



**Chinese Election Interference in Taiwan's National Elections from 2008-2016: Summary of  
the Case History of Election Interference Events**

By

Edward J. Barss, M.A.

*This submission is a summary of research from a book manuscript intended for publication*

This research was made possible through the Taiwan Fellowship. I would also like to thank the National Taiwan University Political Science Department for hosting me and the wonderful staff at the National Central Library for their help and support.



## Note on Translation

A number of Chinese article titles or names have been translated by the author, these titles should not be taken as their actual names but only to help understanding of the content of the material contained therein. Most names have been translated into English using the Wade-Giles transliteration when available and the pinyin spelling when a translation was unavailable. All sources are presented in traditional Chinese regardless of whether they were originally simplified.



## Introduction

The overwhelming weight of evidence shows that China has been interfering in Taiwan's domestic politics for years. This is not a new revelation, as many observers have noted China is quite sensitive when it comes to Taiwan. However, as political interference and election interference have become a more widespread topic of concern, interest in China's operations has fallen by the wayside. Actions such as these are ongoing and undermine the political legitimacy of democratic systems by perverting the process of democratic decision-making. By examining election interference in the recent past, we can better understand how to defend democracy from these actions in the future.

China's attempts to subvert foreign democratic elections is an understudied phenomenon that requires urgent attention. Election interference research is still a young field with few major works, however the disproportionate focus of research is on Russia and the U.S. whereas there are very few English language studies on China. This is a big problem as China has been active in attempting to influence elections for decades. Moreover, these operations are not confined to Taiwan. For instance, there is evidence that China attempted to interfere with the U.S. presidential election in 1996 as well as the British general election in 1992.<sup>1</sup> There is also evidence that "the Chinese Consulate in Toronto was directly interfering in elections, by sending Chinese students into the homes of Chinese-language-only households and telling residents which candidates the Consulate wanted to choose."<sup>2</sup> Due it is important that scholars understand the scope, method, and objectives of Chinese election interference activities. This paper seeks to remedy such issues and demonstrate, through careful study of China's election interference methods in Taiwan's national elections from 2008-2016, how China practices election interference.

## Approach, methods, and background

### Frameworks for understanding election interference

Before delving into the details of China's election interference, we must first have a framework for understanding what election interference is and what it constitutes. Election interference is not a generalizable activity, it is context-specific, country-specific, and specific to the time period it is in. Similarly, the countries that interfere do not interfere for the same reasons, use the same tools, or adopt the same strategy. Lastly, factors such as changes in the media environment and other trends will affect all of these factors. At best, what can be offered are frameworks for understanding the phenomenon, but these frameworks should not be mistaken for the activity itself.

Political warfare is the use of methods that stop short of war to achieve the aims of political leaders. These are comprised of at least four types of actions: information actions such as propaganda, military and intelligence actions such as conventional military operations, economic actions such as trade or

---

<sup>1</sup> Holly Porteous, "Commentary No. 72: Beijing's united Front Strategy in Hong Kong," *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, Winter, 1998. Accessed archived version in the Wayback Machine, August 15, 2019.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20110927062452/http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm72-eng.asp#18>


<sup>2</sup> The quote is attributable to Michel Juneau-Katsuya, co-author of the CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service) Sidewinder Report. Sam Cooper, "Is China influencing B.C.'s politicians? Court case, CSIS documents suggest pressure to suppress Falun Gong protests," *The Province*, September 14, 2014. Accessed August 15, 2019.

<http://www.theprovince.com/life/china+influencing+politicians+court+case+csis+documents+suggest+pressure+suppress+falun+gong/10206216/story.html>

finance, and diplomatic actions such as routine diplomacy.<sup>3</sup> Election interference then can be considered a subset of political warfare which is concerned with elections and is further distinguished by the targets and timing of its methods. Targets of election interference can be further separated by scope and type. The scope of election interference can be divided into three categories: interference in the electoral process, interference in electoral outcome, and interference in party positions. Interference in the process is about affecting the mechanisms of voting and voting infrastructure, either to change, deny, or disrupt the system itself. This would be akin to deleting election results, influencing election officials, or mobbing polling stations in order to shut them down. Outcome interference is more about shifting voter opinions in an attempt to achieve a specific electoral outcome. This includes activities such as mobilizing voters, holding fundraising events, or offering endorsements of specific candidates. Lastly, there is interference at a more elite level, which is about shifting party platforms and policy positions. This is similar to lobbying efforts, but can also come in the form of outside pressure.

As for the targets of election interference, this includes elites (politicians), those who control the election process (election officials), blocks of voters, and influencers (the media). The timing for electoral interference is more rudimentary, as election interference generally occurs during an election or a campaign cycle. Though longer term attempts at subversion will affect the ability of a country to successfully execute such interference. For a basic illustration of this model, see **figure 1**.

## Election Interference as a Subset of Political Warfare



**Figure 1.**

Although this provides the basis for understanding election interference generally, there is also a need to understand what election interference means for Taiwan specifically. The most appropriate model for

<sup>3</sup>Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva. "The Growing Need to Focus on Modern Political Warfare," *Rand*, 2019, 2. Accessed April 7, 2019. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_briefs/RB10071.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10071.html)

this is Wu Jieh-min's (吳介民) model of Chinese influence. Wu Jieh-min's model posits two types of Chinese influence, direct influence exerted by the Chinese government and indirect influence transmitted through the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) cross-strait network.<sup>4</sup> Direct influence is simply interference carried out directly by the CCP. Indirect influence is a more complicated process. The process starts with a formal policy intention on the part of the CCP, which is then transmitted to the CCPs cross-strait political/economic network (local collaborative networks).<sup>5</sup> This network then mobilizes cooperative locals who exert political influence on local policies, having an effect on behavior and policy.<sup>6</sup> This comes in many forms such as direct lobbying, campaigning, spying, and other activities. The majority of this paper is concerned with indirect influence, though some consideration is given to direct influence as well.

### Definitions and terminology

Before moving onto a survey of literature in this field and an explanation of this study's approach, a short definition of frequent terms is necessary. One of the more common acronyms which comes up in this research is Government Organized Non-government Organizations (GONGOs). GONGOs act as front organizations designed to mask Chinese intelligence activities abroad and are largely organized through the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a Chinese intelligence organization. Most often they pose as social organizations that have sprung up organically, though this is usually easy to see through as many GONGOs list UFWD members as chairmen or important leaders for these groups.

The '1992 consensus' and 'pro-independence forces' also frequently come up when discussing election interference. The '1992 consensus' is a reference to the idea of 'one China with different interpretations' (一个中国各自表述), first discussed at a 1992 meeting in Hong Kong between Taiwan's Kuomintang Party (KMT) and CCP.<sup>7</sup> The CCP favors this term as it does not imply a state-to-state relationship between Taiwan and China. Support for the '1992 consensus' is widely associated with the KMT and is often used by the CCP as an indirect reference to the KMT in its statements on Taiwan. Oppositely, 'pro-independence forces' refer to those who support the idea that Taiwan and China have a state-to-state relationship. It is also frequently used by the CCP to refer to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) indirectly.

### Literature Review

Previously several approaches have been used in detailing what constitutes electoral interference. Dov H. Levin in his cross-national statistical analysis of U.S. and Soviet Union electoral interventions from 1946-2000, believes that electoral interference is:

“a situation in which one or more sovereign countries intentionally undertakes specific actions to influence an upcoming election in another sovereign country in an overt or covert manner that they

---

<sup>4</sup> Wu Jieh-min [吳介民], “Mechanisms of Influence and Resistance in the ‘China Factor’ [中國因素作用力與反作用力],” in *Anaconda in the Chandelier: Mechanisms of Influence and Resistance in the ‘China Factor’* [吊燈裡的巨蟒: 中國因素作用力與反作用力] eds. Wu Jieh-min, Cai Hong Zheng, and Zheng Zubang [吳介民, 蔡宏政, 和鄭祖邦]. (New Taipei City: Rive Gauche Publishing House [左岸文化], 2017), 32.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>7</sup> Monte Bullard and Judy Norton, “PRC-Taiwan Relations: 1992 Consensus,” *East Asia Peace and Security Initiative*. <https://www.eapasi.com/1992-consensus.html>

believe will favor or hurt one of the sides contesting that election and which incurs, or may incur, significant costs to the intervener (s) or the intervened country.”<sup>8</sup>

He goes on to define electoral interference as consisting of official public threats or promises, campaign funding, ‘dirty tricks’ (sabotage, forged documents, assassination, etc.), pre-election concessions or benefits to one side, and creation of campaign materials.<sup>9</sup> This is a similar approach to recent research by Bubeck, Jäger, Marinov, and Nanni, which categorizes election interference actions by conditional aid, conditional threats, tangible support for one party, or statements of support by a foreign actor.<sup>10</sup> Although Levin’s study provides valuable insight into the perception and impact of electoral interference, it fails to note the possible alternative objectives and methods used for such interventions. For example, decreasing voter turnout, undermining democratic legitimacy, or attempts to control smaller political parties are not accounted for. Nor does this deal with the boundaries of what constitutes legitimate or illegitimate interventions, with regards to the normal course of foreign policy actions.

Levin does find great power election interference has a significant and positive effect on targeted elections. The change in voter share found by the study is large, with an average 3% change in vote share.<sup>11</sup> To put that in the context of the ROC, overt attempts to influence the election by the CCP may influence the voting patterns of up to 710,700 citizens. Furthermore, according to Levin’s findings, overt interference in elections by great powers does not create a backlash but will in fact favor the supported party. However, the study is based on cases from over 20 years previous, with different actors, so the findings may not be applicable to the ROC.

Schulman and Bloom in their study of electoral interference in Ukraine in 2004 do not provide a concrete definition of electoral interventions either but do introduce several key distinctions useful for consideration. The authors distinguish between election interference based on the agents of influence, the partisanship of influence, and the salience of influence.<sup>12</sup> Although these concepts are introduced with a view to understanding the reactions of Ukrainians to foreign intervention efforts, they provide a useful lens from which to analyse patterns of election interference. Specifically, they raise the questions: Which people or organizations does a foreign state use for electoral interventions? Does the state favour one party or none at all? How visible and intelligible is the interference to different audiences? Furthermore, the authors imply that the closer such interventions are related to state actors, the more direct the interference.<sup>13</sup> This is similar to the basis of Wu Jieh-min’s model of interference and strengthens the idea of distinguishing between direct and indirect election interference as an explicit measure.

---

<sup>8</sup> Dov. H. Levin, “When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 60, (2016): 192.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>10</sup> Johannes Bubeck, Kai Jäger, Nikolay Marinov, Federico Nanni, “Why Do States Intervene in the Elections of Others? The Role of Incumbent–Opposition Divisions,” *SSRN* (January 29, 2020): 8

<sup>11</sup> Levin, “When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results,” 193.

<sup>12</sup> Stephen Schulman and Stephen Bloom, “The legitimacy of foreign intervention in elections: the Ukrainian response,” *Review of International Studies*, vol. 38 (April 2012): 449.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 458.

Despite these excellent studies, much of the research in the field is concerned with the effectiveness of election interference, disinformation, or the legal implications of such actions<sup>14</sup> rather than its methods of employment or the relationship between the method used and overall goals. Moreover, the legitimacy of these election interference activities are viewed from the perspective of whether such interventions are accepted by the public rather than what they mean geopolitically.<sup>15</sup> Some authors do go into detail regarding some types of electoral intervention tactics such as threats, fundraising, vote-buying, explicit promises, etc., but that is usually not discussed in significant detail.

U.S. electoral interventions are the key area of focus for a majority of English language studies, with little scholarly work on China. Studies that do take an interest in Chinese actions tend to be focused on Chinese actions against the U.S. For example, the Hoover Institute's study of Chinese influence operations focuses on the U.S. and other Western countries while ignoring Taiwan.<sup>16</sup> Although this is understandable to some degree given the importance of the U.S.-Chinese relationship, it ignores the importance of Taiwan for this field of research. Taiwan is a testing ground and critical area of focus for Chinese influence operations. Moreover, Taiwan is still the single greatest point of contention between the U.S. and China. Similarly, while there is a great deal of study of cross-strait relations or studies of Taiwan's political system generally, there is little regarding more explicit attempts to influence Taiwan's elections. Overall, the English language literature on the subject provides a poor guideline for explicit conceptions on the practice of electoral interference outside of the U.S. context and little to no acknowledgment of China or Taiwan.

Chinese language literature takes both a broader and more narrow approach to election interference. For example, while several authors acknowledge that many of the CCP's actions constitute election

---

<sup>14</sup> Paul Baines and Nigel Jones, "Influence and Interference in Foreign Elections," *The RUSI Journal*, 161:1, 12-19; Nicholas J. Monaco, "Computational Propaganda in Taiwan: Where Digital Democracy Meets Automated Autocracy," *Computational Propaganda Research Project: Oxford University*, Working Paper No. 2017. Accessed May 18, 2019. <http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Taiwan-2.pdf>; Fergus Hanson, Sarah O'Connor, Mali Walker, and Luke Courtois, "Hacking Democracies: Cataloguing cyber-enabled attacks on elections," Australia Strategic Policy Institute, 15 May 2019. Accessed August 16, 2019. <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/hacking-democracies>; Russel Hsiao, "CCP Propaganda against Taiwan Enters the Social Age," *China Brief*, Vol. 18, Issue 7, 24 April, 2018. Accessed May 18, 2019. <https://jamestown.org/program/ccp-propaganda-against-taiwan-enters-the-social-age/>; Communications Security Establishment Canada, Government of Canada. *Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process*. Modified: December 6, 2018. Accessed March 22, 2018. <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/sites/default/files/cse-cyber-threat-assessment-e.pdf>; Jens David Ohlin, "Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law?" *Cornell Law Faculty Publications*, No. 6, 2017, <https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2632&context=facpub>; Erik Brattberg and Tim Maurer, "Russian Election interference: Europe's Counter to Fake News and Cyber Attacks," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 23, 2018. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/23/russian-election-interference-europe-s-counter-to-fake-news-and-cyber-attacks-pub-76435>; Ashok Deb, Luca Luceri, Adam Badawy, and Emilio Ferrara. "Perils and Challenges of Social Media and Election Manipulation Analysis: The 2018 US Midterms," in *Companion Proceedings of the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW '19 Companion)*, May 13–17, 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA. <https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3308560.3316486>; David Rushing Dewhurst, Christopher M. Danforth, and Peter Sheridan Dodds, "Noncooperative dynamics in election interference," *Physical Review*, 101 (2), February 2020; Tai-Li Wang, "Does Fake News Matter to Election Outcomes?: The Case Study of Taiwan's 2018 Local Elections," *Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research*, Vol.8, No. 2, (May 31, 2020); Gary Schmitt and Michael Mazza, "Blinding the Enemy: CCP Interference in Taiwan's Democracy," *Global Taiwan Institute*, October 2019. <http://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/GTI-CCP-Interference-Taiwan-Democracy-Oct-2019-final.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Jonathan J. Godinez, "The Vested Interest Theory: Novel Methodology Examining US-Foreign Electoral Intervention," *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol.11, No.2, (Summer 2018): 3; Daniel Corstange and Nikolay Marinov, "Taking Sides in Other People's Elections: The Polarizing Effect of Foreign Intervention," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 56, No. 3, (July 2012): 658.

<sup>16</sup> Report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States, "Chinese Influence & American Interests," Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 2018

interference, these actions are placed within a broader context of influence activities instead of as a discrete phenomenon. Wu Jieh-min, one of a handful of authors who has studied this topic in the context of Taiwan, places election interference as a subset of influence activities. For him electoral interference consists of military actions meant to scare voters, the facilitation/subsidization of voters' trips to polling stations, and using economic tools to force policy conformity with the CCP's views.<sup>17</sup> As Wu notes, this process has evolved beyond direct threats made in 1996 and 2000 when the CCP used military force and blunt warnings to influence voters, as they often proved counter-productive to Beijing's goals.<sup>18</sup>

Two further Chinese language studies are worth mentioning with regards to election interference research, though both of these studies are from the perspective of Mainland Chinese authors assessing the effectiveness of Chinese efforts to influence Taiwan's elections. The first is research from an MSS linked journal studying the effects of CCP economic policies on election results. In the paper Yu, Geng, Chen, and Li make the case that where the CCP has bought agricultural products, reduced cross-strait trade barriers, bought surplus goods, etc., there has been a 'positive change' in voting patterns.<sup>19</sup> The important markers of this 'positive change' in preferences included an increase in votes for the KMT and a decrease in voter participation or an increase in invalidated ballots from green voters.<sup>20</sup> The second paper by Zhang Wensheng (张文生) is a more broad-based analysis, which places election interference as part of a range of tools that can be used for unification.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, this paper is sponsored by an arm of the Shanghai Taiwan Affairs Office. Of specific note, the paper mentions using a 'Crimea Style' tactics to takeover Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu, and then using those islands as a basis for the invasion of Taiwan.<sup>22</sup> Although there are other papers from Mainland authors that analyse Taiwanese elections, there are few like these which speak to the specifics of how China's election interference.

### Approach

This study looked at the methods of election interference across several different categories in order to best capture the multi-varied nature of election interference. This paper uses election interference events or cases pulled from material on organized crime, pro-unification parties and organizations, religious groups, the media, and others. For the purposes of this paper election interference events are situations where: there is evidence of a connection to the CCP and the action taken or situation created is likely to impact an election or elections. These events might be ongoing, singular, or representative of a pattern of behavior. Some types of interference, such as those in the media, are ongoing and so the events listed are more representative of a pattern of behavior rather than singular actions. Although military, diplomatic, and economic events have been analysed as part of a larger project on election

---

<sup>17</sup> Wu Jieh-min [吴介民], "Mechanisms of Influence and Resistance in the 'China Factor' [中國因素作用力與反作用力]," 32.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>19</sup> Sponsor of the journal is CASS (中国社会科学院台湾研究所) which was formed from the former intelligence analysis unit of the MSS. Yu Qiang, Geng Shu, Chen xi and Li yang [于强, 耿曙, 陈曦, 李扬], "The Impacts of Economic Preferential Policies on Taiwanese Farmers: interests, identity, and voting behavior [惠台政策对台湾农渔业选民的影响研究: 利益, 认同与投票行为]," *Taiwan Studies [台湾研究]*, no. 2, (2016): 16-17.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>21</sup> The sponsor for the journal the article is published in is the Shanghai Taiwan Institute (上海台湾研究所) which is an arm of the Shanghai TAO. Zhang Wensheng [张文生], "A Dialectical Analysis of National Development and Reunification- With a View into the Process and Models of Reunification within the Next Three Decades [发展与统一的辩证思维-兼论未来三十年国家统一进程与模式]," *Cross-Taiwan Studies 台海研究*, No. 3, (2018): 36-38.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 38.

interference, this paper is focused only on local interference events. Meaning events which are covert or indirect.

## Overview of Election Interference Methods and Techniques Used

Several illustrative examples of election interference events have been included to help the reader better understand the dynamics and scope of such activities. Moreover, these examples show the type of evidence uncovered in the larger research project on election interference as all relevant research could not be included in its full-format. A detailed summary of election interference events are summarized in a chart following the examples.

### Flight Discounts and The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland

One of the CCP's more blunt methods of election interference is shipping Taiwanese voters living in Mainland China to Taiwan. This is a much more direct method of election interference compared with throttling tourism, as the United Front encourages Taiwanese businesspeople (*Taishang*) to vote in elections.<sup>23</sup> Of the ROC citizens who live in the mainland, roughly 80% voted for the KMT in 2012, and nearly 250,000 went back to Taiwan to vote that year.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, trips back to Taiwan are facilitated by Beijing, as many state-controlled airlines have offered as much as 50% off of flights to Taiwan for the election.<sup>25</sup> The most prominent CCP organization involved in this activity is The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland (全國台灣同胞投資企業聯誼會- ATIEM), which is controlled by the CCP through the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and targeted at *Taishang*.<sup>26</sup> They have frequently and explicitly tied facilitating return flights to Taiwan for voting as part of their mission. As the ATIEM in their 2012 year-end meeting states:

“[t]he ATIEM, according to *Taishangs'* needs, has coordinated relevant departments to solve the problems for return voting and Chinese New Year flights [全國台企聯根據廣大台商的需要, 協調有管部門解決返鄉投票和過春節的機票和航班問題的工作情況].”<sup>27</sup>

This was not the only time the ATIEM looked to influence Taiwan's elections. Prior to the 2010 and 2014 local elections and the 2016 national elections, the ATIEM gave flight discounts to voters in Mainland

---

<sup>23</sup> Yimou Lee and Faith Hung, “Special Report: How China's shadowy agency is working to absorb Taiwan,”

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Should some question whether the organization is truly controlled by the CCP, the Legislative Yuan did extensive questioning of Lin Zhongsen (林中森) one of the ATIEM board chairs. During questioning, Lin admitted that the 3 honorary chairs of the organization were members of the CCP, the Executive Deputy was a member of the TAO, and that the organization was established by the CCP. Moreover, a basic search of all current executive members of the organization turned up a large number of meetings between ATIEM leaders and the United Front officials. Many of these meetings were as parts of delegations, but were publicized through propaganda channels run by the UFWD, the TAO, or the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, with some meetings dating back to August 2009. Most frequently provincial United Front officials handle such events. For reference see the record of the 8<sup>th</sup> Legislative Yuan's Sixth session of the Judicial and Legal Committee's 10<sup>th</sup> Committee Record (立法院第8屆第6會期司法及法制委員會第10次全體委員會議紀錄) from October 27-29, 2014.

<sup>27</sup> “National Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Second Routine Deputy Chief Meeting's Fourth Session Opens in Beijing [全國台企聯第二屆常務副會長會第四次會議在京召開],” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 30, 2011. Accessed October 12, 2019.

[http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230\\_2233657.htm](http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230_2233657.htm)

China.<sup>28</sup> These plans were made with Taiwan's elections in mind. For example, a November 2010 statement on buying return flights to Taiwan include specific comments on the election stating:

"The 2010 Taiwan Metropolitan election results will likely exert influence on cross-strait direct flights and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), and continue to have a big effect on the stable development of cross-strait relations. ATIEM alongside numerous airline companies has already increased flights, [and] group ticket discounts [...] For cross-strait peace, the people's welfare, and economic development, let us quickly return home to use our democratic rights and vote to decide Taiwan's destiny. We will construct a beautiful future for cross-strait relations, you absolutely cannot be absent from the 2010 elections. [2010年, ECFA 全國台企聯已與多家航空公司就增加航班, 團體票優惠達成一致 [...] 為了兩岸和平, 為了人民福祉, 為了事業發展, 讓我們積極反響行使民主權利, 用選票抉擇臺灣的未來, 營造兩岸關係的美好前景, '五都'選舉, 絕不缺席。]"<sup>29</sup>

To reiterate the context, this is a CCP controlled organization extorting Taiwanese citizens to go home and vote in the election. The note goes on to finish:

"With your ballot, vote for hope and the future. With your ballot, fulfill your duty. With your ballot, protecting your personal interests and Taiwan's development. With your vote, protect the people's happiness and the future of the cross-strait. Brethren, acts have power, the municipal election is your moment to shine, alongside your friends and relatives rise up, use your acts to determine our future. Taiwan's industry needs your vote. Cross-strait peace needs your vote. Taiwan's future needs your vote. [這一票, 投出的是希望, 抉擇的是未來。這一票, 是義務的履行, 也是實力的展現。這一票, 是對自身利益的維護, 也是對臺灣未來發展的關注。這一票, 是為了人民的福祉, 也是為了兩岸的前途。鄉親朋友們, 行動才有力量, "五都"選舉您是關鍵的要角, 請您和您的親朋好友"動起來", 用行動決定我們的未來。台商的事業需要您的一票。兩岸的和平需要您的一票。臺灣的未來需要您的一票。]"<sup>30</sup>

Clearly, the Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland is not a neutral actor when it comes to Taiwan's elections and neither are their actions in providing flight discounts.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> "National Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Second Session of the Second Supervisory Meeting Opens in Shenyang, Liaoning [全國台企聯第二屆第二次理監事會在遼寧省沈陽市召開]," The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, November 4, 2010. Accessed October 12, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201011/t20101104\\_1589294.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201011/t20101104_1589294.htm); "The Beijing Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland, Northern China Region Meeting Commences in Beijing [全國台企聯北京, 華北片區會議在北京召開]," The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, November 4, 2010. Accessed October 12, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201512/t20151216\\_11259884.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201512/t20151216_11259884.htm); "Taiwan Nine in one Election Taishang Reinforcement Meeting Opens in Xiamen [台灣九合一選舉台商后援總會座談會在廈門召開]," The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, October 24, 2014. Accessed October 12, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201410/t20141024\\_7769989.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201410/t20141024_7769989.htm); "Mainland Airline Companies Sales Representative Arrangement Situation Notice [大陸各航空公司銷售代理安排情況的通知]," The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 16, 2015. Accessed October 13, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201512/t20151216\\_11260261.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201512/t20151216_11260261.htm)

<sup>29</sup> "If Taiwan is to be better, you can't not vote [台灣要更好您的一票不能少]," The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, October 24, 2014. Accessed October 13, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201011/t20101110\\_1596822.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201011/t20101110_1596822.htm)

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Discount dates are also quite revealing. The 2014 ticket discount purchase period was from October 20 to November 15 for traveling to Taiwan from November 22 to 29<sup>th</sup>. That is to say that these discounts would only be valid for flights up until the day of the municipal elections. There is also some evidence that associations related to the *Taishang* would directly ask about voting preferences before giving tickets, though it is difficult to establish that outside of circumstantial evidence. Ma Ying-jeou

In addition to facilitating voting, the ATIEM also has a lobbying role. For instance, in December 2012 the group attempted to convince President Ma Ying-jeou to allow Taiwanese citizens to hold official membership in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a CCP state body.<sup>32</sup> This attempt failed but is revealing. Furthermore, some members of the KMT have been blatant in using the ATIEM for domestic political goals while the CCP has been more than accommodating.

One outstanding example of this mutual accommodation is the October 14, 2014 ATIEM hosted meeting entitled, "Taiwan's Nine in one Election Taishang Reinforcement General Meeting (臺灣九合一選舉台商後援總會座談會)," which had participants who included: former KMT Vice-Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤), the Magistrate of Kinmen county Lee Wo-shih (李沃士), and KMT Central Committee member Jiang Shuoping (江碩平).<sup>33</sup> Unsurprisingly given its title and the attendance of a number of KMT officials, the meeting essentially was a campaign event for the KMT paid for and facilitated by the CCP. The former Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation and Vice-Chairman of the Kuomintang Chiang Pin-kung told those present:

"Thinking back to the eight years when the DPP held power, without peace across the straits there was no prosperity. I implore those here, go back to Taiwan, and win over your friends, employees, and relatives in Taiwan, use all means that you can to support KMT candidates for governorship and legislative representative, make them win. Go and secure our collective benefits, allow our cross-strait compatriots, especially our Taiwan compatriots, to enjoy success, cross-strait peace, and economic prosperity. [回想過去民進黨執政八年, 兩岸沒有和平, 就不會有繁榮。拜託各位, 回到臺灣, 爭取朋友, 員工和在台的親戚, 全力地支持中國國民黨所提名的所有的縣市長, 議員, 讓他們高票當選, 來確保我們大家的權益, 讓兩岸同胞尤其是臺灣同胞能夠安居樂業, 促進兩岸和平, 經濟繁榮。]"<sup>34</sup>

Other KMT members in the meeting expressed similar sentiments urging Taishang to return home to vote.<sup>35</sup> These sentiments were not one-sided either, business leaders also stressed the importance of mobilizing voters in the election and receiving discounts on plane tickets home, while other ATIEM members voiced their support for the KMT.<sup>36</sup> Although this was one of the more blatant uses of ATIEM to facilitate a campaign event, it was not the first.

Prior to the 2012 election, the KMT similarly used the ATIEM as a forum for soliciting votes. In this case, it was at a large banquet in Guangzhou attended by a KMT Central Review Committee member Zhang Ronggong (張榮恭), Chiang Pin-kung, KMT Central Committee Chair Jiang Shuoping, the KMT Mainland

---

may also have been aware of such activities as he was present at a September 6, 2014 meeting with ATIEM officials. The case for his knowledge of these events grows stronger when you consider the number of joint events held by KMT officials and ATIEM. See: Su Fanghe and Wang Wenxuan [蘇芳禾和王文萱], "Chinese Taiwan Associations Helps Taishang with Return Tickets, Requests Votes for KMT [中國台協補助台商返台機票 要求投國民黨]," *Liberty Times*, October 28, 2014. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/825289>

<sup>32</sup> Yimou Lee, Faith Hung, "Special Report: How China's shadowy agency is working to absorb Taiwan," *Reuters*, November 27, 2014. Accessed April 5, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-special-report-idUSKCN0JB01T20141127>

<sup>33</sup> "Taiwan Nine in one Election Taishang Reinforcement Meeting Opens in Xiamen [臺灣九合一選舉台商後援總會座談會在廈門召開]."

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

Affairs Deputy Director Xu Xinsheng (徐新生), and 1,200 guests.<sup>37</sup> At the banquet, Zhang Ronggong encouraged those attending to cherish their right to vote by returning home and voting for 'peaceful and economically beneficial cross-strait development.'<sup>38</sup> As the event was organized by the ATIEM, it should be assumed that expenses for the banquet were also paid for by them. That is to say, paid for by the TAO. Nor was this a one-off for that month. The banquet had been preceded by another hosted in Xiamen by the ATIEM for 800 guests, where Chiang Pin-kung is quoted as saying: "After Taiwan's election next year, should there be an eighth Chen-Chiang talk, then everyone's hopes regarding the investment protection agreement will definitely be fulfilled [明年臺灣大選之後, 假如還有第 8 次陳江會的話, 大家所關心的投資保障協定, 一定會實現]."<sup>39</sup> As if that had not been enough, there had been another banquet for 1,270 guests that month hosted by ATIEM called the "Ma Ying-jeou and Wu Den-yih Support Meeting."<sup>40</sup> Clearly, the banquets were designed to buy business leaders votes and attempt to convince them to vote KMT by linking the election outcome with cross-strait relations. In sum, the ATIEM, a CCP controlled organization, hosted banquets for over 3,000 people a month before the 2012 general election in order to lobby votes for the KMT.

### Use of Pro-unification Organizations

The Alliance for the Reunification of China (中國統一聯盟) is a pro-unification organization with links to the UFWD. In addition to meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing in 2014, the group has had several meetings with the China Council for Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (a UFWD GONGO) and participated in a forum organized by the same group on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.<sup>41</sup> None of these events or liaisons should be taken lightly as they all involved close contact with a Chinese intelligence organization. Most of the Alliance's activities prior to 2016 are not election related. The one

<sup>37</sup> "2012 Guangzhou Taishang New Year Fellowship Meeting [2012 广州台商迎新年联谊会]," The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 30, 2011. Accessed October 14, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230\\_2233658.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230_2233658.htm)

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> "Xiamen ATIEM Branch 19<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Celebration [廈門台協舉行十九周年紀念活動]," The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 22, 2011. Accessed October 14, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230\\_2233658.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230_2233658.htm)

<sup>40</sup> "Xiamen Taishang Ma Ying-jeou, Wu Den-yih Support Banquet Held [廈門台商馬英九、吳敦義後援會成立]," The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 19, 2011. [http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111219\\_2217806.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111219_2217806.htm)

<sup>41</sup> Also present at some of these meetings were the Alliance for the Reunification of China, the Cross-Strait Peaceful Unification Promotion Association, and the Association for Chinese Unity. The Chairman of the group also published an article in the 'Reunification Forum', a China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification bimonthly publication. "China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Secretary and Taiwan's Alliance for the Reunification working Delegation Meeting [中國同促會秘書處領導與台灣中國統一聯盟工作訪問團座談]," China Council for Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification's Website, June 2, 2009. Accessed August 22, 2019.

[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/201210/t20121011\\_3165449.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/201210/t20121011_3165449.html); "The Unification and Rejuvenation of the Chinese People' Seminar in Macau is Held [中華民族團結與復興研討會在澳門舉辦]," China Council for Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification's Website, October 10, 2013. Accessed August 22, 2019.

[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/201310/t20131011\\_5008510.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/201310/t20131011_5008510.html); The American branch of the GONGO also visited the Alliance for the Reunification of China and the Taiwan New Alliance Association in May 2010. Zong Ying [宗鷹], "Alliance for China's Peaceful Reunification, USA Travels [全美中國和平統一促進會聯合會巡禮]," China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, April 25, 2012. Accessed August 23, 2019.

[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtchxl/201211/t20121105\\_3348241.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtchxl/201211/t20121105_3348241.html); "Chinese People's Unification and Rejuvenation Forum Held in Macau [中華民族團結與復興研討會在澳門舉辦]," China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, December 23, 2013. Accessed August 23, 2019.

[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201306/201312/t20131226\\_5431641.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201306/201312/t20131226_5431641.html);

exception is a series of meetings they organized called the 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar. The seminar was held from 2011 November 19 to December 31 in Taipei, Tainan, Taoyuan, Taichung, Hualien, and Kaohsiung with the express purpose of: “calling upon the people to cast their vote for stable cross-strait relations and Ma Yingjeou [呼籲民眾把選票投給穩定兩岸關係德馬英九].”<sup>42</sup> Based on a summary of the arguments made, a secondary purpose of the seminars was to discourage voters from voting for James Soong and splitting the vote for Ma Ying-jeou. The Alliance’s self-reported numbers for the meetings give a rough idea of the impact these seminars had. In Hualien, 250 people showed up, in Tainan 100, in Taoyuan 300, in Kaohsiung 650, in Lungtan 450, and in Jianan 100.<sup>43</sup> Nearly 2,000 in total across the country. In regards to the demographic makeup of these meetings, based on photographic evidence attendees were largely older. The message of the events was direct, even blunt, suggesting a lack of nuance attempts to sway voters. The lack of flexibility in language reflects the top-down approach of the CCP when it comes to information control. It is unknown what electoral impact these events had, though it does not appear to be significant.

Another organization with ties to the United Front is the Association for Chinese Unity (中華民族團結協會). Its connections to the United Front include attending a Chinese Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification event in 2013 as well as a meeting with the Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy (another UFWD GONGO).<sup>44</sup> In addition, the leader of the Association for Chinese Unity, Xia Yingzhou (夏瀛洲), has made several controversial statements and had direct contacts with the United Front. In 2011, Xia Yingzhou was criticized for reportedly stating, “from this day

---

<sup>42</sup> “Alliance for the Reunification of China Holding the 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar [中國統一聯盟舉行 2012 大選說明會],” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, November 22, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019.

<http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000329>

<sup>43</sup> You Wanlian [游萬連], “December 17 Huadong 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar record [12 月 17 日花東分會’2012 大選說明會’紀實]” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, December 21, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019. <http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000336>; Lin Yaocheng [林耀呈], “November 27 Taichung 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar report [11 月 27 日台中分會’2012 大選說明會’報導]” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, November 27, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019.

<http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000335>; “November 26 Taozhu Guishan 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar report [11 月 26 日桃竹分會龜山’2012 大選說明會’報導],” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, November 26, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019.

<http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000333>; Yan Huiwen [顏耀文], “November 20 Jianan 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar report [11 月 27 日台中分會’2012 大選說明會’報導]” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, December 14, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019.

<http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000332>; “Alliance for the Reunification of China 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar receives a warm reception in Kaohsiung [「中國統一聯盟 2012 年大選說明會」在高雄受到熱烈迴響]” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, December 26, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019.

<http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000339>; “Alliance for the Reunification of China 2012 General Election Explanation Penultimate Seminar held in Lungtan [中國統一聯盟 2012 大選說明會」壓軸在龍潭舉辦],” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, January 1, 2012. Accessed August 22, 2019.

<http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000353>

<sup>44</sup> “Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Invites Taiwan Huangpu Organization Cadres Delegation to Jiangxi [黃埔同學會邀請台灣黃埔組織骨幹參訪團赴江西],” The United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee Website-United Front Current Events, May 12, 2017. Accessed August 23, 2019.

<http://www.zyztb.gov.cn/tzb2010/S2012/201705/e3f18ba5a8d841bdb8c5ae11bbdc5ea1.shtml>; Liu Fei [刘菲], “More than One Hundred Taipei Experts Discuss Cross-Strait Peaceful Reunification Progress [百余专家学者台北讨论‘两岸和平统一进程’],” China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, December 17, 2018. Accessed August 23, 2019. [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/xgxw/201812/t20181217\\_12122935.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/xgxw/201812/t20181217_12122935.html)

on we should not differentiate between the RCAF (Republic of China Armed Forces) or the PLA, we are both China's military [今後不要分什麼國軍, 共軍, 我們都是中國軍隊].<sup>45</sup> It should be no wonder that these remarks were received poorly when they were made in Beijing in front of the United Front Work Department's Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference reception hall at a forum organized by the Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy.<sup>46</sup> Clearly, the association between the Association for Chinese Unity and the United Front is more than a passing one.

One election related event held by the Association for Chinese Unity was the 'Call to Protect Justice' Friendship Meeting (呼群保義聯誼活動) on December 4, 2015.<sup>47</sup> The purpose of the meeting was to campaign for votes for the KMT and the New Party, and was attended by 56 political organizations seating roughly 150 tables.<sup>48</sup> Attendees which the Association for Chinese Unity called attention to on their website included former KMT Presidential Candidate Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), KMT Chairman Eric Chu Li-luan (朱立倫), New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming (郁慕明), Wang Ping-tung (王炳忠) chair of the New China Youth Association (新中華兒女會) and Wu Sz-huai (吳斯懷) head of the ROC Army Officers Alumni Association (陸軍官校校友總會).<sup>49</sup> Of note is Wang Ping-tung, who at the time was working with Zhou Hongxu as a spy for the CCP. Wu Sz-huai is also worth mentioning as he too has had numerous contacts with the UFWD's military-oriented GONGOs.<sup>50</sup> These connections become more important when you consider the purpose of the meeting itself. The 'Call to Protect Justice' Friendship Meeting's purpose was to strengthen political contacts and mobilize a number of groups to vote for the

---

<sup>45</sup> This is paraphrased from what PLA general Luo Yuan (羅援) said. Archived version. Liu Tianbin [羅添斌], "RCAF and PLA are both China's Military- Retired Military Officer can't Differentiate between Enemy and Ally [國軍共軍都是中國軍]," *Liberty Times* [自由時報], June 9, 2011.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20111108222552/http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2011/new/jun/9/today-t1.htm>

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> "Public Announcement-December 5, 2015," Association for Chinese Unity Website, December 5, 2015. [http://www.chinese-unity.org/news\\_423.php](http://www.chinese-unity.org/news_423.php)

<sup>48</sup> At 5 per table that's 750 people, though from pictures it looked closer to 10 per table which would be 1,500. Zhang Jiawen [張嘉文], "Deep Blue Banquet Host 150 Tables Chu-Hung Campaign for Votes and Call to Protect China [深藍辦席開 150 卓朱洪拉票籲捍衛中華]," *CRNTT* [台灣中平網], December 5, 2015. Accessed August 24, 2019.

<http://www.crntt.tw/doc/1040/3/1/4/104031472.html?coluid=93&kindid=15870&docid=104031472&mdate=1205005108>

<sup>49</sup> Of note the New China Youth Association uses phrasing which frequently comes up in the United Front Work Department's Handbook. ROC Army Officers Alumni Association has been translated by the author. "Public Announcement-December 5, 2015," Association for Chinese Unity Website, December 5, 2015. [http://www.chinese-unity.org/news\\_423.php](http://www.chinese-unity.org/news_423.php)

<sup>50</sup> This does not include several mentions of Wu Sz-huai on the Central United Front Work Department Group website and the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website post-2016. "Shanxi Province Huangpu Alumni Association Receives Taiwan Daoist Cultural Association Delegation [陝西省黃埔軍校同學會接待臺灣中華道教文化團體聯合總會參訪團]," Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, August 9, 2015. Accessed August 24, 2019.

[http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201509/t20150901\\_10590529.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201509/t20150901_10590529.html); "Yunnan Province Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Holds 'A Recollection of the Yunnan-Myanmar War of Resistance, advancing national rejuvenation' Conference [雲南省黃埔軍校同學會舉行'追憶滇緬抗戰,促進民族振興'座談會]," Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, July 19, 2016. Accessed August 24, 2019. [http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201607/t20160719\\_11513175.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201607/t20160719_11513175.html); "Tianjin Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Receives Taipei Chinese Huangpu Four Seas Concentric Association Cultural Delegation [天津市黃埔軍校同學會接待臺北市中華黃埔四海同心會文化交流團]," Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, April 14, 2015. Accessed August 24, 2019.

[http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201506/t20150603\\_9950088.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201506/t20150603_9950088.html); This trip involved the group Wu Sz-huai represents.

"Taiwan Retired Military Officers and Famous Calligraphy Artists Delegation heads to Hebei to Observe and Study [臺灣退役將領暨書畫名家參訪團到河北參觀考察]," Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, August 15, 2014.

Accessed August 24, 2019. [http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201408/t20140815\\_6987215.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201408/t20140815_6987215.html); Written by the head of the organization Wu Sz-huai represents. Hu Zhusheng [胡築生], "Taiwan Guangfu Holiday Speech [臺灣光復節感言]," Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, September 1, 2015. Accessed August 24, 2019.

[http://www.huangpu.org.cn/hpzz/hpzz201505/201509/t20150909\\_10637539.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/hpzz/hpzz201505/201509/t20150909_10637539.html)

KMT. It demonstrates the significant political power pro-CCP groups have and, more importantly, shows there are politicians who are interested in getting their support.

### Full list of significant cross-strait interference events

Below is a chart that details a number of election interference events over the period of study. Unfortunately, this is only a summary of these events drawn from the larger research project. These are short descriptions of longer-term interference efforts and only partially describe the activities undertaken.

Type	Time Period	Description
Media	Pre-2008	Infiltration of 17 media entities such as United Daily News through proxy investment vehicles. <sup>51</sup>
	Various post-2008	Forced changes in coverage due to threats or incentives from the CCP to Duowei (多維), Mingjing (明鏡), ERA (年代新聞台), FTV (民視新聞台), SET (三立台灣台), The Journalist (新新聞). <sup>52</sup>
	December 5, 2008- Ongoing	Tsai Eng Meng (蔡衍明) announces the purchase of China Times Media Group (hereafter Want Want Media Group). Wang Yi (王毅) is present on the day of the announcement and offers full support from TAO. The purchase blocks Jimmy Lai (黎智英) from purchasing the media group. Later it is found the CCP provides substantial subsidies to Tsai's company. Following the purchase coverage shifts to explicit suppression of pro-independence news and boosting of pro-Ma Yingjeou coverage. Want Want Media Group (旺旺中時媒體集團) becomes an intermediate agent for advertising and places advertorials (disguised advertising) for the CCP. <sup>53</sup>
	December 2010	Want Want Media Group attempts purchase of China Network Systems (中嘉網路). <sup>54</sup>
	2011	A large number of articles in Want Want Media Group outlets found to be copied from Xinhua News Agency (新華社). <sup>55</sup>

<sup>51</sup> He Qinglian [何清漣]. *Red Infiltration: The Truth of China's Global Media Expansion* \*[紅色滲透: 中國媒體全球擴張的真相]. (New Taipei City, Gusapublishing [八旗文化/遠足文化事業股份有限公司]: 2019): 162-3

<sup>52</sup> He Qinglian [何清漣]. *Red Infiltration: The Truth of China's Global Media Expansion*. 88-89, 95, 100-101; Hsu, Chien-Jung, "China's Influence on Taiwan's Media," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 54, No. 3, (May/June 2014):524-530.

<sup>53</sup> Lin Pu [普麟] (August 2018). *The Impact of [sic] China Factor and Authoritarian Diffusion on [sic] Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong and Taiwan: 2008-2015*. [中國因素與威權擴散: 中國對香港與台灣新聞自由之影響]. (Master's Thesis) National Taiwan University, Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences, Taipei, Taiwan, 96; Hsu, "China's Influence on Taiwan's Media," 520, 521; Kenji Kawase, "Chinese subsidies for Foxconn and Want Want spark outcry in Taiwan," *Nikkei Asian Review*, April 30, 2019. Accessed June 7, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Chinese-subsidies-for-Foxconn-and-Want-Want-spark-outcry-in-Taiwan>; He, *Red Infiltration: The Truth of China's Global Media Expansion*, 166.

<sup>54</sup>Pu, *The Impact of [sic] China Factor and Authoritarian Diffusion on [sic] Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong and Taiwan: 2008-2015*, 60, 101.

<sup>55</sup> Hsu, "China's Influence on Taiwan's Media," 522; Chang Chinhua [張錦華], "Methods of Resistance in the News Media [新聞傳播領域中的反作用力]," in *Anaconda in the Chandelier: Mechanisms of Influence and Resistance in the 'China Factor'* [吊燈裡的巨蟒: 中國因素作用力與反作用力] eds. Wu Jieh-min, Cai Hong Zheng, and Zhengzubang [吳介民, 蔡宏政, 和鄭祖邦]. (New Taipei City, Rive Gauche Publishing House [左岸文化], 2017), 500; Chun-Yi Lee, "Will cheap flight tickets buy over Taishang hearts and minds?," *Ballots & Bullets*, School of International Relations, University of Nottingham, December 4, 2011. Accessed July 8, 2019. <http://nottspolitics.org/2011/12/04/will-cheap-flight-tickets-buy-over-Taishang-hearts-and-minds/>

	November 2011-March 2012	CTI (中天電視), TVBS, Eastern Media (東森新聞) pursuing negotiations with CCP through former KMT news bureau chief regarding broadcasting rights in Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone. <sup>56</sup>
	2011-2012	ERA's "News Face to Face" (新聞面對面) political coverage provokes a negative reaction from CCP officials who summon ERA management to meet with them. <sup>57</sup>
	2011-2012	Want Want Media Group uses its merger with China Network Systems to block a cable deal with Next TV and then attempts to buy Jimmy Lai's company secretly through a third-company in Singapore. <sup>58</sup>
	2013-2014	Apple Daily advertisers simultaneously pulled ads in November 2013, followed by cyber-attacks attributed to the PLA. <sup>59</sup>
	2015	DMG group attempts to purchase Eastern Broadcasting Company, but the purchase is blocked on national security grounds. <sup>60</sup>
Cross-strait Connections (see previous text for sources)	2010	Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland (ATIEM) provides facilitates flights and attempts to influence voting patterns for those returning to vote in the 2010 elections (for ATIEM references see text).
	2011-2012	ATIEM facilitates discounts and flights for those returning to Taiwan to vote in the 2012 elections.
	December 2011-January 2012	ATIEM holds at least three banquets with KMT officials to campaign for votes in the Mainland.
	December 2011-January 2012	Taishang hold press conferences to re-affirm the principles of the 1992 consensus. <sup>61</sup>
	2011-2012	CCP reduces the number of tourists visiting Taiwan prior to the election.
	2014	ATIEM facilitates flights for those returning to Taiwan to vote in the 2014 elections.
	October 2014	ATIEM hosts meeting with KMT officials in Mainland for campaign purposes.
	2015-2016	ATIEM facilitates flights for those returning to Taiwan to vote in the 2016 elections.
	2015-2016	The number of tourists from China halved just prior to the election. <sup>62</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Hong Zhikun [洪智坤], "Pingtan Island is more than unique! Why is Sean Chen asking to put the brakes on? [平潭島 比特區 還特! 陳沖大踩平潭煞車為哪樁?]," *The Journalist* [新新聞], March 21, 2012. Accessed November 13, 2019. <https://www.new7.com.tw/SNewsView.aspx?Key=%e5%b9%b3%e6%bd%ad&i=TXT20120321150517M5X&p=2>

<sup>57</sup> Hsu, "China's Influence on Taiwan's Media," 529.

<sup>58</sup> Pu *The Impact of [sic] China Factor and Authoritarian Diffusion on [sic] Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong and Taiwan: 2008-2015*, 101.

<sup>59</sup> Pu, *The Impact of [sic] China Factor and Authoritarian Diffusion on [sic] Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong and Taiwan: 2008-2015*, 73; "Apple Daily hacked – Beijing suspected," *Reporters Sans Frontiers*, June 22, 2014. Accessed April 20, 2020. <https://rsf.org/fr/node/26145>

<sup>60</sup> Brian Hioe, "DMG Entertainment Cooperating with the White Wolf to Acquire Eastern Broadcasting?" *New Bloom*, September 29, 2016. Accessed September 23, 2019. <https://newbloommag.net/2016/09/29/dmg-entertainment-white-wolf/>; "Is Chinese money seeking to use Chang An-le as an intermediary? [中資找張安樂當人頭? 傳洽購東森電視台]," *Liberty Times* [自由時報], September 26, 2016. Accessed September 23, 2019. <https://m.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1837484>

<sup>61</sup> Wu Jieh-min [吳介民], "'The 1992 Consensus': The Effectiveness of Chinese Influence in Elections ['九二共識: 中國因素的選舉效應']," in *East Asian Views of Culture, Democracy, and Cross-strait relations* [文化, 民主, 與兩岸關係的東亞觀點] eds. Ma Changyi [馬場毅], Huang Yingzhe [黃英哲], and Xie Zhenglun [謝政論]. (Taipei: Songhui [松慧文化], 2012): 163.

<sup>62</sup> Yimou Lee, "Some China tourists eager to see free-wheeling democracy in action in Taiwan," *Reuters*, January 12, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-election-tourists/some-china-tourists-eager-to-see-free-wheeling-democracy-in-action-in-taiwan-idUSKCNOUR0L52016011>

Organized Crime	June 2007	Chang An-le (張安樂) meets with President Ma Ying-jeou's sister Ma Yinan (馬以南) in Shenzhen to solicit campaign funds. <sup>63</sup>
	June 2013	Chang An-le returns to Taiwan and begins opening Chinese Unity Promotion Party (中華統一促進黨) Offices <sup>64</sup>
	May 2013	Luo Fu-Chu (羅福助) attempts to infiltrate New Taipei DPP membership with roughly 4,000 applications from gangsters <sup>65</sup>
	February 2014	Chang An-le declares 'war' on Alliance of Referendum for Taiwan (公投護台灣聯盟) and World United Formosans for Independence (臺灣獨立建國聯盟) and vows to take action against Tainan mayor William Lai (賴清德). <sup>66</sup>
	April 2014	Chang An-le sends 500 followers to intimidate Sunflower Student Movement Protestors <sup>67</sup>
	May 2014	Chang An-le speaks with Alex Tsai (蔡正元), two of Ma Ying-jeou's sisters, and Wang Ping-chung (王炳忠) at New May Fourth Movement event (新五四愛國運動). <sup>68</sup>
	Various	Chang An-le provides physical protection for Chen Deming (陳德銘), Huang An (黃安), and Kuo Kuang-ying (郭冠英).
Pro-Unification Organizations	2008	Commerce and Industry Unification Association (商工統一促進會) opposes the 2008 referendum. <sup>69</sup>
	November – December 2011	Alliance for the Reunification of China holds seminars across Taiwan asking to discourage voters from voting for James Soong and to vote for Ma Ying-jeou (see example)
	December 2011	Commerce and Industry Unification Association magazine calls for the continued support of Ma Yingjeou <sup>70</sup>
	January 2012	Huangpu Four Seas Concentric Association (中華黃埔四海同心會) sends out a newsletter urging members to vote for Ma Ying-jeou and not vote for Tsai Ying-wen or James Soong. <sup>71</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Wang Beilin, "Weekly Magazine Alleges Ma Yinan had secret meeting with the White Wolf for fundraising [週刊爆料馬以南赴中密會白浪募款]," *自由時報* [Liberty Times Net], February 28, 2008. Accessed April 15, 2019.

<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/192341>; Mo Yan-chih, "Ma confirms sister met with gangster," *Taipei Times*, February 28, 2008. Accessed April 15, 2019. <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/02/28/2003403193>; "Cover Story: Ma Yinan makes overtures to organized crime for votes, conducts secret meeting with the White Wolf [封面故事向黑幫募款拉票 馬以南大陸密會白狼]," *Next Magazine* [台灣壹週刊], February 26, 2008. Accessed September 20, 2019. <https://www.nextmag.com.tw/realtimenews/news/30299045>

<sup>64</sup> Michael J. Cole, "The Return of Gangster Politics," *The Diplomat*, February 26, 2014. Accessed April 1, 2019.

<https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-return-of-gangster-politics-in-taiwan/>

<sup>65</sup> Chris Wang, "Chen Shui-bian to apply to be DPP member again," *Taipei Times*, May 23, 2013. Accessed September 13, 2019. <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/05/23/2003562962>; Li Xinfang, Li Yuxin, Peng Xianjun [李欣芳, 李宇欣, 和彭顯鈞], "Organized Crime Enters Politics DPP: Related to Lo Fu-zhu [黑道入黨民進黨: 與羅福助有關]," *Liberty Times* [自由時報], May 23, 2013. Accessed September 13, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/681777>

<sup>66</sup> *China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States*, 18.

<sup>67</sup> J. Michael Cole. *Black Island: Two Years of Activism in Taiwan: Essay from the Front Lines*. (Leipzig: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015):304

<sup>68</sup> Cole, *Black Island: Two Years of Activism in Taiwan: Essay from the Front Lines*. 306,342

<sup>69</sup> "Historical Background [歷史沿革]," Commerce and Industry Unification Promotion Association Website. Accessed August 21, 2019. <http://www.adlpp.com/wu5199/zh/about.php>

<sup>70</sup> *Leisheng Magazine* [雷聲], December 2011, 5, 12-13, 15. Accessed October 21, 2019.

<http://www.wu5199.com/magazines/gal/mags/ma03/page/7>

<sup>71</sup> *Huangpu Four Seas Concentric Association Newsletter* [黃埔會訊], No.27, January 2012.

	September 2014	Xi Jinping meets with roughly 20 pro-unification groups. The groups met with Chinese officials and the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification. <sup>72</sup>
	December 2014-January 2018	Wang Ping-tung, Hou Han-ting (侯漢廷), and Lin Min-cheng (林明正), members of the New Party (新黨), start Fire News in cooperation with the CCP spy Zhou Hongxu (周泓旭) as part of a TAO intelligence operation. The group also gathered intelligence on Taiwanese political parties, particularly the KMT, supplying 100,000 NTD for 'training and education'. The group also set up the New China Youth Association (新中華兒女學會) to recruit agents and coordinated promotional material for the New Party. <sup>73</sup>
	August 2015	Chinese Democratic People's Party (中國民進黨) leader Zhou Qingjun (周慶峻) gives a lecture on 'One country, two systems,' in Taipei <sup>74</sup>
	December 2015	Association for Chinese Unity holds the 'Call to Protect Justice' Friendship meeting, to gain votes for the KMT and attended by 56 political organizations.
	December 2015	Commerce and Industry Unification Association magazine publishes articles urging voters not to vote for Tsai Ying-wen or the People First Party, as well as propaganda from the TAO. <sup>75</sup>
Political Contacts	December 2009	Kao Chin Su-mei (高金素梅) leads a 50 person delegation to Beijing and is given 20 million RMB to personally distribute for disaster relief. She later meets with the Beijing City Tourism Expert Group (北京市旅遊行業協會) on December fourth, one day before local elections. <sup>76</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Dong Le [董乐], "Taiwan New Party Leaders lead group to meet with Xi Jinping [台湾新党领袖率团访问大陆将见习近平]" *BBC*, September 24, 2014. Accessed June 19, 2019.

[https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/09/140924\\_taiwan\\_china\\_visit](https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/09/140924_taiwan_china_visit); Zhang Yun [章蕴], "Xi Jinping sees Taiwan's pro-unification groups joint delegation [習近平會見和平統一團體聯合參訪團]," *Wenhuiwang* [文匯網], September 26, 2014. Accessed June 19, 2019. <http://news.wenweipo.com/2014/09/26/IN1409260023.htm>; Xiao Er and Dong Le [蕭爾和董乐], "Xi Jinping Meets with Taiwanese Unification Faction, Reaffirms One Country Two Systems Policy [習近平晤台灣統派 重申一國兩制方針]," *BBC*, September 26, 2014. Accessed June 19, 2019. [https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2014/09/140925\\_china\\_taiwan\\_relations\\_xi](https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2014/09/140925_china_taiwan_relations_xi)

<sup>73</sup> Information taken from the reproduction of the Ministry of Justice's statement on the case. Chen Yiwei [陳毅偉], "Communist Spy Network Star Fire T Project Discovered, Wang Ping-Tung's Father loses 600,000 NTD from the Taiwan Affairs Office [共諜網軍'星火T計畫' 露餡 王炳忠父親搞丟國台辦60萬]," January 2, 2018. Accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.mirrormedia.mg/story/20180102inv014/>

<sup>74</sup> Chen Yaozong [陳耀宗], "When did Taiwan get another DPP? Actually..... [台灣何時多了'中國民主進步黨'?原來是----]," *Storm Media* [風傳媒], August 11, 2015. Accessed August 23, 2019. <https://bit.ly/3eg96Uk>

<sup>75</sup> *Leisheng Magazine* [雷聲], December 2015, 6, 18, 19, 38. Accessed October 21, 2019. <http://www.wu5199.com/magazines/gal/mags/ma10/page/7>

<sup>76</sup> Chen Xiaolu [陈小炉], "Moving Closer to Taiwan's Atayal People [走进台湾高山族的泰雅人部落]," China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification Website, June 12, 2008. Accessed September 24, 2019. [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/2008ndyq/201210/t20121018\\_3199540.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/2008ndyq/201210/t20121018_3199540.html); Liu Shiyang [刘世洋], "Taiwan Public Opinion Ambassadors in Cross-Strait Exchanges [两岸大交流中的台湾民意代表群像]," China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification Website, April 23, 2015. Accessed September 24, 2019. [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201502/201504/t20150420\\_9618844.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201502/201504/t20150420_9618844.html); "Wang Yang to See Kao Chin Su-mei Delegation [汪洋会见高金素梅一行]," China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification Website, June 29, 2019. Accessed September 24, 2019. [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/xgxw/201906/t20190629\\_12178734.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/xgxw/201906/t20190629_12178734.html)

	November 2011	The Shanghai UFWD invites 28 members from the Taiwan Northern Municipal Townsmen Association Secretary General (台灣各縣市旅北同鄉會) to Shanghai for an all-expenses-paid trip. <sup>77</sup>
Religious Influence	September 2010	Taiwan Mazu Fellowship (台灣媽祖聯誼會) meets with the head of the TAO, who urges unity in opposing Taiwan independence and upholding the 1992 consensus. <sup>78</sup>
	December 2011	Yen Ching-piao (顏清標) receives a jade statue from a UFWD group. The reception ceremony is attended by President Ma Yingjeou and several local politicians. <sup>79</sup>
	2015	Chen Deming meets with Taichia, Yilan, and Taipei Mazu temples and urges leaders to 'make the correct decision' in the election. <sup>80</sup>
Hacking	January 2007-2008	Ma Ying-jeou's campaign and spokesperson are hacked weekly, including DDoS attacks on his email servers. <sup>81</sup>
	July 2007	Local DPP organizations targeted by malware in Tainan, Keelung, Hsinchu, and Pingtung. <sup>82</sup>
	December 2007	Retired Central Election Commission (中選會) officials targeted with a Trojan horse program. <sup>83</sup>
	December 2007	20 DPP administrators targeted by Trojan horse programs, exposing election strategy documents. <sup>84</sup>
	January 2008	Central Election Commission is hacked days before legislative elections. <sup>85</sup>
	July 2011	DPP Legislator receives a fake email containing a virus. <sup>86</sup>
	July 2011	A fake phishing email is sent out impersonating Tsai Ying-wen. <sup>87</sup>

<sup>77</sup> "Cover Story: CCP United Front Eager to Help Elect Ma, Invites the Taiwan Lubeitong Townsmen Association [封面故事 機要台灣旅北同鄉會 中共統戰部輔選救馬]," *Next Magazine* [台灣壹週刊], December 8<sup>th</sup> 2011. Accessed September 24, 2019. <https://www.nextmag.com.tw/realtimenews/news/33870195>

<sup>78</sup> Wu Yaming [吳亞明], "Wang Yi: Cross-strait relations peaceful development is the work of comrades on both sides of the strait [王毅称: 两岸关系和平发展是两岸同胞的共同事业]," China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, September 24, 2010. Accessed September 7, 2019.

[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/stzl/37497/wxzl/wxzl/gtbwx/201210/t20121018\\_3197120.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/stzl/37497/wxzl/wxzl/gtbwx/201210/t20121018_3197120.html);

<sup>79</sup> "December 2011 to January 2012 Cross-Strait Major Events [2011年12月-2012年1月海峡两岸大事记]," China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, February 28, 2012. Accessed September 7, 2019.

[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/2012ndyq/201210/t20121018\\_3196803.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/2012ndyq/201210/t20121018_3196803.html)

<sup>80</sup> The exact wording in Chinese is: "考量兩岸關係, 做出最佳選擇。" Gu Mingjun and Hong Yingfa [古明君和洪瑩發], "The Benefits of Cross-Strait Mazu Belief [媽祖信仰的跨海峽利益]," in *Anaconda in the Chandelier: Mechanisms of Influence and Resistance in the 'China Factor'* [吊燈裡的巨蟒: 中國因素作用力與反作用力] eds. Wu Jieh-min, Cai Hong Zheng, and Zheng Zubang [吳介民, 蔡宏政, 和鄭祖邦]. (New Taipei City, Rive Gauche Publishing House [左岸文化], 2017), 316.

<sup>81</sup> Wang Yuzhong [王寓中], "Chinese Hackers Suspected of Attacking Blue Camp [藍營疑被中國網軍攻擊]," *Liberty Times* [自由時報], December 13, 2007. Accessed December 23, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/175081>

<sup>82</sup> Yang Guowen and Li Keqiang [楊國文和李克強], "China Hackers Continue to Attack Taiwan [中國'駭'群之馬攻台接二連三]," *Liberty Times* [自由時報], November 10, 2007. Accessed September 30, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/167197>

<sup>83</sup> Lin Xinhui [林修卉], "Chinese Cyber Military, Hackers Invade, Central Election Commission Prepares for War [中國網軍, 駭客入侵 中選會備戰]," *China Times* [中國時報], January 5, 2008.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> Li Xinfang [李欣芳], "Hacker Impersonates Tsai, Sends Phishing Email [駭客假冒小英 激發釣魚信件]," *Liberty Times* [自由時報], June 9, 2011. Accessed September 23, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/507114>

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

	August 2011	DPP headquarters hacked. <sup>88</sup>
	November 2011	People First Party received several phishing emails. <sup>89</sup>
	December 2015	Chinese APT targets two media organizations with spear-phishing attack. <sup>90</sup>
	December 2015	50 DPP targeted by cyber-attacks and the DPPs Deputy Director of International Affairs hacked. <sup>91</sup>

## Overall Analysis of Election Interference Events

### Media

Media interference in Taiwan's elections is systemic and tends to involve efforts to control the media through monetary incentives, self-censorship, or outright ownership of an outlets parent company. Most media interference starts with some sort of leverage, usually financial, and then escalates. In regards to elections, this has an effect on shifting coverage to a more pro-KMT slant while suppressing negative stories about China. For the 2008 election, Chinese influence over the media did not appear substantial and events involving Chinese attempts to change coverage were not found, though the CCP had purchased ownership in several Taiwanese media companies through proxies in the British Virgin Islands. This changed significantly post-2008. Following the purchase of the China Times Media Group in December 2008 by Tsai Eng Meng, the CCP began much more actively interfering in Taiwanese news coverage. This included dissemination of propaganda through CCP connected news outlets, suppression of NEXT TV's expansion into Taiwan, and leveraging the ad market to influence Taiwanese media companies. The increase in the number of tools used by the CCP to interfere with news coverage prior to the 2012 election signaled a shift in tactics that had been facilitated through increased cross-strait economic connections. After 2012 however, the number of election interference events decreases, most likely due to public pressure and better regulation from the National Communications Commission (國家通訊傳播委員會). One notable change not reflected in the chart above is the CCP's increasing focus on 'new media' (internet media) following the Sunflower Student Protests in 2014. This focus later accelerated with the reform of the UFWD and the creation of the Strategic Support Force in 2015, which may explain why disinformation efforts expanded significantly post-2016. However, in general, media interference efforts during the 2016 election did not show any substantial change in tactics from previous years.

In regards to the methods of CCP media interference, there are several broad trends. First, the CCP often used incentives to influence media companies, such as denying broadcasting rights to a television

<sup>88</sup> Jimi Liao, "Hackers enter the DPP, Research, Development and Evaluation Commission Denies Responsibility [駭客入侵民進黨 研考會撇清]," *Taiwan News* [台灣英文新聞], August 10, 2011. Accessed September 23, 2019.

<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/ch/news/1675934>

<sup>89</sup> Shi Xiaoguang [施曉光], "Important Figures in the Orange Camp's Computers get Hacked [橘營要角電腦 傳遭駭客攻擊]," *Liberty Times* [自由時報], November 6, 2011. Accessed September 23, 2019.

<https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/537171>

<sup>90</sup> Ryann Winters, "Threat Research: The EPS Awakens," *FireEye Threat Intelligence*, December 20, 2015. Accessed June 27, 2019. <https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html>

<sup>91</sup> "Chinese hackers increase attacks on Taiwan opposition before January's presidential election: US security firm," *South China Morning Post* [Originally from Bloomberg], December 21, 2015. Accessed June 27, 2019.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1893663/chinese-hackers-increase-attacks-taiwan-opposition>

show unless certain demands were met. This led to voluntary shifts in coverage from media companies or even personnel changes in order to please Beijing. Under normal circumstances, coverage would not be influenced to such a degree, but because the CCP has such tight control over access to information domestically it allows them a stronger degree of leverage when making political demands. Second, the CCP used advertising purchases to acquire leverage over Taiwan's media landscape. In Taiwan's case advertising purchases are made through a middle-man (the Want Want Times) and are paid at well above market prices. This has the effect of allowing the CCP to disrupt the local media market, incentivizing self-censorship. Third, the CCP used proxies to purchase ownership in Taiwanese media companies allowing them a more direct say in the day-to-day running of these companies. Related methods identified by scholars include using investment to control stock ownership, inserting personnel into key positions, and giving cooperative businessmen benefits.<sup>92</sup> In cases where the CCP does not have a financial lever it can use to manipulate the media the CCP will resort to threats or attacks. This may come in the form of forcing companies to drop advertising with the media outlet, hacking attempts from the PLA, or hostile takeovers engineered through allies.

Lastly, although the CCP has attempted to use disinformation to influence public opinion in Taiwan, disinformation attempts during the 2008-2016 period were not sophisticated or prominent until post-2016. The most prominent form of disinformation during this time period is the spread of CCP state propaganda through its own media channels or cooperative Taiwanese partners. No information designed to smear a specific political opponent was observed, outside of some statements from Chinese politicians. However, the CCP did begin to adopt the tactic of creating news websites that would produce content in the hopes that it would go 'viral' and get picked up by Taiwan's mainstream media. This was used effectively in the case of an ROC diplomat, who subsequently committed suicide because of the CCP's disinformation campaign.

#### Cross-Strait Economic Connections

The way economic connections are utilized to interfere in Taiwan's elections is through the manipulation of cross-strait travel. The most prominent of which involves reducing flows of Chinese tourists or CCP officials at advantageous times or as a means to punish and threaten. Cross-strait flows are also manipulated by providing flight discounts or more frequent flights to encourage *Taishang* to return to Taiwan to vote. This is facilitated through GONGOs such as the ATIEM who act as lobbyists and organize campaign events in China for the KMT. The TAO and UFWD appear most involved in these efforts, likely because their role requires them to gather intelligence and cultivate contacts with *Taishang*. The CCP also utilizes these connections to control *Taishang's* public statements. This is done through implied threats of violence, promises of lucrative deals, or threats to existing financial assets. The cumulative effect of these methods is to co-op and subdue 'dissenters' while facilitating those who comply.

These methods are observed in all major elections from 2010 onwards, though reductions in tourism related to election interference only appears to occur during the 2012 and 2016 national elections.<sup>93</sup> It is not clear if tourism was reduced to avoid a backlash against the mainland during the election, exert pressure on politicians, or reduce the amount 'democracy tourism' from Chinese tourists. However,

---

<sup>92</sup>Chang, "Methods of Resistance in the News Media," 490.

<sup>93</sup> This also occurred prior to the 2020 election which led to the Magistrates of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu going directly to the TAO for support.

based on examples of how the CCP has used tourism as a tool to punish Taiwanese politicians in 2009 and influence the election in 2020, it seems plausible these were attempts to pressure politicians. Generally, the reduction of cross-strait flows from the Chinese side creates economic pressure on tourist-dependent businesses in Taiwan which in turn puts pressure on public opinion and politicians. Often, these actions are framed as punishments for wrong behavior, so when tourist flows are reduced politicians are blamed for not 'managing' cross-strait affairs properly. However, these actions are not entirely aimed calculated to increase pressure on politicians, they are also rooted in Beijing's fears. In particular, the fear of a cross-strait incident involving a PRC citizen or official leading to a backlash against China. The effect this can have on an election is not insubstantial. For example, the Chou Tzu-yu incident in 2016 shows how potent an effect an event of this type can have in galvanizing DPP supporters at the polls.

Manipulation of cross-strait business and trade connections follow a different path from tourism. The UFWD and the TAO target and attempt to co-opt *Taishang*. This is facilitated through GONGOs and fieldwork by UFWD agents. As part of this work *Taishang* are provided with flight discounts, lobbying services, and political connections. The hosting of campaign events for the KMT in the Mainland is also accommodated by the CCP through the UFWD and TAO. The aim of which is to create the appearance that cross-strait economic ties, support for the KMT, and Taiwan's economy are mutually dependent on one another.

#### Organized Crime

The most important political function of organized crime groups for the CCP is their role in establishing a parallel cross-strait network, or as Wu Jieh-min described it, a CCP Cross-strait Network. That is a series of connections that mirror regular cross-strait exchanges except they are built to avoid regulation by ROC authorities. Through this network, the CCP has been able to fund and establish political parties, introduce channels for corruption, sponsor political candidates, and attempt to infiltrate the DPP. In regards to the use of these methods by organized crime figures in individual elections, the evidence is sparse. For the 2008 election, it appears that only one incident involving funding a political campaign occurred, while during the 2012 election there was no use of organized crime except for an incident involving Yen Ching-piao (see religious influence). However, post-2012 political actions involving organized crime increased from 2013 onwards. This may be related to Xi Jinping shifting tactics or previous rumours that the CCP was interested in setting up a CCP controlled political party in Taiwan by 2012. Regardless, the CCP over time better utilized organized crime for political interference in Taiwan post-2012. However, this did not apply to the 2016 election.

Overall, organized crime's involvement in politics has remained an endemic problem in Taiwan and their connections with the CCP make them a convenient vehicle for election interference operations. Of particular concern is their role in the practice of vote-buying, though no events were found where CCP affiliated organized crime figures participated in such activities, except possibly in the case of Yen Ching-piao. More common is the use of organized crime in the disruption of protests and the staging of counter-protests. Outside of this, it appears that organized crime is beneficial in forming connections between *Taishang* and CCP officials. Further, the CCP appears to fund organized crime activities and possibly use them for money laundering. Lastly, through Chang An-le, the CCP has been successful in using organized crime to set-up a political party which can directly field candidates in elections, deepen connections with politicians, act as a platform for propaganda, and provide political intelligence. All of

these functions are extremely useful for election interference activities, as local collaborators are necessary for most election interference activities.

#### Pro-Unification Parties and Organizations

One of the most wide-reaching types of electoral interference is the CCP's manipulation and subversion of pro-unification organizations. Most of these organizations are also political parties which make this even more concerning than other forms of interference. The CCP appears to have used these connections to mobilize voters by holding banquets, conducting seminars and forums, or placing ads in newsletters. Similarly, pro-unification groups have helped produce and distribute pro-CCP propaganda. This often mimics the language of UFWD guidelines, which makes such efforts transparent. However, it is a useful form of propaganda as they demonstrate the ability to target different sections of the electorate with specific messages through a trusted source. For the 2008 election, election interference activities involving these groups appear sparse and directed only at the referendum. By 2012 however, these events increase, though most are propaganda related and only one event was found aimed at rallying voters. By 2016 however, it appears some efforts were made to better coordinate these groups and a greater variety of interference methods were utilized. In particular, the use of several members of the New Party for a spying operation in cooperation with the TAO demonstrated an interest in using pro-unification figures to field political candidates, distribute propaganda, and collect political intelligence.

According to Dong Liwen, one of the main goals of the CCP's manipulation of pro-unification organizations is to control 3-5% of Taiwan's votes so that the CCP is able to influence the overall results of any given election.<sup>94</sup> Controlling a swing vote of this magnitude would be quite valuable, and further pressure Taiwanese politicians. However, many of these parties are small, uncoordinated, and only appear viable with older voters. This makes it doubtful that they were effectively used in the past for such purposes, though the September 2014 meeting between numerous pro-unification groups and Xi Jinping looks to have partly rectified some coordination issues.

Most frequently pro-unification groups operate as reactionaries. The moves made by them are there to check what the perceived opposition is doing. So when a new independence party is created, a pro-unification figure is there to create a new pro-unification party. When there are protests, pro-unification organizations organize counter-protests, often relying on paid supporters. The goal of these actions is to silence critics, blunt political movements in Taiwan, wear away at the opposition's legitimacy, and reduce detractor's rhetorical options. This reactionary approach appears to be part of a larger attempt to manufacture consensus by making it appear there is more widespread support for their cause. This is an interesting contrast to Russia's use of chaos and disinformation in its interference activities which are aimed at dividing its enemies, instead of projecting strength.

With over 200 pro-unification groups, the events shown are only representative of a small portion of their total activities, but they do elucidate some of the kinds of election interference activities they are used for. In particular, they seem useful for creating connections to prominent politicians. However, they are also important as a vehicle for spreading propaganda, mobilizing voters, launching counter-

---

<sup>94</sup> Dong Liwen [董立文], "The Cross-strait Party-to-party exchange situation in 2017 and its future direction," in *2018 Yearbook on Chinese Communism*. 中共年報 2018 (2017.1-2017.12). Eds. Yearbook on Chinese Communism editorial committee [中共年報編纂委員會], (Taipei, zhonggongyanjiuzazhishe [中共研究雜誌社], 2018): 5-59.

protests, transferring funds from the CCP, collecting intelligence, and in recruitment activities. In essence, they can work as a proxy political party akin to how the UFWD controls 'democratic' organizations in China.

#### Cultivation of Political Contacts Outside of Major Parties

There are two specific cases of the CCP attempting to cultivate political contacts for the purpose of election interference. One used direct influence. Essentially persuasion and bribery to convince a grassroots organization's leadership to rally votes for Ma Ying-jeou on the CCP's behalf. The other case used more indirect means of influence. This involved a direct transfer of funds to circumvent the normal processes of cross-strait relations. Although it is not conclusive that these funds were used to specifically influence the 2009 election, circumstantial evidence suggests that political influence was the primary goal behind this action. Common to both accounts is the travel to the Mainland through official invitation and the transfer of funds, either directly or in the form of gifts. These operations are most likely related to the long-term cultivation of political contacts for use in future actions.

#### Religious Interference

Religious organizations are attractive targets to the CCP for several reasons. The first is that many religious organizations are influential within the local community. In particular, the boards of religious organizations include influential politicians or businessmen. The second reason is that these organizations can be used as a cover for trips to the Mainland as well as a source for money laundering. The third reason is that some temples are also meeting spots for powerful organized crime groups. Lastly, as one Mainland researcher noted in a UFWD sponsored journal, temples provide two crucial elements important for elections: mobilization of voters and financial backers.<sup>95</sup>

The CCP influences religious organizations in Taiwan by first establishing contact through CCP controlled GONGOs. These are operated by the United Front, as they are responsible for targeting religious organizations in China. These GONGOs create cross-strait travel opportunities and events to further solidify relationships and connections. These relationships are then used to create unofficial channels for contacting CCP officials, which businesses or politicians can use for their own purposes. The CCP returns the favor by providing gifts, donations, or other incentives to the temples. The temples also get access to China's 'religious market,' providing them with a large group of possible new worshipers and opportunities for expansion.

The CCP's use of religious organizations for election interference comes by way of connections through the United Front and their associated organizations as well as direct appeals from officials. The most prominent method appears to be direct appeals from CCP officials to the leaders of temples or religious organizations to support or oppose political parties. Evidence shows officials targeting temple leaders in small gatherings, though occasionally the CCP facilitates larger meetings where political appeals can be made as well. In addition to direct appeals, there is evidence the CCP will use gifts/bribes to influence leaders of religious organizations. Though it is difficult to tell how widespread this method is outside of evidence for a direct bribe/gift and another instance of the CCP assisting in the establishment of a large

---

<sup>95</sup> The sponsor of this journal is the Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification. Han Bing [韩冰], "Taiwan's 'popular beliefs' and electoral politics intimate relations [台湾地区'民间信仰'与选举政治的亲和相关性]," *Reunification forum* [统一论坛], no. 4, (2019): 23.

temple within China. The CCP also uses temples to facilitate cross-strait connections with businessmen and politicians.

Similar to other methods of election interference, the CCP started with weakly developed means of influence in 2008 and over time strengthened its ability to interfere through greater cross-strait contacts. In 2012 and 2016, the CCP made a conscious effort to use these connections to interfere with the elections. For the 2012 election, interference was practiced through a well-placed bribe to a notorious organized crime figure/politician (Yen Ching-piao). For 2016, interference came in the form of a direct visit by a CCP official who attempted to lobby temple leaders to vote for the correct candidate. It remains to be seen how effective such efforts were.

### Hacking

Although hacking is an area where it is difficult to discern the actors involved, the evidence points to the CCP as the primary culprit. The main method used for these attacks was spear-phishing which targeted party organizers, the media, and the Central Election Commission. The goal for most of these attacks appear to be the retrieval of confidential information, though the end-use of this information is unknown. However, it is important to keep in mind that information gathered in these types of attacks can also be used for further attacks. There were also several attempts made to directly penetrate computer networks of political campaigns and the electoral infrastructure, which could be used for a wide range of purposes. Overall, many of the methods used are rudimentary, though this may be due to a bias towards events that were easy to detect.

The CCP's use of hacking in election interference in the 2008-2016 period was usually limited to spear-phishing attacks aimed at the distribution of malware and the collection of intelligence. Attacks against election officials were limited to the period before 2009 and is not a persistent target of CCP attributed cyber-attacks. Unlike other methods of election interference hacking is not restricted in targeting one party but rather targets a variety of politicians. This may be because the goal of such attacks are to collect intelligence or for deterrence purposes. What is worrying is the amount of data on voters political parties have which is invaluable for further election interference activities. This data likely is similar to and may even surpass in some aspects the information held by the Central Election Commission. However, unlike the Central Election Commission political parties do not have the same access to resources or expertise which allows them to adequately defend against these attacks. This makes them valuable targets for many types of election interference actions.

### Summary Analysis

In regards to the use of election interference methods over each election, a couple of points stand out. First is that pre-2008 the CCP heavily favoured diplomatic, military, or international pressure to influence the results of Taiwan's national elections. In contrast, during that same period events involving local actors within Taiwan were generally rare. Second, following the establishment of closer economic ties, the CCP appears to have been able to build up a greater number of connections it could use to interfere with Taiwan's elections. Prior to the 2012 election, there was a notable increase in the number and types of election interference methods used by the CCP. Third, during the 2016 election there was a notable decrease in the number of indirect election interference events, though those that did occur were more sophisticated than others in the past. However, the decrease in indirect interference was contrasted with an increase in military and verbal threats from the CCP. Over the 2008-2016 period, the

CCP improved the sophistication and types of methods utilized for political interference. Furthermore, a notable trend emerged where China relied on diplomatic and military means of coercion when the DPP was in power or was favoured to win an election, while economic coercion and local/indirect interference was preferred during KMT administrations.

The utility of the models of election interference is also worth considering in comparison with the events listed here. First, although it is important to generally consider the timing of election interference, the longer-term build-up of influence and the day-to-day operation of organizations with close ties to the CCP was not fully captured by solely looking at indirect events. This is especially true for the development of ties between political parties and the CCP as well as the effects of economic policies. Second, looking at the targets of election interference it can be seen that politicians, the media, and voters were most frequently targeted. Events that targeted election officials or party administrators were rare and generally limited to hacking. Targeting voter's reveals an interest in influencing the outcomes of elections while targeting elites (politicians and the media) reveals an interest in both influencing the outcome of elections and the specific policies adopted by candidates. Last, although categorizing election interference by diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic means are helpful for broad classifications, it is not useful for defining the specific mechanisms of influence. These are more often revealed by the means used for influence, which most often included some form of bribery, relationships with UFWD GONGOs, propaganda, and material ties to China (travel, business, or family).

Finally, most of the election interference activities covered here were facilitated through the United Front Work Department. Usually, this was done through exchanges in the Mainland with UFWD GONGOs. Though occasionally CCP officials directly met with local proxies for the purpose of election interference activities. For most interference activities, however, it appears the UFWD is the leading point of contact. Moreover, the local actors targeted in most election interference events correspond directly to the targets of UFWD intelligence work, such as indigenous groups, religious organizations, and *Taishang*. None of this would be possible without extensive cross-strait contact and exchanges. Many of these are open attempts to indoctrinate or cultivate agents from different parts of Taiwan's society. When the CCP says that it wishes to increase exchanges to facilitate 'cultural understanding', it actually means it wants to expand its efforts to spread propaganda and co-opt locals. If Chinese society had more independent social organizations that were not controlled and regulated by CCP leaders or the United Front, this would be a different story.

### Conclusion

From this research several conclusions about Chinese election interference are evident. First, China uses multiple methods to influence Taiwan's domestic politics, focused on influencing elites and the general population. These methods are not limited to disinformation. In fact, disinformation during the 2008-2016 period was found to be one of the lesser-used methods of interference. Instead, China used organized crime, *Taishang*, religious organizations, and politicians to create a parallel cross-strait network outside of the scope of normal diplomatic relations. Second, because China's greater focus on shifting the views of elites and ordinary citizens, China's election interference activities are largely designed to influence the outcome of elections or political stances, and not Taiwan's electoral process. This is related to China's goal of 'peacefully annexing' Taiwan, otherwise known as unification or re-unification, which emphasizes a peaceful transition of power instead of annexation through force. This strategy has largely been dictated by the reality that any military invasion of Taiwan would be extremely

difficult to undertake and require dealing with U.S. and allied military forces. Moreover, China has a secure strategic position that allows it to take its time. Meaning the manipulation of Taiwan's populace takes precedence over sowing chaos, as China is operating on a longer time frame with the goal of controlling a stable Taiwan.

Third, the premier organization for conducting these operations is the United Front Work Department, a Chinese intelligence organization responsible for influencing the CCP's political enemies. United Front operations include many activities such as participation in 'cultural exchange' programs designed to sway political opinions and recruit spies, the use of Government Organized Non-Government Organizations, and more traditional espionage operations. Fourth, China's political interference methods and influence policies are sensitive to election results and particularly sensitive to anti-China sentiment or Democratic Progressive Party electoral successes. Generally, it appears the CCP uses Taiwan's election results to adjust its Taiwan policy and target areas which more heavily support the DPP. Municipal and local election results in particular are used to anticipate general election outcomes and prepare accordingly. Fifth, Chinese interference methods tend to replicate domestic methods of control and recreate these power structures abroad, similar to how imperialists recreated their home government's structure in their colonies. This is due to China's more rigid top-down approach to foreign campaigns, ideological and political controls within the party, and the lack of experience with alternative methods of influence.

Sixth, there are several general indicators China is working with local Taiwanese actors for the purposes of influence. Indicators that Taiwanese citizens are working with the CCP include relationships with UFWD GONGOs, propaganda, indications of bribery, and material ties to China (travel, business, or family). This is a more general summary of specific indicators that are usually context or method-specific but provide a useful guideline for identifying possible sources of interference. Finally, the CCP's methods of election interference have grown more sophisticated as cross-strait interactions have increased. China has not moderated its approach in response to friendlier ties with Taiwan. Instead, it has consistently expanded its manipulation of Taiwan's domestic politics in response to greater opening. This does not mean China has not brought benefits, but even under its policy of 'economics first, politics second,' politics has remained the foremost consideration of the CCP.

The CCP's long term goals for its election interference activities is to annex Taiwan without firing a shot. Election interference has largely been about shifting attitudes in the general population and elites as a means to facilitate a 'soft takeover' of Taiwan. This type of influence requires increasing links between the two countries as a means to further this goal. Moreover, the CCP's election interference work puts them in a better position should Taiwan become internationally isolated and the U.S. abandon its commitments in Asia. The major problem is at the general level these appeals have largely failed because the CCP's system of government is not an attractive alternative model when compared to a robust democracy. This is exacerbated by intergenerational shifts in opinion. Moreover, because of the CCP's top-down approach, inflexible positions, and highly antagonistic relationship with the DPP, it has not been able to adapt to the political environment in Taiwan at the popular level. However, these failures may only lead to the adoption of more extreme tactics. Taiwan should be prepared to systemically combat this interference to preserve its democracy.

## Works Cited

### Books

- Blackwill, Robert D. and Jennifer M. Harris. *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Clive Hamilton. *Silent Invasion*. (Hardie Grant Books, 2019).
- Cole, Michael J. *Black Island: Two Years of Activism in Taiwan: Essays from the Front Lines*. (Lexington, KY: Books On Demand, 2014).
- He Qinglian [何清濂]. *Red Infiltration: The Truth of China's Global Media Expansion* \*[紅色滲透：中國媒體全球擴張的真相]. (New Taipei City: Gusapublishing [八旗文化/遠足文化事業股份有限公司]: 2019).
- Jonathan Manthorpe. *Claws of the Panda: Beijing's Campaign of Influence and Intimidation in Canada*. [Kindle Edition]. Cormorant Books, 2019.
- Ko-lin Chin. *Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan*. (New York: East Gate, 2003).
- Nicholas Eftimiades. *Chinese Intelligence Operations*. [Kindle Edition] Naval Institute Press, 2011.

### Book Chapters

- Ashok Deb, Luca Luceri, Adam Badawy, and Emilio Ferrara. "Perils and Challenges of Social Media and Election Manipulation Analysis: The 2018 US Midterms." In *Companion Proceedings of the 2019 World Wide Web Conference (WWW '19 Companion)*, May 13–17, 2019, San Francisco, CA, USA. <https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3308560.3316486>
- Chang Chinhua [張錦華]. "Methods of Resistance in the News Media [新聞傳播領域中的反作用力]." In *Anaconda in the Chandelier: Mechanisms of Influence and Resistance in the 'China Factor'* [吊燈裡的巨蟒：中國因素作用力與反作用力] eds. Wu Jieh-min, Cai Hong Zheng, and Zhengzubang [吳介民, 蔡宏政, 和鄭祖邦], (New Taipei City: Rive Gauche Publishing House [左岸文化], 2017).
- Dong Liwen [董立文]. "The Cross-strait Party-to-party exchange situation in 2017 and its future direction." In *2018 Yearbook on Chinese Communism. 中共年報 2018 (2017.1-2017.12)*. Eds. Yearbook on Chinese Communism editorial committee [中共年報編纂委員會], (Taipei, zhonggongyanjiuzazhishe [中共研究雜誌社], 2018).
- Gu Mingjun and Hong Yingfa [古明君和洪瑩發]. "The Benefits of Cross-Strait Mazu Belief [媽祖信仰的跨海峽利益]." In *Anaconda in the Chandelier: Mechanisms of Influence and Resistance in the 'China Factor'* [吊燈裡的巨蟒：中國因素作用力與反作用力] eds. Wu Jieh-min, Cai Hong Zheng, and Zhengzubang [吳介民, 蔡宏政, 和鄭祖邦], (New Taipei City, Rive Gauche Publishing House [左岸文化], 2017).
- Wu Jieh-min [吳介民], "Mechanisms of Influence and Resistance in the 'China Factor' [中國因素作用力與反作用力]." In *Anaconda in the Chandelier: Mechanisms of Influence and Resistance in the 'China Factor'* [吊燈裡的巨蟒：中國因素作用力與反作用力], eds. Wu Jieh-min, Cai Hong

Zheng, and Zheng Zubang [吳介民, 蔡宏政, 和鄭祖邦]. New Taipei City: Rive Gauche Publishing House [左岸文化], 2017.

Wu Jieh-min [吳介民]. "The 1992 Consensus': The Effectiveness of Chinese Influence in Elections ['九二共識: 中國因素的選舉效應']." In *East Asian Views of Culture, Democracy, and Cross-strait relations* [文化, 民主, 與兩岸關係的東亞觀點] eds. Ma Changyi [馬場毅], Huang Yingzhe [黃英哲], and Xie Zhenglun [謝政論], (Taipei: Songhui [松慧文化], 2012).

### *Journal Articles*

Corstange, Daniel and Nikolay Marinov. "Taking Sides in Other People's Elections: The Polarizing Effect of Foreign Intervention." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 56, No. 3, (July 2012): 655-670.

David Rushing Dewhurst, Christopher M. Danforth, and Peter Sheridan Dodds. "Noncooperative dynamics in election interference." *Physical Review*, 101 (2), February 2020.

Dotson, John. "Retired Taiwan Officer Exchanges Offer Insight into a Modern 'United Front'." *The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief*, Volume 11, Issue 19, (October 14, 2011). Accessed April 19, 2019. <https://jamestown.org/program/retired-taiwan-officer-exchanges-offer-insight-into-a-modern-united-front/>

Godinez, Jonathan J. "The Vested Interest Theory: Novel Methodology Examining US-Foreign Electoral Intervention." *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol.11, No.2, (Summer 2018): 1-31

Han Bing [韓冰]. "Taiwan's 'popular beliefs' and electoral politics intimate relations [台湾地区 '民间信仰' 与选举政治的亲关系]." *Reunification forum* [统一论坛], no. 4, (2019): 22-24.

Hsiao, Russel. "CCP Propaganda against Taiwan Enters the Social Age." *China Brief*, Vol. 18, Issue 7, (April 24, 2018). Accessed May 18, 2019. <https://jamestown.org/program/ccp-propaganda-against-taiwan-enters-the-social-age/>

Jens David Ohlin. "Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law?" *Cornell Law Faculty Publications*, No. 6, 2017, <https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2632&context=facpub>

Johannes Bubeck, Kai Jäger, Nikolay Marinov, Federico Nanni. "Why Do States Intervene in the Elections of Others? The Role of Incumbent-Opposition Divisions." *SSRN* (January 29, 2020).

Lee, Chun-Yi. "Will cheap flight tickets buy over Taishang hearts and minds?" *Ballots & Bullets*, School of International Relations, University of Nottingham, December 4, 2011. Accessed July 8, 2019. <http://nottspolitics.org/2011/12/04/will-cheap-flight-tickets-buy-over-Taishang-hearts-and-minds/>

Levin, Dov. H. "When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results." *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 60, (2016): 189-202.

Mattis, Peter. "China's Espionage Against Taiwan (Part II): Chinese Intelligence Collectors." *Jamestown Foundation: China Brief*, Volume 14, Issue 23, (December 5, 2014). Accessed April 16, 2019. <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-espionage-against-taiwan-part-ii-chinese-intelligence-collectors/>

- Monaco, Nicholas J. "Computational Propaganda in Taiwan: Where Digital Democracy Meets Automated Autocracy." *Computational Propaganda Research Project: Oxford University*, Working Paper No. 2017. Accessed May 18, 2019. <http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Taiwan-2.pdf>
- Paul Baines and Nigel Jones. "Influence and Interference in Foreign Elections." *The RUSI Journal*, 161:1, 12-19
- Schulman, Stephen and Stephen Bloom. "The legitimacy of foreign intervention in elections: the Ukrainian response." *Review of International Studies*, vol. 38, (April 2012): 445-471.
- Wang, Tai-Li. "Does Fake News Matter to Election Outcomes?: The Case Study of Taiwan's 2018 Local Elections." *Asian Journal for Public Opinion Research*, Vol.8, No. 2, (May 31, 2020): 67-104.
- Yu Qiang, Geng Shu, Chen xi and Li yang [于强，耿曙，陈曦，李扬]. "The Impacts of Economic Preferential Policies on Taiwanese Farmers: interests, identity, and voting behavior [惠台政策对台湾农渔业选民的影响研究：利益，认同与投票行为]." *Taiwan Studies [台湾研究]*, no. 2, (2016):16-25.
- Zhang Wensheng [张文生]. "A Dialectical Analysis of National Development and Reunification- With a View into the Process and Models of Reunification within the Next Three Decades [发展与统一的辩证思维-兼论未来三十年国家统一进程与模式]." *Cross-Taiwan Studies 台海研究* , No. 3, (2018): 34-38.

### News Articles

- "Apple Daily hacked – Beijing suspected." *Reporters Sans Frontiers*, June 22, 2014. Accessed April 20, 2020. <https://rsf.org/fr/node/26145>
- "Chinese hackers increase attacks on Taiwan opposition before January's presidential election: US security firm." *South China Morning Post* [Originally from Bloomberg], December 21, 2015. Accessed June 27, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1893663/chinese-hackers-increase-attacks-taiwan-opposition>
- "Cover Story: CCP United Front Eager to Help Elect Ma, Invites the Taiwan Lubeitong Townsman Association [封面故事 機要台灣旅北同鄉會 中共統戰部輔選救馬]." *Next Magazine [台灣壹週刊]*, December 8<sup>th</sup> 2011. Accessed September 24, 2019. <https://www.nextmag.com.tw/realtimenews/news/33870195>
- "Cover Story: Ma Yinan makes overtures to organized crime for votes, conducts secret meeting with the White Wolf [封面故事 向黑幫募款拉票 馬以南大陸密會白狼]." *Next Magazine [台灣壹週刊]*, February 26, 2008. Accessed September 20, 2019. <https://www.nextmag.com.tw/realtimenews/news/30299045>
- "Is Chinese money seeking to use Chang An-le as an intermediary? [中資找張安樂當人頭? 傳洽購東森林電視台]." *Liberty Times [自由時報]*, September 26, 2016. Accessed September 23, 2019. <https://m.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1837484>
- Chen Yaozong [陳耀宗]. "When did Taiwan get another DPP? Actually..... [台灣何時多了'中國民主進步黨'? 原來是----]." *Storm Media [風傳媒]*, August 11, 2015. Accessed August 23, 2019. <https://bit.ly/3eg96Uk>

- Chen Yiwei [陳毅偉]. "Communist Spy Network Star Fire T Project Discovered, Wang Ping-Tung's Father loses 600,000 NTD from the Taiwan Affairs Office [共諜網軍'星火T計畫'露餡 王炳忠父親搞丟國台辦60萬]." *Mirror Media* [明鏡], January 2, 2018. Accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.mirrormedia.mg/story/20180102inv014/>
- Cole, Michael J. "The Return of Gangster Politics." *The Diplomat*, February 26, 2014. Accessed April 1, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-return-of-gangster-politics-in-taiwan/>
- Cooper, Sam. "Is China influencing B.C.'s politicians? Court case, CSIS documents suggest pressure to suppress Falun Gong protests." *The Province*, September 14, 2014. Accessed August 15, 2019. <http://www.theprovince.com/life/china+influencing+politicians+court+case+csis+documents+suggest+pressure+suppress+falun+gong/10206216/story.html>
- Hille, Kathrin. "Taiwan primaries highlight fears over China's political influence." *Financial Times*, July 16, 2019. Accessed November 12, 2019. <https://www.ft.com/content/036b609a-a768-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04>
- Hioe, Brian. "DMG Entertainment Cooperating with the White Wolf to Acquire Eastern Broadcasting?" *New Bloom*, September 29, 2016. Accessed September 23, 2019. <https://newbloommag.net/2016/09/29/dmg-entertainment-white-wolf/>
- Hong Zhikun [洪智坤]. "Pingtan Island is more than unique! Why is Sean Chen asking to put the brakes on? [平潭島比特區還特! 陳沖大踩平潭煞車為哪樁?]." *The Journalist* [新新聞], March 21, 2012. Accessed November 13, 2019. <https://www.new7.com.tw/SNewsView.aspx?Key=%e5%b9%b3%e6%bd%ad&i=TX20120321150517M5X&p=2>
- Hsu, Chien-Jung. "China's Influence on Taiwan's Media." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 54, No. 3, (May/June 2014): 515-539.
- Kawase, Kenji. "Chinese subsidies for Foxconn and Want Want spark outcry in Taiwan." *Nikkei Asian Review*, April 30, 2019. Accessed June 7, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Chinese-subsidies-for-Foxconn-and-Want-Want-spark-outcry-in-Taiwan>
- Lee, Yimou and Faith Hung. "Special Report: How China's shadowy agency is working to absorb Taiwan." *Reuters*, November 27, 2014. Accessed April 5, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-special-report-idUSKCN0JB01T20141127>
- Lee, Yimou. "Some China tourists eager to see free-wheeling democracy in action in Taiwan." *Reuters*, January 12, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-election-tourists/some-china-tourists-eager-to-see-free-wheeling-democracy-in-action-in-taiwan-idUSKCN0UR0L520160113>
- Li Xinfang [李欣芳]. "Hacker Impersonates Tsai, Sends Phishing Email [駭客假冒小英激發釣魚信件]." *Liberty Times* [自由時報], June 9, 2011. Accessed September 23, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/507114>
- Li Xinfang, Li Yuxin, Peng Xianjun [李欣芳, 李宇欣, 和彭顯鈞]. "Organized Crime Enters Politics DPP: Related to Lo Fu-zhu [黑道入黨 民進黨: 與羅福助有關]." *Liberty Times* [自由時報], May 23, 2013. Accessed September 13, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/681777>

- Liao, Jimi. "Hackers enter the DPP, Research, Development and Evaluation Commission Denies Responsibility [駭客入侵民進黨 研考會撇清]." *Taiwan News* [台灣英文新聞], August 10, 2011. Accessed September 23, 2019. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/ch/news/1675934>
- Lin Xinhui [林修卉]. "Chinese Cyber Military, Hackers Invade, Central Election Commission Prepares for War [中國網軍, 駭客入侵 中選會備戰]." *China Times* [中國時報], January 5, 2008.
- Liu Tianbin [羅添斌]. "RCAF and PLA are both China's Military- Retired Military Officer can't Differentiate between Enemy and Ally [國軍共軍都是中國軍]." *Liberty Times* [自由時報], June 9, 2011. <https://web.archive.org/web/20111108222552/http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2011/new/jun/9/today-t1.htm>
- Mo Yan-chih. "Ma confirms sister met with gangster." *Taipei Times*, February 28, 2008. Accessed April 15, 2019. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/02/28/2003403193>
- Shi Xiaoguang [施曉光]. "Important Figures in the Orange Camp's Computers get Hacked [橘營要角電腦 傳遭駭客攻擊]." *Liberty Times* [自由時報], November 6, 2011. Accessed September 23, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/537171>
- Su Fanghe and Wang Wenxuan [蘇芳禾和王文萱]. "Chinese Taiwan Associations Helps Taishang with Return Tickets, Requests Votes for KMT [中國台協補助台商返台機票 要求投國民黨]." *Liberty Times*, October 28, 2014. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/825289>
- Tseng Wei-chen and Jake Chung. "PRC United Front officials 'pose security threat'." *Taipei Times*, June 1, 2014. Accessed April 19, 2019. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/06/01/2003591721>
- Wang Beilin. "Weekly Magazine Alleges Ma Yanan had secret meeting with the White Wolf for fundraising [週刊爆料馬以南赴中密會白浪募款]." *Liberty Times* [自由時報], February 28, 2008. Accessed April 15, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/192341>
- Wang Yuzhong [王寓中]. "Chinese Hackers Suspected of Attacking Blue Camp [藍營疑被中國網軍攻擊]." *Liberty Times* [自由時報], December 13, 2007. Accessed December 23, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/175081>
- Wang, Chris. "Chen Shui-bian to apply to be DPP member again." *Taipei Times*, May 23, 2013. Accessed September 13, 2019. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/05/23/2003562962>
- Yang Guowen and Li Keqiang [楊國文和李克強]. "China Hackers Continue to Attack Taiwan [中國'駭'群之馬 攻台接二連三]." *Liberty Times* [自由時報], November 10, 2007. Accessed September 30, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/167197>
- Zhang Jiawen [張嘉文]. "Deep Blue Banquet Host 150 Tables Chu-Hung Campaign for Votes and Call to Protect China [深藍辦躡席開 150 卓 朱洪拉票籲捍衛中華]." *CRNTT* [台灣中平網], December 5, 2015. Accessed August 24, 2019. <http://www.crntt.tw/doc/1040/3/1/4/104031472.html?coluid=93&kindid=15870&docid=104031472&mdate=1205005108>
- Zhong Lihua [鍾麗華]. "China's Ten Big United Front Targets, Taiwan 'Unification' work 10 Billion a year [中國鎖定十大目標 對台統戰 年砸百億]." *Liberty Times* [自由時報], January 15, 2018. Accessed May, 29, 2019. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1168821>

## Government Produced Materials

- “Huangpu Alumni Association Invites Taiwan Huangpu Organization Cadres Delegation to Jiangxi [黃埔同學會邀請臺灣黃埔組織骨幹參訪團赴江西].” The United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee Website-United Front Current Events, May 12, 2017. Accessed August 23, 2019. <http://www.zyztzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/S2012/201705/e3f18ba5a8d841bdb8c5ae11bbdc5ea1.shtml>
- Central Election Commission [中央選舉委員會], Republic of China. “2012 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election.” Accessed August 3, 2019. <https://www.cec.gov.tw/english/cms/pe/24834>
- Central Election Commission [中央選舉委員會], Taiwan. “2012 Legislator Election.” Accessed August 3, 2019. <https://www.cec.gov.tw/english/cms/le/24842>
- Communications Security Establishment Canada, Government of Canada. *Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process*. Modified: December 6, 2018. Accessed March 22, 2018. <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/sites/default/files/cse-cyber-threat-assessment-e.pdf>
- Editors Liu Xianchuan and Zhang Junming [劉先傳和張俊明]. Beijing’s United Front Work Handbook [北京統一戰線工作手冊]. Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press [中央編譯出版社], 2007.
- Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Republic of China. *A General Discussion of CPC Organizations that Deal with Taiwan: Second Edition [中共對台工作組織體系概論: 修訂二版]*. Editor Guo Ruihua [郭瑞華]. Taipei: Ministry of Justice, 2004.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States. *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations: 27 November 2012 Incorporating Change 1 20 November 2014*. 20 November, 2014. Accessed February 23, 2019. [https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3\\_13.pdf](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf)
- Legislative Yuan, Republic of China. 8<sup>th</sup> Legislative Yuan’s Sixth Session of the Judicial and Legal Committee’s 10<sup>th</sup> Committee Record [立法院第8屆第6會期司法及法制委員會第10次全體委員會議紀錄] from October 27-29, 2014.
- Porteous, Holly. “Commentary No. 72: Beijing’s united Front Strategy in Hong Kong.” *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, Winter, 1998. Accessed archived version in the Wayback Machine, August 15, 2019. <https://web.archive.org/web/20110927062452/http://www.csis-scrc.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm72-eng.asp#18>

## Master’s Theses

- Pu, Lin [普麟] (August 2018). *The Impact of China Factor [sic] and Authoritarian Diffusion on Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong and Taiwan: 2008-2015*. [中國因素與威權擴散: 中國對香港與台灣新聞自由之影響]. (Master’s Thesis) National Taiwan University, Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences, Taipei, Taiwan.

## Reports

- Anne-Marie Brady. “Magic Weapons: China’s political influence activities under Xi Jinping.” *Wilson Center* September 18, 2017

- Erik Brattberg and Tim Maurer. "Russian Election interference: Europe's Counter to Fake News and Cyber Attacks." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 23, 2018. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/23/russian-election-interference-europe-s-counter-to-fake-news-and-cyber-attacks-pub-76435>
- Fergus Hanson, Sarah O'Connor, Mali Walker, and Luke Courtois. "Hacking Democracies: Cataloguing cyber-enabled attacks on elections." Australia Strategic Policy Institute, 15 May 2019. Accessed August 16, 2019. <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/hacking-democracies>
- Kurlantzick, Joshua and Perry Link. "China: Resilient, Sophisticated Authoritarianism." in *Undermining Democracy: 21<sup>st</sup> Century Authoritarians*, June 2009.
- Larson, Eric V., Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Cathryn Quantic Thruston. "Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities." *Rand*, 2009. Accessed April 6, 2019.
- Mulvenon, James C., Murray Scot Tanner, Michael S. Chase, David Frelinger, David C. Gompert, Martin C. Libicki, and Kevin L. Pollpeter. "Chapter 5: Option Two: Subversion, Sabotage, and Information Operations." In *Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense*. *Rand*, 2006.
- Report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States. "Chinese Influence & American Interests." Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2018.
- Robinson, Linda, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva. "The Growing Need to Focus on Modern Political Warfare." *Rand*, 2019. Accessed April 7, 2019. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_briefs/RB10071.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10071.html)
- Schmitt, Gary and Michael Mazza. "Blinding the Enemy: CCP Interference in Taiwan's Democracy." *Global Taiwan Institute*, October 2019. <http://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/GTI-CCP-Interference-Taiwan-Democracy-Oct-2019-final.pdf>
- Stokes, Mark and Russell Hsiao. "The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: *Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics*." *Project 2049*, October 14, 2013, 4. Accessed June 5, 2019. <https://project2049.net/2013/10/14/the-peoples-liberation-army-general-political-department-political-warfare-with-chinese-characteristics/>
- Winters, Ryann. "Threat Research: The EPS Awakens." *FireEye Threat Intelligence*, December 20, 2015. Accessed June 27, 2019. <https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html>

## Websites

- "The Unification and Rejuvenation of the Chinese People' Seminar in Macau is Held [‘中華民族團結與復興’研討會在澳門舉辦]." China Council for Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification's Website, October 10, 2013. Accessed August 22, 2019. [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/201310/t20131011\\_5008510.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/201310/t20131011_5008510.html)
- "2011 Cross-strait Exchange Activity Record [2011 海峽兩岸交流互訪活動記事]." *Leisheng Magazine* [雷聲], August 2011. Accessed October 21, 2019. <http://www.wu5199.com/magazines/gal/mags/ma02/page/4>

- “2012 Guangzhou Taishang New Year Fellowship Meeting [2012 廣州台商迎新年聯誼會].” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 30, 2011. Accessed October 14, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230\\_2233658.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230_2233658.htm)
- “Alliance for the Reunification of China 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar receives a warm reception in Kaohsiung [「中國統一聯盟 2012 年大選說明會」在高雄受到熱烈迴響].” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, December 26, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019. <http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000339>
- “Alliance for the Reunification of China 2012 General Election Explanation Penultimate Seminar held in Lungtan [中國統一聯盟 2012 大選說明會] 壓軸在龍潭舉辦.” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, January 1, 2012. Accessed August 22, 2019. <http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000353>
- “Alliance for the Reunification of China Holding the 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar [中國統一聯盟舉行 2012 大選說明會].” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, November 22, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019. <http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000329>
- “China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Secretary and Taiwan’s Alliance for the Reunification working Delegation Meeting [中國同促會秘書處領導與台灣中國統一聯盟工作訪問團座談].” China Council for Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification’s Website, June 2, 2009. Accessed August 22, 2019. [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/201210/t20121011\\_3165449.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnyw/201210/t20121011_3165449.html)
- “Chinese People’s Unification and Rejuvenation Forum Held in Macau [中華民族團結與復興研討會在澳門舉辦].” China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, December 23, 2013. Accessed August 23, 2019. [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201306/201312/t20131226\\_5431641.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201306/201312/t20131226_5431641.html)
- “December 2011 to January 2012 Cross-Strait Major Events [2011 年 12 月-2012 年 1 月海峡两岸大事记].” China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, February 28, 2012. Accessed September 7, 2019. [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/2012ndyq/201210/t20121018\\_3196803.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/2012ndyq/201210/t20121018_3196803.html)
- “Historical Background [歷史沿革].” Commerce and Industry Unification Promotion Association Website. Accessed August 21, 2019. <http://www.adlpp.com/wu5199/zh/about.php>
- “If Taiwan is to improve, you must vote [臺灣要更好您的一票不能少].” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, October 24, 2014. Accessed October 13, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201011/t20101110\\_1596822.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201011/t20101110_1596822.htm)
- “Mainland Airline Companies Sales Representative Arrangement Situation Notice [大陸個航空公司銷售代理安排情況的通知].” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 16, 2015. Accessed October 13, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201512/t20151216\\_11260261.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/tzgg/gglb/201512/t20151216_11260261.htm)
- “National Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Second Routine Deputy Chief Meeting’s Fourth Session Opens in Beijing [全國台企聯第二屆常務副會長會第四次會議在京召開].” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 30, 2011. Accessed October 12, 2019. [http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230\\_2233657.htm](http://www.ggtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230_2233657.htm)

- “National Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Second Session of the Second Supervisory Meeting Opens in Shenyang, Liaoning [全國台企聯第二屆第二次理監事會在遼寧省瀋陽市召開].” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, November 4, 2010. Accessed October 12, 2019. [http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201011/t20101104\\_1589294.htm](http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201011/t20101104_1589294.htm)
- “November 26 Taozhu Guishan 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar report [11月26日桃竹分會龜山’2012大選說明會’報導].” Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, November 26, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019. <http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000333>
- “Public Announcement-December 5, 2015.” Association for Chinese Unity Website, December 5, 2015. [http://www.chinese-unity.org/news\\_423.php](http://www.chinese-unity.org/news_423.php)
- “Shanxi Province Huangpu Alumni Association Receives Taiwan Daoist Cultural Association Delegation [陝西省黃埔軍校同學會接待臺灣中華道教文化團體聯合總會參訪團].” Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, August 9, 2015. Accessed August 24, 2019. [http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201509/t20150901\\_10590529.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201509/t20150901_10590529.html)
- “Taiwan Nine in one Election Taishang Reinforcement Meeting Opens in Xiamen [臺灣九合一選舉台商後援總會座談會在廈門召開].” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, October 24, 2014. Accessed October 12, 2019. [http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201410/t20141024\\_7769989.htm](http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201410/t20141024_7769989.htm)
- “Taiwan Retired Military Officers and Famous Calligraphy Artists Delegation heads to Hebei to Observe and Study [臺灣退役將領暨書畫名家參訪團到河北參觀考察].” Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, August 15, 2014. Accessed August 24, 2019. [http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201408/t20140815\\_6987215.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201408/t20140815_6987215.html)
- “The Beijing Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland, Northern China Region Meeting Commences in Beijing [全國台企聯北京, 華北片區會議在北京召開].” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, November 4, 2010. Accessed October 12, 2019. [http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201512/t20151216\\_11259884.htm](http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201512/t20151216_11259884.htm)
- “Tianjin Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Receives Taipei Chinese Huangpu Four Seas Concentric Association Cultural Delegation [天津市黃埔軍校同學會接待臺北市中華黃埔四海同心會文化交流團].” Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, April 14, 2015. Accessed August 24, 2019. [http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201506/t20150603\\_9950088.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201506/t20150603_9950088.html)
- “Wang Yang to See Kao Chin Su-mei Delegation [汪洋会见高金素梅一行].” China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification Website, June 29, 2019. Accessed September 24, 2019. [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/xgxw/201906/t20190629\\_12178734.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/xgxw/201906/t20190629_12178734.html)
- “Xiamen ATIEM Branch 19<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Celebration [廈門台協舉行十九周年慶典活動].” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 22, 2011. Accessed October 14, 2019. [http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230\\_2233658.htm](http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111230_2233658.htm)
- “Xiamen Taishang Ma Ying-jeou, Wu Den-yih Support Banquet Held [廈門台商馬英九, 吳敦義後援會成立].” The Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland Website, December 19, 2011. [http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111219\\_2217806.htm](http://www.qgtql.com/gzdt/201112/t20111219_2217806.htm)
- “Yunnan Province Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Holds ‘A Recollection of the Yunnan-Myanmar War of Resistance, advancing national rejuvenation’ Conference [雲南省黃埔軍校同

- 學會舉行'追憶滇緬抗戰, 促進民族振興'座談會]." Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, July 19, 2016. Accessed August 24, 2019.  
[http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201607/t20160719\\_11513175.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/gddt/201607/t20160719_11513175.html)
- Chen Xiaolu [陈小炉]. "Moving Closer to Taiwan's Atayal People [走进台湾高山族的泰雅人部落]." China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification Website, June 12, 2008. Accessed September 24, 2019.  
[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/2008ndyq/201210/t20121018\\_3199540.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/2008ndyq/201210/t20121018_3199540.html)
- Dong Le [董乐]. "Taiwan New Party Leaders lead group to meet with Xi Jinping [臺灣新黨領袖率團訪問大陸將見習近平]." *BBC*, September 24, 2014. Accessed June 19, 2019.  
[https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/09/140924\\_taiwan\\_china\\_visit](https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/09/140924_taiwan_china_visit)
- Hu Zhusheng [胡築生]. "Taiwan Guangfu Holiday Speech [臺灣光復節感言]." Alumni Association of the Huangpu Military Academy Website, September 1, 2015. Accessed August 24, 2019.  
[http://www.huangpu.org.cn/hpzz/hpzz201505/201509/t20150909\\_10637539.html](http://www.huangpu.org.cn/hpzz/hpzz201505/201509/t20150909_10637539.html)
- Huangpu Four Seas Concentric Association Newsletter [黃埔會訊]*, No.27, January 2012.
- Leisheng Magazine [雷聲]*, December 2011. Accessed October 21, 2019.  
<http://www.wu5199.com/magazines/gal/mags/ma03/page/7>
- Lin Yaocheng [林耀呈]. "November 27 Taichung 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar report [11月27日台中分會'2012大選說明會'報導]. Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, November 27, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019.  
<http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000335>
- Liu Fei [劉菲]. "More than One Hundred Taipei Experts Discuss Cross-Strait Peaceful Reunification Progress [百余專家學者台北討論'兩岸和平統一進程']." China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, December 17, 2018. Accessed August 23, 2019.  
[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/xgxw/201812/t20181217\\_12122935.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/xgxw/201812/t20181217_12122935.html)
- Liu Shiyang [刘世洋]. "Taiwan Public Opinion Ambassadors in Cross-Strait Exchanges [两岸大交流中的台湾民意代表群像]." China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification Website, April 23, 2015. Accessed September 24, 2019.  
[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201502/201504/t20150420\\_9618844.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201502/201504/t20150420_9618844.html)
- Monte Bullard and Judy Norton. "PRC-Taiwan Relations: 1992 Consensus." *East Asia Peace and Security Initiative*, Accessed March 15, 2020. <https://www.eapasi.com/1992-consensus.html>
- Wu Yaming [吳亞明]. "Wang Yi: Cross-strait relations peaceful development is the work of comrades on both sides of the strait [王毅稱: 兩岸關係和平發展是兩岸同胞的共同事業]." China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, September 24, 2010. Accessed September 7, 2019.  
[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/stzl/37497/wxzl/wxzlk/gtbwx/201210/t20121018\\_3197120.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/stzl/37497/wxzl/wxzlk/gtbwx/201210/t20121018_3197120.html)
- Xiao Er and Dong Le [蕭爾和董乐]. "Xi Jinping Meets with Taiwanese Unification Faction, Reaffirms One Country Two Systems Policy [習近平晤台灣統派 重申一國兩制方針]." *BBC*, September 26, 2014. Accessed June 19, 2019.  
[https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2014/09/140925\\_china\\_taiwan\\_relations\\_xi](https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2014/09/140925_china_taiwan_relations_xi)

Yan Huiwen [顏耀文]. "November 20 Jianan 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar report [11 月 27 日台中分會'2012 大選說明會'報導]." Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, December 14, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019.  
<http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000332>

You Wanlian [游萬連]. "December 17 Huadong 2012 General Election Explanation Seminar record [12 月 17 日花東分會'2012 大選說明會'紀實]." Alliance for the Reunification of China Website, December 21, 2011. Accessed August 22, 2019.  
<http://www.onechina.org.tw/index.php?f=ViewArt&c=440120000336>

Zhang Yun [章蘊]. "Xi Jinping sees Taiwan's pro-unification groups' joint delegation [習近平會見和平統一團體聯合參訪團]," *Wenhuiwang* [文匯網], September 26, 2014. Accessed June 19, 2019. <http://news.wenweipo.com/2014/09/26/IN1409260023.htm>

Zong Ying [宗鷹]. "Alliance for China's Peaceful Reunification, USA Travels [全美中國和平統一促進會聯合會巡禮]." China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification Website, April 25, 2012. Accessed August 23, 2019.  
[http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtchxl/201211/t20121105\\_3348241.html](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtchxl/201211/t20121105_3348241.html)

