The Link Between National Feelings and Immigration Attitudes among Taiwanese Citizens

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I. Introduction

This study examines the link between national feelings and immigration attitudes among Taiwanese citizens. There are three research questions for this study: (1) What is Taiwanese identity? (2) What do Taiwanese people think about immigration? (3) To what extent do the various dimensions of national identity and national feelings affect Taiwanese attitudes toward immigration? The study is significant because (1) it focuses on Taiwanese identity, a salient characteristic in Taiwanese society; (2) it connects Taiwanese identity with the issue of immigration, which has not yet been intensively examined; and (3) it fully takes into account the multidimensional characteristics of national identity and national feelings among Taiwanese citizens.

In Taiwan, the issue of national identity or national feelings has become significant in explaining various aspects of its political and social world. For instance, national identity has become a dominant factor in party configuration in Taiwan (Hsieh and Niou 1996a, 1996b; Hsieh 2002; Hsieh 2005). Zhong (2016) identified a shift in national identity among Taiwanese citizens; many Taiwanese no longer identify themselves as Chinese or even both Taiwanese and Chinese. Instead, today most Taiwanese identify themselves as Taiwanese.

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Taiwanese identity has shifted significantly since Taiwan became a democracy in the 1990s (Fang-Yu Chen et al. 2017). In 1991 about 25% of Taiwan's residents identified themselves as exclusively Chinese, 17.6% as exclusively Taiwanese, and nearly half as both Chinese and Taiwanese. By 2014 only 3% of Taiwan's residents still identified themselves as exclusively Chinese, and more than 60% identified themselves as exclusively Taiwanese (Fang-Yu Chen et al. 2017). A 2017 study found that today only one-third of Taiwan's residents consider themselves both Chinese and Taiwanese, and among those who are 29 years old or younger, 78% identify themselves as exclusively Taiwanese (Fang-Yu Chen et al. 2017). If this trend continues, a solely Taiwanese identity will prevail in Taiwan in the near future (Fang-Yu Chen et al. 2017).

<Figure 1> Changes in How Taiwanese Citizens Identify Themselves: Chinese, Taiwanese, or Both Chinese and Taiwanese


Source: The Economist. 2005. "Turning Taiwan." January 13.

With rapid globalization, the issue of immigration has gained prominence in many countries around the world. Every year millions of people from all over the world immigrate (UN Population Division 2009); thus, immigration has become a very significant problem in many countries, including Taiwan (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Immigration trends over the past two decades show a significant increase in the number of foreign permanent residents in Taiwan—from 680,765 in 1966

to 1,004,108 in March 2015 (see Figure 2). In 2014, for the first time in history, first- and second-generation immigrants living in Taiwan exceeded Taiwan's indigenous population (Sinclaire Prowse 2015). The recent increase in immigration to Taiwan is the result of the creation of permanent residence in 1999 and the relaxation of rules related to the financial, health, and criminal records of immigrants (Sinclaire Prowse 2015). Some of the largest groups of foreigners living in Taiwan include Indonesian (238,956), Vietnamese (193,974), Filipino (149,492), and Taipei (64,793) immigrants (National Immigration Agency 2018), making Taiwan a multicultural society.

<Figure 2> Number of Immigrants Living in Taiwan between 1966 and 2016

Source: National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan). 2018. "Number and rates of births, deaths, immigrants and emigrants, marriages and divorces."

What is the response of Taiwanese citizens to the increasing number of immigrants in Taiwan? Figure 3 compares Taiwan's migrant acceptance index to those of other countries. Taiwan's index is 6.8, while the average of the all countries examined is 5.35. This shows that Taiwanese are relatively tolerant toward immigrants. However, compared to countries like New Zealand, Australia, and the Netherlands, Taiwan's index is low, demonstrating a need for even greater tolerance.

What are the political implications of the shift in identify among Taiwanese and the increased number of immigrants in Taiwan? This study will explore the link between these issues. National feelings/identity and immigration are inseparable because, for many people, attitudes toward

immigrants may change at their nation's border. Citizens may demonstrate an unwillingness to share benefits with those who are not currently members of the political community (Jeong 2013). Thus, "immigration issues bring to the fore the very conceptions of one's nation, and attitudes toward immigrants might be strongly associated with feelings toward one's nation" (Jeong 2013, 1461). Particularly in a country like Taiwan, where a significant shift in national identity has been occurring, attitudes toward immigration may be influenced by national identity. Immigration issues may tap into Taiwanese citizens' sense of who they are and what they think nationhood means.

<Figure 3> Gallup's Migrant Acceptance Index

Source: Neli Esipova, John Fleming and Julie Ray. 2017. "New Index Shows Least-, Most-Accepting Countries for Migrants" August 23.

The present study is based on symbolic politics theory, which suggests the significant role of symbolic concerns in the process of attitude formation. Based on this theory, the study will investigate whether/how Taiwanese citizens' feelings toward Taiwan shape their interpretations of immigration issues. According to the symbolic politics theory, humans are concerned with abstract political symbols despite the significant emotional costs and meager benefits of these symbols (Sears 1993). Sears (1993) argued that individuals acquire stable affective responses to particular symbols; these learned dispositions may not persist through adult life, but the strongest, which are called "symbolic

predispositions," do. Symbolic politics theory maintains that the consistent flow of information about public events presents symbols that evoke emotional responses from citizens. Strong affective commitments to certain symbols are the central elements of political belief systems and remain constant for many years, constraining individuals' political responses to other stimuli such as policies or political events (Sears et al. 1980).

Thus, symbolic politics theory argues that longstanding values related to society and the polity influence the formation of political attitudes more strongly than short-term instrumentalities for the satisfaction of an individual's current private needs. In short, according to the theory, symbolic predispositions have four characteristics: (1) they are established early in life, (2) they are frequently and consistently reinforced by later learning, (3) their objects are invested with emotional meaning, and (4) they are central to an individual's self-concept (Sears and Huddy 1987).

Relying on the symbolic politics theory, I suggest that national feelings and national identity are the most important symbolic concerns for ordinary Taiwanese, who utilize them to understand the political world, particularly the issue of immigration. To examine the research questions of the present study, I will utilize the analysis of survey data.

II. RATIONALE AND SIGNIFICANCE

The present study will offer two major innovations: First, it will attempt to fill the gap in the literature by examining the link between the shift in national identity and immigration attitudes among Taiwanese, an issue that has not been explored extensively in previous literature. Previous literature has investigated the issue of Taiwanese identity and the changing identity configuration among Taiwanese (e.g., Zhong 2016; Schubert 2004; Hsieh 2005); however, little research has connected the issue of immigration with national identity and national feelings. Instead, these issues have only been extensively discussed separately thus far. The present study will attempt to link the two issues and

examine how national identity and national feelings influence Taiwanese attitudes toward immigration.

The rationale for linking national feelings and national identity to the issue of immigration is that immigration, more than any other issue, is expected to be strongly associated with individuals' feelings about their nation: "Immigrants are by definition outsiders in contexts where nationhood is the basis of self-categorization and psychological attachment" (Jeong 2013, 1463). Therefore, I suggest that, for many Taiwanese citizens, immigration may be a highly resonant symbol of Taiwanese nationhood. Furthermore, I predict that immigration is a resonant symbol for Taiwanese because of Taiwan's unique history with mainland China. Therefore, the symbols associated with Taiwan will impact how Taiwanese perceive immigration.

Scholars have examined how symbolic concerns shape attitudes toward immigrants in various countries (Brader et al. 2008; Citrin et al. 1990; Huddy and Sears 1990; Schildkraut 2005). These studies show that unfavorable feelings toward immigrants are the result of a belief that outsiders will violate what it means to be a citizen of the host nation and fear that they will neither recognize nor fulfill the standards of behavior accepted by the host nation (Burns and Gimpel 2000; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Fetzer 2000). The present study will examine whether similar phenomenon exist in Taiwan.

The second innovation of the present study is its promotion of the multidimensional character of national feelings. Studies have suggested that there are various types of national feelings—national pride, nationalism, blind patriotism, constructive patriotism, chauvinism, national identity, and so on (Jeong 2013). However, the literature on national feelings in Taiwan mainly focuses on the aspect of national identity. Based on the literature, I will delve into Taiwanese citizens' national feelings and sense of identity and expose the multidimensional nature of these feelings. More specifically, I will focus on three types of national feelings—nationalism, national identity, and national pride—and

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examine how Taiwanese exhibit various types of national feelings and how each type impacts attitudes toward immigrants.

I suggest that the three types of national feelings highlighted in this study may have different impacts on attitudes toward immigration. Jeong (2013) showed that, in the case of Americans, one form of national feeling provokes anti-immigrant sentiment, while another elicits pro-immigrant sentiment or has no relationship to immigration attitudes. The present study will examine the impact of national feelings on immigration attitudes in Taiwan and, by doing so, develop a more nuanced view of Taiwanese national feelings and national identity.

III. METHODS

Based on Jeong (2013), the present study will define three types of national feelings—nationalism, national pride, and national identity—and suggest their impact on immigration attitudes (see Table 1).

<Table 1> Definition of National Feelings

Nationalism	National Pride	National Identity
● Feeling of superiority and contempt for foreigners ● Perception that one's country is superior to other countries and should therefore be dominant (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989)	● Individual sentiments of pride directed toward the nation-state (Hjerm 1998) ● Self-referential process of attachment to the nation (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008)	● Sense of being or feeling Taiwanese ● Not related to feelings of Taiwanese superiority or the inferiority of other nations

● Other-referential process of attachment to the nation (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008) ● Inherently related to out-group derogation (Jeong 2013) ● Expected to be related to unfavorable attitudes toward immigration	● Does not automatically imply negative connotations (Keane 1994)	● Expected to be non-ideological (Huddy and Khatib 2007)

The present study used the ISSP 2013 survey data set to scientifically examine the national feelings of Taiwanese and their impact on immigration attitudes. Table 2 describes how the present study measured the main variables using the data set.

<Table 2> Variables and Their Measurement

	Variables	Questions
Main independent variable	Nationalism	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly) (1) Generally speaking, Taiwan is a better country than most other countries. (2) The world would be better if more people from other countries were more like the Taiwanese.
	National pride	How proud are you of Taiwan in terms of each of the following? (very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all) (1) The way Taiwan's democracy works (2) Taiwan's political influence in the world

		(3) Taiwan's economic achievements
		(4) Taiwan's social security system
		(5) Taiwan's scientific and technological achievements
		(6) Taiwan's achievements in sports
		(7) Taiwan's achievements in the arts and literature
		(8) Taiwan's armed forces
		(9) Taiwan's history
		(10) Taiwan's fair and equal treatment of all groups in society
	National identity	How important is it to feel Taiwanese? (very important, fairly important, not very important, not important at all) How close do you feel to Taiwan? (very close, close, not very close, not close at all)
Dependent variable	Immigration attitude	There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in Taiwan. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly) (1) Immigrants increase crime rates. (2) Immigrants are generally good for the country's economy. (3) Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Taiwan. (4) Immigrants improve the country's society by bringing new ideas and cultures. (5) Taiwan's culture is generally undermined by immigrants. (6) Legal immigrants to Taiwan who are not citizens should have the same rights as Taiwanese citizens. (7) Taiwan should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants. (8) Legal immigrants should have equal access to public education as Taiwanese citizens.

Control variable	education, income, gender, age	

IV. RESULTS

1. Descriptive analysis

This section presents the results of descriptive statistics. These results describe the general characteristics of national identity of Taiwanese and their attitudes toward immigration.

(1) Nationalism

<Table 3> Nationalism

	Percentage (Q1)	Percentage(Q2)
Agree strongly	10.1	5.6
Agree	54.5	30.3
Neither agree nor disagree	19.3	28.9
Disagree	14.9	30.7
Disagree strongly	1.1	4.4
Total	100.0	100.0

Q1 Taiwan is a better country than most other countries
Q2 World better place if people were more like the Taiwanese

Looking at <Table 3>, when Taiwanese respondents were asked if Taiwan is a better country than most other countries, more than half of them (54.5%) agreed on the statement. 19.3% of people responded, "neither agree nor disagree", while 14.9% said they do not agree that Taiwan is a better country than most other countries. About one out of ten people strongly believed that Taiwan is a better country than most other countries, displaying a strong sense of nationalism.

Another question that taps into nationalism is to ask if respondents agree with that statement that the world would be a better place if people were more like Taiwanese. A different pattern emerged regarding this question. 30.7% of respondents disagreed with the statement, indicating that they do not believe that the world would become a better place if people were more like Taiwanese.

On the other hand, a similar percentage of people (30.3%) agreed with statement. This means that regarding this dimension of nationalism, Taiwanese are aligned on both sides of the issue.

(2) National pride

National pride was measured with ten questions. These questions were often asked to tap into individuals' level of pride toward their country in the previous literature. <Table 4> and <Table 5> presents the results of the data analysis. First, when people were asked how proud they are of the way democracy works, about 40% said they are not very proud, the response "somewhat proud" following behind (38.3%). The second question showed the similar results, showing that 52% of respondents said they are not very proud of Taiwan's political influence in the world. In a similar vein, about 41% said they are not very proud of the country's economic achievements. These results imply that Taiwanese have relatively low level of national pride, particularly in the dimensions of politics and economics.

On the other hand, Taiwanese' pride in the country's social security system was relatively strong, with 51% being somewhat proud. Also, when respondents were asked about their pride in the country's scientific and technological achievements, about 64% of respondents express that they are somewhat proud and about 21% said that they are very proud.

<Table 4> National pride I

	Percentage (Q1)	Percentage (Q2)	Percentage (Q3)	Percentage (Q4)	Percentage (Q5)
Very proud	9.5	2.6	5.7	7.9	21.2
Somewhat proud	38.3	29.1	37.6	51.0	63.8
Not very proud	40.4	52.0	41.3	31.6	12.7
Not proud at all	11.7	16.2	15.4	9.5	2.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Q1 Proud of: way democracy works
Q2 Proud of: its political influence in the world
Q3 Proud of: its economic achievements
Q4 Proud of: its social security system
Q5 Proud of: its scientific and technological achievements

Furthermore, the present study examined respondents' national pride in terms of the country's achievements in arts and literature. The analysis showed that about 62% said that they are somewhat proud. Similar pattern emerged in the analysis of the pride on the country's achievements in sports. About 65% of respondents said that they are somewhat proud. However, when respondents were asked about their pride in the country's armed forces, Taiwanese showed a low level of pride with 49% responding "not very proud." On the other hand, respondents' pride level was more up when asked about their pride in the country's history and fair treatment of all groups in society. 58% of respondents said that they are proud of Taiwan's history while about 48% take pride in the country's fair treatment of all groups in society

<Table 5> National pride II

	Percentage (Q6)	Percentage (Q7)	Percentage (Q8)	Percentage (Q9)	Percentage (Q10)
Very proud	26.7	16.7	2.8	19.5	14.7
Somewhat proud	62.1	64.9	27.9	58.2	47.7
Not very proud	10.2	16.6	49.0	18.8	28.7
Not proud at all	1.0	1.8	20.4	3.4	8.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Q6 Proud of: its achievements in the arts and literature
Q7 Proud of: its achievements in sports
Q8 Proud of: its armed forces
Q9 Proud of: its history
Q10 Proud of: fair treatment of all groups in society

(3) National identity

National identity was measured using two questions. First, the survey asked how important it is to feel Taiwanese. About 61% responded "very important" and about 35% said "fairly important." The second question used is to ask respondents how close they feel to Taiwan. Regarding this question, about 56% said that they feel close to Taiwan and 38% responded "very close." In sum, these results indicate that Taiwanese display a strong national identity.

<div align="center"><Table 6> National identity</div>

	Percentage (Q1)		Percentage (Q2)
Very important	60.7	Very close	38.4
Fairly important	34.6	Close	56.4
Not very important	3.7	Not very close	4.8
Not important at all	1.0	Not close at all	.4
Total	100	Total	100

Q1 How important is to feel Taiwanese   Q2 How close do you feel to Taiwan?

(4) Attitudes toward immigration

Immigration attitudes were measured by eight questions. The results of analysis with the first four questions that ask the extent to which one agree with the negative impact of immigrants were presented in <Table 7>. With respect to the statement "immigrants increase crime rate", about 40% of respondents disagreed, while 32% agreed. When respondents asked, if immigrants take jobs away from Taiwanese, about 44% agreed while about 27% disagreed. This indicates that respondents might feel more threatened by immigrants when it comes to the issue of jobs and economy. On the other hand, when asked if immigrants undermine culture, 57% of respondents disagreed displaying a relatively higher level of cultural tolerance toward immigrants. Regarding the statement that illegal immigrants should be excluded, about 56% agreed and 25% agreed strongly. These results showed that majority of Taiwanese tend to favor taking a strong measure toward illegal immigrants.

<div align="center"><Table 7> Immigration attitudes</div>

	Percentage (Q1)	Percentage (Q2)	Percentage (Q3)	Percentage (Q4)
Agree strongly	4.9	9.1	1.9	25.1
Agree	32.0	43.8	17.6	55.9
Neither agree nor disagree	20.1	18.6	18.7	8.2
Disagree	40.3	26.5	57.0	9.6
Disagree strongly	2.7	1.9	4.8	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Q1 Immigrants increase crime rates

Q2 Immigrants take jobs away from people born in Taiwan
Q3 Immigrants undermine culture
Q4 Illegal immigrants should be excluded

        <Table 8> below presents the descriptive statistics using the four questions on the positive impact of immigrant in the society. The first question asked if immigrants are generally good for economy. About 40% of respondents agreed, while about 30% disagreed. The second question was about immigrants brining new cultures and ideas. About half of respondents agreed with this statement, showing their favorable evaluation on immigrants. The third question asked if legal immigrants should have the same rights. Regarding this question, about 42% agreed while 34% disagreed. The fourth question was about legal immigrants having equal access to education. About 75% of respondents agreed, showing the overwhelming consent on this issue.

<Table 8> Immigration attitudes

	Percentage (Q5)	Percentage (Q6)	Percentage (Q7)	Percentage (Q8)
Agree strongly	2.4	4.6	4.4	15.6
Agree	39.4	45.5	42.1	74.6
Neither agree nor disagree	25.7	24.0	14.0	5.4
Disagree	29.6	23.9	34.0	4.0
Disagree strongly	2.9	2.0	5.6	0.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Q5 Immigrants generally good for economy

Q6 Immigrants bring new ideas and cultures

Q7 Legal immigrants should have same rights

Q8 Legal immigrants should have equal access to education

2. Regression analysis

Before the regression, the present study examined the relations between the variables in order to determine the possible combination of variables. First, the two questions that tap into nationalism have the correlation of .355 (See <Table 9>). And, the ten questions that are used to measure national pride have a Cronbach α of .789 (See <Table 10>).

<Table 9> Correlations of Nationalism questions

		Q1World better place if people were more like the Taiwanese	Q2 Taiwan is a better Country than most other countries
Q1World better place if people were more like the Taiwanese	Pearson correlation	1	.355[**]
	Sig.(two-tailed)		.000
	N	1867	1840
Q2 Taiwan is a better countr countries	Pearson correlation	.355[**]	1
	Sig.(two-tailed)	.000	
	N	1840	1893

<Table 10> National pride

Cronbach's α	N of items
.789	10

National identity was measured with two questions and their correlation coefficient is .270.

<Table 11> National identity

		Q1 How close do you feel to Taiwan?	Q2 How important is to feel Taiwanese?
Q1 How close do you feel to Taiwan?	Pearson correlation	1	.270[**]
	Sig. (two-tailed)		.000
	N	1942	1910
Q2 How important is to feel Taiwanese	Pearson correlation	.270[**]	1
	Sig. (two-tailed)	.000	
	N	1910	1918

Lastly, factor analysis was conducted for immigration related questions. The results were shown below. Two factors were extracted, therefore, the present study combined each questions into 2 set of immigration questions and named them respectively, Immigration 1 and Immigration 2.

<Table 12> Factor Analysis of immigration questions

Communalities

	Initial	Extraction
Q1 Immigrants increase crime rates	1.000	.513
Q2 Immigrants generally good for economy	1.000	.352
Q3 Immigrants take jobs away f people born in Taiwan	1.000	.564
Q4 Immigrants bring new ideas and cultures	1.000	.472

Q5 Immigrants undermine culture	1.000	.485
Q6 Legal immigrants should have same rights	1.000	.422
Q7 Illegal immigrants should be excluded	1.000	.348
Q8 Legal immigrants should have equal access to education	1.000	.625

Extraction method: principal axis factoring

Factor Matrix

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Q1 Immigrants increase crime rates	.663	.271
Q2 Immigrants generally good for economy	-.585	.099
Q3 Immigrants take jobs away from people born in Taiwan	.702	.266
Q4 Immigrants bring new ideas and cultures	-.673	.138
Q5 Immigrants undermine culture	.686	.121
Q6 Legal immigrants should have same rights	-.422	.493
Q7 Illegal immigrants should be excluded	.267	.526
Q8 Legal immigrants should have equal access to education	-.319	.724

Extraction method: principal axis factoring

a. 2 factors extracted

Finally, the present study examined the impact of national feelings on immigration attitude using regression analysis. First, regarding Immigration attitude I variables, national pride turns out to

have an impact, indicating those who have a strong national pride tends to perceive immigration

negatively. Other national feeling variables, such as nationalism and national identity, did not have

significant effects on the formation of immigration attitude. Gender[1], age, education[2] variables

influenced the way in which immigration attitudes are formed. Male, young, the educated are less

likely to have a negative perception on immigration on Taiwanese society. Income[3] did not have a

significant effect.

<Table 13> Immigration attitude I

Regressor	Coefficient	
Nationalism	.057	(.051)
National pride	-.049***	(.018)
National identity	.032	(.076)
Age	-.024***	(.006)
Education	.136***	(.023)
Income	2.037E-6	(.000)
Gender	-.359**	.141
Constant	11.931***	(.651)
Adjusted R^2	.095	
No. of observations	1315	

Notes: The table reports the unstandardized coefficient estimates and
their standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variable
is Immigration attitude I. Significance: *$p<0.1$, **$p<0.05$, ***$p<0.01$

<Table 14> presents the results of regression analysis with Immigration attitude II as a

dependent variable. As shown in the results on Immigration attitude I variable, only national pride

among national feeling variables was effective. Individuals with a strong national pride are less likely

to think immigration of having a good influence in Taiwan society and to support favorable policies

toward immigrants. Female and old are more likely to view immigrants in a negative way, while

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[1] The gender variable was coded as male=1, female=2.

[2] The education variable was measured by respondents' years of schooling

[3] Income variable was measured by asking respondents' household income per month (0 = no income, ….1250000 = 1,000,000 TWD per month)

education tends to make individuals more favorable toward immigrants.

<Table 14> Immigration attitude II

Regressor	Coefficient	
Nationalism	.031	(.044)
National pride	.096***	(.015)
National identity	.015	(.066)
Age	.023***	(.005)
Education	-.101***	(.020)
Income	-9.802E-8	(.000)
Gender	.506***	.122
Constant	7.535***	(.562)
R^2	.114	
No. of observations	1311	

Notes: The table reports the unstandardized coefficient estimates and
their standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variable
is Immigration attitude I. Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

V. Conclusion

The results of the present study showed that national feelings do have an impact on immigration attitudes among Taiwanese citizens. Those with a strong national pride tend to have a negative attitude toward immigrants. This indicates that the issue of immigration is in relation to the way individual perceive toward the nation they belong to. The issue of immigration has been becoming more salient in Taiwan with the increasing number of immigrants residing in the country. The present study presents that how the country will confront with the accompanying problems regarding the immigration issue will surely depend on how ordinary citizens perceive toward their country.

However, the results also showed that the other two dimensions of national feelings – national identity and nationalism – do not have a significant impact on immigration attitudes, which implies the limited effect of national feeling variables on the formation of immigration attitude. With more

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research, particularly with a comparative perspective with other countries, will help better

understanding of the link between national feelings and immigration attitude among Taiwanese.

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