploration of the 2013-2014 Ukrainian Crisis and its Presidential-Parliamentary Election. *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*. Volume XIX Number III January 2016. Pp. 73-124. - P. 76.

evaluation “friend-foe” substrate, which rejects any rational arguments, acting as a powerful and massive irrational force:

“<...> The deeper dividing lines can be unfolded by asking what it is that Russia and the EU represent for these people in relation to the opportunities that they have in their lives and the sense of belonging that gives them a history and a culture. This border has no fixed points on land but exists because it is sustained by some previous experience, both personal and stored in the memory of generations. It becomes actual when people in their ‘new’ encounters with the empirical world can recognize something with which they feel familiarity or what, contrarily, feels alien, and in its practical implications means discontinuity with their ways of existence.”¹⁰⁹

Culture is virtually the substrate and driver of ideational/value civil and international conflicts. The organic interconnection and interaction between culture and democracy (being the determining modernization criterion of political regime and normative order) deserve special attention. However, the black-and-white dichotomy is not relevant in analyzing the above complex relationship.

As Shufang Wu from Central China Normal University (mainland China) argues:

“democracy has also become a component of Chinese culture ever since the early 20th century. Although the development of democracy has lagged far behind that of science and the progress of economic development, it has been rooted in the soil of Chinese society and is comprehensively admired by Chinese people, especially liberal intellectuals”.¹¹⁰

That is why any analysis of cultural roots of a conflict, either civil or international, should take into consideration the development of democracy with regard to the concerned parties’ political regimes.

Yue Yin draws attention to the fact that “direct democracy with Chinese characteristics” occupies an important and independent position in public perceptions of democracy in China, which reveals the limitation in using the binary categories “guardianship” vs. “liberal democracy” to explore what is on the minds of Chinese citizens when they think about democracy”.¹¹¹

We argue that fundamental principles of modern Western society as pluralism and the rule of law have their traditional conformities among core values of the Chinese and, wider, Confucian social culture, although in substantially converted forms.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Rytövuori-Apunen, H. (2017). The Depth of Borders Beyond the State: Analytical, Normative and Epistemic Challenges of Study. In: Cengiz Günay & Nina Witjes (Editors). *Border Politics. Defining Spaces of Governance and Forms of Transgressions*. Vienna; Munich: Springer. Pp. 175-193. P. 190.

¹¹⁰ Wu, Sh. (September 2015). Politicisation and De-Politicisation of Confucianism in Contemporary China: A Review of Intellectuals. *Issues & Studies*. Issue 51. No. 3: 165-205. P. 191.

¹¹¹ Yue, Yin. The Understandings of Democracy, Commitment to Democracy, and Opinions about the Government among China’s People. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, Volume 14, No. 2: 143-171.

¹¹² Marmazov V., Piliaiev I. Marmazov, V. & Piliaiev, I. The Ukraine crisis and prospects for the East-West trans-civilizational model. – In: Altai, D. (Ed.) (2018). *Globalization and modern Eurasia: history, trends, challenges for change. Proceedings of the Nineth East Asian Conference*

In contrast to Confucianism where there is no fundamental difference between ours and others, since relationships with all require harmonization, in the Western discourse of the Alien (Other), the imperative of harmonizing relations is absent. Moreover, relations with the Other imply permanent conflict due to the immanent insolvability of the deep contradictions of identity, a certain estrangement in relations, distrust of a partner acting in the status of “The Other” - such a Protestant value-civilizational approach especially manifested in the concept of the “Other” developed by the Norwegian political scientist Iver Neumann¹¹³, is especially characteristic of the Protestant worldview (conceptual and doctrinal thinking). Such (permanent or wavy) forcing tension in relations with the Other implies corresponding doctrines, such as (e.g., practiced in the USA-USSR relations) *brinkmanship*, *nuclear deterrence*, *containment*, etc.

Olena Lyubchenko, while living in multicultural and ethnically tolerant Canada, has researched the substantial interaction between pro-Western liberals and the anti-Russian radical right forces during and after the victory of Euromaidan rally protests in Ukraine. She posits that within the classical Carl Schmitt’s *friend-enemy mental distinction* “no longer geographically defined, those who have not embraced ‘Europe’ for ideological or socio-economic reasons are deemed irretrievably backward and, virtually, ethnically different”¹¹⁴. Such an essentialised and, eventually, irrationalized cultural argument refutes and delegitimizes any opposite opinion with regard to the national geopolitical choice, economic or cultural policy.

To our mind, the lack of progress in settling the Ukraine crisis is just due to the dominance in the Western, Ukrainian and Russian political discourse of the culturally *Alien (Other)*, relations with which are doomed to conflict due to values antagonism. In the Central and Eastern Europe countries, since the conflict with Russia, “New Orientalism” is growing¹¹⁵ delegitimizing the “East” from the cultural standpoint as the Europe’s Other¹¹⁶.

on *Slavic Eurasian Studies*. June 30 – July 1, 2018. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: Udam soyol. – Pp. 320-338.

113 See Neumann, I. (1999). *Uses of the Other. The 'East' in European Identity Formation*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, Borderline Series, 1999. (Russian 2004]

114 Lyubchenko, O. The Ukrainian Crisis: A Case of 'New Orientalism'. *Acta Politologica*. 2017, Vol. 9. Issue 1. P. 45-60. - P. 54.

115 See: Lyubchenko, O. The Ukrainian Crisis: A Case of 'New Orientalism'. *Acta Politologica*. 2017, Vol. 9. Issue 1. P. 45-60.

116 Carl Schmitt in his probably most influential work titled *The Concept of the Political* (first published in 1932) grounds his conception of state sovereignty (or autonomy) upon the *friend – enemy* distinction. The latter is to be determined subjectively, "existentially", i.e. the enemy is whoever is "the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible." Schmitt, C. (2007) *The Concept of the Political. Expanded Edition*. The University of Chicago Press. 126 pp. P. 27. This concept was further developed in the works of contemporary Norwegian political scientist Iver Brynild Neumann. (See: Neumann, I. (2004). *Ispol'zovaniye Drugogo: Obrazy Vostoka v formirovaniy yevropeyskikh identichnostey* [The Use of the “Other”: Images of the East in the Formation of European Identities]. Moscow: New Publishing House. 240 pp. (In Russian)

Quite characteristic for the above-mentioned phenomenon is publication on December 10, 2018 (five days before the unification council (*sobor*) of the Orthodox churches of Ukraine¹¹⁷ which, under President Poroshenko's direct protection, established the Orthodox Church of Ukraine under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in confrontation with and as a challenge to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) at the official website of the St. Andrew's Church in Kyiv - soon after the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine's decision to transfer it to the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate – of late Methodius', Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine, Primate of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church¹¹⁸ in 2000-2015, essay titled “ONE PEOPLE, ONE LANGUAGE, ONE CHURCH”¹¹⁹. The following words from the essay fully correlated with and directly referred to President Poroshenko's main pre-election slogan (*credo*) of winter 2018-2019: “Army, language and faith”:

“The modern Russian-Ukrainian war is a war of the Moscow Horde against the Holy Rus, the war of Genghis Khan against the Equal-to-the-Apostles, Prince Vladimir. Our adversary is mighty. However, we believe and know that in the struggle of imperial Russia against Ukraine, the victory will be on the good side. God is with us! The holiness of Ancient Rus is with us! St. Sophia and eternal Kyiv are with us!”¹²⁰

Here is a substitution of the concept of Ukrainian civil (political) nation and the ideology of civic nationalism laid into the new Ukrainian state's constitutional basis with the concept of Ukrainian ethnic nation and the ideology of radical Ukrainian ethnonationalism, close to essentially totalitarian Dmytro Dontsov's integral nationalism doctrine elaborated under the strong influence by Italian fascism and German nazism in 1930s¹²¹.

¹¹⁷ The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (the UOC-MP) being the largest among all churches of Ukraine by number of parishes (more than 12 thousand) ignored the event as “non-canonic”. Only two (of nearly 90) bishops of the UOC-MP attended the council.

¹¹⁸ The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church's clergy was an active participant of the unification council (*sobor*) and since December 15, 2019 entered the newly established Orthodox Church of Ukraine of the Ecumenical (Constantinopol) Patriarchate. The latter's establishment aroused an unprecedented discord and institutional conflict between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

¹¹⁹ Methodius, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine, Primate of the UAOC. ONE PEOPLE, ONE LANGUAGE, ONE CHURCH (from the personal archives of His Beatitude Metropolitan Methodius). Published on December 10, 2018. *Site of the St. Andrew's Church of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*. Kyiv. Retrieved from: <http://andriyivska-tserkva.kiev.ua/ru/odin-narod-odna-mova-odna-cerkva-z-osobistogo-arxivu-blazhennishogo-mitropolita-mefodiya/>

¹²⁰ Methodius, Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine, Primate of the UAOC. ONE PEOPLE, ONE LANGUAGE, ONE CHURCH (from the personal archives of His Beatitude Metropolitan Methodius). Published on December 10, 2018. *Site of the St. Andrew's Church of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*. Kyiv. Retrieved from: <http://andriyivska-tserkva.kiev.ua/ru/odin-narod-odna-mova-odna-cerkva-z-osobistogo-arxivu-blazhennishogo-mitropolita-mefodiya/>

¹²¹ Kvit S. (2013). Dmytro Dontsov: ideolohichnyy portret. Vydannya druhe, vypravlene i dopovnene [Dmytro Dontsov: ideological portrait. Second edition, corrected and supplemented]. Lviv: Галицька видавнича спілка [Galician Publishing Union], 2013. 192 p. P. 157-158. (In Ukrainian); Spil'nyy vysnovok ukrayins'kykh ta pol's'kykh istorykiv za pidsumkamy ikh-kh mizhnarodnykh naukovykh seminariv (Varshava, 5-11 lystopada 2001 r.) / Dokumenty z

President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for 2018 and the early 2019 actively participated in the process of forming and establishing a new "Orthodox Church of Ukraine", contrary to Article 35 of the Constitution of Ukraine which declares that "the church and religious organizations in Ukraine are separate from the state"¹²². Poroshenko personally attended the above-mentioned unification council of the new church on December 15, 2019 and at Tomos's autonomy presentation to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul on January 6, 2019. At the same time, despite the administrative pressure of the authorities, only 2 of nearly 90 bishops of the self-governing Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate¹²³ – the largest confession of Ukraine by number of parishes (more than 12,000)¹²⁴ – took part in the unification council.

With regard to language, we may refer to the recent reliable sociological data, insofar as the All-Ukrainian population census data in this respect have long been outdated, since the last such census in Ukraine was carried out back in 2001. According to the Rating sociological agency (February 2018), the majority - 53% - citizens of Ukraine use either Russian, or both Russian and Ukrainian to communicate at home. These data are also confirmed by the All-Ukrainian survey conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS): in the early 2019, actually a minority - 46% of Ukrainians - spoke at home mostly or only in Ukrainian. At the same time, 28.1% of Ukrainians speak mostly or only in Russian. Another 24.9% of Ukrainians equally speak Ukrainian and Russian. That is, Russian-speaking or Russian-Ukrainian bilinguals make up 53% of the population of Ukraine. Other languages are spoken by 0.2%, found it difficult and refused to answer questions - 0.7%. At the same time, in the Donbas 66.7% of the population speaks at home only in Russian.¹²⁵ As evidenced by the computer model developed at KIIS, in the east of Ukraine for the next 15-20 years radical changes regarding the language will not happen.¹²⁶

vidznachennya 60-yi richnytsi trahichnykh podiy na Volyni 1943 roku (zvernennya, zayavy, lysty) [Joint conclusion of Ukrainian and Polish historians according to the results of the IX-X international scientific seminars (Warsaw, November 5-11, 2001) / Documents commemorating the 60th anniversary of the tragic events in Volyn in 1943 (appeals, statements, letters)]. *Voyenna istoriya [Military History]*. 2003. – №№ 3-4. (In Ukrainian). Retrieved from: http://warhistory.ukrlife.org/3_4_03_2.htm

122 Constitution of Ukraine. Article 35. (The official text in Ukrainian). The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine's official website. Retrieved from: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=254%EA%2F96%2D%E2%F0>

¹²³ The Ukrainian Orthodox Church's official website. Retrieved from: <https://church.ua/pravyashhie-arxierei/>

¹²⁴ The Ukrainian Orthodox Church's official website. Retrieved from: <https://church.ua/pravyashhie-arxierei/>

¹²⁵ The all-Ukrainian survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) from February 28 to March 11, 2019 in all regions of Ukraine (except Crimea and the particular (not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities) districts of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions). Retrieved from: <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng>.

¹²⁶ Professor Volodymyr Paniotto's interview to the *Ukrainian Pravda*. February 4, 2019. Retrieved from: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/02/4/7205638/>

Meanwhile, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the post-Euromaidan convocation, chaired by Ukrainian radical ethnonationalist Andriy Parubiy, on April 26, 2019, that is, after the defeat of President Petro Poroshenko's radical ethnonationalist program at the presidential election (the second round of elections took place on April 21, 2019), adopted a new, very strict in its content language law titled "On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language", which provides for Ukrainization of all public spheres. It concerns education, labor relations, legal proceedings and office work, healthcare, services, etc. The law provides that established by the law Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language will monitor the implementation of the law. The administrative and criminal liability for violations is provided by the law as well. President Poroshenko signed the law on May 16, 2019, that is just four days before leaving his post, and on July 16, 2019 the law came into force.

Meanwhile, as a prominent Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Paniotto emphasized in the midst of the presidential election campaign, in such an ethnoculturally and confessionally diverse country like Ukraine, "Elections, the language law and Tomos in one year can critically destabilize society".¹²⁷

As aptly noted an American authority in the Eastern Europe modern (especially the Second World War) history Professor of the Yale University Timothy Snyder with regard to Poroshenko's above-mentioned political creed slogan, the strong national army, the Ukrainian state language and the Ukrainian church are all very important things but they are permanent things, so that the current armed conflict with Russia and the permanent issues of national linguistic & religious identity essentially "forced out the future" from President Poroshenko's political agenda and thereby doomed him to failure in the March-April, 2019 presidential elections.¹²⁸ Moreover, such a credo promoted further split of the culturally, linguistically and religiously cleft country and society.¹²⁹

In fact, under Poroshenko's rule the Ukrainian radical right's ideological discourse, notwithstanding their poor presence in the official establishment, came "to dominate the conversation around Ukraine's present and future. This discursive triumph <...> influenced a general right-wing shift in Ukrainian politics as well as in

127 *Professor Volodymyr Paniotto's interview to the Ukrainian Pravda*. February 4, 2019. Retrieved from: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/02/4/7205638/>

128 Американський історик Тімоті Снайдер вважає, що зміна політики щодо російської мови зміцнить позицію України у світі і боляче вдарить по інтересах Кремля. *BBC*. 10 July, 2019. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-48924775>

129 Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and remaking of world order*. London: Simon & Shuster; Katchanovski, I. (2006). *Cleft countries: Regional political divisions and cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova*. Stuttgart: ibidem. *Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova*. By Ivan Katchanovski. Foreword, Francis Fukuyama. *Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society*, no. 33. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2006. 286 pp.; Helena Rytövuori-Apunen. *The Depth of Borders Beyond the State: Analytical, Normative and Epistemic Challenges of Study*. (In: Cengiz Günay & Nina Witjes, Editors (2017). *Border Politics. Defining Spaces of Governance and Forms of Transgressions*. Vienna; Munich: Springer. Pp. 175-193. P. 191.

mainstream and academic thinking.”¹³⁰ As a result, no Ukrainian left-wing party succeeded even to participate in the July 2019 early parliamentary elections.

Meanwhile, predominantly inter-ethnic (including ethno-linguistic) or interconfessional conflicts are characterized by confrontation between traditional ethnic or religious identities (which are, as a rule, rather stable for many generations) and their corresponding values. By contrast, mainly ideological (ideationally) value conflicts are characterized by “fluidity”, vagueness, hybrid identity and opposition of ideological (dependent on propaganda, information wars and manipulations) values, primarily relating to regime-political, geopolitical, political-economic, socio-psychological, historical and cultural orientations (preferences) of the population.

The name of Ukraine as a state appeared on the political map of the world, like Taiwan among members of some international organizations, only in the 20th century. The world learned about the "Ukrainian" nationality only at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries.

Ukrainian ethnogenesis is in fact not yet complete. Serhy Yekelchuk points out that “the three-fourths of Ukraine outside of its westernmost part are “diverse and fluid”¹³¹. При этом the former Austro-Hungarian Western Ukraine (the country’s westernmost part)’s population makes up less than 15% of Ukraine’s population. In fact, it is difficult to say something about a Ukrainian (as well as about a Taiwanese) until you know how he feels about Russia (mainland China respectively) as his country’s historically main “Other”.

Paradoxes are also associated with the Ukrainian “Piedmont” - the Western Ukraine’s historical land of Galichina (Galicia), which is traditionally considered to be the region of the “most conscious Ukrainians” and the bastion of Ukrainian ethnonationalism. Nevertheless, in this region, as in most other regions of Western Ukraine, there has never been any Cossacks or Hetmans — historically the main actors and symbols (moreover, the Hetmanate is probably the principal cornerstone of the Ukrainian political and state building) of the Ukrainian ethno-national and state identity, a kind of “reference points” of the formation of the Ukrainian ethnic nation and state-building. Also, these regions later than the center of Ukraine (Naddniprianschina – literally On-the Dnieper lands) made the transition from the Ruthenian (from Rus) to the Ukrainian ethnic identity and from the Ruthenian (Rusky) to the Ukrainian language (in practice, this happened there only in the first half of the twentieth century).

As Verena Fritz pointed out as early as in 2006:

“The eastern part of Ukraine, the central part and the western part of the country have great differences in economic structure, proportion of ethnic population and historical and cultural

130 Lyubchenko, O. (2017) The Ukrainian Crisis: A Case of ‘New Orientalism’. *Acta Politologica*. Vol. 9 Issue 1, 45-60. P. 50.

¹³¹ Yekelchuk, S. (2015). *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*. 2015. xix, 186 pp. P. 20.

memory. This has led to a large burden on the country's nation-construction process after independence, and it is difficult for the Ukrainian national identity to seek common ground.”¹³²

Nicolai Petro (USA) designates the mostly Russophone Ukrainian East as “the Other Ukraine” stressing that “the peremptory removal of president Yanukovich violated the delicate balance of interests forged between Galicia¹³³ and Donbass”¹³⁴ and jeopardized “the Ukraine’s inherent pluralism”.¹³⁵

According to the all-Ukrainian (except Lugansk region and Crimea) poll, in Eastern Ukraine since May till September 2014, i.e. in the midst of the armed conflict in Donbas, the share of the local population positively related to Russia increased from 77% to 83%, while in Western Ukraine it fell from 30% to 25%.¹³⁶ In December, 2016 the share of the Eastern Ukraine’s population positively related to Russia (excluding the major part of Donbas not currently controlled by Ukraine) amounted to 63,1%, while in Western Ukraine – only 16% (the KIIS, 2017), i.e. 4 times less.¹³⁷

Such a split identity is sometimes paradoxically manifested in Ukraine’s foreign policy, especially towards Russia as Ukraine’s *Other*.¹³⁸

Ukrainian political scientist Olexiy Haran debatably argues in a prestigious Korean journal that “since the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Moscow and Kyiv held opposite views of its future — “reintegration” and “civilized divorce” respectively”,¹³⁹ while not mentioning the actual split in the ethno-culturally heterogeneous Ukrainian society regarding the country's geopolitical choice.¹⁴⁰

132 Fritz, V. *State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia*, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2006, pp.114-115.

133 The most pro-Western region of Ukraine, formerly a part of Poland, Austria and Austro-Hungary. It never belonged to Russia, was occupied by the Soviet Union in September 1939 during the Nazi-Polish war and then annexed to the Ukrainian SSR.

134 Petro, N. N. (2015) Understanding the Other Ukraine: Identity and Allegiance in Russophone Ukraine (P. 19-35). In Pikulicka-Wilczewska, A. & Sakwa, R. (Eds.). *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*. Bristol, UK: E-international Relations Publishing. – P. 31.

135 Pogrebinskii, M., Popov, A. & Tolpygo, A. (2013) Formirovanie polikul'turnoi ukrainy: istoricheskii ocherk i sovremmenoe sostoyanie [Formation of Multicultural Ukraine: Historical Overview and the Current State], in Pogrebinskii, M. B. and Tolpygo, A. K. (Eds.) *Krizis multikul'turalizma i problemy natsional'noi politiki*. Moscow: Ves' Mir, pp. 237-281 (in Russian).

136 The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. (2014, October 6). *Kak izmenilos' otnosheniye naseleniya Ukrainy k Rossii i naseleniya Rossii k Ukraine* [How the attitude of the population of Ukraine to Russia and the population of Russia to Ukraine has changed]. Retrieved from <http://kiis.com.ua>

137 The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. (2017, February 10). *Yak zminyuvalosya stavlennya naselennya Ukrayiny do Rosiyi ta naselennya Rosiyi do Ukrayiny u 2016 rotsi* [Changes in the attitude of the population of Ukraine toward Russia and of the Population of Russia toward Ukraine]. Retrieved from <http://kiis.com.ua>

138 Ukraina - ne Rossiia: [Ukraine is not Russia]. President of Ukraine L.Kuchma’s book. Moscow: Vremia, 2003. 560 pp.

139 Haran, O. (2015) Op. cit. – P. 127.

140 Haran, O. (2015).Op.cit.

Meanwhile, contemporary Ukraine's foreign policy was distinguished for many years by the geopolitical inconsistency and uncertainty. For instance, in 1993 President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk announced Ukraine's intention to become an associate member of the CIS states' intended Economic Union.¹⁴¹ In 2003, another Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed the Yalta Agreement of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan on Forming the Common Economic Space envisaging a supranational body on tariffs and trade. The Agreement was ratified by Parliament of Ukraine in April, 2004¹⁴² but its implementation was blocked soon by the Orange Revolution. Ukraine, unlike Georgia, despite the armed conflict with Russia, has not withdrawn from the CIS.

Some, in particular East Asian, researchers, mainly those superficially familiar with the Ukrainian crisis and its cultural, value and historical background, reduce this conflict to an ethnic one, while ignoring its ideological (ideational values) nature and root causes. For example, Cheng-Chi Kuang & Jenn-Jaw Soong posit (argue) that allegedly "The Ukrainian political tendencies and language differences are basically alike".¹⁴³ They take quite a simplified look at the Ukraine crisis' domestic roots:

"Taking the Dnieper River as the division line, Ukraine has clearly been divided into the east and the west part. The citizens at the western area, who are mostly Catholic and speak Ukrainian, hope to join the EU; the citizens at the eastern area, who are mostly orthodox and speak Russian, advocate a close relationship with Russia. This division caused a deep fault line in Ukraine for which a consensus could not be reach(ed) between both parties; thus confrontations were prone to appear."¹⁴⁴

Such a vision absolutizing the political significance of some natural, historical or cultural frontiers (borders) and striving to draw some symbolic and distinct dividing line in Ukraine is characteristic to some European (especially Polish) and North American political scientists.¹⁴⁵ For example, Justyna Zajac (2016) argues:

141 The CIS States' Treaty of 24.09.1993 on Establishment of the Economic Union. Retrieved from <http://lawru.info/dok/1993/09/24/n114222.htm> (in Russian)

142 The Agreement on the Common Economic Space of September 19, 2003. *Ofitsiynyy visnyk Ukrayiny [Official Bulletin of Ukraine]*. 16 July 2004. – No. 26, p. 244 (in Ukrainian).

143 Cheng-Chi Kuang & Jenn-Jaw Soong. An Exploration of the 2013-2014 Ukrainian Crisis and its Presidential-Parliamentary Election. *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*. Volume XIX Number III January 2016. Pp. 73-124. - P. 90.

144 Cheng-Chi Kuang & Jenn-Jaw Soong. An Exploration of the 2013-2014 Ukrainian Crisis and its Presidential-Parliamentary Election. *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*. Volume XIX Number III January 2016. Pp. 73-124. - P. 77.

145 Zajac, J. (2016). *Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order*. Palgrave Macmillan. 226 pp. P. 137; Petro, N. N. (2015) *Understanding the Other Ukraine: Identity and Allegiance in Russophone Ukraine* (P. 19-35). In Pikulicka-Wilczewska, A. & Sakwa, R. (Eds.). *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*. Bristol, UK: E-international Relations Publishing. – P. 31; S. L. Wolchik, V. Zviglyanich, eds. (1999), *Ukraine : The Search for a National Identity* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield); Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and remaking of world order*. London: Simon & Shuster; Katchanovski, I. (2006). *Cleft countries: Regional political divisions and cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova*. Stuttgart: ibidem. *Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-*

Politically and culturally, Ukraine is divided almost in half, with a pro-Western orientation prevailing in the western part of the country, and a pro-Russian outlook being predominant in its eastern part.¹⁴⁶

In fact, the split lines in Ukraine are fractal at all levels, not only and even not so much along the Dnipro (Dnieper) line. Of course, if we compare the most politically radical regions of Galicia and Donbass in their respective pro-European and pro-Russian sympathies, then the correlation between ethnic, linguistic and religious identity, on the one hand, and the indicated geopolitical sympathies, on the other, is obvious. However, in general, Ukraine is a continuum with fractally distributed splitting lines. And this split is determined not so much by external formal identities as by mental-value categories, largely dependent on the ideological, axiological and moral choices within each community and (in the head and soul) of every citizen. In this sense, Edward Said's conclusion from his famous book "Culture and Imperialism" perfectly fits to better understand the nature of the Ukrainian crisis:

"No one today is purely *one* thing. <...> No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and distinctiveness..."¹⁴⁷

We argue that the Ukraine crisis is the only predominantly values (rather than inter-ethnic) armed conflict in the post-Soviet space.

However, the course of the Donbas armed conflict in 2014-2019 indicates that, unlike the frozen post-Soviet regional armed conflicts in Caucasus and Transnistria, it is rather axiological, ideological and geopolitical than ethnic one. The armed conflict in the Donbas, as evidenced by its development during 2014-2019, unlike the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus and Transnistria or post-communist wars in the former Yugoslavia, is not so much ethnic, but rather geopolitical and the ideational values one. That is manifested by absence of any ethnically-based cross-cutting splits in political loyalties of civilian population in the conflict zone as well as by mainly economically motivated geography of Donbas refugees/displaced persons' flows.¹⁴⁸ One should distinguish political sympathy for Putin's multiethnic Russia on

Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. By Ivan Katchanovski. Foreword, Francis Fukuyama. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, no. 33. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2006. 286 pp.

146 Zając, J. (2016). Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order. Palgrave Macmillan. 226 pp. P. 137. For more, see S. L. Wolchik, V. Zviglyanich, eds. (1999), Ukraine : The Search for a National Identity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield).

147 Said, E. W. (1994). Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books. xxviii, 380 pp. P. 336.

148 Though about ¾ of the Donbas pre-war population were Russian-speaking[*All-Ukrainian population census' 2001. State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. Retrieved from <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language>*], numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons from the region as a result of the armed conflict, respectively, into the territory of Russia (1.1 million pers.) and into the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine (0.8-1.0 million pers.) have been, as of February 2016, approximately balanced [See: *Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine. 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016. Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. – 57 pp. – P. 7*], and the Author has no evidence of the ethnic homogeneity, or at least any clear ethnic trends of such flows.

some part of the Donbas population, nostalgic about Soviet times, from the ethnic identification.

As results of the national survey of Ukraine's population conducted in 2016 by the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, in collaboration with the Charity fund Intellectual, clearly testified:

"<...> Concerning pro-European respondents, assumptions about the differences between supporters of geopolitical orientation on ethnolinguistic grounds are not justified. European orientations are not determined by ethnic identity and native language. <...> In any case, the absence of the effect of ethnolinguistic factors and the availability of value factors of pro-European orientations signal the rationalization of these respondents' aspirations."¹⁴⁹

It is noteworthy how a Russian writer and ethnopolitologist Alexander Karevin, living in Ukraine, characterizes its ordinary citizens's attitudes to the conflict in the Donbas: "Who is ours, who is a stranger? This is not determined by formal grounds. Neither origin, nor place of birth, nor even the spoken language is of decisive importance."¹⁵⁰

Опровергают утверждение о прежде всего этническом конфликте на востоке Украины и результаты внеочередных парламентских выборов в Украине, прошедших 21 июля 2019 г., на которых убедительную победу во всех регионах Украины одержала правоцентристская партия "Слуга народа" во главе с новоизбранным президентом Украины, успешным шоуменом, арт-менеджером и сценаристом политической сатиры Владимиром Зеленским (его инаугурация состоялась 20 мая 2019 г.), выступающая с лозунгами общегражданского консенсуса, борьбы с олигархическим режимом и коррупцией, опоры на средний класс, креативную молодежь, модернизации и интеграции в ЕС и НАТО.

In contrast to essentially inter-ethnic or interconfessional interstate conflicts, which may last infinitely (the Arab-Israeli, the Armenian-Turkish, the India-Pakistan (in Kashmir) conflicts, etc.), ideological values international conflicts tend to soften and be transformed as far as the ideological transformation of their public actors, due to objective processes of the world and regional transformations.¹⁵¹

On the one hand, the present conflict is not generated or determined by ethnic conflict but, as we may agree on principle with Lodewijk SMOOR, "is rooted in ethnic tensions"¹⁵². As a prominent Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Paniotto argues, If the principles of Ukrainization were more flexible, they would not be so

149 Reznik, O., & Reznik V. (2017). Ukraine's European Choice as a Social Condition of Democratic Transition. *Ideology and Politics*. 8(2), 117-145. P. 137.

150 Karevin, A. (Kyiv, Ukraine). Post on Facebook dated July 14, 2019. Retrieved from: https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=2366348226937817&id=100006879888184

151 As an example, Aleksandr Etkind, Dirk Uffelman and Ilya Kukulin have revealed the mechanism of transforming social cleavages into cultural cleavages and then (sub-)ethnic identities in Russian empire (save indigenous population) when "social groups were nominated and treated as sub-ethnic groups" (See: Etkind, A., Uffelman, D. & Kukulin, I. (2016) Domestic Colonisation of Russia: Between Practice and Imagination. In: Makarenko V. P. (ed.), Rossiya-Ukraina: peresmotr ili vosпроизводство politicheskikh paradigm? Rostov-on-Don: Yuzhnyi Federal'nyi Universitet [the Southern Federal University]. 735 pp. P. 122.

152 Smoor, L. (2017) Understanding the Narratives Explaining the Ukrainian Crisis: Identity Divisions and Complex Diversity in Ukraine¹ Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 11. P. 73. DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2017-0004

painful for the East. Russian-speaking Ukrainians, however, have been treated not quite as full citizens.¹⁵³ However, the reasons inherent in the Ukraine population's "mutually exclusive geopolitical orientations"¹⁵⁴ and the corresponding division into the two large groups looking respectively to the West and the East¹⁵⁵ are much deeper than the empirical criteria of language or ethno-cultural preferences and are related to the long-term historical influences and interactions of various civilizations on the territory of modern Ukraine.

On the other hand, the conflict in the East of Ukraine "does not represent a clash of two civilizations. It is rather a clash of interpretations of history and values and a sign of a deepening cultural divide between Russia and Ukraine."¹⁵⁶

One may conclude that the armed conflict in Donbas has a geopolitical and value character, but the values themselves are largely determined by the ethno-national and linguistic identity of the population. Another factor of value identity can be the historical affiliation of specific administrative-territorial entities to certain polities, different in their civilization, political and value nature.

The former lands of the Zaporizhzhia Army (around the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions) are located at the intersection of the Baltic-Black Sea and Azov-Black Sea geopolitical massifs, and it is there that "one of the key centers of the modern Ukrainian statehood's geopolitical basis" is located.¹⁵⁷

Accordingly, belonging to the historical Sloboda Ukraine (the pre-revolutionary Kharkiv province) may be considered, in terms of the fractal-value dichotomy, as a cultural-historical indicator of European identity in contrast to the historical belonging to the Don Host (Army) as a criterion for Eurasian (pro-Russian) identity.

In this context, one may talk about value identity, since, according to the extant Ukrainian legislation, nationality and mother tongue are issues of voluntary conscious choice of every citizen, that determines them as a person's ethno-cultural value orientations. Another factor of value identity may also be a an administrative-territorial entity's historical affiliation to a certain polity, different in its cultural and civilizational nature.

It should be noted that the line of contact between the warring parties in Donbas mentioned in the Minsk Memorandum dated 19 September 2014 in the context of the mutual removal of heavy weapons has historical parallels with the demarcation line between the lands of the Sloboda Ukraine, the Kalmius

¹⁵³ Professor Volodymyr Paniotto's interview to *Ukrainian Pravda*. February 4, 2019. Retrieved from: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/02/4/7205638/>

¹⁵⁴ Minakov, M. (2017). Post-Soviet Transit between Revolution and Restoration. *Ideology and Politics*. 8(2) (8), 3-7. Pp. 6-7.

¹⁵⁵ Reznik, O., & Reznik V. (2017). Ukraine's European Choice as a Social Condition of Democratic Transition. *Ideology and Politics*. 8(2), 117-145. P. 137.

¹⁵⁶ Smoor, L. (2017) Understanding the Narratives Explaining the Ukrainian Crisis: Identity Divisions and Complex Diversity in Ukraine1 *Acta Univ. Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies*, 11. P. 73. DOI: 10.1515/auseur-2017-0004

¹⁵⁷ Gorbulin, V. P. (2015) Ukraine and Russia: the Ninth Wave or the Chinese Wall / V. P. Gorbulin, O. S. Vlasyuk, S. V. Kononenko. Kyiv, the National Institute of Strategic Studies. - P. 23.

palanka (territorial district) of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host (The Zaporozhian Sich), on the one hand, and the Don Cossack Host, on the other, fixed by the Russian government's decree of April 30, 1746. Meanwhile, the historic start of curbing Don Cossacks and reorganizing their independent liberties into the Kremlin-controlled liberties and privileges (as compared with other “Tsar’s servants”) was initiated by the charter by Tsar Ivan IV Grozny on January 3, 1570, which connected Donschyna (the Don region) with the Moscow State as opposed to the Cossack relations with the King of Poland. Thus, one may observe that the fractal dichotomy of values and geopolitical orientations throughout a vast steppe space of the Cossacks' residence between the Dniester and the Don rivers over the historical time acquired the institutional format of the Ukrainian and the Don Cossack autonomies, which respectively and conditionally personified at this level, although having been intersecting closely in language, customs and culture, the extreme Eastern boundary of the axiological-behavioral Europe and the extreme Western boundary of the axiological-behavioral Eurasia.¹⁵⁸

Let us conditionally, for the instrumental purposes of the local fractal-value analysis of the Luhansk region, as an inter-civilizational borderland zone actualized by geopolitical armed conflict, to consider Ukrainian ethnonational, Ukrainian language affiliation and historical affiliation to the Yekaterinoslav or the Kharkiv provinces as indicators of European identity, and Russian ethnonational, Russian language identity as well as belonging to the Region of the Don Cossacks to be indicators of Eurasian (pro-Russian) identity.

According to the results of the last All-Ukrainian Population Census (2001), Ukrainians in the national composition of the population of Luhansk oblast make up 58.0%, while Russians - 39.0%. Ethnic Ukrainians constituted the majority in all districts of the oblast, except for the Stanichno-Lugansk, Krasnodon districts and towns of regional subordination Krasnodon, Dovzhansk, Krasny Luch, Stakhanov, in which Russians predominate. At the same time, the Krasnodon district and all the above-mentioned towns since the spring of 2014 have been on the territory that is not actually controlled by the Ukrainian authorities. By contrast, in 2001, only 30% of the Luhansk region's population considered Ukrainian to be their native language, in particular 63.8% of the rural and 25.5% of the urban ones. In 8 of the 12 districts of the Lugansk region, where the Ukrainian authorities exercise authority, the Ukrainian language is considered native by: from 93.8% (the Markov district) to 62.8% (the Troitsky district) population, while from 6 districts where the state authorities of Ukraine temporarily do not exercise their powers, only in one - (the Dovzhansky

¹⁵⁸ Piliaiev, I. (2015). Fraktal'na lokalizatsiya hlobal'noyi paradyhmy «Skhid – Zakhid»: sproba synerhetychnoho analizu zbroynoho konfliktu na Donbasi [Fractal Localization of the East – West Global Paradigm: an Attempt of Synergetic Analysis of the Armed Conflict in Donbas]. *Naukovyy visnyk Dyplomatychnoyi akademiyi Ukrayiny [Scientific Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine]*. 22 (Part II), 112-120. (In Ukrainian)

(formerly Sverdlovsk), - more than half of the population (56.0%) indicated Ukrainian as their native language.¹⁵⁹

The author has carried out the fractal analysis of towns of regional subordination and districts of the Luhansk region according to three criteria – ethnonational (the population’s absolute majority having the Ukrainian ethnic identity – 2E or Russian ethnic identity - 2A, the population’s simple majority having Ukrainian ethnic identity – E, the population’s simple majority having Russian ethnic identity – A, no absolute or simple majority - AE), language identity (the Ukrainian-speaking absolute majority – 2E, the Russian-speaking absolute majority – 2A; the Ukrainian-speaking simple majority – E, the Russian-speaking simple majority – A, no absolute or simple majority - AE) and pre-revolutionary (pre-Soviet) belonging to the Yekaterinoslav and Kharkiv provinces (respectively E) or the Don Host (respectively A). The author’s analysis has shown that the most conflicting identity is found in the the regional subordination towns of Bryanka, Alchevsk, Golubivka (former Kirovsk), Kadievka (former Stakhanov), Severodonetsk and the Pereval’sky district (2E-2A). The strongest pro-Ukrainian identity is mainly in the northern mostly rural districts (the historical Slobozhanschina (the Sloboda Ukraine) and the Zaporozhian Host (Army)’s historical lands): Bilovodsky, Belokurakinsky, Kreminsky, Markovsky, Milovsky, Novopskovsky, Swatovsky, Starobilsk (all - 5E), Popasnyansky and Troitsky districts (the both - 4E). The strongest pro-Eurasian (pro-Russian) identity is present in the districts of Sorokine (former Krasnodon) (4A), Anthracite, Dovzhansk, Khrustalny (former Krasniy Luch) (all - 1E-4A) and the Stanichno-Lugansky district (4A), and the latter, unlike the cities listed above, is now controlled by the Ukrainian authorities.

In this context, the formation of fractal tables of value identity in the context of regions (oblasts), districts and administrative-territorial units of local self-government seems relevant, when the fractal results of the value identity of the corresponding objects of analysis are presented when the dialog box is called up. Accordingly, the tables should be compiled fractally inland - to the level of individual settlements, their historical and functional parts, streets, microdistricts and then - and fractally up - to the level of regions of Ukraine, countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the whole Europe, Eurasia, etc. Searching for “red” (problem) indicators should be carried out in the automatic search mode to the entire fractal depth for each indicator (index).

Thus, the Ukrainian crisis is in its essence primarily a value conflict (between conditionally pro-European (pro-Western) and pro-Russian Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, between the collective West and Russia), similar in nature to the conflicts that have not been resolved so far around Taiwan and Korean Peninsula. This is a one-of-a-kind predominantly ideological value-based, rather than inter-ethnic, armed conflict (and is actually simmering, not settled or frozen) in the post-Soviet space and the Central-Eastern Europe in the post-bipolar era.

¹⁵⁹ The author’s analytical calculations according to the 2001 All-Ukrainian Population Census data.

The Ukraine crisis is the only predominantly ideological (ideational) values (rather than interethnic *or interconfessional*) armed conflict in the post-Soviet space. This is eventually a continental crisis, reflecting fundamental problems in the present East-West relations.

The value conflict in Donbas, blurred with the ethnic and the language identity cleavages, is originated in the Cold War era and its legacy (in particular, in political psychology, psychology of political elites in the West, in the CEE and in the post-Soviet space). That is why the whole Ukraine crisis is really “the product of residual Cold War mentality”.¹⁶⁰ Thus, it may be classified as the post-Cold War syndrome, like the analogous ideological, (geo)political & cultural value conflicts around Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsular.

The East-West Dichotomy and the Ukraine Conflict

But the key question in this case is the following: are the values and life orientations associated respectively with Russia (and, wider, with post-Soviet Eurasia) and Europe truly antagonistic? And, consequently, is the East-West dichotomy in its historical, cultural and value (axiological) dimensions antagonistic?

Analysis from the viewpoint of the East-West fractal cultural and civilizational dichotomy allows to cover all three of the above levels of analysis of the Ukraine crisis.

In contemporary Western social sciences the conviction about the mechanical East-West dichotomy, let it be camouflaged with declarations of the East-West complementarity and integrity, still dominates. Thorsten Pattberg in his eponymous fundamental book posits:

“Since our physiology projects itself on the world we perceive, this makes me wonder whether our definition of an inductive East and an analytical West is another example of the structure of our cognitive system - the two cerebral hemispheres - correctly corresponding and portraying categorizations of the world we perceive, namely the East-West dichotomy. <...>

To my knowledge, no Western culture has ever produced anything like the works of Confucius, and no Eastern culture has ever produced anything like Plato's ideals. The notion of the share of labor makes me think that the division of an analytically-based West and an integration-based East could be no coincidence in human evolution, but a collective behavior to fully exploit and develop all the cognitive capacities of the human race.”¹⁶¹

Milan Lajciak, Slovak political philosopher and long standing diplomat in East Asia presents a characteristic example: absolutizing the East-West dichotomy he disputably opposes the critical thinking in the West to the allegedly subdued critical thinking in the Confucian East. In his conception, the West has produced “truth-seekers”

160 ENGAGING RUSSIA: A Return to Containment? THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION 2013/2014 TASK FORCE REPORT RELEASED ON MAY 15, 2014. 37 pp. P. 27. URL: http://trilateral.org/download/doc/TF_Russia_for_WEBSITE_final_15_May_2014.pdf

161

striving for the transcendental truth beyond our world, while the East generated “way-seekers” searching for harmony in the existing material world.¹⁶² Lajciak posits as if the West has created the man who incorporated spiritual aspects of the life, while the East produced the man oriented for ethical rules,¹⁶³ ignoring the fact that Confucianism in the East Asia has always been supplemented by spiritually rich teachings of Taoism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Chinese ethnic religious cults (paganism) including those of pantheistic and polytheistic nature.

Meanwhile, Pattberg realizes the empirical difficulties to identify separate individuals or households as definitely belonging to East or West but he is apparently inclined to do so with larger entities:

“If zooming into separated households, naturally we would find each individual of that household having many identities. They identify themselves, for example, by their faith, profession, social status, ethnicity, hobbies, friends they have etc.

Looking at humankind from the moon, however, those identities can be summarized to belong to a certain region, cultural group, and civilization, East or West.”¹⁶⁴

That is why, in the above context of the mechanical division of East and West we agree with Joy Hendry & Heung Wah Wang’s critics that these two categories are oversimplifying the current world-order and all other cultural, geographical, historical, political and social affairs.¹⁶⁵ In Olena Lyubchenko’s view, “the West-East dichotomy mirrors the difference between normal and abnormal government and society”.¹⁶⁶ Especially, approaches to the East-West dichotomy have been criticized for failing to take into account the historical hybridity of the regions.¹⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the conceptual contrast between East and West determined since Herodotus (484 BC-425 BC) and developed by universal historians and theoreticians up to Samuel Huntington¹⁶⁸, Iver Neumann¹⁶⁹, Alexandr Panarin¹⁷⁰, Yuriy Pavlenko¹⁷¹,

162 Lajciak Milan (2017). *East and West: Manifestation of Ancient Thought Paradigms in Modern Times: Heritage of Old Thinking Modes and Their DNA*. Lambert Academic Printing.

163 Lajciak Milan (2017). *East and West: Manifestation of Ancient Thought Paradigms in Modern Times: Heritage of Old Thinking Modes and Their DNA*. Lambert Academic Printing.

164 Pattberg, Thorsten (2009). Chapter 20 / *The East-West dichotomy*. New York: LoD Press. URL:

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_East-West_dichotomy_/Chapter_20

165 Hendry, Joy & Wong, Heung Wah, (2006), *Dismantling the East-West Dichotomy: Essays in Honour of Jan van Bremen*. Routledge, New York.

166 Lyubchenko, O. (2017) *The Ukrainian Crisis: A Case of 'New Orientalism'*. *Acta Politologica*. Vol. 9. Issue 1. P. 45-60. P. 48.

167 See: Berger, Mark T. (1997). "The triumph of the East? The East-Asian Miracle and post-Cold War capitalism". In Borer, Douglas A. *The rise of East Asia: critical visions of the Pacific century*. Routledge. - P. 275.

168 Huntington, Samuel P. (2000), *Culture Matters, How Values Shape Human Progress*, Basic Books (Perseus), New York.

169 Neumann, I. (1999). *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 304 pp.

170 Панарин А.С. *Искушение глобализмом*. - Москва: Эксмо-Пресс, 2002. - 416 с.

is a quite relevant reflection of reality. But it needs a further essential interdisciplinary development in accordance with the latest achievements of the world natural and social sciences.

The dichotomy of values, civilizational and cultural aspirations is inherent in Eurasia both by definition (in fact, its very name implies the duality of the continent's two different wings) and historically, especially since the Mongol invasion. Moreover, such a dichotomy of classical Europe (that is Europe of the historical space of the Carolingian Empire) and classical Asia, as a zone of active civilization influence of the "Celestial Empire" ("Great China"), is a universal property of the whole post-Soviet space at the macro-regional, national, regional, subregional and local levels. We have shown that this dichotomy has a fractal nature, i.e., in practically every society, at each of its structural levels, there is a potential of both the East and the West. The question is in their dynamic proportions.¹⁷² As Umberto Eco (2016) points out: "It is impossible to imagine Western civilization and, in particular, European civilization, without specifying the "Greek miracle", but "neither the Greek civilization nor the Roman one can be realized without reconstruction <...> of "their Eastern roots"¹⁷³.

Relativeness of the East-West dichotomy for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia on the whole may be testified by the infinite number of examples. May we adduce herewith within the limited framework only a few very characteristic ones.

Probably the most famous European philosopher of Modernity Immanuel Kant's Masoleum is situated in contemporary Russia (Kaliningrad, former Königsberg).

One of the greatest Russian-language lexicographers, the author of Explanatory Dictionary of the Live Great Russian language published in four huge volumes in 1863–1866 Vladimir Dahl was an ethnic Danish born in Lugansk (the Donetsk region of the then Russian empire). His pen name was the Lugansk Cossack.

So far the most comprehensive and authoritative source for Slavic etymology - the Etymological dictionary of the Russian language was prepared by Russian-born German graduate of the Saint-Petersburg University Max Vasmer in Berlin where Vasmer lived after emigration in consequence of the Bolshevik revolution since 1925 up to his death in 1962. In 1944, the Allies' bombing of Vasmer's house in Berlin

171 Pavlenko, Y. V. (2002). Chapter II. The Stages, Ways, and Historical Types of the Civilizational Process Realization. In Y. N. Pakhomov (Ed.). *Civilizational Models of the Present and their Historical Roots* Kyiv: Naukova Dumka (in Russ.).

172 Piliaiev, I. S. Zbroynyy konflikt na Donbasi yak proyav fraktal'noho dualizmu postradyans'koho rozvytku. *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu politychnykh i etnonatsional'nykh doslidzhen' im. I. F. Kurasa NAN Ukrainy*. [Armed conflict in the Donbas as a manifestation of the fractal duality of post-Soviet development. Scientific notes of the I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnonational Studies., National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. – Kyiv : IPIEND im. I.F.Kurasa, 2015. – # 1 (75). – P. 129-138 (in Ukrainian).

¹⁷³ Eco, U. (2016). *Vstup do antychnosti* [Introduction to antiquity]. – In Eco, U. (Ed.), *Istoriya yevropeys'koyi tsyvilizatsiyi. Blyz'kyy Shhid* [The history of European civilization. Middle East] (Trans. from Italian. Kharkiv, Ukraine: Folio. P. 17. (In Ukrainian)

destroyed most of his research materials. Nevertheless, Vasmer persevered in his work, which was finally published in three volumes by Heidelberg University in 1950–1958 as *Russisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. The Russian translation of Vasmer's dictionary – with extensive commentaries by prominent Russian linguist Oleg Trubachyov – was translated from German into Russian and printed in 1964–1973 in Moscow¹⁷⁴.

Bridging, in fact, the East-West dichotomy a prominent Prussian and German historian Leopold von Ranke pointed out that “the Turkish threat had guaranteed the survival of German Protestantism.”¹⁷⁵

Iver Neumann emphasizes the role played by groups who are ambiguously poised between any identity poles. He argues that collective identities are overlapping and multifaceted phenomena which must not be reified and studied in isolation from one another.¹⁷⁶

The author argues that historical roots of the Ukraine crisis stretch deep into the 13-14th centuries when the former Kiev Rus lands were divided between Mongols' Horde, having been a periphery zone of the Chinese influence, and political Europe¹⁷⁷. That determines the historical struggle for *Rus' legacy*, wherein the contemporary Russian Federation essentially acts as the despotic-authoritarian alternative to the project of the pluralistic, pro-Western Rus-Ukraine – the case with many parallels to the DPRK-ROK opposition on the Korean Peninsula. In contrast to today's Ukrainian society and economy (being predominantly neo-feudal but with a dynamically developing segment of capitalist relations of the European kind), the contemporary Russia's socio-economic system is of the palace-neopolitar type wherein the top bureaucratic oligarchy has established a monopoly on power controlling and redistributing, with the purpose of its utmost enrichment, the core economic resources and assets of that country¹⁷⁸. The unlikely, as of today, success of Russian modernization can threaten the very foundations of Russian statehood that is similar to the DPRK's case.

174 Фасмер М. Этимологический словарь русского языка. В 4-х томах: Перевод с немецкого. - 2-е издание. - Москва: Прогресс, 1986.

175 Guido Franzinetti (2008) The idea and the reality of Eastern Europe in the eighteenth-century, *History of European Ideas*, 34:4, 361-368 p. 366.

176 Neumann, I. (June 1996). Self and Other in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*. 2(2):139-174.

177 Piliaiev, I. Fractal Localization of the East – West Global Paradigm: an Attempt of Synergetic Analysis of the Armed Conflict in Donbas // *Scientific Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine*. – Vol. # 22. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy: Traditions, Trends, Experience. Part II. The Political Sciences series. – Kyiv: Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, 2015. – P. 112-120 (in Ukrainian); Piliaiev, I. (30 May 2015). Localization of the fractal historical paradigm "East - West" as a tool of diagnosis and potential settlement of the armed conflict in Donbass. Russia – Ukraine: trends and prospects of cooperation. The Russian Academy of Sciences Presidium's Program "Prospects for a Coordinated Economic and Social Development of Russia and Ukraine in the European Context". Retrieved from <http://ukros.ru/2015/05/30/> (in Russian).

178 Piliaiev, I. (2016) Contemporary Russia as the Palace-Neopolitar State and Economy. *Economic Annals-XXI*. Vol. 156 (1-2). Pp. 4-8.

Cheng-Chi Kuang & Jenn-Jaw Soong emphasize the key significance of the West-East dichotomy for understanding the nature of Russian political culture and the problem of self identification by both the Russian political elites and society.¹⁷⁹

Such distinguished 19th-20th centuries philosophers of history as Nikolay Kostomarov, Georgy Fedotov, Nikolay Berdyayev, Nikolai Trubetzkoy, Mikhail Pokrovsky, Lev Gumilyov, George Vernadsky considered the Moscow state since the rule of Ivan III to be the direct successor not of the Kievan Rus, but the empire of Chingizids that (the Moscow state) inherited and realized in the new historical conditions principles of the effective government of vast empire brought by the Mongols from the conquered China. The mental-value genetics of Moscow's great power from the Horde was further inherited by the Russian Empire: though the latter borrowed from Europe a lot of symbols and cultural artifacts, the autocratic nature of the tsar's power-property was preserved (Kul'pin, 2008, pp. 74-75).

The territories of Kievan Rus, after its collapse, accumulated over the centuries around sharply conflicting centers: conditionally the European (Galician-Volyn Rus, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Poland, Rzeczpospolita, Austria, Austria-Hungary, again Poland) and the Eurasian (Volodymyr-Suzdal Rus, the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the Tsardom of Russia, Russian Empire).¹⁸⁰ Only a brief historical period –in 1939-1941 and 1944-1991 – these centres were in the format of united state –the USSR. Similarly, the dichotomy of the European and Horde-Moscow Rus is clearly traceable both in the denominational and axiological dimensions through the keen rivalry between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (that is headed by *Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus*) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate founded (self-declared) in 1992 and headed by *Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine*.

Thus, for more than seven centuries after the Mongol invasion, one may observe not only civilizational and cultural bipolarity, but also a distinct fractality of historical and ethnocultural development on the territories of the former "Rus' land" (the Old Rus state): Western Rus (Ruthenia) – Eastern Rus (Muscovy), the Ukrainian ethnogenesis respectively within the above-mentioned Central Europe states and within the tsarist Russia, the (Dnieper) Right Bank Ukraine – the (Dnieper) Left Bank Ukraine, the historical Sloboda Ukraine Donbas – the under Late modernity industrialized Donbass, etc.

A dichotomous understanding of the nature of conflictogenicity in society in its various strata, diachronic sections and localizations in essence - through the doctrine of the dualism of the yin and yang forces for two and a half thousand years is an indispensable element of dialectical constructs in Chinese philosophy, especially in Taoism and Confucianism. Being a fundamental model of all things, the yin-yang

179 Cheng-Chi Kuang & Jenn-Jaw Soong (Political Economists at Taiwan Cheng Kung University). An Exploration of the 2013-2014 Ukrainian Crisis and its Presidential-Parliamentary Election. Tamkang Journal of International Affairs. Volume XIX Number III January 2016. Pp. 73-124. - P. 75.

180 Compare states of California in Mexico and the USA, state and province of Punjab respectively in India and Pakistan, Sudan and the South Sudan, etc.

concept explains the universal pattern of the universe: there can be no "final victory", because there is nothing final, there is no end as such.¹⁸¹ In this, respectively, - the fundamental basis of morality, moral behavior of man and social order. Hence, for example, the high authorities of both South Korea and Japan, the closest allies of the United States in the Far East, underscore the inappropriateness of a mutually exclusive view of the choice of "China or the United States" for their countries and tend to speak out in favor of establishing cooperation within the framework of the transcontinental project of China " One Belt, One Road", while trying to confront the growing economic, marine and geopolitical influence of the mainland China.¹⁸²

Thus, the armed conflict in Donbas appears as a fractal localization of historical paradigm of the East – West confrontation which axiologically, civilizationally and culturally since the Migration Period, that is at least for the last fifteen hundred years, is expressed in the dichotomy of “Europe as the successor of ancient Greece and Rome – Asia as an extrapolation of Great China, Turkic Great Steppe and, since the 7th century, the Islamic world”, while during the Contemporary history – “the Euro-Atlantic community – the Eurasian community” institutionalized today respectively within NATO / the European Union / the European Economic Area (EEA) and within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) / the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) / the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

In this regard, the armed conflict in Donbas may be better and deeper understood through localizing the East-West fractal dichotomy in the conflict as **national, pluralistic and competitively democratic European Rus-Ukraine versus pro-empire, multinational, strongly authoritarian Eurasian Rus-Russia.**

The Ukraine – Taiwan – Korean Peninsula strategic conflict parallels

Ukraine and Taiwan represent very interesting comparative parallels.

1. At first, the two are parties of asymmetric¹⁸³ international strategic conflict deeply involving as well ideological divides: the resource potential and, accordingly, the military capabilities of Ukraine and Taiwan are much lesser than those of the Russian Federation and mainland China respectively (although in terms of population, the difference between Russia and Ukraine is about 3.5 times, and between Taiwan and mainland China - about 60 times).

2. In the dichotomy of the historical development of the territories of the former Ancient (Kievan) Rus after its division between the Horde and the Christian

181 Markov, L. (2003). Sistema dual'nykh protivopolozhnostey In' - Yan v sravnitel'nom osveshchenii [The system of dual opposites Yin - Yang in comparative covering. Vostok [The East]. 2003. Issue 5. Pp. 17-31.

182 Song Young-gil. [Interview] “Stronger ties with China, Russia will promote peace”. *The Korea Times*. January 8, 2018. Retrieved from: http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/phone/news/view.jsp?req_newsidx=242082 (Last accessed: 10.10.2018).

183 In contrast to the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, where the forces, territories and resources of the parties are commensurable.

Europe, the Lithuanian Rus and then Rus-Ukraine acts as a kind of “Other”, a geopolitical and value alternative to Eurasian Rus-Russia, which is also manifested in contradistinction Kyiv (the Rus' first and original metropolitan capital) - Moscow (as the post-Horde Rus-Russia's capital). Also in the context of the Chinese civilization, Taiwan (Republic of China) appears, as it were, politically and axiologically “other China”.

3. During the civil war of 1918-1922 in the former Russian Empire, the main theater and the main base of anti-Bolshevik resistance was the territory of modern Ukraine, and by the end of the civil war of 1945-1949 in post-imperial China the impregnable stronghold of the anti-communist forces' resistance proved to be just Taiwan. It is characteristic that in 1918 during the half-year existence of the anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian State headed by Hetman P. Skoropadsky as well as in summer and autumn of 1920 during the Supreme Ruler of Russia, General Baron P. Wrangel's anti-Bolshevik military alliance with the Supreme Ataman of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic Simon Petliura, the territory of modern Ukraine was the embodiment of an alternative way of the development of Rus.¹⁸⁴

Ukraine and Taiwan appeared on the political map of Modernity as a result of the civil war on the territory of the former Russian Empire (in 1918) and China (in 1949), respectively.

In 1920, by the end of the civil war in the European part of the former Russian empire, the Crimean Peninsula and the adjacent southern part of “continental” Ukraine became the last bulwark of the regular White Army's (in military alliance with the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic and supported by Entente) resistance against the Bolsheviks' Red Army and their totalitarian dictatorship regime. In contrast to the dramatic fall of the White Crimea in November 1920, Taiwan since 1949 has become the survived bulwark against the Communist dictatorship after the Chinese Civil War.

4. Another similarity of the Ukrainian issue with the Taiwanese one is in the formation of a nation and national consciousness, emphasizing and instigating ethno-cultural, ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious differences, primarily under the influence of ideological (ideological and value) and geopolitical, rather than natural, geographical, climatic, economic, cultural and historical other objective factors.

The identity of Ukraine's and Taiwan's population is contradictory, “diverse and fluid”¹⁸⁵. Under both the post-Maidan Ukraine's authorities and President Tsai

184 Piliaiev, I. Evolution of the Anti-Bolshevik Russia's Nationalities Policy in 1917-1920. Bulletin of Mariupol State University. Series: History. Political Studies. Collection of Research Papers. – Issue 13-14. – 2015. – Pp. 266-279.

185 With regard to Ukraine's populations' identification see: Yekelchuk, Serhy (2015). *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*. 2015. xix, 186 pp. - P. 20. Meanwhile, the fluid dynamics of the Taiwan's population's identification is characterized by the following facts: “over the past three decades, the percent of the population in Taiwan that identifies as Chinese has plummeted as Taiwanese identification has surged. In 1992, 46.4 percent of those surveyed by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University reported that they identified as “both

Ing-wen's administration trying to delineate their population's identity from respectively Russia and mainland China¹⁸⁶, it stipulates painful and risky split in their politicum and society's geopolitical orientations and sympathies.

The example of Taiwan and Ukraine suggests that the commonality (unity) of language and religion are not decisive for the political orientation (geopolitical and political-value preferences) of the population, while the origins and nature of the political regime may be of decisive importance¹⁸⁷.

One may observe split identities in Ukraine and in Taiwan appealing either to the [traditional/historical "Big Brother"] former "Big Motherland" ("Our Civilization"), or to a new strategic "Big Brother" ("Our Protector", "Big Boss").

5. On the wave of a psychological impass / disappointment in the long-term political future / permanent instability there is a lack of rationality and the rise of irrational expectations upon obviously populist figures (upstarts, parvenus) like a professional political satire comic actor and scriptwriter Mr. Zelensky – now the newly elected President – in Ukraine or an up-and-coming Mayor of Kaosiung Han Kuo-yu who rushly has got scandalously popular in Taiwan especially through promises of positive break-through in relations with mainland China¹⁸⁸.

At the same time there are very important institutional differences between Ukraine and Taiwan as strategic conflict epicenters on the Eurasian continent:

1. Ukraine is not so far either legally (by means of an bilateral or multilateral legally binding international treaty) or institutionally (by means of participating in an interstate/intergovernmental military alliance), — like Georgia in 2008 at the time of the 5 day Russian-Georgian war — is not **an ally of the USA**¹⁸⁹ (as, indeed, of any other country).

2. The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed at the OSCE conference in Budapest, Hungary on 5 December 1994, relating to the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons originally signed by three nuclear powers, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the USA (*Beijing and Paris gave somewhat weaker individual assurances in separate documents*) **in fact is not the legally binding document.** It was never ratified by the

Taiwanese and Chinese"; 25.5 percent identified as Chinese; and 17.6 percent identified as Taiwanese. In December 2017, dual identification had fallen to 37.3 percent and Chinese identification to 3.8 percent. Taiwanese identification, on the other hand, had risen to 55.3 percent of respondents. <...> Interestingly, the percentage of respondents identifying as solely Taiwanese peaked at 60.6 percent in 2014, during [President] Ma's second term, while Taipei and Beijing had a closer relationship than is typical." (Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2018-07-27/storm-brewing-taiwan-strait>)

186 Lee, Sh. (December 25, 2018). Taiwanese democracy powers on. *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved from: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org>

187 Gumilyov, L. N. (2004). *Ot Rusi k Rossii* [From Rus to Russia]. Moscow: AST.

188 Aspinwall, N. (June 5, 2019). Taiwan's Democracy Is Utterly Confounded by Populist Mayor Han Kuo-yu. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/taiwans-democracy-is-utterly-confounded-by-populist-mayor-han-kuo-yu/>

189 Medcalf R. Crimea. A Silver Lining for the United States' Asian Allies? April 22, 2014. URL: <https://www.nbr.org/publication/crimea-a-silver-lining-for-the-united-states-asian-allies/>

respective Parliaments and State Parties. **It refers to political assurances, but it does not impose a legal obligation of military assistance on its parties**¹⁹⁰.

Moreover, there are substantial the political regime differences between the binary alternative to the geopolitical choice in Taiwan (political freedom to vote for such alternatives) and Ukraine (where, after the Euromaidan victory, such freedom of geopolitical choice is limited due to accusations of those who stand for integration with Russia in “favoring the aggressor” and even in high treason).

With regard to the Korean peninsula conflict Lisa Collins, predicting the North Korean instability in the long term perspective, draws evident and alarming parallels with the Ukraine crisis, especially with the Euromaidan security instability consequences:

“Beijing’s stake in North Korea resembles Moscow’s stake in the Crimean region. Chinese ‘core interests’ could dictate the need to rush in to fill the vacuum left by a collapsed DPRK regime. A large amount of Chinese property, and some nationals, are located in North Korea. Chinese scholars have even claimed sections of North Korean territory to be, historically, a part of China. This could provide China with a similar rationale for an ‘emergency intervention’ in the North”.¹⁹¹

At the same time, like Ukraine with respect to the United States and Russia, and obviously Taiwan with respect to unification with China or independence with the support of the United States, “South Korea is a severely polarized country in terms of its views on North Korea and the United States.”¹⁹² That means the same problem of the fluid and sharply confronting identities present in the conflict cases of Ukraine and Taiwan. Therefore, the only possible peaceful outcome for each of the three above-mentioned great strategic and value crises in Eurasia is avoiding any unilateral action approach, fostering multilateral high-level productive dialogue including all the parties concerned and finding a way for a compromise solution with full respect to the conflicting parties’s cultural values and full account of the respective powers’ strategic interests.

190 See: Vasylenko, Volodymyr (15 December 2009). "On assurances without guarantees in a 'shelved document'". The Day. Retrieved 18 April 2019; Shymanska, Alina (2018). "The "Double Standard" of Nonproliferation: Regime Type and the U.S. Response to Nuclear Weapons Program". International Journal of Nuclear Security. 4 (1): 1–20); According to Stephen MacFarlane, a professor of international relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK "It gives signatories justification if they take action, but it does not force anyone to act in Ukraine." (Are the US and the UK bound to intervene in Ukraine?, France24, 3 March 2014.). In April 2013 Belarus Precedent took place: the government of Belarus said that US sanctions were in breach of the Memorandum; the United States government responded that, **although not legally binding**, the Memorandum is compatible with its work against human rights violations in eastern Europe.

191 Lisa Collins (June 12, 2014). Preempting a crisis on the Korean Peninsula: lessons from Ukraine. PacNet, Pacific Forum CSIS. Honolulu, Hawaii. Number 43. 2 pp.

192 Lee, Seong-hyon. The Korean Angle on Crimean Fallout: America’s Perception Gap. April 22, 2014. Retrieved from: <https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-korean-angle-on-crimean-fallout-americas-perception-gap/>

Consequences of the Ukraine crisis

The direct consequence of the Ukrainian crisis was a very high, reminiscent of the height of the Cold War, the strategic and geopolitical instability not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but throughout the megacontinental area of Eurasia.

Another major consequence of the Ukraine crisis, in Sergiy Korsunsky's, Director of the Gennady Udovenko Diplomatic Academy by the MFA of Ukraine, opinion has been the formation of “the new geopolitical triangle of the USA — China — Russia“ in which main problems of world politics are now “roaming.”¹⁹³

According to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in 2012-2014, Acting Chairman of the OSCE in 2013 Leonid Kozhara:

“Ukraine has become a hammer against Russia in a geopolitical war. I feel it with pain. We could have taken a completely different place on the map of Europe, on the world map.”¹⁹⁴

At the same time, the strategic victory of the West in the neorealist struggle for Ukraine may turn out to be Pyrrhic. As reasonably points out Ammon Cheskin,

“While the evidence here points to increased affective investment into European identities, it does not follow that common perceptions of European values and their utility are unquestioned, or that they will continue to take root in Ukraine. <...> even when there is a significant reserve of potential soft power and affect, this can all too easily be undercut by developments that directly challenge the subject's perception of his or her active self. <...> As a result, soft power, and especially Russian soft power, remains enduringly elusive.”¹⁹⁵

The above soft power challenges in the context of the ongoing systemic socio-economic crisis, depopulation and de-industrialization of Ukraine require from the Euro-Atlantic community quick and innovative approach reactions, especially while appealing to Ukrainian ordinary citizens and civil society, through adapting democratic instruments to the local realities. The Zelensky phenomenon is a very illustrative example of how the soft power tools may be transformed and adjusted in critical cases of the ostensibly pro-Western but fully corrupted national political elite losing control over the public loyalty.

While having virtually anticipated the lough's strong soft power potential for influencing the mass public opinion and consequent cardinal reshuffling Ukraine's political elite, the authors of a special report prepared by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga as early as in 2017 stressed:

“as a special tool, humour appeals not only to the emotions, but also to critical thinking. <...>

- humour is a universal factor of influence, since it can be disseminated quickly and with minimal effort;

193 Korsunsky, S. (April 9, 2019). Beijing's European policy. *ZN.UA*. Retrieved from: https://zn.ua/international/evropeyskaya-politika-pekina-313996_.html

194 Leonid KOZHARA: Our country is for everyone, not just ethnic Ukrainians. *Socialists*. 17.04.2019. Retrieved from: <http://socialisty.com.ua/en/news/leonid-kozhara-nasha-strana-dlia-vsekh-a-ne-tolko-dlia-etnicheskikh-ukraintsev/>

195 Cheskin, A. Russian soft power in Ukraine: A structural perspective *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 50 (2017) 277-287. P. 285.

- on the one hand, humour must be supported by real facts and news. On the other hand, humour creates an altered reality. This makes humour an exceptional tool of propaganda and counterpropaganda <...>”¹⁹⁶

Meanwhile, under the partially frozen armed conflict having been simmering for over 5 years Ukraine has found itself in a “grey zone” (“in which is neither with Russia, nor with the EU/NATO”¹⁹⁷) of absence of real and reliable allies in отсутствия реальных и надежных союзников и партнеров in the processes of ensuring its international security, economic integration and sustainable social development. “Ukraine’s disrupted and profoundly transformed relationship with Russia” сочетается на неопределенную перспективу с “its uncertain relationship with Europe and the United States”¹⁹⁸, particularly in the light of Donald Trump’s scepticism about Ukraine combined with Brexit and the rise of eurosceptical nationalism and populism in the EU member states.

In its turn, “the instability of Ukraine will really obstruct the interconnection of Eurasia.”¹⁹⁹. Thus, the Ukraine crisis is used by the US (American and Euro-Atlantic supporters of the strategy of containing Russia) to block the processes of Eurasian continental integration.

The Ukraine crisis has stirred up serious concerns among the U.S. allies in Eastern Asia about Washington’s ability to cope with the opposing authoritarian great power’s possible – potentially sudden and direct – military challenges in the region. Both in mainland China and in the U.S. ally countries, especially South Korea and Taiwan, there is a perception of the dangerously open question: if the United States failed to dissuade Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, can Washington then manage and contain Beijing in East Asia?²⁰⁰ As Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, Chairman of the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies in Taiwan, unequivocally posits:

“Putin’s swift action in Crimea and the inability of the West to react quickly will serve as a significant reference for China. If the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can act quickly and put Taiwan firmly under its control, the rest of the world might have little choice but accept the fait accompli”.²⁰¹

196 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (2017). StratCom laughs: in search of an analytical framework. Project was requested by Ministry of Defence of Republic of Latvia. Riga, 2017. 157 p. P. 136. Retrieved from: file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Downloads/full_stratcomLaughs_report_web_15.03.2017.pdf

197 Ana Maria COSTEA (GHIMIS). THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS - AN UNPREDICTABLE EVENT? *CES Working Papers*. Volume VIII, Issue 3. Pp. 333-347. - P. 345.

198 Menon, R. & Rumer E. B. (2015). *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. P. 151.

199 Song LILEI (2015). The Ukraine crisis: a multidimensional analysis in China. *Eastern Journal of European Studies*. Volume 6, Issue 2, December 2015: 159-175. P. 172.

200 Song LILEI. The Ukraine crisis: a multidimensional analysis in China. *EASTERN JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES*. Volume 6, Issue 2, December 2015: 159-175.

201 Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang. Taiwan Is No Crimea, But... by April 22, 2014. Retrieved from:

An Indian political analyst writes in Harvard International Review with no less anxiety:

“The danger that now lies ahead is if China interprets US restraint as seen in Ukraine to symbolize a larger trend of US isolationism following a long decade of bloody occupations that have wearied the American people.”²⁰²

Within the alarming context of the Ukraine crisis which has opened the Pandora box of the neorealist balance of power approach to the European and Eurasian politics Francis Fukuyama is troubled by the potential for a US-China war (“the Thucydides trap”). “<...> I can think of lots of scenarios by which such a war could start. I don’t think it would be a deliberate attack by one country on the other – like Germany invading Poland in 1939 – it’s more likely to come out of a local conflict over Taiwan, over North Korea, possibly a confrontation in the South China Sea that escalates.” (*the bold is mine – I.P.*)²⁰³

It is particularly a vital question in light of the much-touted America’s (under Obama’s administration)²⁰⁴ emphatically proclaimed but in actuality dubious “pivot” to Asia.

The frozen Ukrainian crisis is blocking integration processes both within Greater Europe and continental Eurasia, between the two economically and socio-politically advanced and most dynamic regions of the modern world - the Asia-Pacific (East Asia) and the European (Euro-Atlantic). At the same time, the risk of a final “turn (pivot) to the East” on the part of Russia and the establishing of a strictly authoritarian geostrategic and even military-political bond between the Russian Federation and the mainland China (with the probable participation of Kazakhstan) increases²⁰⁵.

Where is the Mitteran “Europe from Brest to the Urals and Vladivostok”? In fact, there is a closure of integration processes in the European Union, while ignoring the rest, much larger part of Eurasia as a continent. And serious European political

202 Raina, H. (April 3, 2014). Implications of the Ukrainian Crisis for the Asia Pacific. Harvard International Review. Retrieved from: <http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=3243>

203 Eaton, G. Francis Fukuyama interview: “Socialism ought to come back”. New Statesman. 17 October 2018. URL: <https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2018/10/francis-fukuyama-interview-socialism-ought-come-back> (Last accessed: 20.04.2019). See also: Allison G. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston, MA, USA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. 384 pp.; Allison G. China vs. America. Managing the Next Clash of Civilizations. Foreign Affairs. September/October 2017.

204 Rory Medcalf (April 22, 2014). Crimea: A Silver Lining for the United States' Asian Allies? Retrieved from: <https://www.nbr.org/publication/crimea-a-silver-lining-for-the-united-states-asian-allies/>

205 Nevertheless, Pavel Baev working for the Peace Research Institute in Oslo even characterizes the present China-Russia relationship as “pseudoalliance” and “a mutually irritating duress” (Baev, P. K. Three turns in the evolution of China–Russia presidential pseudo-alliance. Asia Pac Policy Stud. 2019;6:4–18. P. 13).

scientists just advocate for such a self-contraction of the Euro-Atlantic and European community.²⁰⁶

A number of Chinese experts argue that the United States' greatest failure has been to push Beijing away from Washington and towards Moscow.²⁰⁷

Thus, we get a vicious circle: while punishing and embittering Russia in the prevalence of the strategy of deterrence over the strategy of cooperation, we isolate it from the democratic community of nations, global and regional modernization and integration processes and further strengthen its backwardness (and social and political, and economic, but not military!), further remove the "aggressive gas station with nuclear missiles and the right of veto in the UN Security Council", further stimulate contempt for the western and, more broadly, the world democratic society exists, the formation of psychology "besieged fortress". If even for North Korea, the American leadership was able to find and offer a cooperation line (concept), then why are we not in a position to offer such a concept for Moscow, which in 1991 peacefully released 14 union republics (40% of the territories of the former USSR!), introduced and recognized electoral democracy, a market economy, is capitalist (albeit oligarchic, palace-neopolitarnogo type - see my article 2016) is in fact a full member state of the Council of Europe, a party to the European Convention on Human Rights recognizing the supranational jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights?

Is it possible to find a way "to the new normality [in relations] with Russia"²⁰⁸ and the continental security architecture as a whole without surrendering the national interests of Ukraine and without "losing face" on the part of key global actors, or Europe and Eurasia as a whole would continue to dive to the deadly funnel of the "zero-sum geo-strategic game" with the deadlock situation over the Ukraine crisis for Ukraine, for Russia, for the West and its East Asian allies?

What to do? (Conclusion)

On the basis of the complex analysis of the Ukraine crisis and generalization of principal academic approaches to its research made in the above chapters the most

206 See, e.g.: Sotiris Serbos and Georgios Anastasiadis (January 2018). REVISITING EUROPE'S GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE AFTER THE UKRAINE CRISIS: AMERICA'S BALANCE OF POWER STRATEGY. Democritus University of Thrace and American College of Thessaloniki // Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal, N° 46. Pp. 177-195.

207 See: Lora Saalman (the Director of, and Senior Researcher at, the China and Global Security Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Grey Men: China and the Ukraine Crisis. Survival. Vol. 58. No. 6. December 2016–January 2017. Pp. 135–156.

208 U RF khoroshiye shansy vernut'sya v PASE bez vypolneniya usloviy – Klimkin. Interv'yu s Ministrom inostrannykh del Ukrainy Pavlom Klimkinym [Russia has good chances to return to PACE without fulfilling the conditions - Klimkin. Interview with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavel Klimkin]. June 24, 2019. Retrieved from: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2019/06/24/7097675/>

efficient and longstanding settlement of that crisis can be seen in the inclusive multilateral dialogue on the new institutional and legal framework of the European and Eurasian continental security and cooperation with the participation of Ukraine as a bridge between the Euro-Atlantic, the European, the post-Soviet Eurasian and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SOC) normative orders as well as with participation of the U.S. East Asian strategic allies (first of all, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan).

One should recall that

“<...> in March 2014, when the Ukrainian crisis was entering the armed conflict stage, former EU enlargement commissioner Günter Verheugen called for peaceful reactions with regard to Russia and proposed that Moscow be offered: (1) an all-European security structure which would include NATO and Russia, and (2) the creation of an ‘economic area from Vladivostok to Lisbon’. In April 2015 this idea of a free trade area ‘from Vladivostok to Lisbon’ gained the support of Chancellor Angela Merkel”.²⁰⁹

Ex-Foreign Minister of Ukraine in 2012-2014, the Acting Chairman of the OSCE Leonid Kozhara argues:

“In a modern turbulent environment the focus on a single center of influence, ignoring the interests of others, would lead to Ukraine being between the great rivals as between the hammer and the anvil. We really need sober, balanced relations with Washington, with Berlin, with Beijing, and with other world capitals”.²¹⁰

With this regard he proposes to discuss a new comprehensive agreement on collective European security envisaging the radical update and strengthening of the European security institutions, first of all, the OSCE.²¹¹

The post-Euromaidan 2014-2019 Foreign Minister of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin is convinced that:

“A complex of solutions is needed - how we relate to Russia and everything connected with it - in politics, economics, trade, culture, absolutely everything. In Russia, we need logic for the whole country at all levels of society. And the logic must be supported by society, otherwise it will not work.”²¹²

However, the above-cited sober-minded reflection is essentially a recognition that for more than five years Mr. Klimkin’s Foreign Ministry has been working semi-

209 Justyna Zając (2016). *Poland’s Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order*. Palgrave Macmillan. 226 pp. - p.190.

210 Kozhara, L. The personal blog post dated March 21, 2019. *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from: <https://blogs.korrespondent.net/blog/politics/4077842/>

211 Leonid Kozhara (February 7, 2019). Загибель ракетного Договору: похмура тінь гонки озброєнь над Європою. [The death of the Missile Treaty: a dark gloom of the arms race over Europe]. *Correspondent Journal*. Retrieved from: https://blogs.korrespondent.net/blog/politics/4062569/?fbclid=IwAR396EPRe4XZqtbZUcaK0FReQ20t-j33zZ1Db0vUZMG8AdgW_QM6_fU3_N8

212 Shuklinov, P. (February 5, 2019). *If We do not change - Russia will crash us*. Interview with Foreign Minister of Ukraine. Retrieved from: <http://www.liga.net/>

blindly, no national or Ministry's strategy has been developed for relations with Russia.

To our mind, the corner-stone of a new collective European and post-Soviet Eurasian security should be, in line with the Council of Europe's strategy, avoiding "new dividing lines" on the Continent²¹³ whatever reasons their proponents would put forward. It assumes no "zero sum game" either in geopolitics, military defense, institutional cooperation, economics, legal or moral values, or culture. At the same time, the fundamental Helsinki principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders within, at least, the OSCE space should be unconditionally and legally guaranteed.

The settlement of value conflicts in Eurasia is a common cause of their participants and other interested great powers, as well as respective international organizations (UNO, OSCE, etc.).

The only way for global actors to avoid the hot confrontation and global nuclear catastrophe of humanity is to avoid doctrinal or fatally messianic thinking but to master planetary (or *noospheric* according to Vladimir Vernadsky and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin) post-non-classical thinking, synthesizing science, philosophy, religion, art, opening the way to the global civilization of the future, bridging, fusing and transcending the East-West and the Self-Other zero-sum game dichotomies²¹⁴.

Despite keen rivalry and geopolitical confrontation, today the conflicting world powers have much more internationally declared values in common than under the Cold War era: they proclaim their commitment to the market economy, respectively universal and mutually compatible European/Confucian values²¹⁵, especially the rule of law, respect for human rights and rights of national minorities, respect for private life, common global challenges (fight against terrorism, religious fundamentalism, illegal migration, energy efficiency, etc.).

In order to overcome present value conflicts originated in the Cold War era and its legacy (in particular, in political psychology, psychology of political elites in the West, in the CEE and in the post-Soviet space) this is necessary to move away from the Realpolitik thinking and Political doctrinism, from the logic of confrontation, confrontation, zero-sum games, from the logic of unilateral, monopoly, neoliberal globalism to the logic of coexistence of different value systems within the Eurasian space, to a new global thinking conceiving fractal dichotomies and possibilities of their transcending (bridging) at all levels.

Without the formation of an inclusive cooperative model of security in Europe and the structural and institutional participation of Russia in the European security system, even more dangerous and terrible conflicts may follow the Ukraine crisis.

213 Hall, B. (07 April 2019). Bring Russia back in from the cold, says Council of Europe chief // Financial Times. Retrieved from: <https://www.ft.com/content/8158d52a-5496-11e9-91f9-b6515a54c5b1>

214 See: Teilhard de Chardin, P. (2003) The Human Phenomenon: A New Edition and Translation of *Le phenomene humain* by Sarah Appleton-Weber : Sussex Academic Press, 320 pp.

215 See: Fukuyama F. Confucianism and Democracy. Journal of Democracy. 1995. Vol. 6, № 2. P. 31.

There should be finding reasonable compromises regarding sensitive political issues, and elaborating win-win strategies of implementing global and regional cooperation initiatives.

A constructive example of interaction between the West and Russia in the post-Soviet Europe can serve as an alliance of pro-Western and pro-Russian political forces in Moldova established in June 2019 in order to remove from the levers of power the only Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plohatnyuk and the government of the Democratic Party dependent on him. As a result of this alliance, Pokhatnyuk was forced to peacefully surrender power and emigrate from the country.

In many respects the War in Ukraine has occurred due to a critical lack of interface between European, Eurasian and Asian-Pacific integration institutions such as the EU, the Eurasian Economic Union, SCO, ASEM, APEC, etc. We may agree with Lilia Arakelyan's well-grounded opinion that "There is an urgent need for the creation of a different security environment in Eurasia that will be embedded in broader regional and global dynamics" involving not only the USA, Russia and China but also the six EU's Eastern Partnership participating countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine)²¹⁶.

In context of the European Union's initiative to formulate its policy on Euro-Asian connectivity²¹⁷ we consider to be expedient to switch the Council of Europe and the OSCE as the pan-European institutions to the Euro-Asian connectivity policy elaborating process.

At the international political level, it seems reasonable to resolve the Ukrainian crisis through:

1) a settlement of the type of Austria a country reestablished after the Second World War as a result of a geopolitical compromise and a difficult consensus between the great powers as a neutral state, which, in accordance with the Moscow Treaty of 1955, is forbidden to unite with Germany into one state. Heinz Fischer

In this context, then President of Austria Heinz Fischer's position expressed in May 2014 with regard to the Ukraine crisis, is of particular interest. In Fischer's opinion, Kyiv should not choose exclusively between the Western model and the Russian one since that contradicts the historical nature of the Ukrainian state. Therefore, Ukraine, like Austria, should become a neutral state.²¹⁸ In the same spirit,

²¹⁶ Lilia A. Arakelyan, L. A. Chapter 4. EU-Russia Security Relations: Another Kind of Europe. In: ... P. 80.

²¹⁷ European Commission High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (19 September 2018). *Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy*. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank. European Commission - Fact Sheet (19 September 2018). *Explaining the European Union's approach to connecting Europe and Asia*. Brussels. Retrieved from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-5804_en.htm

²¹⁸ Prezident Avstrii: Ukraina dolzhna stat' neytral'nym gosudarstvom [President of Austria: Ukraine should become a neutral state]. *Vesti.ru*. May 2, 2014. (In Russian). Retrieved from: <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1537572&tid=105474>

after the conclusion of the Minsk agreements, wrote Andreas Bock, Ingo Henneberg and Friedrich Plank:

“It is important to make clear to all actors that Ukraine does not have to choose between Russia and the West. Including Ukraine in both Russian and Western institutions may result in de-escalation of the conflict. Ukrainian membership in NATO, therefore, should not be an option in the near future.”²¹⁹

2) the formation at the multilateral international legal and institutional level of the pan-European and Eurasian continental system of international collective security, including the member countries of NATO, the OSCE, the SCO, ASEAN, the both Korea, and Japan.

We agree with Maria Raquel Freire, that Russia and the West now conflicting in Europe (in our opinion, as well as conflicting actors of international politics in Northeastern Asia) “might be better integrated in norm-making and norm-taking, socializing principles and means for actions <...>. Exclusion has shown not to be the right path.”²²⁰ It is worth to recall the most illustrative example from the history of the XX century, when the League of Nations - then the universal institutional system of international security lost as aggressors or collaborators or voluntarily left great powers of Germany, Italy, the USSR, France (the Vichy regime), and Japan. As a result, Great Britain, which had remained in the League of Nations, was left with nobody to discuss issues of European security, war and peace, and the organization itself, as an institutional platform for preventing a new world war, proved useless and its political death in September 1939 was formally confirmed in 1946. That is why, in our opinion, no regulatory or moral-value differences should not outweigh the issue of preventing a big hot war on the Eurasian megacontinent. And we share the opinion of Zbigniew Brzezinski which he expressed in one of his last appearances in the media:

“In order to avoid a global clash, the US, China and Russia should seek cooperation. <...> The ideal geopolitical response is a trilateral connection between the United States, China and then Russia, with Russia in that context having no choice but to accept the reality and the necessity of a better relationship both with China and the United States.”²²¹.

As Graham Allison and Dimitri Simes reasonably consider, for the USA “closer relations with Russia could provide counterbalancing to China”.²²² However, Gregham Allison's statement about the "civilizational incompatibility" of

219 Bock, A. M. ; Henneberg, I. ; Plank, F. (March 2015). "If you compress the spring, it will snap back hard": The Ukrainian crisis and the balance of threat theory. *International journal. Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*. Toronto, Ont. 70(1):101-109. P. 108.

220 Freire, M. R.. *Chapter 9. Ukraine and the Restructuring of East-West Relations*. Pp. 189-210. - P. 205.

221 Brzezinski, Z. How To Address Strategic Insecurity In A Turbulent Age. *HuffPost*. January 3, 2017. URL: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-china-russia-relations_us_586955dbe4b0de3a08f8e3e0?section=us_world (Last accessed: 10.04.2019).

222 Allison, G., Simes, D. (December 18, 2016). A Blueprint for Donald Trump to Fix Relations with Russia. A Policy Memo to the President-Elect. Priority: high. *The National Interest*. Retrieved from: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/blueprint-donald-trump-fix-relations-russia-18776> (Last accessed: 10.04.2019).

the United States and China²²³, despite the well-known deep differences between Americans and Chinese in assessing the role of the state, economy, personality, relations between countries and the nature of time, is refuted by the historical experience of successful convergence, the integration of the values of Chinese and Western (primarily Anglo-American) cultures in "Asian tigers", especially in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore directly related to the Chinese civilization.

As our analysis shows, a long-term settlement of the Ukrainian crisis is possible only in a combination of an international political and domestic political settlement. That is why in parallel with rethinking and restructuring the European & Eurasian collective “security architecture in a more inclusive way”²²⁴ it is necessary, with the assistance of the international community, to launch a process of a comprehensive internal political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis²²⁵, an integral component of which should be, in accordance with the Minsk agreements, “inclusive national dialogue”.²²⁶

The model of the internal political settlement in Ukraine could serve as the Monkloa Pact passed in October 1977 under Spain’s transition from the authoritarian country cleft by civil cleavages to democracy: an agreement amongst politicians, political parties, and trade unions to plan how to operate during the transition. The pact became a compromise: each side agreed to certain concessions in the name of a common goal - the stabilization of the regime of representative democracy. Its signing helped to avoid the collapse of the economy, to create an atmosphere of civilized coexistence of the main political forces of the country, which eventually, by adopting constitutional forms, made it possible to establish a plural and competitive parliamentary democracy.

It would also be useful to consider the experience of the Central Rada - the supreme legislative body of the Ukrainian People's Republic - with regard to implementation in the period of 1917-1918 cultural and ethnonational, including personal, autonomy in Ukraine, which guaranteed the protection, preservation and development of the ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the indigenous peoples and national minorities of the country, respect for both collective and individual cultural rights of citizens while ensuring the constitutional guarantees of the state's territorial integrity, consolidation and development of the Ukrainian ethnic nation. In this context, the following thought of a Finnish political scientist Helena

223 Allison, G. China vs. America (August 15, 2017). *Managing the Next Clash of Civilizations. Foreign Affairs.* September/October 2017. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-08-15/china-vs-america> (Last accessed: 10.10.2018).

224 Freire, M. R. Chapter 9. Ukraine and the Restructuring of East-West Relations. In: Roger E. Kanet (Ed.). *The Russian Challenge to the European Security Enviroment*. Pp. 189-210. P. 205.

225 Andreas Bock, Ingo Henneberg and Friedrich Plank characterize it as “the inner-Ukrainian conflict”. However, we think that the conflict has the hybryd nature – both domestic and international. Therefore, the Ukraine crisis means crisis in and over Ukraine.

226 OSCE Secretariat. *Chairperson-in-Office welcomes Minsk agreement, assures President Poroshenko of OSCE support.* Bern. 5 September 2014. Retrieved from: <https://www.osce.org/cio/123245> .

Rytövuori-Apunen sounds relevant within the context of making efforts to settle the conflict in the east of Ukraine:

“The crucial issue remains the autonomy that enables people to pursue their lives without feeling that their habitual ways and the culture which they recognize as their ‘own’ is not part of the national culture in their country”.²²⁷

As Henry Kissinger stressed at the start of March 2014, when the conflict in the east of Ukraine had not yet turned into a phase of bloody armed clashes and the entire Ukrainian-Russian border from the Donbas' side was controlled by the State Border Service of Ukraine:

“Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side's outpost against the other – it should function as a bridge between them.”²²⁸

He concludes his article with this aphoristic thought: “The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction.”²²⁹

We also believe that the Road Maps on the formation of the four common spaces of the European Union and the Russian Federation²³⁰, signed at the Russia-EU summit in Moscow on May 10, 2010²³¹, should not only be renewed but extended to the whole space of Eurasian megacontinental security with the inclusion of post-Soviet countries, China and other Eastern countries, and possibly South, Asia.

In this regard, special attention should be paid to promoting the Asia– Europe format, the OSCE-Asia dialogue initiatives, intensifying the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, using the transit capabilities of alternative versions of the New Silk Road from Europe to Northeast Asia and vice versa. Obviously, that implies the development of ways for the future trans-civilization consensus of the United States - Europe - Russia - China - Asian Dragons, which is hardly achievable without the integration of the Korean Peninsula and the settlement of the hybrid armed conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Due to a very successful modernization despite the long-lasting war with the Communist regime in the North, the Republic of Korea poses both a striking example

²²⁷ Rytövuori-Apunen, H. (2017). The Depth of Borders Beyond the State: Analytical, Normative and Epistemic Challenges of Study. In: Cengiz Günay & Nina Witjes, Editors. *Border Politics. Defining Spaces of Governance and Forms of Transgressions*. Vienna; Munich: Springer. Pp. 175-193. - P. 190.

²²⁸ Kissinger, H. (March 5, 2014). How the Ukraine crisis ends. Op-ed. Washington Post. Retrieved from : <https://www.washingtonpost.com>

²²⁹ Kissinger, H. (March 5, 2014). How the Ukraine crisis ends. Op-ed. Washington Post. Retrieved from : <https://www.washingtonpost.com>

²³⁰ The four common spaces cover: 1) the common economic space; 2) the common space of freedom, security and justice; 3) the common space of external security; 4) the common space of science and education, including cultural aspects.

²³¹ Certain approaches to the format of integration (harmonization) of integration within the framework of the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union are currently being worked out at the expert level. (See: Kosikova, L. S. (2017) Проблемы взаимодействия евразийской и европейской интеграций. Россия и современный мир Problemy vzaimodeystviya yevraziyskoy i yevropeyskoy integratsiy. [Problems of interaction of Eurasian and European integration]. *Rossiia i sovremennyy mir* [Russia and the Modern world]. 2017 (Issue 1). P. 85-102. P. 101 (in Russian)

of the East-West fruitful integration with regard to complex society characteristics and a valuable experience of tackling the key regional conflict with global/nuclear powers' involvement.

A settlement on the Korean Peninsula would mean that systems with extreme (polar) political-institutional and (political-axiological) political-value parameters of conditionally East and West (the totalitarian communist regime of the DPRK and the regime of liberal structural democracy in the Republic of Korea) would find points not only of peaceful coexistence, but integration and convergence with the participation of such great actors of world politics as the United States, China and Russia. The same prospect may be for a possible settlement of the Taiwan problem. However, this is possible under the imperative condition that the USA and the West as a whole will abandon the Fukuyama's alleged concept of "The End of History"²³², global transition exclusively to the Western liberal model of democracy and will adopt, will also accept the system of neo-Confucian values. The author is confident that only through a fusion of Western liberalism (based primarily on the foundations of the reformist values of Protestantism) and East Asian neo-Confucianism it is possible to form a single global civilization of the future, which Russia will undoubtedly be forced to join. This would open the way to the long-term peace and sustainable development of both the continental megaregion of Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific megaregion.

A dichotomous understanding of the nature of conflictogenicity in society in its various strata, diachronic sections and localizations in essence - through the doctrine of the dualism of the yin and yang forces for two and a half thousand years is an indispensable element of dialectical constructs in Chinese philosophy, especially in Taoism and Confucianism. Being a fundamental model of all things, the yin-yang concept explains the universal pattern of the universe: there can be no "final victory", because there is nothing final, there is no end as such.²³³ In this, respectively, - the fundamental basis of morality, moral behavior of man and social order. Hence, for example, the high authorities of both South Korea and Japan, the closest allies of the United States in the Far East, underscore the inappropriateness of a mutually exclusive view of the choice of "China or the United States" for their countries and tend to speak out in favor of establishing cooperation within the framework of the transcontinental "One Belt, One Road" project initiated by Beijing, while trying to

232 Francis Fukuyama himself has quite definitely recognized the historical inconsistency, the unrealizability and the fallacy of this concept. (See: Eaton G. (2018). Francis Fukuyama interview: "Socialism ought to come back". *New Statesman*. 17 October 2018. Retrieved from: <https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2018/10/francis-fukuyama-interview-socialism-ought-come-back> (Last accessed: 30.04.2019).

233 Марков Л. Система дуальных противоположностей Инь — Ян в сравнительном освещении. *Восток*. 2003. № 5. С. 17—31.

confront the growing economic, marine and geopolitical influence of the mainland China.²³⁴

Meanwhile, as realities of modern globalization testify, East and West can and do efficiently interact, intertwine, enrich each other, converge. The concept and policy of “one country, two systems,” initially developed for Taiwan but implemented by the PRC for Hong Kong and Macao, along with the ROK’s initiatives and policy aiming at peaceful reunification of Korean Peninsula²³⁵ (and, to a lesser degree, Japan’s proposals on Northern Kurile Islands) pose special interest in this regard.

Given that in the coming decades main centres of the world socio-economic dynamics will be located in the areas of the Protestant and Confucian traditions, just Protestantism and Confucianism, as the most rationalistic world religions, can facilitate the dialogue among representatives of the “world core” with respect to the synthesis of civilizations and the gradual formation of a transcontinental and then a global new civilization of the future.

On the basis of recent achievements of science regarding the fractal nature of the universe and society and taking into account the relativeness and fractality of the East–West dichotomy as well as other values paradigms, it seems appropriate building in the future, in contrast to a discrete-dichotomous approach, a computer model of the value continuum to the full depth of fractal analysis - from the world system to local levels - searching for a dynamic equilibrium of value parameters in the conflict zone. We see this as an important task of modern conflictology.

Mediation/Peace-making Potential of the Northeastern Asia Confucianism and Bridging the East-West Dichotomy

Meanwhile, for Confucianism there is no fundamental difference between the Our and the Other, because any relations require harmonious peace. “Since ancient times, – points out Prof. Qiao Zhao-hong from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, – China has treated the wisdom of human civilization development with the idea of “harmony without uniformity”.²³⁶ With regard to the mainland China’s contemporary politics Peter Toft and Jonathan Kirshner see no reason to believe that China as a rational power striving to ensure its survival will seek hegemony rather

234 Song, Young-gil. [Interview] “Stronger ties with China, Russia will promote peace”. *The Korea Times*. January 8, 2018. Retrieved from: http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/phone/news/view.jsp?req_newsidx=242082 (Last accessed: 10.04.2019).

235 See: Diamond, L. and Shin, G.-W. (Eds.) (2014) *New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan*. Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity held on 29-31 May 2013 in Jeju, Republic of Korea. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 408 pp. Retrieved from <http://jejupeaceforum.or.kr/eng/2013/?code=Overview>.

236 Qiao Zhao-hong. Culture Crisis and Culture Self-confidence. *Cultural and Religious Studies*. August 2017. Vol. 5, No. 8, 493-497. P. 495.

than rely on cooperative mechanisms.²³⁷ In Dong Wang and Chengzhi Yin's opinion, "mainland Chinese leaders are trying to avoid the emerging security dilemma between mainland China and the United States, and thus seeking a non-zero-sum path forward for U.S.-China relations."²³⁸

It is worth noting that, in spite of the pro-Russian bias in mainland China's media, academic and expert communities's positions towards the Ukraine crisis, the official Beijing keeps restraint and tries to maintain constructive relations with Ukraine's post-Euromaidan incumbent authorities. The official Kyiv, on its part, expresses full respect for mainland China's leadership trying to soothe negative effects of Russia's post-Euromaidan pivot to China and consequent strengthening the China-Russia strategic ties. Thus, on September 18, 2017 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin met with the PRC's Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of their attendance at the UN General Assembly in New York having made the following complimentary statement:

"The Ukrainian side appreciates China's objective and fair stances on international and regional affairs, and hopes that China could play a greater role in the settlement of the Ukrainian issue."²³⁹

Concerning the armed conflict in Donbas, what unites all the Asian-Pacific region's countries historically influenced by Confucian political culture, despite their various assessments of the causes and conditions of the Ukrainian crisis, is that "all those countries are against military intervention and welcome a peaceful resolution of the conflict".²⁴⁰

It is the Confucian approach to resolving conflicts with elements of Taoism and Buddhism that could serve as the basis for resolving the great strategic conflict over Ukraine and a new political ethics in Eurasia. Since for Confucianism there is no fundamental difference between the Our and the Other, since any relations require "harmonious peace", such a "Golden Middle" approach might be a pledge of peaceful, constructive resolution of such fractal counterpositions as "Eastern Ukraine – Western Ukraine", "Ukraine – Russia", "Russia – Europe", "China – Russia – the West". In this context, Ukraine may have a crucial significance for a success of the Asia – Europe pancontinental dialogue.

237 Toft, Peter (December 2005). "John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power". *Journal of International Relations and Development*. Palgrave Macmillan. 8 (4): 381–408. P. 397. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065 ; Jonathan Kirshner, "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China", *European Journal of International Relations* 18:1 (2010): 59–61.

238 Dong Wang @ Chengzhi Yin. *Mainland China Debates U.S. Pivot/Rebalancing to Asia Issues & Studies* Vol. 50, no. 3 (September 2014): 57-101. - P. 87.

239 China, Ukraine : Wang Yi Meets with Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin of Ukraine. *MENA Report* ; London (Sep 21, 2017). Publisher: Albawaba (London) Ltd. URL: <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1941159035?accountid=10067>)

240 Ганьшина Г. И. Украинский кризис глазами стран АТР // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. 2014, № 4. С. 47-58. - С. 54. [Ganshina G. I. The Ukrainian crisis through the eyes of the APR countries // *Bulletin of Peoples' Friendship University of Russia*. 2014, No. 4. P. 47-58. - S. 54].

In this regard, institutions reflecting the Confucian values could be invited to the Ukraine crisis' international mediation. An appropriate platform might be the Trilateral Commission involving, inter alia, wise persons from China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and, possibly, Singapore.

Especially, South Korea and India, as countries deeply and sincerely interested in resolving regional conflicts whose policy won the world community of nations' respect and which currently pursue a policy of the balanced geopolitical pragmatism, may be involved in mediating the conflict settling and peace-making efforts in the East of Ukraine.

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