Final Report
Taiwan Fellowship 2021

Chinese Intellectuals in Cold War Hong Kong and Taiwan: From May Fourth to Exile and Localization

While intellectual historians of twentieth century China have explored many new sources in recent years, an issue that has not yet received the attention it merits is the position of intellectuals and the development of political ideas in the marginal spaces at the periphery of China. Hong Kong has long functioned as China's offshore public sphere, with a tradition of print capitalism and freedom of press dating back to the late 19th century, which made it an ideal base for political dissidents or revolutionaries. Taiwan also occasionally played this role, even as early as the late-Qing (when Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 briefly wrote for the Taiwan Daily News), and more famously with journals like *Free China* 自由中國 edited by Hu Shih 胡適, Lei Chen 雷震 and Yin Hai-Kwong 殷海光 in the 1950s, and the ephemeral China Democratic Party (Zhongguo minzhudang 中國民主黨). Of course, throughout the martial law era (1949-1987), such activities were severely hampered by the repressive censorship laws of the KMT regime. In addition to its free press, Hong Kong obviously had a closer geographical proximity to China; however, Taiwan also remained, to some extent, a rallying point of Chinese elite culture in the Cold War and as such never entirely lost its attraction for exiles who remained committed to Chinese nationalism. For this reason, intellectuals in both territories continued to refer to the model of the May Fourth intellectual throughout the Cold War period. However, at the same time, distinctive endogenous dynamics could also be observed in each territory, which contributed to redefining the status and role of intellectuals.

This working paper aims to propose a preliminary framework through which to revisit the status and role of intellectuals in Taiwan and Hong Kong, in a historical and comparative perspective, from the end of World War Two to the social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. It is based on an analytical review of secondary literature, as well as a selection of first-hand sources, mainly journals from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s published in Taiwan and Hong Kong. It should be pointed out that the selection of sources is to some extent “cherry-picked” and should not be understood as a representative sample of political stances or editorial ventures at the time, which will require a more systematic collection of sources.[1]

1. The May Fourth Paradigm in Question

In early twentieth-century China, the May Fourth and New Culture movements provided a model for a new social type: intellectuals. They inherited from the late-Qing literati a moral mission of responsibility toward society and the nation, while at the same time claiming an avant-garde position on the basis of their access to science and western knowledge. Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, they became increasingly politicized and were often criticized for their elitism and factionalism. Many sided with the Communist or Nationalist parties; a few collaborated with the Japanese occupation forces. During and after the Civil War, many intellectuals fled mainland China for Hong Kong, hoping to preserve the ideal of intellectual autonomy, which was under direct threat in the newly-founded People’s Republic of China.[2] Some remained on the mainland, where those who did not actively serve the regime entered “internal exile” like Shen Congwen. Others fled to Taiwan, hoping to preserve spaces of autonomy despite the repressive policies of the nationalist government. Nor was autonomy guaranteed in Hong Kong, where the colonial authorities sometimes censored the press and publications, generally discouraged political activities, and sometimes actively discriminated against Chinese society.[3] In both Taiwan and Hong Kong, in subsequent decades, the elite status and cultural nationalism of intellectuals were challenged by locally-inspired social movements that advocated different forms of democratization. These events gave rise to new articulations of their role and status.

A preliminary clarification is in order with respect to terminology. Before the 1911 Revolution, literati (*wenren* 文人) were usually referred to as “scholar-officials” (*shi dafu* 士大夫). Their status was defined by the existence of an imperial examination system, and their mission, though also political and epistemic, was mainly to provide moral guidance to the state and the community.[4] They were called upon to take responsibility for the affairs of the world (*yi tianxia wei ji ren* 以天下為己任), or to work for the public good (*wei gong ruhe* 為公如何), a notion which gradually came to be defined in connection with the nation or with society.[5] After the imperial examination system was abolished in 1905, followed by the imperial institution itself in 1912, the term *shi dafu* gradually gave way to two others. The first was "knowledge class" (*zhishi jieji* 知識階級), a translation of the Russian term *intelligentsia* via the Japanese (*chishiki kaikyu* 知識階級 and its cognate *chishiki jin* 知識人 or "intellectual," which did not fully make the transfer into Chinese although it is sometimes used today as a more neutral term).[6] Lu Xun mentions the influence of a talk given by the Russian writer Eroshenko in 1922, which was published in the *Chenbao* 晨報 under the title "The mission of the intelligentsia."[7] From the 1920s, *zhishi jieji* was replaced by the more politically correct notion (for a group of people overwhelmingly attracted to the orbit of communism) of "knowledgeable elements" (*zhishifenzi* 知識分子) that, rather than constituting a class of their own (inevitably bourgeois), could and should be dissolved within the working class.[8]

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[1] This working paper is based on research undertaken in the framework of the Taiwan Fellowship from March to August 2021 (some sources could unfortunately not be accessed due to pandemic related circumstances). I would like to thank Prof. Max Huang-Ko Wu for his insightful comments on my oral presentation of an earlier version.

[2] See Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, *The Great Exodus from China: Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Modern Taiwan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020 ; Chi-Kwan Mark, “The ‘Problem of People’: British Colonials, Cold War Powers, and the Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, 1949-62”. *Modern Asian Studies* 41:6 (2007), 1145-1181.

[3] Michael Ng, “When Silence Speaks: Press censorship and rule of law in British Hong Kong 1850s-1940s,” *Law and Literature* 29:3 (2017), 425-56.

In the PRC class system after 1949, *zhishifenzi* was defined as anyone with secondary schooling and who did not engage in manual work, encompassing many levels of clerks and office workers in state administrations. After Mao's death and the fall of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping in 1978 officially reinstated intellectuals as part of the working class, and the term *zhishifenzi* again referred more narrowly to college graduates, who were much in demand to take a leading role in carrying out the "four modernizations." As a consequence, the term remains the dominant one in the Chinese language today. Interestingly, despite the Cold War context, the somewhat left-leaning term *zhishifenzi* continued to be widely used in critical publications in Cold War Hong Kong and Taiwan.

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[4] Yü Ying-shih, "Zhongguo zhishifenzi de bianyuanhua" (The Marginalization of Chinese Intellectuals), *Ershiyi shiji*, vol. 6, August 1991, pp. 15-25..

[5] Timothy Cheek, *The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History*, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 5.

[6] Zhang Shenfu, "Zhishi jieji," *Meizhou pinglun* (The Weekly Review), no. 31, 15 July 1919.

[7] Lu Xun, "Guanyu zhishi jieji", 13 November 1927 in *Lu Xun Jiwaiji shiyi bubian*, *Lu Xun Quanji* (Beijing, Renmin Wenxue, 2005), vol. 8: 223 and note 3. Eroshenko's essay was published under the title "Zhishi jieji de shiming" in the supplement to the *Chenbao* on 6 and 7 March 1922.

[8] Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment. Intellectuals and the legacy of the May Fourth movement*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986; Eddy U, *Creating the Intellectual: Chinese Communism and the Rise of a Classification*, Oakland: University of California Press, 2019.

The two implicit definitions sketched out above—one predicated on a (traditional) moral mission, the other considering intellectuals as a (modern) social class—reproduce a dyad well known to scholars of intellectuals in different contexts. One the one hand, intellectual historians and philosophers are inclined to consider the "intellectual" as a normative concept (defined by the ability to conform to a certain culturally or historically prescribed role). In the Chinese context, modern intellectuals remain indebted to the model of the scholar-official, who generally advises the state, sometimes formulates a loyal remonstrance and in rare situations may choose to withdraw from society to express deep disagreement.[9] This model was carried over into the Republican context and later reappeared as Timothy Cheek's "Leninist scholar-official" illustrated by Chiang Kai-shek's close advisor Chen Bulei 陳布雷 (1890-1948) on the KMT side and by the party journalist Deng Tuo 鄧拓 (1912-1966) in the PRC (both of whom ultimately committed suicide).[10]

Social scientists on the other hand tend to emphasize the function of intellectuals as a social group in establishing relations of domination within any given society. Antonio Gramsci, for example, demystifies the "universal intellectuals" by pointing out that they are in fact "organic" to a class, articulating the interests of a certain social group by their distinct contribution to producing a hegemonic discourse.[11] Pierre Bourdieu, often quoted by scholars of the May Fourth movement, similarly noted that intellectuals are engaged in a strategic struggle for prestige in the form of symbolic capital.[12] György Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, studying the role of intellectuals in the socialist context of Cold War Hungary, pointed out that the planned economy had created the need for a new type of expert, giving birth to a group of "organic intellectuals" who represented a distinct class within the socialist state and saw its interests largely aligned with the regime.[13] In this sense there is always a need to go beyond the moral claims and investigate the actual relationship between intellectuals and dominant groups in society as well as the intellectuals' self-understanding or self-justification.

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[9] Frederic Wakeman, "The Price of Autonomy: Intellectuals in Ming and Ch'ing Politics." *Daedalus*, vol. 101, no. 2, 1972, pp. 35-70.

[10] Timothy Cheek, *The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History*.

[11] Antonio Gramsci, *The Gramsci Reader*, NYU Press, 2000, p. 303-306.

[12] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Intellectual Field: A World Apart" (1985) in *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1990, pp. 140-149.

[13] George Konrád and Ivan Szelényi, *Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, NY, Harcourt, 1979.

I have previously tried to envisage an alternative historical trajectory to the *shidafu* model, by investigating a small number of intellectuals, working neither for the state nor for the market, who have tried to justify their social status and role through the empirically-grounded investigation of concrete social situations (rather than through theoretical knowledge often acquired through foreign sources), and their positioning on the margins of society, together with dominated or disenfranchised groups.[14] This alternative existed at various points in time, whether among the late-Qing reforms in the "grassroots enlightenment" movement or among the groups who after May Fourth advocated "Going to the people" (*dao minjian qu* 到民間去), but it was generally drowned out by elite intellectuals and political parties. As Li Hsiao-t'i put it, the *minjian* ideal of 1919 was replaced by *minzhong* 民眾 (the masses) and eventually *renmin* 人民 (the people) under Party guidance.[15] Although the Cold-War intellectuals should not necessarily be described as *minjian*, the localization of intellectuals in Hong Kong and Taiwan also connects with the search for an alternative tradition grounded in empirical investigation and connected to disenfranchised groups within society.

2. The Early Post-War Period in Hong Kong and Taiwan

Hong Kong and Taiwan emerged as advanced posts of the "free world" in the Cold War, even as a limited civil war continued during the first decades within Hong Kong (clashes between KMT and CCP supporters) and arguably in Taiwan (persecution of "communists" in the White Terror). Both territories emerged from the war as depoliticized refugee societies, in which exiles had difficulty connecting with local culture, and both underwent cultural recolonization as the émigrés tried to preserve traditional Chinese culture far from its imagined "center" with a view to a future reestablishment or "return." Nonetheless, certain continuities in the role and status of intellectuals can be noted. Intellectuals in Taiwan tended to follow the patron-client model, by which critical groups or publications sought to place themselves under the protection of a political patron, in particular by expressing a form of loyalty to the regime. In Hong Kong, the situation was more complex, as intellectuals were more directly exposed to market forces in the "depoliticized" colonial environment.

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[14] Sebastian Veg, *Minjian: the Rise of China's Grassroots intellectuals*, Columbia UP, 2019.

[15] Li Hsiao-t'i, "Making a Name and a Culture for the Masses in Modern China," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, 9:1 (2001), 29–68.

Nonetheless, because of American and British cultural Cold War policies, a form of more indirect patronage also developed through certain publications funded indirectly by Cold War institutions like the Asia Foundation.

Hong Kong was a destination of choice for the so-called “Third Force” (*disan shili* 第三勢力) intellectuals.[16] Some were close to the KMT like Ku Meng-yu 顧孟餘, the subject of a recent authoritative study by Huang Ko-wu,[17] some of them from the smaller parties, like the China Youth Party or the Democratic League (Li Huang 李璜, Zuo Shunsheng 左舜生, Zhang Junmai 張君勱), some unaligned individuals like Cao Juren 曹聚仁 (1900-1972), who was more left-leaning, or the more conservative Neo-Confucian philosophers who set up New Asia College on 10 October 1949 in Kowloon. Shanghainese journalists and writers held particular prestige in the areas of publishing and the press, like Louis Cha 查良鏞 (Jin Yong, who co-founded *Mingpao* in 1959).

In the context of post-war Hong Kong, there was no possibility of maintaining the kind of relationship of patronage with politicians and parties that had sustained intellectuals with political inclinations in the 1930s. There were, however, opportunities to make a living either by teaching in one of Hong Kong’s many secondary schools or by taking advantage of the thriving market of print capitalism that sustained newspapers, periodicals and books, fiction or other types. Yü Ying-shih, who spent five years in Hong Kong as an undergraduate between 1950 and 1955, notes in his memoirs that “intellectuals” (*zhishiren*) enjoyed basic freedoms of opinion, press and association, of which they took advantage by writing for a significant number of journals like *Ziyou Zhenxian* 自由陣線 (Freedom Front weekly), *Dadao* 大道 (Ta Tao)*, Zhongguo zhisheng* 中國之聲 (China’s Voice), *Lianhe pinglun* 聯合評論 (United Voices, Taipei) or *Zaisheng* 再生 (National Renaissance). Yet in this apparently free environment, the availability of Cold War funding, whether from the CIA or other sources, also created the risk of turning intellectuals into the “organic” defenders of the social classes associated with the Cold War effort, through the anti-utopian ideology of “Cold War liberalism.”[18]

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[16] They are distinct from the *disanzhong liliang* during the War of Resistance and the *zhongjian dangpai* during the Civil War.

[17] Huang Ko-wu, “Gu Mengyu yu Xianggang disan shili de xingshuai” (Ku Meng-yu and the rise and fall of Hong Kong’s third force), *Ershiyi Shiji*, no. 163 (August 2017), p. 47-63. Huang Ko-wu, *Gu Mengyu de qinggao: Zhongguo jindaishi de lingyizhong keneng* (The dignity of Ku Meng-yu: an alternative possibility in China’s modern history), Hong Kong: CUHK Press, 2020.

[18] Anthony Arblaster, *The Rise and Fall of Western Liberalism*, Oxford UP, 1984, 317-331.

Nonetheless, many intellectuals were very critical of the colonial environment. A significant number of the so-called "south-coming literati" (*nanlai wenren* 南來文人, as they were ironically called in Hong Kong) had migrated to Hong Kong from other parts of China throughout the 1930s and during the War of Resistance and the Civil War. Many of them taught in schools registered under the ROC curriculum, which they found excessively conservative. At the same time, they resented the multiple discriminations against Chinese residents in the colonial system, including the hegemonic status of the English language, the limitations on residence and the more stringent censorship of the Chinese language press. For many of them, Hong Kong was best viewed in the perspective of the May Fourth critique of imperialism, and some described it as a "cultural desert," typically manifesting the elite and avant-garde mindset of their May Fourth predecessors.

To some extent, Hong Kong saw the continuation of the Civil War in the attenuated form of "Chinese politics on Hong Kong soil" (e.g. the Double Ten Riots in 1956), despite the efforts of the colonial authorities to suppress its manifestations. But Hong Kong also became a point of tension within the global Cold War, which led to heightened attention by the conflict's main actors to political and cultural activities in the territory. Furthermore, as Law Wing-sang has argued, the Cold War gave rise to a distinctive cultural and political imaginary of "diasporic nationalism" among local intellectuals, which became an element of HK identity.[19] It is generally understood that the founders of New Asia College, for example, showed little interest in local society, which was itself in great upheaval. When New Asia was merged into the newly established Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) in 1963, Tang Chün-i melancholically reminisced: "The educational goal of New Asia was originally to offer knowledge and learning to China. It is painful that what we hoped cannot be realized."[20] This is of course a kind of reiteration of the intellectuals' moral mission of taking responsibility for society and the nation, yet at the same time under the shadow of instrumentalization by Cold War politics.

As Law writes, anti-communism legitimized disengagement from the Hong Kong colonial reality, even as US involvement through the financial support of Union Press 友聯出版社 by the Asia Foundation (itself funded by the CIA) offered further opportunities for publishing and other cultural projects.[21] For example, the journal *Chinese Student Weekly* 中國學生週報, established in 1952 under the initial editorship of Yü Ying-shih, was funded with a view to producing a form of "information" generally favorable to the US positions and disseminating it in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.[22] However, *Chinese Student Weekly* also saw the gradual convergence between the elite concerns of the exiles and the younger generation of local students who took up the reference to the May Fourth and gave it their own meaning, picking up its anti-traditional and cosmopolitan strands. Margaret Ng, for example, published an early essay (aged only 15) in *Chinese Students Weekly*, in which she took exception to the idea that students at English-language schools were unpatriotic or had no appreciation for Chinese culture.[23]

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[19] Law Wing-Sang, *Collaborative colonial power: the making of the Hong Kong Chinese*. Hong Kong: HKU Press, 2009.

[20] Tang Chün-i, "Xinya de guoqu, xianzai yu jianglai" (The Past, Present and Future of New Asia College, 1973), in *Xinya Jiaoyu*, Hong Kong, 1981. Quoted in Law Wing-sang, *Collaborative colonial power*, p. 139.

Among the exiles, some developed an interest in Hong Kong, for example the politician Sun Baogang 孫寶剛 (1909-1990), recently studied by Kenneth Yung. Sun arrived to Hong Kong in 1949 as a member of the Social-Democratic Party and with US funding published the journal *Minzhu yu Ziyou* 民主與自由; in Hong Kong he gradually became implicated in the project of self-governance and full citizenship for Chinese residents of Hong Kong and set up the Hong Kong Social Democratic Party in 1964. After the Star Ferry protests of 1966, his Party submitted an investigation report calling for political reforms in Hong Kong.[24]

In Taiwan too, the continuity of the moral role of intellectuals combined with Cold War liberalism and diasporic nationalism dominated the intellectual pursuits of the émigrés. The famous fortnightly *Free China* established on 20 November 1949 by Lei Chen, Hu Shih and Yin Hai-Kwong embraced the cause of anti-communism and liberating the communist-dominated mainland, at the same time as it advocated freedom, democracy, and reforms in the ROC government. Later, the "Manifesto on Chinese Culture" (Zhongguo wenhua xuanyan 中國文化宣言) published on 1 January 1958 and signed by Hsu Fu-kuan 徐復觀 and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 in Taiwan, as well as

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[21] Fu Po-shek, "Wenhua lengzhan zai Xianggang: *Zhongguo xuesheng zhoubao* yu Yazhou Jijinhui" (The Cultural Cold War in Hong Kong: *Chinese Student Weekly* and the Asia Foundation), *Ershiyi shiji*, 173 (June 2019): 47-62 and 174 (August 2019): 67-82.

[22] Shen Shuang, "Empire of Information: The Asia Foundation's Network and Chinese-Language Cultural Production in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia," *American Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (2017): 589-610.

[23] Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee, "Women jiu bu neng aiguo ma?" (Are we therefore not patriotic?), *Chinese Students Weekly*, no. 590 (8 Nov 1963).

[24] Kenneth Yung, "Minzhu shehui zhuyi zai lengzhan Xianggang: cong lilun chanshu dao canyu bendi zhengzhi" (Democratic Socialism in Hong Kong during the Cold War Era: From Theoretical Exploration to Participation in Local Politics), *Journal of Chinese Studies* No. 67 (July 2018), pp. 229-251.

Tang Chün-I 唐君毅 in Hong Kong and Zhang Junmai in the United States, argued that the proto-democratic elements in Confucianism should be transformed into a modern constitutional democratic system. Lei Chen was expelled from the KMT in 1955 and in the second half of the 1950s, *Free China* published several articles challenging the KMT's monopoly on power, but also the possibility of retaking the mainland. The formation of the China Democratic Party and the publication in *Free China* of its "15 Demands" in April 1960, in connection with local elections, marked an early point of "localization" of the émigré intellectuals, who joined forces with local politicians and activists. In September, the journal was closed and Lei Chen arrested and convicted of sedition, and sentenced to 10 years prison. Yin Hai-Kwong was prohibited from teaching in 1966.

Apollo 文星, founded in 1957, carried on the flame of liberalism in the early 1960s and published a series of famous articles by Li Ao 李敖 praising Hu Shih and the May Fourth spirit, while criticizing the older generation, especially the Confucian philosophers, but to some extent the journal remained within the patronage model of the Republican literati.[25] Li Ao was warned and *Apollo* was shut down in 1965.[26] The journals *Apollo* and *Free China* stood for democratization as well as affirming their continuities with May Fourth thought, combining the traditional Chinese ideal of an intellectual contributing to social good with "Western" reforms and modernization. Nonetheless, subject to repression and censorship, young intellectuals in the 1960s generally felt powerless, ineffectual, and melancholic, feelings that were connected to a perception of being cut off from history and the nation.[27]

3. Social science and social movements

By the late 1960s and 1970s, the diasporic mindset came to be challenged by the post-war generation born in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Social movements and social science both played an important role in this shift. As suggested by Eyerman and Jamison, social movements can be considered as producers of ideas, theories and new forms of knowledge, rather than as transpositions of political theories into practice.[28] In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, after social movements shook society, social science developed a new analysis of society that called into question the elite position of intellectuals.

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[25] Huang Ko-wu, "Yiwei 'baoshou de ziyou zhuyizhe.' Hu Shi yu *Wenxing* zazhi" (A 'conservative liberal': Hu Shih and the journal *Apollo*) in *Hu Shi de duncuo. Ziyou yu weiquan chongzhuang xia de zhengzhi xuanze* (Hu Shih's Setback: Political choices under the clash between freedom and authoritarianism), New Taipei: Commercial Press, 2021, p. 201-238.

[26] Around the same time, in 1964, Peng Ming-min, a professor of political science at NTU and his 2 students secretly prepared a manifesto calling for a democratic constitution and Taiwan independence, but were arrested before it was issued. In 1966, local intellectuals founded the Association for Promoting nation-wide youth solidarity to reestablish multiparty democracy and seek independence, which was broken up.

[27] A-chin Hsiau. "A 'Generation in-Itself': The Authoritarian Rule, Exilic Mentality, and the Postwar Generation of Intellectuals in 1960s Taiwan,", *The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics and Culture*, 3:1 (2010), 1-31.

The Star Ferry protests of 4-7 April 1966, ostensibly against the price raise of the first-class ticket for crossing the harbor, were followed by arrests and curfew imposed by the colonial regime. The attention paid to the protests by *Undergrad* 學苑, the journal of the HKU Student Union (established in 1952) is often seen as a turning point at which intellectual elites began engaging with the social realities of Hong Kong. As noted in the émigré journal *Zhongguo minzhu luntan* 中國民主論壇 (Chinese Democrats Forum, published from 1965 to 1967 by Huang Yu-jen 黃宇人): "during the Kowloon disturbances [of 1966], the Student Union of the Hong Kong University had two extraordinary meetings and issued a declaration to express its regret and condemnation. In the *Sing Tao Daily* of 9 April, the views of the Student Union of New Asia College of the Chinese University were published in detail. … I do not wish to say whether I support the views of the two student unions, but their concern for Hong Kong politics, their beginning to discuss Hong Kong politics, is definitely a positive phenomenon. It is true that because the older generation have been used to working for the Crown and to being colonial subjects, they only know to defer to those above them, and not to act independently and decide from themselves. In this era of democracy, self-government for Hong Kong is only a matter of time."[29]

The protests were also discussed and analyzed in *Chinese Students Weekly*. On April 22, the journal published a short article titled "Advice to the Authorities": it begins by distinguishing between "demonstrations" (youxing) and "acts of violence" (baoxing), demanding that they be considered differently, while advising to exercise leniency when dealing with young people who have broken the law.[30] An amusing mock-editorial the following week announced that the price of the journal would be increased to compensate the editors for the additional cost of the Star Ferry price rise,[31] showing that perhaps not all contributors took the protests seriously, or alternatively that they were trying to question whether the price rise of the first-class ticket was really the main cause of social discontent. After the first results of the government inquiry became known, the journal published another article in its "academic forum" (*xuetan*) column, arguing that the price increase was only an opportunity to express a deeper resentment against mainstream society that was widely shared among youth and students, and had in no way receded after the troubles were tamped down. Ascribing it mainly to commodification and individualism leading to moral confusion, the essay calls on the political and economic establishment to look the causes squarely in the eye and take the opportunity to reform and diversify society.[32] In a journal that was funded partly by American money and situated within the orbit of the exiled intellectuals at CUHK, these essays mark a definite "local turn" toward increasing engagement with social questions like youth resentment and inequality, as illustrated by another article published in late June on "Hong Kong society and the problem youth."[33]

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[28] Ron Eyerman, Andrew Jamison, *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1991.

[29] Zhong Min, "Hong Kong's Undegraduates begin to talk politics", *Zhongguo minzhu luntan*, 2:8 (15 April 1966), quoted in Steve Tsang, ed. *A Documentary History of Hong Kong. Government and Politics*, HKUP, 1995, p. 250.

[30] Shao Ming, "Jiu Jiulong shijian xiang dangju jinyan" (Advice to the authorities about the Kowloon incident), *Chinese Students Weekly*, no. 718, 22 April 1966.

Whereas the 1967 riots could be seen as the last event of the civil war, the protests of 1966 were the harbinger of a Hong Kong-centered politics for a younger generation dissatisfied with the corruption and inequality of the colonial regime.[34] They sparked a wave of social movements dealing with local issues, such as the marriage law, corruption in schools and law-enforcement, and Chinese as an official language. Most importantly, they sparked a change in cultural identification, as illustrated in a letter from a young university graduate to the same journal: "The wealth, educational standard and social connections of individuals are mostly different, but the impossibility of returning to the mainland, unwillingness to go to Taiwan, and unsuitability to move overseas are the same for all. Since we all intend to continue to live in Hong Kong, we should change our attitude from being sojourners and visitors to considering ourselves the local people and to caring about the political affairs of Hong Kong and helping to reform them. This is the proper attitude when one faces reality."[35] It is particularly interesting to note that, just like later in Taiwan, the process of localization is seen as a process of "facing reality."

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[31] "Xiang dao jiajia shizhun weiyuanhui tonggao" (Notice from the Hong Kong Island Price Increase Approval Committee), *Chinese Students Weekly* no. 719, 29 April 1966.

[32] "Saodong sui ping, jiyin reng zai!" (Although the riots have been pacified, their causes are still there), *Xuetan* column, *Chinese Students Weekly* no. 725, 10 June 1966.

[33] "Xianggang shehui yu wenti qingnian" (Hong Kong Society and the Problem Youth), *Xuetan* column, *Chinese Students Weekly* no. 727, 24 June 1966.

[34] Lui Tai-lok, "Fleeing the nation, creating a local home, 1949-1983," in Gordon Mathews, Eric Kit-wai Ma, Tai-lok Lui, *Hong Kong, China. Learning to become a nation*, Routledge, 2008, p. 33.

In Taiwan, *The Intellectual* 大學雜誌 (1968-1987), a journal that brought together contributors of both Taiwanese and Mainland background, originally argued for the renewed relevance of the traditional role of the intellectual, as an extension of the patronage model previously adopted by *Free China* and *Apollo* . The first issue of *The Intellectual* contains a series of introductory editorial statements that are revealing in this respect. First, a short piece on the inside cover highlights the need to make complex knowledge more broadly available and understandable "in a way that university professors will find interesting and tricycle drivers will find enjoyable."[36] This not uncontroversial phrasing reaffirms the chasm between intellectuals and mainstream society, even as it sets out to bridge it. The chasm can be overcome thanks to the enjoyable dimension of knowledge, which the editors emphasize with reference to aesthetics: famous artworks are to adorn the covers of the journal and it is argued that the May Fourth dyad of democracy and science has regrettably entailed a lack of interest in beauty.[37] In the inaugural editorial that appears on the following page, the role of intellectuals is explicitly defined with reference to the traditional ideal: "no matter whether they are speaking or writing, intellectuals must at every moment consider the rise and fall of the cosmos [*yi tianxia xingwang wei nian* 以天下興亡為念], if they ever forget, they do not deserve to be called intellectuals." It further underscores the need for greater specialization for intellectuals in the era of industrialization, as well as the need to put forward constructive proposals and fair criticism.[38]

This is followed by another piece authored by the publishers (*benshe*) providing guidelines for prospective contributors, which calls for new ideas and openness of form, but also gestures toward the traditional ideal of intellectuals: "*The Intellectual* is a periodical that loves the nation *(ai guojia* 愛國家*)* and loves society *(ai shehui* 愛社會*)*;

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[35] Wu Kang-sheng, "Hong Kong people should care about political affairs of Hong Kong," *Zhongguo minzhu luntan* 2:11 (1 june 1966). Quoted in Steve Tsang, ed. *A Documentary History of Hong Kong. Government and Politics*, HKUP, 1995, p. 249.

[36] "Daxue Zazhi he ni" (*The Intellectual* and you), *The Intellectual* no. 1 (January 1968), unpaginated inside cover. The mention of tricyle dirvers (*sanlun chefu*) might be an allusion to the famous controversy around Lin Shu's mention of "soy milk cart-pullers" (*yin che mai jiang zhe*), in his critique of vernacular writing in 1919.

[37] Cai Yuanpei's emphasis on aesthetics may have also influenced this view, as Cai was clearly important to Chen Shaoting and perhaps other editors of the journal.

[38] "Rang women laizuo yige shiyan" (Allow us to conduct an experiment), *The Intellectual* no. 1 (Jan. 1968), p.1.

any speech that does not concord with the interests of the nation and society, has not the slightest hope of passing our editorial office. We offer this platform to provide intellectuals who have the most empathy, who are the most concerned with the well-being of the masses, with a free and autonomous space to publish their original views, not to be used as a tool to vent personal frustrations or stir up trouble."[39] If criticism is free and fair, the journal will not need to manufacture artificial controversies to attract the public's attention.

Finally, a longer programmatic piece by Chen Shaoting 陳少廷 (1932-2012), one of the journal's Taiwanese-born founders (and later briefly publisher), brings together the traditional model of Chinese intellectuals, the connection with May Fourth, and a desired relation of patronage with the nationalist regime. Chen references various formulations of the traditional responsibility of the literati, the tradition of *yan lun bao guo* 言論報國 (supporting the country through public speech), Fan Zhongyan's 范仲淹 vow to speak freely at the risk of death rather than living in silence, the notion of shouldering responsibilities first and enjoying benefits last (*xian tianxia zhi you* 先天下之憂). In fact, Chen argues that taking part in national affairs by exercising freedom of speech is not only a Chinese tradition, but also a modern citizen's right and responsibility. May Fourth is introduced through a reference to Cai Yuanpei's 蔡元培 explicit mention of the role of knowledge through study, but which remains tied in with a moral/patriotic agenda: : "patriotism should not omit seeking study and seeking study should not omit patriotism" (*aiguo bu wang qiuxue* 愛國不忘求學). Study is not simply for knowledge but to cultivate moral quality (*pinxing* 品性), of which patriotism is the highest expression. Hence, the new generation of students should strive for a new national psychology (*minzu xinli* 民族心理) to build the spiritual foundations of a modern China. A series of May Fourth liberal thinkers are referenced at the end of the article, which serve to establish an explicit connection with the ROC on Taiwan, including Sun Yat-sen 國父, Wu Zhihui 吳稚暉, Cai Yuanpei, Hu Shih, and Fu Ssu-nien 傅斯年. Chen also places the journal under the intellectual patronage of the KMT regime, which, he argues, has been struggling for enlightened liberalism and the Three Principles of the People.[40]

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[39] "Women de taidu he jianjie" (Our attitude and views), *The Intellectual* no. 1 (January 1968), p.2.

[40] In issue no. 11 (November 1968) there is a full page on the inside cover expressing wishes of longevity to Chiang Kai-shek on the occasion of his 80-sui birthday (he was born on 31 October 1887). This expression of loyalty is also a reiteration of the loyal stance taken by *Free China* in the 1950s towards the KMT government.

Noting that 18 years have passed since the motherland was lost, Chen underscores that during this time the "Communist regime" has destroyed the traditional ideal of morality through its political campaigns: first land reform and now the Cultural Revolution. For this reason, he expresses support for Chiang Kai-Shek's view that Chinese culture is based on the three pillars of morality, democracy and science.[41]

However, *The Intellectual* also advocated the need to end intellectuals' removal from reality and the broader population. Using the term "modern Chinese intellectuals" (*xiandai Zhongguo zhishifenzi* 現代中國知識份子), the editors articulated a critique of the traditional elite role, in particular by introducing the importance of social science. As early as issue 2, the journal published an article by the sociologist Ambrose King 金耀基, arguing that "Throughout the momentous changes that took place in China over the last century, one of the most significant is the fall and extinction of the *shidafu* and the appearance and generalization of new intellectuals. As a result of the mass-media revolution, growing specialization and professionalization, intellectual activities have spread far beyond the class of intellectuals in the narrow sense of academics, who no longer hold a monopoly over legitimate knowledge or collaboration with officials. His hope for establishing what he calls "new institutionalized intellectual estate" (in English) is that it can function as a truly autonomous social group and provide a counter-balance to state power (without being its opponent). Most importantly, these new intellectuals express their views on the basis of their "participation in society" rather than as a dominant class that monopolizes knowledge. "Because the new intellectual class is based on the precondition of democracy, the views of its members can be expressed with appropriate weight, but its members cannot decree that its views have more value than those of other groups in society." Their relationship to the state is based on the authority they derive from their knowledge and their position of professional integrity. Their duty is to advance modernization, not to preserve their position as the late-imperial literati did, to the detriment of the national interest. Their loyalty is to knowledge (*zhishi* 知識) and to their conscience (*liangxin* 良心).[42]

The Baodiao 保釣 Movement of the 1970s, an echo of global youth movements critical of American imperialism and the Vietnam War, sparked an anticolonial movement in

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[41] Chen Shaoting, "Zhe yidai Zhongguo zhishifenzi de zeren" (The Responsibility of this generation of intellectuals), *The Intellectual* no. 1 (January 1968), p. 4-5.

[42] Ambrose Yeo-chi King (Jin Yaoji), "Zhongguo xin zhishi jieceng de jianli yu shiming" (The establishment and mission of China's new intellectual class), *The Intellectual* no. 2 (February 1968), p. 2-3.

Hong Kong and played a significant role in Taiwan's "awakening" from exilic apathy.[43] In 1971, around the time of the dramatic sequence of events from the Baodiao protests in April to the ROC's exit from the UN in October, *The Intellectual* underwent internal reorganization. The new editorial team that took over in January published increasingly trenchant calls for social and political reforms. After 4000 students demonstrated at NTU and 2000 signed a petition with their blood in April 1971, the May 1971 issue was devoted almost entirely to the Baodiao issue, which provoked a police raid on the journal office. The July issue published the first installment of an in-depth study of "social forces" (*shehuili* 社會力) in Taiwan, which put into practice the calls for the importance of social science. In the October issue, Chen Shaoting called for a complete re-election of the central parliamentary organs by popular vote in the "free areas." In the November 1971 issue, the main editorial called to support the government in reforming Taiwan after the UN setback, and the journal published several other contributions on the subject, including a manifesto titled "This is the time for Awakening!" (*Zhe shi juexing de shihoule* 這是覺醒的時候了) calling to protect Taiwan and unify China. While the journal kept up the calls for political reforms in 1972, by 1973 the editors and other like-minded activists and contributors came under increasing pressure (Chen Guu-ying 陳鼓應 was dismissed in the NTU Philosophy Department incident) and the core group split between liberals (who went on to establish *The China Tribune* 中國論壇), left-wing activists (who founded *China Tide* 夏潮) and the group that targeted the electoral system and established *Taiwan Political Review*.

4. Nationalism and Anti-Colonial Thought

At the same time as the elite status of intellectuals was called into question by social science and social movements, the local political movements that developed both in Taiwan and in Hong Kong initially remained bound up with a broader Chinese nationalist discourse, within Taiwan's *dangwai* 黨外 movement in the 1970s and among Hong Kong's pro-democracy activists in the 1980s. It was only later (in Taiwan from the 1980s; in Hong Kong from the 1990s) that the growing sense of local identification within society, especially among the younger generations native to each territory, translated into political claims. This broader nationalist framing of the democratization discourse took place through two lenses: the critique of colonialism and the demand for democracy in the name of the Chinese nation.

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[43] A-chin Hsiau, "The Emergence of De-Exile Cultural Politics and the Postwar Generation in Taiwan", *Oriens Extremus*, 52 (2014), 173-214.

In Taiwan, the Japanese colonial period was initially banned from public memory after 1945, brought up mainly by the KMT government to stigmatize the local inhabitants of Taiwan who had been "enslaved" by colonialism. However, it underwent a form of re-narration in the 1970s when anti-colonial resistance was articulated as part of an anti-imperialist awakening that was presented as an echo of the May Fourth movement and a precursor of the Baodiao Movement of 1971.[44] For example, the *Taiwan Political Review* 台灣政論, a prominent *dangwai* journal that flourished briefly in 1975, extolled the anti-colonial resistance during the Japanese period at the same time as it advocated democratization in Taiwan (as part of China), calling to criticize the outdated constitution and end martial law. *Taiwan Political Review* published the translator's preface to the Taiwan edition of a Japanese collection documenting Taiwanese resistance movements and their repression by the authorities, originally compiled by the Japanese governor-general in 1939. The preface begins by discussing "social movements" (*shehui yundong* 社會運動) under Japanese rule and underscores that under the governor's pen, " 'Taiwan society' refers to the conscious and goal-oriented movement to resist and oppose Japan" in the areas of "politics, economy, society, thought and culture." It further notes that "during the fifty years and four months that Japan occupied Taiwan, the resistance movements did not cease for a single day." Characteristically, the early opponents of Japanese rule are described as "the many awakened/prescient Taiwanese [*Taiwan de xianjuezhe* 台灣的先覺者] who struggled for the survival and the future of Taiwan compatriots."[45] In this wording, anti-Japanese resistance is both affirmed and localized, at the same time as it is expressed with a word borrowed from the vocabulary of the May Fourth awakeners. The introduction concludes with an expression of regret that among the activists who demanded more humane rule, democracy and equality (*rendao tongzhi, minquan pingdeng* 人道統治、民權平等), some ended up joining forces with the communist left. The following issue contains an entire article dedicated to Chiang Wei-shui 蔣渭水, described as the father of "Taiwan's national liberation movement" and compared to Sun Yat-sen and Gandhi.[46]

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[44] A-chin Hsiau, "The Emergence of De-Exile Cultural Politics."

[45] Zheng Hong, "Taiwan kang Ri yundong" (Taiwan's anti-Japanese resistance movement), *Taiwan Political Review* no. 4 (November 1975), p. 48.

In Hong Kong, from an early date, the local Chinese elite was strongly implicated in a form of "collaborative colonialism" that was conceived as a model for the modernization of China as a whole.[47] For early elite intellectuals like Ho Kai 何啟 (1859-1914), it was possible to be both a proponent of British colonialism and a Chinese nationalist.[48] This trajectory led to critical views among some Hong Kong intellectuals of the May Fourth movement that lasted throughout the interwar period and into the 1950s and 1960s. While generally resistant to May Fourth ideas, early Hong Kong intellectuals often embraced colonial modernization in tandem with cultural nationalism and their elite/gentry role, whereas Taiwan had a stronger anticolonial movement as early as the 1920s and 1930s.[49]

The movement for Chinese as an official language was one of the early organized critiques of colonial governance in Hong Kong. While the left-wing journalist Lee Yee's 李怡 *The Seventies* 七十年代, a journal under the influence if not the direct orders of the underground united front operations in Hong Kong, rarely engaged with local politics (focusing mainly on the imperialism of the US and its Asian allies, and the need to reunify China), an article published at the end of 1970 was devoted to the Official Language movement. It describes its proponents as divided among three strands: those who advocate the legal status of Chinese on the basis of national (or anti-colonial) sentiment, those who support the idea but with reference only to universal human rights (in connection with the movement for legalization of sex workers), and finally those who emphasize the need to work pragmatically with the government and "focus on Hong Kong" (*xiang xin Xianggang* 向心香港). The author concludes that, although the nationalists may be sincere, they may be unaware that they are in fact preparing the way for the second group whose real aim is to advocate for Hong Kong independence, and possibly “create a third or fourth China.”[50] Despite these divisions, the goal of making Chinese an official language was achieved in 1974.

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[46] Fan Fu, "Gemingjia Jiang Weishui" (Revolutionary Chiang Wei-shui), *Taiwan Political Review* no. 5 (December 1975), p. 76-79. The author may be Huang Huang-Hsiung who one year later published a biography of Chiang Wei-shui, which also compares him to Sun Yat-sen. Huang Huang-Hsiung, *Taiwan de xianzhi xianjuezhe, Jiang Weishui xiansheng* (Taiwan's prophet and precursor, Mr Chiang Wei-shui), Taipei, 1976.

[47] Law Wing-Sang, *Collaborative colonial power*.

[48] John Carroll, "Nationalism and Identity: the case of Ho Kai," in *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong*, Harvard, 2005.

[49] Liao Ping-hui, 2006. "Print Culture and the Emergent Public Sphere in Colonial Taiwan 1895-1945," in Liao Ping-hui and David Der-wei Wang, eds., *Taiwan under Colonial Rule 1895-1945: History, Culture, Memory*, New York: Columbia UP, p.78-94.

In parallel, the Baodiao protests of 1971 also marked a turning point in expressing anti-colonial nationalism. The journal Panku 盤古, founded by a group of exiled nationalist intellectuals in 1967 (including Bao Cuoshi 包錯石 from Taiwan), did not begin as a pro-communist journal.[51] Very quickly, however, it put forward the trope of “return” (*huigui* 回歸) referring to a social and psychological process by which the situation of diasporic Chinese intellectuals could be solved through a new nationalist scholarship (*guoqing yanjiu* 國情研究) focused on the PRC. Refuting both the “democracy separatism” of the ROC under Chiang Kai-shek and the “nationalist separatism” of Taiwan independence, Bao Cuoshi theorized an existential return to Chineseness: “Life is simply a movement of return (*huigui*), into which every person inserts their nostalgia, their contributions, the human society to which they need to return. The joys and sorrows, separations and reunions in life are simply the foam on the waves of this return. … For us overseas Chinese (*haiwai de Zhongguoren* 海外的中國人), our belonging (*guishu* 歸屬) is simply this movement of return.”[52] Arguing that the PRC represents the most advanced synthesis of cultural belonging and modernity, Bao concludes his article with the call “Ah, you, Chinese person, at the time of the motherland’s distress, do not abandon her!”[53]

When the pro-China student movement began to fracture, the student unions and the journals they controlled were criticized for promoting abstractions like “the motherland”: the “social faction” (*shehuipai* 社會派) advocated a return to “reality” and to more concrete issues within society.[54] *Panku* by contrast remained staunchly within the “motherland faction” (*zuguopai* 祖國派) and became an increasingly pro-PRC publication; in 1972, it ran strident editorials attacking “rightist professors”, “stinking intellectuals", "imperialist running dogs, "intellectual compradors,"[55] before collapsing after the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976. The HKU student journal *Undergrad* also pursued an editorial line with strong sympathies for the PRC and the Cultural Revolution, yet at the same time, it advocated a new focus on the territory of Hong Kong.[56] As Leung Shuk-man argues, "national identification, as it turns out, was an incubator of a sense of local identity, resulting in the development of a twin sense of belonging to both the national and local communities united against colonialism in Hong Kong." She sums up this idea as "nation-building through city-building."[57]

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[50] Ng Kwok Wai, “Zhongwen fading yundong de lailong qumai” (The origins and development of the Chinese as official language movement), *The Seventies*, no. 10 (November 1970), p. 4-6.

[51] For example, in the first issue, an essay mentions the writers of the “three family village” (Deng Tuo, Wu Han and Liao Mosha, intellectuals critical of Mao who were attacked at the start of the Cultural Revolution) as outstanding examples of the Chinese intellectual tradition and the middle class that the CCP is trying to eradicate. Tang Xin Zhai [Chinese Heart Studio], “Fei Zhengqing yu Zhongguo wenhua lunzhan” (John Fairbank and the controversy on Chinese culture), *Panku*, no.1 (12 March 1967), p. 20.

[52] Bao Cuoshi (et al.), “Haiwai Zhongguoren de fenlie, huigui yu fandu” (Separatism, Return and Anti-independence among oversears Chinese,” *Panku*, 1968, p. 4

[53] Bao Cuoshi (et al.), “Haiwai Zhongguoren,” p. 16.

[54] Zhang Xian, “Dui wunianlai Xianggang xueyun de yixie yinxiang” (A few impressions of the Hong Kong student movement in the last five years), *The Seventies*, no. 62 (March 1975), p. 55.

In the 1980s, Hong Kong's fledgling democracy movement remained bound up with traditional ideals of regenerating the nation: "democratic reunification" (*minzhu huigui* 民主回歸), advocated among others by the group Meeting Point 匯點, was seen as an alternative to the undemocratic, though efficient and liberal, colonial system, but also as an opportunity to change China for the better. An article in *The Seventies* sets out the typical arguments associated with this position. After noting that talks are getting under way to deal with the "1997 problem" the author argues "the so-called question of Hong Kong future is, at the most fundamental level, a problem of Hong Kong reuniting (*fuhe* 複合) with China. The heart of this problem are the aspirations of 5 million Chinese people. If an absolute majority of Chinese people residing in Hong Kong accepted returning (*huigui*) to China, the so-called '1997 question' would simply not exist. In fact, raising the question of Hong Kong's future reflects the appearance of Hong Kong's local consciousness (*bendi yishi de taitou* 本地意識的抬頭)." In addition, the crisis of colonial governance is already apparent: "with the coming of age of a new generation and the rise in the level of knowledge, people began to pay attention to the personal rights they are entitled to. The contradiction between the consciousness of life in modern society and the backward political system of the colony is growing day by day, and the right to voice political opinions claimed broadly by the population is not a demand that the colonial consultative 'democracy' can satisfy. Hong Kong's future has thus precisely become a problem of people expressing their wishes." China in fact needs democracy as part of its "modernization," while its absence is the greatest obstacle to Hong Kong's successful return. Hong Kong too needs democracy as a way out of colonial rule. Therefore, the authors calls on all Hong Kong people to join the fight for democracy: " 'Everyone shares responsibility for the fate of the nation' (*guojia xingwang, pifu youze* 國家興亡，匹夫有責): as one of its members, we have a responsibility to advance political reforms in society, and make the motherland "love" every member of the people." In this sense, every "citizen" (*shimin* 市民) of Hong Kong has a responsibility to advance the cause of China's democratization.[58]

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[55] "Xiang ben Gang niugui sheshen yulun xuanzhan" (Declaration of War to all local Ox and Snake demon Opinions), *Panku* no; 44 (1972), p. 1-5.

[56] "Shelun: Yi zerengan daiti guishugan" (Editorial: Substituting responsibility for belonging), *Undergrad*, 6:3 (1968), p. 5. Quoted by Shuk Man Leung (see following note).

[57] Shuk Man Leung, "Imagining a national/local identity in the colony: the Cultural Revolution discourse in Hong Kong youth and student journals, 1966–1977," *Cultural Studies*, 34:2 (2020), p. 332.

That same year, the students unions of HKU and CUHK famously wrote to Premier Zhao Ziyang 趙紫陽, who sent reassuring replies to their queries about "Hong Kong's democratic self governance" (港人民主治港).[59] Hong Kong student unions also played an important role in organizing support demonstrations for the students in Tiananmen Square in 1989, which led to the foundation of the Alliance for Support to Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (known as "The Alliance" 支聯會) on 21 May 1989. The 1989 democracy movement in China therefore rallied the local democracy movement in Hong Kong under a "patriotic banner" and democracy in Hong Kong continued to be mostly envisioned as part of the larger national project of democratizing China.

5. Democratization, Elections and the Dynamics of Localization

Finally, elections played an important role in localization, in the sense that they provided a concrete indication of the boundaries of the political community. As opposed to Hong Kong, Taiwan experienced some limited forms of electoral participation under both Japanese and KMT rule. Democratization became associated early on with localization through the notions of "return to reality" (*huigui xianshi* 回歸現實), as opposed to the fiction of the Republic of China, and "return to native soil" (*huigui xiangtu* 回歸鄉土) in the 1970s, even as the ideal of the Chinese nation continued to hold sway among intellectuals. For this reason, it has been suggested that the early containment of Taiwan's democratization within a "China" framework was a strategic public transcript more than a substantive claim.[60] Huang Hsin-chieh 黃信介 and Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥

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[58] Chen Qin, "Xianggang de chulu shi minzhu huigui" (Hong Kong's way forward is democratic reunion), *The Seventies*, July 1982, pp. 77-78.

[59] Letters by the HKU Student Union and the CUHK Student Union to Premier Zhao Ziyang and his replies, in *Jibenfa mian mian guan* (The Basic Law from every angle), Hong Kong, 1984, p. 112-119.

[60] Wu Jieh-min, "Xiangtu wenxue lunzhan zhong de shehui xiangxiang. Wenhuajie gonggong lingyu zhi jiti rentong xingsu yu chongtu" The social imagination in the Roots Literature controversy. Components and

who were elected to local office respectively in 1969 and 1972, and were the first to refer to themselves as *dangwai*, later founded *Taiwan Political Review* in 1975, which by defining itself as a "platform for popular expression" (*minjian de fayan tai*)[61] made explicit the link between the localization of intellectuals within society and democratization. The fifth and last issue (December 1975) was devoted entirely to discussing the meaning of the competitive elections for the legislature, and effectively entailed the shutdown of the journal. Similarly, *Formosa* 美麗島 magazine, established in 1979 again by Huang Hsin-chieh, combined theoretical arguments in favor of democracy[62] with political activism and organization, establishing offices around Taiwan for the 1979 election campaign, which led to the Kaohsiung incident on 10 December 1979 (Human Rights Day) and the shutdown of the journal.[63]

In Hong Kong, by contrast, almost no elections were held through universal suffrage until the last decade of the colonial era (not least because PRC leaders threatened Britain from the 1950s onward to reclaim Hong Kong by force if the territory took any steps toward self-rule). The idea to democratize Hong Kong's governance was only put forward by the UK after Deng Xiaoping refused to compromise on the question of full Chinese sovereignty after 1997, after Margaret Thatcher had originally proposed exchanging a return of sovereignty to China against an extension of the UK's right to administrate the territory. The Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government 民主政制促進聯委會 was established to demand elections by universal suffrage in Hong Kong in 1986. It was only after the last governor Chris Patten accelerated the implementation of political reforms, leading to significant local elections in the 1990s, that the localization of intellectual debates was completed, with the establishment of the first full-fledged political parties in 1991. Alvin So has argued that the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s nurtured the rise of service professionals (educators, social workers), who engaged in community work in the 1980s and formed the backbone of the local democracy movement. Service professionals were initially supportive of the notion of "democratic reunification" with

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contradictions of collective identity in the public sphere of the cultural world), Lii Ding-tzann, ed., *Gonggong lingyu zai Taiwan: kunjing yu qiji* (The Public Sphere in Taiwan: difficulties and turning points), Taipei: Crown, 2004, p. 299-355..

[61] "Bianzhe de hua" (Editorial), *Taiwan Political Review*, no.1 (August 1975), p. 3.

[62] For example the Editorial "Minzhu wansui" (Long Live Democracy), *Formosa* no. 1 (16 August 1979), p. 4-9.

[63] On 1 June 1979, key members of the *dangwai* established *Formosa* magazine (Meilidao zazhi). The magazine established county offices around the island, which they called "service centers." The 4th issue of the journal reached 100,000 copies. The incident led to large-scale arrests, temporarily ending liberalization.

China in the early 1980s, at a time when corporate professionals were reticent. But the loyalties of the two groups were inverted after the 1989 democracy movement, when service professionals spearheaded the struggle to introduce democratic safeguards in the Basic Law while corporate professionals were increasingly won over by Beijing's promises of uninterrupted capitalism and prosperity.[64] The repression of the 1989 democracy movement was therefore also the point at which the democracy movement parted roads with the reunificationists.

In conclusion, as noted initially, this working paper mainly aims to raise some questions for further research on intellectuals in Hong Kong and Taiwan during the post-war and Cold War ear. By attempting to place this historical episode into the context of the history of intellectuals in the long 20th century, I have tried to highlight both continuities and displacements. In Hong Kong and Taiwan after 1949, intellectuals were confronted with undemocratic politics, (with a higher degree of coercion in Taiwan), which was not really new with respect to the earlier situation in China. The basic tension between the moral ideal of intellectual autonomy and the social reality of patronage and elite networks was therefore not immediately altered by the situation of exile.

However, intellectuals were confronted with new challenges from within local society that questioned their elite status, as part of socially dominant groups and networks, but also as representatives of central culture. These challenges, in the form of local elections and social movements, to some extent displaced and reduced the role of intellectuals, in a process of localization. On a theoretical level, they led to the rise of social science as a tool for intellectuals to engage more productively with society than through the traditional notion of responsibility. At the same time, the intellectuals' initial engagement with the budding democracy movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong continued to refer to earlier representations of the May Fourth movement, and the themes of anti-imperialism and anti-traditionalism. It was only when the democracy movement engaged with concrete issues in local society, and in particular with elections, that the national or nationalistic frame was subject to deeper questioning. In this sense, while the localization of intellectuals in Hong Kong and Taiwan represents an understudied chapter in the 20th century intellectual history, it can still fruitfully be considered in connection with earlier episodes in the complex modern history of Chinese intellectuals.

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[64] Alvin So, *Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy : A Societal Analysis*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

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臺灣獎助金
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