

臺灣對國家安全戰略概念應有的考量： 以美國和以色列經驗為例¹

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摘 要

本文概述協助臺灣發展、協調和傳遞國家安全戰略的考量因素。以美國及以色列為例，提供制定國家安全戰略概念的方法參考，目的是藉國家安全戰略內容討論臺灣如何以一獨立民主國家生存，並能為其人民提供民主、安全、健康和繁榮的環境。內文包含10個部分：(1)簡要文獻探討(2)發展臺灣國家安全戰略概念之必要性(3)美政府制定國家安全戰略官程序及適用臺灣的考量因素(4)檢視其他具有國家安全戰略的國家(5)中國共產黨及人民解放軍戰略(6)以色列國家安全概念及對臺適用性(7)風險管理(8)臺灣發展國家安全戰略需考量之因素(9)總結(10)建議。另探討臺灣制定國家安全戰略之利與弊，並藉重大國家利益來說明每個國家及美國政治部門之異同。研究的文獻來源使用部分解密的美國官方文件，透過詮釋國家安全戰略制定的目標與實踐方案，理解其如何支持國家利益。本研究並非著眼國家安全戰略發展的綜合分析，亦非試圖分析已發表的臺灣戰略文件；相反的，將置重點於考量因素及提供進一步研究的議題。文中亦穿插討論兩岸關係(中華民國—中華人民共和國)戰略意涵，最後以簡短建議總結，希冀提升臺灣國家安全之總體概念。

關鍵詞：以色列、國家安全戰略、臺灣、美國、至關重要利益

本文將概述精進臺灣制定、協調和傳遞國家安全戰略概念的考慮因素，並藉美國和以色列提供了國家制定國家安全戰略概念方式的案例。美國、英國、法國和俄羅斯都有官方的國家安全戰略(NSS)程序。本文將意指正式的官程序，例如，美國國會曾要求總統制訂國家安全戰略(NSS)，以及以色列政府自1948年成立以來採用的非正式概念作法，冀提供制定國家安全戰略概念的方法。目的是藉國家安全戰略文本來討論臺灣如何以一獨立民主國家存續，並能為其人民提供民主、安全、健康和繁榮的環境。此外，本文也參考兩岸關係(中華民國"ROC"、中華人民共和國"PRC")的戰略意涵。

壹、美國政府制定國家安全戰略的流程

1 限於篇幅僅刊登中譯文之摘要及重要論述，中譯全文請洽國防雜誌社索取。

在制定國家安全戰略時，總統、外交部、國防部、經濟部及內政部等各部會均依實需參與其中。² 通常，在嘗試策定國家安全戰略時，亦同步進行各項相關程序。其中一個過程是確立國家的各種利益，按重大、極重要、重要、次要或次級利益細分。³ 國家安全戰略另一部分是分析環境，來決定從環境到人類威脅有那些是挑戰國家重大利益的領域。最後，國家安全戰略為政府、各行業及人民提供前瞻性的願景，使其理解並共同努力保護重大利益、減輕威脅，並為實現一統的未來而努力。

然而，戰略文件除將政府國家戰略暴露給對手知道外，敵對國還可評估政府對其重大利益做出的承諾。儘管美國的戰略聲稱印太、歐洲和西半球等地區很重要，中國、北韓、伊朗、委內瑞拉和俄羅斯等國，亦會試探和評估美國在此區域的決心。

近期，美國在俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭期間對烏克蘭的支持，表明拜登政府將提供物資援助而不是軍事介入。美國的介入與不介入，都向對手、朋友和盟友提供有關美國在發生衝突時支持可能的方式與程度。美國對烏克蘭的支持，對中國、臺灣、南海、印度、越南、菲律賓和印太地區（以及世界其他地區）周圍的其他衝突地區都有影響。關於臺灣，值得一提的是在俄羅斯入侵之前，美國並無增加對烏克蘭的武器運輸。

如果中國人民解放軍對臺灣實施禁運、抵制或全面空中和海上封鎖外國飛機和船隻，美國可能會（通過與中國人民解放軍的核對抗）在兩岸衝突臺灣遭封鎖時提供軍事援助。⁴

拜登政府的印太戰略指出，美國早就認識到印太地區對其安全與繁榮至關重要。⁵ 印太戰略詳細闡述美國與其親密夥伴的重大利益，要求一個自由和開放的印太地區，在那裡各國政府可根據國際法規定的義務，作出自己身為的主權國家的選擇權利；在海上、空中和其他國際公域，是依國際法授權行為管轄。這一說法也反映在國家安全戰略暫行指導中，分析這份聲明中的美國和美國最親密夥伴的重大利益，指的是那些與美國結盟的國家，不包括非美國聯盟國家。目前，美國還沒有正式將臺灣列為親密戰略夥伴之一，此聲明中的美國重大利益也與歐洲和西半球一起反映在國家安全戰略暫行指導中。分析這份聲明中的用詞，美國的重大利益和我們最親密夥伴的重大利益，是指那些

2 臺灣，政府部門，https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/3866.php?qx_xCat=2（檢索日期：2022年4月5日）

3 格雷厄姆·埃裡森及羅伯特·布萊克威爾，《美國國家利益》，2000，<https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/amernatinter.pdf>（檢索日期：2022年4月4日）

4 帕特里克·塔克，2022年5月5日，戰略司令部負責人表示，中國可能會在2027年之前使用核武力來佔領臺灣，國防一號，<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/05/china-likely-use-nuclear-coercion-bid-take-taiwan-2027-stratcom-chief-says/366551/>（檢索日期：2022年5月9日）

5 《2022印太戰略》，第4頁（檢索日期：2022年4月5日）

與美國結盟的國家。本聲明不包括非美國聯盟成員的國家。目前，美國並未正式將臺灣確定為親密戰略夥伴之一。⁶

美國2022年印太戰略中，對臺灣政策無任何改變，聲明美國將支持臺灣自我防衛（美國將出售武器），但沒有承諾美國軍事干預解放軍與國軍的武裝衝突。與2014年俄羅斯入侵後美國向烏克蘭軍隊提供大量戰術訓練相比，自1979年以來美國從來沒有與臺灣軍隊進行公開的軍事演習。如果美國決定干預解放軍的入侵，軍事演習有助於增強臺灣防禦能力並創造有利條件。沒有聯合訓練的聯合作戰容易出現多種錯誤，在最壞的情況下，可能會導致友軍交火誤擊。與合作夥伴進行聯合訓練是必要的，以盡量減少此類錯誤，並以最大限度地有效利用聯戰武力。

印太戰略中未明確具名的美國重大利益，是保護臺灣免受中共的侵略，其加強威懾部分的宣稱：「美國將捍衛我們的利益，阻止對自己國家及盟國與夥伴——包括臺灣海峽兩岸——的軍事侵略，並通過發展新的能力、作戰概念、軍事活動、國防工業提議和更具彈性的部隊態勢來促進地區之安全。」⁷

貳、非正式途徑的以色列國家安全概念

以色列尚未正式發布過國家安全戰略。對於這一個與恐懼共存並無時不擔憂遭入侵或受到威脅的國家，可以理解其為何不發布完整的國家安全戰略。因此明智的類似作法是，臺灣也應不發布全面的國家安全戰略，除非有特定內容可幫助臺灣公民瞭解臺灣政府的意圖和計畫的部分內容（內容、時間、原因、地點和方式），並就關鍵問題上向盟友和對手傳達訊息。這些資訊可能對政治目的有用（例如整個政府的共同努力方向、教育和培訓人民、向盟友和對手傳達訊息、選舉等）。

以色列和臺灣有類似共同特點，同是民主國家，人口大多居住在海岸線的平原上、技術先進、面積和人口少，由於缺乏自然資源而被迫強調教育和人力資本的發展等；兩者都身處強悍鄰國，但通過在高科技和以科學為基礎的行業中表現出色而成為成功案例。⁸ 由於以色列沒有國家安全戰略，因此必須從以色列領導人的著作和引用中推斷出以色列的重大利益。以色列重大利益的一個方面是希望保持自由裁量權，採取行動保護其重大利益並阻止其他人威脅。從猶太和以色列歷史中發現，依靠他人保障自己的安全，會造成了災難性的後果。


6 《2022印太戰略》，第8頁（檢索日期：2022年4月5日）

7 《2022印太戰略》，第15頁（檢索日期：2022年4月5日）

8 索博爾，莫爾。2018.《以色列與臺灣的關係：建立運作方式的追求》。未發表的論文被Don Shapiro引用，《臺灣：沒有深厚根基的戰後猶太社區》，現代亞洲的猶太社區，劍橋大學出版社，〔即將出版〕2022。

參、風險評估和挑戰：威脅來源

一個國家具有保護其重大利益及國家戰略預期目標的責任，惟入侵者可阻止一個國家實現此目標。開發國家安全戰略的過程，一部分是進行風險評估，以確立可能降低實現預期目標的可行性的情境或挑戰。正如政府會花費資源（勞動力、資金、材料、時間等），來實現增強重大利益的目標一樣。還有其他因素可對抗此措施，例如延遲、否認、威懾、欺騙，甚至有時會藉破壞國力以保護其重大利益。



風險評估流程示意圖⁹

美國國家標準與技術研究院開發出民族國家可運用的風險評估模型，如上圖風險評估流程所示，流程第一步是準備評估、第二步識別威脅源。美國的風險評估指南為進行風險評估制定可靠的威脅分類法，最初是為確保訊息安全，另威脅分類也與國家安全戰略概念有關。

肆、建議事項和考慮因素

根據本文研究結果，筆者提供臺灣政府、軍隊、企業與民眾未來可以思考精進的五

⁹ 美國，《風險評估指南》，特別出版物800-30（修訂版1），2012年，<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-30r1.pdf>，第23頁（檢索日期：2022年4月20日）

項建議和三項考慮因素如下：

一、建議事項

(一)制定一份文件來闡述臺灣的重大利益，框定國家優先事項，而非一份全面性的國家安全戰略

極簡形式的國家安全戰略文件對臺灣更有利，主要由於提供細節反而限制決策者面對對手意外事件或意外選擇的彈性，並為國內政治反對派提供談論要點。對國家和重大利益的廣泛陳述有助於被大眾接受，並可灌輸和培養民族愛國主義。

(二)應考慮以色列自衛方式，增強民眾的自衛和民族主義觀念

臺灣應該尋求類似的精神，並歡迎各國提供支持，但不期望其他國家為自己防衛作戰而戰。最近有關臺灣人變得更加愛國的文章令人放心，但理想情況下，愛國行為應該更加系統化與有組織。

(三)增強國防與其他國力的對稱及不對稱能力，另增加來自國內和國際國防工業的相應的培訓，以阻止或延緩中共及解放軍發動攻擊。正如最近的一篇研究論文指出，臺灣不僅應該為入侵作準備，還應為在90%人口居住的城市環境中可能發生的持久戰作好準備。¹⁰ 增強對稱和非對稱能力的建議尤其重要，因為在與解放軍發生兩岸衝突期間，美國可能將被限制（通過與解放軍的核對抗）提供臺灣軍援。¹¹

(四)利用臺灣人才發展全面性人力培育與訓練計畫。像是阿圖達、普薩戈特、哈瓦扎洛及阿蒂迪姆等以色列人力資源國家安全計畫，臺灣應考慮制定適應自身國防和長期國家安全的人才計畫。朝著此方向邁出的一個簡單步驟是為臺灣安全組織人員建立一個閱讀清單，藉此在國家安全和領導力的等多項領域中積累知識和經驗。每個美國軍事部門的領導人都會為其部屬建立閱讀清單，至少應有兩本理解中共威脅的英文書在名單上，像是克里·格尚內克的政治作戰及媒體戰。

10 艾爾莎·卡尼亞和伊恩·伯恩斯·麥卡斯特林，《解放軍對城鎮戰的演變與展望：學習、訓練和對臺灣的影響》，戰爭研究所，2022/04，https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20PLA%20Outlook%20on%20Urban%20Warfare%20ISW%20April%202022_0.pdf（檢索日期：2022年5月7日）

11 帕特里克·塔克(Patrick Tucker)，《中國可能在2027年之前使用核武來佔領臺灣》，戰略司令部負責人說，國防一號，2022/05/05，<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/05/china-likely-use-nuclear-coercion-bid-take-taiwan-2027-stratcom-chief-says/366551/>（檢索日期：2022年5月9日）

(五)制定一種方法和手段，確保國家安全組織有效地運作。可通過初步調查國家安全組織如何運作，特別是學習、傳遞知識和適應環境來著手，以文獻來探討包括對此類有用的參考資料。

二、考慮因素

(一)最近，日本這個基於廣島和長崎的二戰經歷而對核武器感到恐懼的國家，正在討論是否應該要求美國於境內部署核武議題——類似德國與其他北約國，允許美國在其領土上儲存核武，並在受部署國和美國同意於戰爭中使用情況下使用核武。事實上瑞典和芬蘭已意識到處於核保護傘下的重要性，並要求加入北約。由於俄羅斯入侵一個無核武（以前擁有3,000枚核彈頭的核武）和非北約國家的烏克蘭，北約已將加速處理入北約程序。挑戰在於官僚的審批過程是冗長的，可能要到夏季之後的某個時候才會發生。於此同時，英國已同意自2022年5月11日起與瑞典和芬蘭達成共同安全協議（政治聲明）。然而，這些協議在作戰地區是否可直接對敵人採取軍事行動或提供核保護傘承諾方面則仍模糊，並且不是全面的安全協議。¹² 筆者曾撰寫過文章主張，¹³ 正如瑞典和芬蘭因俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭而競相加入核保護傘一樣，由於伊朗伊斯蘭共和國在建立核武儲備方面取得進展，無核國家武器而不是在核保護傘下將(1)爭相加入核聯盟(2)製造自己的核武，或(3)害怕。那些靠近侵略性威權政權的國家，如俄羅斯、中國、北韓和伊朗（即將）爭先恐後地加入聯盟或擁有自己的威懾能力。沙烏地阿拉伯、阿聯酋及伊朗附近的其它國家已經宣布，如果伊朗擁有核武器，他們將尋求核威懾。同樣的挑戰也適用於鄰近中國的那些國家，幾乎所有這些國家都簽署了無核武區條約。由於聯合國不將臺灣視為主權國家，臺灣尚未簽署無核武器區協議。然而，由於臺灣使用核能、1964年在維也納簽署國際原子能機構——中華民國——美國三邊保障協定，保障核材料的責任從美國轉移給國際原子能機構。¹⁴ 1998年與國際原子能機構的另一封信中，臺灣同意對核材料追蹤，採用更嚴格的標準。因此，國際原子能機構在臺灣對所有核材料和核設施實施保障措施，就好像它是《不擴散條約》無核武器締約國一樣，進行包括附加議定書核查活動在內的定期檢查。¹⁵

12 卡佳阿德勒，《英國同意與芬蘭和瑞典達成共同安全協議》，BBC新聞，2022/05/12，<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-61408700>（檢索日期：2022年5月12日）

13 格爾曼特斯·萊拉里，《核彈多米諾效應：核傘，自己製造炸彈，還是害怕？》，星期日衛報，2022/04/02，<https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/nuclear-bomb-domino-effect-nuclearumbrella-make-bomb-afraid>（檢索日期：2022年4月17日）

14 國際原子能機構，臺灣原子能委員會，2022年1月14日，<https://www.aec.gov.tw/english/Administration-Regulations/IAEA-84.html>（檢索日期：2022年5月8日）

就常理來說，臺灣應尋求成為核保護傘安全保障下的一員，以阻止中共命令解放軍入侵臺灣。不幸的是，由於中共對衝突多方面施加限制，特別是該地區的經濟和軍事力量，這種舉動及措施將充滿挑戰。特別是過去中共和解放軍都曾聲明，任何將臺灣置於核保護傘之下或讓臺灣擁有核武器的企圖都可能成為一個藉口，因為它阻礙中共與臺灣的統一（違反中共核心利益之一）。若臺灣、日本、韓國和其他盟國政府由於中共的核威脅而決定建立核武器能力，則有多種選擇可供考慮，例如印度和以色列據稱採用的隱密核威懾。若臺灣無法成為核保護傘的一部分，那麼臺灣應該尋求其他解決方案。

(二)臺灣近期沒有像以色列那樣面臨持續游擊戰和恐怖主義的挑戰。然而，游擊戰和恐怖主義卻可能成為臺灣的挑戰。根據馬里蘭大學維護全球恐怖主義數據庫表示，臺灣在1991至2000年（十年）遭受38次襲擊，造成33人死亡和65人受傷，而從2001至2019年（二十年期間）臺灣人遭受14次襲擊，造成22人受傷。¹⁶ 中共通過資助和培訓共產主義叛亂和恐怖組織繼續支持恐怖戰爭。中共還通過各種法律和強製手段在全球範圍內追捕反共人士。中共的陰險行動可能來自中共2005年通過的《反分裂法》¹⁷ 和2021年的法律，該法律將任何個人或實體因對臺灣有民主傾向而終身定罪；黑名單已經擬定。¹⁸ 一旦中共感到被啟用該法，中共尋找異議者或孤立當地人的威脅可能會成為對自由行動形成嚴重威脅。從實際對維族人的追捕和國際刑警組織的紅色通告作為一種法律工具的使用來看，這並不是一個牽強的想法。¹⁹

(三)美國2017國家安全戰略提供臺灣制定國家安全相關建議的最後說明

一個民主國家的韌性取決於人民。一個資訊流通、積極參與的公民社會是一個自由而富有彈性的國家基本要求。幾世代以來，我們的社會一直保護新聞、言

15 《臺灣的核電》，世界核協會，2021/2012年，<https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/nuclear-power-in-taiwan.aspx>（檢索日期：2022年5月8日）

16 全球恐怖主義數據庫，臺灣，https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=perpetrator&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&country=201&count=100（檢索日期：2022年5月16日）

17 田耀倫，2021/11/06，《中國以刑事責任威脅獨立支持者激怒臺灣》，路透社，<https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-it-will-hold-supporters-taiwans-independence-criminally-responsible-2021-11-05/>（檢索日期：2022年4月27日）

18 美國，《2017美國國家安全戰略》，白宮，2017年，<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>，頁14（檢索日期：2022年4月25日）

19 布拉德利渣甸和娜塔莉霍爾，《國際社會必須抵制中國濫用國際刑警組織》，《新聞周刊》，2021年11月19日，<https://www.newsweek.com/international-community-must-resist-chinas-abuse-interpol-opinion-1650890>（檢索日期：2022年4月27日）

論和思想自由。如今，俄羅斯等國家行為者正在利用資訊工具，試圖破壞民主政體的合法性。對手的目標是媒體、政治行程、金融網路和個人數據。美國公共和私營部門必須認識到這一點，並共同努力捍衛我們的生活。不允許任何外部威脅動搖我們對民主價值觀的共同承諾，破壞我們的政府體系，或分裂我們的國家。²⁰

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20 美國，《2017美國國家安全戰略》，白宮，2017年，<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>，第14頁（檢索日期：2022年4月25日）

National Security Strategy Concept Considerations for Taiwan: Two Case Studies

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Abstract

This paper outlines considerations to develop, coordinate, and transmit a national security strategy (NSS) for Taiwan. The US and Israel provide examples of ways nations develop national security strategy concepts. The intent is to inform a NSS discussion of how Taiwan can survive as an independent democratic country and be able to provide its citizens a democratic, safe, healthy, and prosperous environment. The paper encompasses the following ten sections: (1) a short literature review, (2) references to the need for a Taiwan National Security Strategy concept, (3) formal NSS process employed by the US government and some considerations that apply to Taiwan, (4) other countries with formal NSS processes, (5) the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) and People's Liberation Army's strategy, (6) the Israeli national security concept and its applicability to Taiwan, (7) a short review of risk management, (8) Taiwan's NSS considerations, (9) summary, and (10) recommendations and considerations. This article presents pros and cons for Taiwan of developing a formal national security strategy. Vital interests are discussed and used to illustrate similarities and differences between each country, as well as between American political administrations. By using a handful of declassified US documents, the author demonstrates how comprehensive NSS documents including clear objectives and actions intended to achieve objectives support national vital interests. The article is not a comprehensive analysis of developing national security strategies nor does it attempt to analyze published Taiwan's strategic documents; rather the article highlights issues for consideration and further research. The strategic implications of cross-strait relations (Republic of China - People's Republic of China) are interwoven into the discussion. The paper concludes with a short summary and recommendations and considerations to enhance Taiwan's national security concept. (280 of 300 words)

Keywords: Israel, national security strategy, Taiwan, United States, vital interest

This paper will outline considerations to develop, coordinate, and transmit a national security strategy concept for Taiwan. The US and Israel provide examples of ways nations develop national security strategy concepts. The US, UK, France, and Russia have formal National Security Strategy (NSS) processes, and each of their respective NSSs will be discussed.

This article will refer to the *formal* process, for example, as directed by the US Congress for the President to produce an NSS¹, as well as the *informal* concept that the Israeli government has employed since its inception in 1948. The intent is to inform the national security strategy discussion of how Taiwan can survive as an independent democratic country and be able to flourish as a society that can provide its citizens a democratic, safe, healthy, and prosperous environment. Additionally, the paper will reference the strategic implications of cross-strait relations (Republic of China (ROC) - People's Republic of China (PRC)).

The paper encompasses the following eight sections: (1) a short literature review, (2) references to the need for a Taiwan National Security Strategy concept, (3) formal NSS process employed by the US government and some considerations that apply to Taiwan, (4) other countries with formal NSS processes, (5) the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and People's Liberation Army strategy, (6) the Israeli national security concept and its applicability to Taiwan, (7) a short review of risk management, (8) Taiwan's NSS considerations, (9) summary, and (10) recommendations and considerations based on the research focused on cross-strait relations. The article is not a comprehensive analysis of developing national security strategies nor does it attempt to analyze published Taiwan's strategic documents; rather the article highlights issues for consideration and further research.

1 Short Review of the Literature

This article focuses on considerations Taiwan should deliberate concerning national security strategy concepts with reference to the American and Israeli frameworks.

In 2016, the U.S. Congress funded a research project, *Formulating National Security Strategy: Past Experience and Future Choices*, which summarizes the strategy formulation process. The project members were tasked to provide an independent appraisal of national security strategy formulation processes and include case studies and "factors that contributed to the development and execution of successful previous strategies" and highlight "best practices and organizational lessons learned" for the DOD.² The following summary of the research covers almost all major components of an NSS:

Strategies are shaped by the processes that produce them. If designed well, a strategy formulation process enables decisionmakers to evaluate the political, security, and budgetary environments, identify choices for an organization, weigh risks, opportunities,

1 United States, H.R. 3622 (99th): Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 1986/10/01, <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/99/hr3622/text> (Search Date: 2022/04/04)

2 United States, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, PUBLIC LAW 114-92, 2015/11/25, <https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/pub192/PLAW-114publ92.pdf>, p. 989 (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

and tradeoffs, and determine the best way forward. A strategy formulation process determines which issues will be raised for decision, how issues are elevated to senior levels, what options are presented, who participates in the decision making, and how the results are communicated both internally and externally.³

A key component not mentioned in the above national security summary is how organizations learn, adapt, and pass on knowledge, especially in national security organizations. Two books, *The Future of War Organizations as Weapons* (2005) and *Military Transformation Past and Present: Historical Lessons for the 21st Century* (2007) by Mark D. Mandeles provide a description of obstacles to organizational learning and adaptation and comparison of organizational designs for effective and adaptive operations.

Paul Lettow in his "U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned" published in the *Texas National Security Review* (Spring 2021) compiled a useful list of lessons supplementing earlier research.

The US Army War College publishes case studies and research on national security strategy processes. One example is Alan G. Stolberg's October 2012 *How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents* published as a Strategic Studies Institute Monograph for the US Army War College. This monograph examines how five countries developed and formulated national strategies including Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the US.⁴ The US Marine Corps has also developed some useful sources including the Marine Corps War College *Strategy Primer* (2021).⁵

In addition to these comparative studies, this article uses primary source documents from countries that have published relevant national-level strategic documents, including national security strategies and defense white papers. When possible, English translations of these documents are used. For example, the PLA has produced some strategy documents such as the *Science of Military Strategy* (most recent version 2020)⁶ and *Defense White Paper* (most recent

3 Mark F. Cancian and others: "Formulating National Security Strategy: Past Experience and Future Choices," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 2017/10/06, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/171006_CSIS_NationalSecurityStrategyFormulation_FINAL_0.pdf, p. ix (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

4 Alan G. Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents," Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, US Army War College, 2012/10, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2201.pdf>, p. x (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

5 United States, *Strategy Primer*, Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps University Press, 2021, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MCWAR%20Strategy%20Primer_web.pdf?ver=-h8PSZ2TTQNIwwL7Tp948A%3d%3d (Search Date: 2022/04/29)

edition 2019).⁷

Other sources amplify points made from the primary source documents. All sources available online are referenced with their respective links. A recommended list of references is provided at the end of the article to support future research.

2 Taiwan's National Security Strategy Concept

During President Chen Shui-bian's (DPP) second administration (2004-2008) published a 162-page *National Security Report*⁸ in 2006 which was a proposed national security strategy concept. The report detailed Taiwan's new security environment, discussed nine internal and external threats to national security, national security policy, and concluded by stating that the core value of Taiwan's national security lies in "protecting the country and the people", ensuring the overall strategic goal of sovereign dignity, survival and security, and prosperity and sustainable development of a democratic Taiwan. The main security threat identified by the report was the CCP's use of hard power (threatened to use force against Taiwan to achieve "unification") and soft power (economic United Front activities and Three Warfares offensive actions such as psychological, media and legal warfares). For example, under legal warfare, the report noted the CCP's use of so-called "Anti-Secession Law"⁹ enacted in 2005 to legally justify armed conflict against Taiwan and to direct the CCP's military and administrative departments to prepare to conduct "non-peaceful means" against Taiwan.

The report identified non-traditional security threats such as economic security, information security, homeland and environmental security, energy security, epidemic security, and community security. The report proposed nine strategies to meet the contemporary defense and security challenges.

Just before leaving office in 2008, the Chen Shui-bian administration updated the 2006 report with a 165-page *National Security Report* revision.¹⁰ The 2008 update expanded on the discussion of national security to include financial security, demographic security, national

6 People's Republic of China, *In their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy*, China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), Air University, <https://airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/29)

7 People's Republic of China, *In their Own Words: China's National Defense in the New Era*, China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), Air University, 2019, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2019-07%20PRC%20White%20Paper%20on%20National%20Defense%20in%20the%20New%20Era.pdf?ver=akpbGkO5ogbDPPbflQkb5A%3d%3d> (Search Date: 2022/04/29)

8 2006國家安全報告—大陸委員會(*National Security Report*), Mainland Affairs Council, 2006/05/20, <https://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/05271047271.pdf> (Search Date: 2022-06-11)

9 Anti-Secession Law, 2005/03/14, <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm> (Search Date: 2022/06/16)

identity (ethnic relations), homeland security (epidemic disasters, bioterrorism, and critical infrastructure), and cross straits relations. In the chapter discussing national security strategy, the report had the same nine strategies as the 2006 report to meet the contemporary defense and security challenges.

Although these two government documents were never declared to be official national security strategies, they did discuss Taiwan's (ROC) national security threats and strategies to mitigate the threats. These efforts demonstrate that when Taiwan's government desires to write an unclassified NSS, the historical references are available to modify and update as needed regardless of the documents' political affiliation.

Asia experts noted as early as 1999 that Taiwan did not have an NSS.¹¹ These three separate organizations subsequently recommended that Taiwan create an NSS:

- Project 2049's Mark Stokes, *The United States and Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait* (2016) noted that "development of a security strategy is complicated by divisions within society on Taiwan over the long-term relationship with authorities in Beijing."¹²
- A *Pacific Forum* conference held 31 August - 1 September 2021 published its discussion, "US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue: Dealing with Increased Chinese Aggressiveness", which consisted of a panel of 80 "scholars, experts, and former and current government officials (the latter in their private capacities) from the United States and Taiwan"¹³ and encouraged "the ROC to develop a National Security Strategy that better articulates the nature of the Chinese threat."¹⁴
- *Global Taiwan Institute's* John Dotson in a February 2022 article, "The Kuomintang Seeks to Reengage with Washington," discussed the Kuomintang [KMT]-DPP views and mentioned that "the KMT had created an 'International Affairs Working Group' (國際事務工作小組) tasked with formulating 'national security strategy guidelines' that would

10 2006國家安全報告（2008修訂版）（2006 *National Security Report (2008 Revision)*），國家安全會議，2008/03/01。

11 Michael D. Swaine, *Taiwan's National Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons Procurement Processes*, 1999, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA372530.pdf>, p. ix (Search Date: 2022-04-05)

12 Mark Stokes, *The United States and Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait*, Project 2049, 2016/02/11, https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/P2049_Stokes_Tsai_Alternate_Future_Policy_Options_In_The_Taiwan_Strait_020116.pdf (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

13 Ralph A. Cossa, Summary Report, Pacific Forum, 2021/10, <https://pacforum.org/publication/issues-insights-vol-21-cr-3-us-taiwan-deterrence-and-defense-dialogue-dealing-with-increased-chinese-aggressiveness>

14 Ralph A. Cossa, p. 5 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

be made available later in 2022." ¹⁵

The referenced KMT guidelines are likely related to the upcoming 26 November 2022 Taiwan local elections in which Taiwanese citizens will vote for nine categories of local officials and councilors. ¹⁶ The 2022 election may indicate trends for the 2024 national Presidential elections. The KMT opposition party appears to be working on its own NSS-like document with input and advice from its American supporters. The DPP likewise may be formulating one as well as to counter the KMT's guidelines, and this paper will enhance Taiwan's national security strategy guidelines dialogue.

3 Formal NSS process employed by the US government

When forming the NSS, all parts of the executive are involved, from the President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Economics, Ministry of Interior, and others as needed. ¹⁷

Usually, parallel processes are at work when trying to construct an NSS. One process is determining what are the various interests of the country, broken down by vital, extremely important, important, and less important or secondary interests. ¹⁸ Another part of the NSS is to analyze the environment and determine those areas that threaten the national vital interests from environmental to human threats. Finally, the NSS provides a path forward for the government, industry and for the people to understand and work together in protecting vital interests, mitigating threats, and the working on a unified future.

For the United States government, the NSS is mandated by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 and has been published usually annually since 1987, but not always: 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2015, and 2017. ¹⁹ The Biden administration probably will publish their NSS in 2022. The NSS represents each President's view of the world and how they plan to achieve their goals.

15 John Dotson, "The Kuomintang Seeks to Reengage with Washington," Global Taiwan Institute, 2022/02, <https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/02/vol-7-issue-4/> (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

16 Lai Yu-chen and William Yen, "Taiwan's 'nine-in-one elections' to be held Nov. 26", 2022/01/14, <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202201140016> (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

17 Republic of Taiwan, Government Agencies, https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/3866.php?xq_xCat=2 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

18 Graham T. Allison and Robert Blackwill, America's National Interests, 2000, <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/amernatinter.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/04)

19 Historical Office - Office of Secretary of Defense, National Security Strategy, <https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Security-Strategy/> (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

3.1 NSS Purpose

According to the GNA, the Congress levied the following requirements upon the President and his staff:

- (a)(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a 'national security strategy report').
- (2) The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.
- (b) Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:
 - (1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.
 - (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.
 - (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
 - (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
 - (5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.
- (c) Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in both a classified and an unclassified form."²⁰

Since the Department of Defense has a key role in the NSS, the Secretary of Defense is directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) to ensure "that strategic planning and contingency

²⁰ Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/dod_reforms/Goldwater-NicholsDoDReordAct1986.pdf, p. 1075 (Search Date: 2022/04/20)

planning are linked to, and derived from, national security strategy, policies, and objective"²¹ and "shall include in his annual report to Congress (A) a description of the major military missions and of the military force structure of the United States for the next fiscal year; (B) an explanation of the relationship of those military missions to that force structure; and (C) the justification for those military missions and that force structure."²² Consequently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) produces the following key documents:

- *National Military Strategy* (1992, 1995, 1997, 2011, 2015, 2018)²³ is the strategic framework for how the US armed forces will execute the overall policy goals expressed in the most recent National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
- *Quadrennial Defense Reviews* (QDR) (1997, 2001, 2006, 2010, 2014)²⁴ were mandated by Congress (Section 923 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1997 (Public Law 104-201). The law was amended in 2017 to replace the QDR with the National Defense Strategy (Section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 (Public Law 114-328)).
- *National Defense Strategy* (2005, 2008,²⁵ 2018,²⁶ 2022-currently in coordination²⁷) was to implement the DOD's tasks assigned by the NSS. Starting in 2018, the NDS only had highlights or a summary published. Most of the document was classified.

These reports are similar to Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense's Reports: Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) (2009, 2013, 2017, 2021) and National Defense Reports (2002, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2021).²⁸ The Legislative Yuan passed Article 31 of the

21 Goldwater-Nichols Act, p. 999 (Search Date: 2022/04/20)

22 Goldwater-Nichols Act, p. 1075 (Search Date: 2022/04/20)

23 United States, National Military Strategy, <https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Military-Strategy/> (Search Date: 2022/04/20)

24 United States, DOD Quadrennial Defense Reviews, <https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/Quadrennial-Defense-Review/> (Search Date: 2022/04/27)

25 United States, National Defense Strategy, 2005, 2008, <https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Defense-Strategy/> (Search Date: 2022/04/27)

26 United States, Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States--Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge, 2018, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/27)

27 United States, Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy, 28 March 2022, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF> (Search Date: 2022/04/27)

28 Republic of Taiwan, Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) Reports, <https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-ministry-of-national-defense-reports/> (Search Date: 2022/04/10)

National Defense Act of 17 July 2008 that mandates the MND to submit a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) within ten months of whenever a new president takes office. Additionally, Article 30 of the National Defense Act tasks the MND to publish a National Defense Report periodically and to inform the citizens of Taiwan about the MND activities. The National Defense Report is "to elaborate national goals, general international situations, military situations, defense policy, restructuring of the armed forces, combat readiness status, utilization of defense resources and the implementation of all-out defense."²⁹

3.2 Vital and Other Interests

Each US administration assesses United States' vital interests. In 2000, a panel of 23 senior American national security experts established the Commission on America's National Interests (CANI), conducted an exhaustive analysis of American security policy, and published *America's National Interests*-a 62-page evaluation of US interests.³⁰ The Commission proposed a four-point scale to rank US national interests: vital interests, extremely important interests, important interests, and less important or secondary interests. The 2021 Marine Corps' *Strategy Primer* uses a category of interests different than CANI: survival interests (survival of the nation), vital interests (political and territorial integrity), important or major interests (economic stability), and peripheral interests (enhance our way of life but are not strictly necessary for the success of a nation).³¹

We now turn to discussing the purpose of an NSS.

3.3 What is the purpose of an NSS?

In a recently published analysis of the history of the NSS, "during the Cold War, national security strategies often took the form of a classified written directive to executive branch departments and agencies as part of a systematic planning process involving senior White House national security officials and cabinet secretaries. These strategies focused primarily on competing with the Soviet Union and its allies."³² During the height of the Cold War, the US

29 Republic of Taiwan, Taiwan's National Defense Act, Article 30, 2012 (updated), <https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=F0010030> (Search Date: 2022/04/27)

30 Graham T. Allison and Robert Blackwill, *America's National Interests*, 2000, <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/amernatinter.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/06)

31 United States, *Strategy Primer*, Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps University Press, 2021, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MCWAR%20Strategy%20Primer_web.pdf?ver=-h8PSZ2TTQNIwwL7Tp948A%3d%3d, pp. 25-26 (Search Date: 2022/04/29)

32 Paul Lettow, "U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned", Texas National Security Review, *The Strategist* Volume 4, Issue 2 Spring 2021, p. 117-154, <https://tnsr.org/2021/04/u-s-national-security-strategy-lessons-learned/> (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

kept much of its national security strategy hidden from the USSR, its main adversary, and from the American public.

Towards the end of the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan published National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 238 on *Basic National Security Strategy*. The now declassified document (formerly TOP SECRET), NSDD-238 explicitly details the purpose of a national security strategy: "The primary objective of U.S. foreign and security policy is to protect the integrity of our democratic institutions and promote a peaceful global environment in which they can thrive."³³ More specifically, the document declares:

The national security policy of the United States shall serve the following broad purposes:

- To preserve the political identity, framework and institutions of the United States as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
- To protect the United States -- its national territory, citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad -- from military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack.
- To foster the economic well-being of the United States, in particular, by maintaining and strengthening the nation's industrial, agricultural and technological base and by ensuring access to foreign markets and resources.
- To foster an international order supportive of the vital interests of the United States by maintaining and strengthening constructive, cooperative relationships and alliances, and by encouraging and reinforcing wherever possible and practicable, freedom, the rule of law, economic development and national independence throughout the world.³⁴

The NSDD-238 19-page document states near the end the following cautionary statement regarding US allies prior to a long, redacted section:

In a conflict not involving the Soviet Union, the United States will rely primarily on indigenous forces to protect their own interests. Commitment of U.S. combat forces will be made only when other means are not considered viable. Such commitment is appropriate only if political objectives are established, our political will is clear, and appropriate military capabilities are available. If U.S. combat forces are committed, the United States will seek to limit the scope of the conflict, avoid involvement of the

33 United States, National Security Decision Directive Number 238 "Basic National Security Strategy", The White House, 1986/09/02, <https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-238.pdf>, p. 1 (Search Date: 2022/04/12)

34 United States, National Security Decision Directive Number 238, 1986/09/02, p. 1-2 (Search Date: 2022/04/12)

Soviet Union, and ensure that U.S. objectives are met as quickly as possible.³⁵

Although Russia has replaced the USSR and still maintains the ability for a second strike, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) People's Liberation Army (PLA) military forces should be added to the above framework. If so, then confronting the PLA in a cross straits military action will be more challenging over time as the PLA builds up its nuclear forces so that it will equal to or exceed the threat that Russia poses.

Following the end of the Cold War, succeeding American administrations released NSS documents for the public and contained a "far less rigorous and analytical process than those which had been pursued by Cold War presidents and more closely resembled an extended speechwriting exercise, disconnected from any prior or ongoing systematic planning."³⁶

President Trump and his national security staff returned to a systematic planning process by producing an unclassified 68-page 2017 NSS³⁷ and classified "internal directives on specific regions and functional topics" focused on "geopolitical threats posed by great-power rivals, especially China, and the need for a competitive U.S. strategy in response."³⁸ A prime example of this systematic planning method was the declassified (formerly Secret/NOFORN) "US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific",³⁹ a 10-page document which will be discussed in detail below.

The 2017 NSS referred to China/Chinese 36 times, and Russia 25 times.⁴⁰ The NSS lists the uniquely nefarious and insidious following efforts by China against the US and the rest of the world:

- Chinese fentanyl traffickers, along with drug cartels, feed the illicit opioid epidemic, which "kills tens of thousands of Americans each year."⁴¹
- China steals "U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars."⁴²

35 United States, National Security Decision Directive Number 238, 1986/09/02, p. 16 (Search Date: 2022/04/12)

36 Paul Lettow, p. 117-154 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

37 United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White House, 2017/12, <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2017.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

38 Paul Lettow, p. 117-154 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

39 United States, "US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific", 2021/01, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

40 Note: Taiwan is mentioned three times in the 2017 NSS, all in the same sentence: "We will maintain our strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with our 'One China' policy, including our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan's legitimate defense needs and deter coercion." p. 47.

41 United States, 2017/12, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS-USA 2017), p. 12 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

42 NSS-USA 2017, p. 21 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

- "China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor."⁴³
- "China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying."⁴⁴
- China rates "the loyalty of its citizens to the state and uses these ratings to determine" employment and access to public services.⁴⁵
- China uses "economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. China's "infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability."⁴⁶
- "China is gaining a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure."⁴⁷
- "Some Chinese practices undermine Africa's long-term development by corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and opaque debts and commitments."⁴⁸

China has exceeded the Soviet threat by its aggressive activities in all domains.

We return to the United States and its post-Cold War national security strategies starting with an analysis of one vital interest that the Clinton administration's 1999 NSS identified-outer space.

3.4 US Post-Cold War NSS

3.4.1 Clinton Administration's NSS - December 1999

In 1999, the Clinton Administration published a National Security Strategy featuring a

43 NSS-USA 2017, p. 25 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

44 NSS-USA 2017, p. 25 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

45 NSS-USA 2017, p. 35 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

46 NSS-USA 2017, p. 46 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

47 NSS-USA 2017, p. 47 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

48 NSS-USA 2017, p. 52 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

clear statement of vital interests:

"vital interests-those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, the economic well-being of our society, and the protection of our critical infrastructures - including energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems and emergency services - from paralyzing attack. We will do what we must to defend these interests, including, when necessary and appropriate, using our military might unilaterally and decisively."⁴⁹

The Clinton NSS added to the above vital interests unimpeded access to space:

"We are committed to maintaining U.S. leadership in space. Unimpeded access to and use of space is a vital national interest - essential for protecting U.S. national security, promoting our prosperity and ensuring our well-being. Consistent with our international obligations, we will deter threats to our interests in space, counter hostile efforts against U.S. access to and use of space, and maintain the ability to counter space systems and services that could be used for hostile purposes against our military forces, command and control systems, or other critical capabilities."

3.4.2 Space: A Vital Interest?

Actions in space by China (11 January 2007 anti-satellite test [ASAT] and other related tests) and Russia (15 November 2021 ASAT) have challenged the US ability to respond or counter the threat. China is developing a wide range of space weapons / counterspace technologies, including "direct-ascent kinetic kill vehicles (KKVs), co-orbital satellites designed to attack another satellite in orbit, directed-energy weapons such as lasers, electronic warfare weapons such as jammers, and computer network attack"⁵⁰ capabilities. China can use their offensive counterspace capabilities to deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, or destroy⁵¹ adversary space

49 United States, 1999/12, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, <https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/media/pdf/nssr-1299.pdf>, p. 1 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

50 Kevin Pollpeter, "China's Role in Making Outer Space More Congested, Contested, and Competitive", Air University's China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2021/09/27, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/CASI%20Articles/2021-09-27%20Congested%20Contested.pdf>, p. 6 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

51 United States, Air Force Doctrine Publication (FPD) 3-14 Counterspace Operations, 2021/01/25, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-14/3-14-D05-SPACE-Counterspace-Ops.pdf, p. 1 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

capabilities while defending their space capabilities.

The 2021 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) published by the US Intelligence Community highlights the threat of China's and Russia's⁵² counterspace capabilities. The ATA report describes China's counterspace threat as follows:

- Counterspace operations will be integral to potential military campaigns by the PLA, and China has counterspace weapons capabilities intended to target US and allied satellites.
- The PLA continues to train its military space elements and field new destructive and nondestructive ground- and space-based antisatellite (ASAT) weapons.
- China has already fielded ground-based ASAT missiles intended to destroy satellites in LEO and ground-based ASAT lasers probably intended to blind or damage sensitive space-based optical sensors on LEO satellites.⁵³

The 2022 ATA reports that China's space capabilities expand, regardless of the US administration in office:

"Beijing is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits that Washington has accrued from space leadership.

- China's space station began assembly and crewed missions in 2021, with full operational capability expected between 2022 and 2024. China also plans to conduct additional lunar exploration missions, and it intends to establish a robotic research station on the Moon and later, an intermittently crewed lunar base.
- The PLA will continue to integrate space services-such as satellite reconnaissance and positioning, navigation, and timing-and satellite communications into its weapons and command-and-control systems to erode the U.S. military's information advantage. Counterspace operations will be integral to potential military campaigns by the PLA, and China has counterspace weapons capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites.

The PLA is fielding new destructive and nondestructive ground- and space-based

52 United States, *Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 2021/04/09, <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf>, p. 11 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

53 United States, *Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, 2021/04/09, p. 8.

antisatellite (ASAT) weapons." ⁵⁴

The updated Defense Intelligence Agency report, *Challenges to Security in Space – 2022*, ⁵⁵ reports the same grim projections and provides more detail on Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean capabilities.

3.4.3 The Clinton administration identified space as a vital interest. Vital interests are difficult to protect when deterrence is ineffective. Deterrence is ineffective when international law has been violated without consequences.

3.5 Recent US Vital Interests

The next key post-Cold War document is the Trump administration's 2017 NSS. President Trump did not explicitly identify US vital interests in its 2017 NSS. National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien and Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger declassified the Trump Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy which they had helped to formulate. The formerly classified four vital interests were the center pieces to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, also referred to as enduring vital interests:

1. Protect the homeland, the American people, and the American way of life
2. Promote American prosperity
3. Preserve peace through strength
4. Advance American influence ⁵⁶

3.6 US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific

The declassified "US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific" (USFIP), is based on the 2017 NSS framework for China and addresses six topics: the national security challenge in the region, which includes China and North Korea; US vital interests; US interests in the Indo-Pacific; assumptions; desired end-states; and lines of effort (with objectives and actions that support the specific objectives). ⁵⁷ The NSS and USFIP organize discussion around four

54 United States, *Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, Director of National Intelligence, 2022/02, <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf>, p. 8 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

55 United States, *Challenges to Security in Space - 2022*, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2022/04/12, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Challenges_Security_Space_2022.pdf (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

56 United States, "US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific," p. 1 (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

pillars ("Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life"; "Promote American Prosperity"; "Preserve Peace through Strength"; and "Advance American Influence"). The Trump administration wrote the USFIP using Cold War national security strategy doctrine and sought to align US government components to achieve the same objectives (ends), using the tools (means), and actions (ways) to achieve the USFIP strategic desired end state.

3.7 Biden Administration

As of early May 2022, the Biden administration has not published an NSS, but they released the following strategic documents:

- Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) (March 2021),⁵⁸
- U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption (USSCC) (December 2021),⁵⁹
- Guidance For Implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33) on National Security Strategy for United States Government-Supported Research and Development (NSS-SRD) (January 2022),⁶⁰
- Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (IPS) (February 2022),⁶¹ and
- 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) (March 2022).⁶²

The first and last two documents on this list are most relevant to Taiwan and indicate the Biden administration's vital interests. The INSSG identified the following vital interests:

- (1) "Protect the security of the American people."
- (2) "Enduring interest in expanding economic prosperity and opportunity, but

57 United States, 2021/01, "US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific," (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

58 United States, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, The White House, 2021/03, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

59 United States, *U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption*, The White House, 2021/12, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/United-States-Strategy-on-Countering-Corruption.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

60 United States, *Guidance For Implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33) on National Security Strategy for United States Government-Supported Research and Development*, The White House, 2022/01, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/010422-NSPM-33-Implementation-Guidance.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/13)

61 United States, *Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States*, The White House, 2022/02, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

62 United States, *2022 National Defense Strategy Fact Sheet*, Department of Defense, 2022/03/28, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF> (Search Date: 2022/04/21)

we must redefine America's economic interests in terms of working families' livelihoods, rather than corporate profits or aggregate national wealth."

- (3) "Realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life."⁶³
- (4) "We will recognize that our vital national interests compel the deepest connection to the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere."⁶⁴

The INSSG, whether by ignorance or by intent, reveals to the CCP and others, issues in which the Biden administration has less interest. Adversaries could pursue their interests more vigorously in these areas of less interests (non-vital interests). The INSSG noted that: "our vital national interests compel the deepest connection to the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere" and "as we position ourselves to deter our adversaries and defend our interests, working alongside our partners, our presence will be most robust in the Indo-Pacific and Europe."⁶⁵

The document mentions Africa three times, but the document does not refer to Africa in the context of "vital national interests." This omission gives a de facto "green light" to China, Russia (and others) to pursue their interests and expect the US would not resist vigorously (the INSSG states the US will "support their [Africa's] economic and political independence in the face of undue foreign influence").⁶⁶ When the US government communicates its vital national interests to the world, adversary nations can act on this information.

In addition to exposing a government's strategy to its adversaries, the adversaries can also assess the government's commitment to its vital interests. Countries like China, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and Russia will test and evaluate the US resolve in regions such as the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere even though US strategy claims their importance.

Most recently, US support to Ukraine during Russia's invasion demonstrated that the Biden Administration will provide materiel aid, but not US forces. The US action and non-action provides information to adversaries, friends, and allies regarding the type and level of US support in the event of conflict. US support to Ukraine has implications for China, Taiwan, the South China Sea, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other conflict zones around the Indo-Pacific region (as well as the rest of the world). With respect to Taiwan, recall that the US did not increase arms shipments to Ukraine until Russia invaded.

63 United States, INSSG, 2021, p. 9 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

64 United States, INSSG, 2021, p. 10 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

65 United States, INSSG, 2021, p. 10 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

66 United States, INSSG, 2021, p. 11 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

Should the PLA initiate an embargo, boycott or a full air and sea blockade of Taiwan of foreign aircraft and vessels, the US may be deterred (by a nuclear confrontation with the PLA) from sending military aid to Taiwan during a cross straits conflict.⁶⁷

3.7.1 Biden's Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (IPS) (February 2022)

The Biden administration's IPS notes that the US "has long recognized the Indo-Pacific as *vital* to our security and prosperity."⁶⁸ The IPS elaborates that "our *vital interests* and those of our closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific, where governments can make their own sovereign choices, consistent with their obligations under international law; and where seas, skies, and other shared domains are lawfully governed."⁶⁹ This statement is also reflected in the INNSG along with Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Parsing the words in this statement, the US vital interests and those of our *closest partners*, refers to those countries with an alliance with the US. Countries not members of the US alliance are not included in this statement. At present, the US did not identify Taiwan officially as one of those close partners.

The IPS mentions Taiwan eight times, as one of several countries which the US seeks to strengthen its relations. The IPS mentions Taiwan in the context of the US key policy documents:

We will also work with partners inside and outside of the region to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, including by supporting Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, to ensure an environment in which Taiwan's future is determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best interests of Taiwan's people. As we do so, our approach remains consistent with our One China policy and our longstanding commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.⁷⁰

The 2022 IPS offers no change in the US Taiwan policy. The IPS states that the US will support Taiwan's self-defense (the US will sell weapons), but no pledge of US military intervention in a conflict between the PLA and the ROC armed forces. In contrast to extensive US tactical training provided to Ukrainian forces after the Russian 2014 invasion, the US has not and does not conduct overt military exercises with Taiwan's military since 1979. Such efforts

67 Patrick Tucker, 2022/05/05, "China Likely to Use 'Nuclear Coercion' in Bid to Take Taiwan by 2027, STRATCOM Chief Says," *Defense One*, <https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/05/china-likely-use-nuclear-coercion-bid-take-taiwan-2027-stratcom-chief-says/366551/> (Search Date: 2022/05/09)

68 IPS 2022, p. 4 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

69 IPS 2022, p. 8 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

70 IPS 2022, p. 13 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

would enhance Taiwan's defense capabilities and set favorable conditions if the US should decide to intervene against a PLA invasion. Combined operations without combined training are vulnerable to many types of errors. In the worst-case scenario, "friendly fire" fratricide could result. Combined training with partners is required to minimize such errors and to maximize the efficient and effective use of the combined military forces.

There was no mention in the IPS of a US vital interest to protect Taiwan from CCP aggression. The following statement in the *Reinforcing Deterrence* section of the IPS declares: "The United States will defend our interests, deter military aggression against our own country and our allies and partners-*including across the Taiwan Strait*-and promote regional security by developing new capabilities, concepts of operation, military activities, defense industrial initiatives, and a more resilient force posture."⁷¹

President Carter initiated the ambiguous US policy to defend Taiwan when he cancelled diplomatic relations with ROC in favor of the PRC, withdrew US forces, and did not renew the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan on 1 January 1979. This ambiguity to defend Taiwan may have been useful, for example, to dissuade Taiwan from initiating conflict with the PRC. Taiwan's governance changed after the first free election in 1996; flourishing Taiwanese democracy has undermined the continued justification for ambiguous defense of Taiwan. Former officials and diplomats-including Michael Pompeo (former US Secretary of State, John Bolton (former National Security Advisor and former US UN Ambassador), and Shinzo Abe (former Prime Minister of Japan)-have recommended a clear US declaration to defend Taiwan against CCP aggression.

3.7.2 National Defense Strategy (NDS) (March 2022)⁷²

The DOD announced that it had provided to Congress the classified version of the NDS on 28 March 2022 before the White House had published the unclassified NSS for the public. In defense of the release to Congress, the DOD announcement noted that the NDS was aligned with the INSSG; it uses the same "vital interests" in the INSSG to frame the NDS. As previously noted, the INSSG cites four vital interests:

- (1) "Protect the security of the American people."
- (2) "Enduring interest in expanding economic prosperity and opportunity, but we must redefine America's economic interests in terms of working families'

⁷¹ IPS 2022, p. 15 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

⁷² 2022 National Defense Strategy Fact Sheet, Department of Defense, 2022/03/28, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF> (Search Date: 2022/04/21)

livelihoods, rather than corporate profits or aggregate national wealth."

- (3) "Realizing and defending the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life."⁷³
- (4) "We will recognize that our vital national interests compel the deepest connection to the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere."⁷⁴

The NDS press release refers to the following three INSSG vital interests:

- (1) Protecting the American people (note omission of "security")
- (2) Expanding America's prosperity (note shorter statement)
- (3) Realizing and defending our democratic value⁷⁵ (shortened)

The NDS did not include the last reference to "vital national interests compel the deepest connection to the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere."⁷⁶ This reference may have been dropped due to sensitivities to other areas of the world not mentioned like Africa, the Middle East, Arctic and Antarctic regions. The NDS press release mentions four defense priorities including the Indo-Pacific and Russia priorities instead of referring to areas of vital interest (perhaps to get around this NSS-NDS vital interest quandary):

The Defense priorities are:

1. Defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC
2. Deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners
3. Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe
4. Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.⁷⁷

The end of the press release claims that DOD will achieve its goals "through three primary ways: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages."⁷⁸

73 INSSG 2021, p. 9 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

74 INSSG 2021, p. 10 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

75 *2022 National Defense Strategy Fact Sheet* (Search Date: 2022/04/21)

76 INSSG 2021, p. 10 (Search Date: 2022/04/05)

77 *2022 National Defense Strategy Fact Sheet* (Search Date: 2022/04/21)

78 *2022 National Defense Strategy Fact Sheet* (Search Date: 2022/04/21)

Some commentators on the NDS press release argue that campaigning and the integrated defense goals will permit a more efficient organization of military forces.⁷⁹ These commentators justify the lack of a major increase in defense spending by stating that the US will work more efficiently and effectively internally and with partners. This position is inconsistent with DoD's observation that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the "most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department." In 2022, the PRC is increasing its budget at a higher rate (7%) than the US (1.7%). Indeed, the US budget increase is effectively less than the inflation rate and does not take into consideration cost overruns on all the major weapon systems.

4 Which countries have publicly released their NSS?

Most permanent UN Security Council members publish some form of an unclassified NSS: US, Russia, UK, France. China is the exception. A short description of the French concept of national security will be presented next to identify a unique way that France determines vital interests.

4.1 France

France has a long tradition of writing strategic security documents. The French used a white book (*Livre Blanc*) in the first three iterations of their strategy published in 1959, 1972, and 1994. They expanded their concept with the "White Paper on Defense and National Security" (DNS) in 2008, with follow-on "Defense and National Security - Strategic Reviews" (DNSSR) in 2013, 2017, and 2021.

According to the 2017 DNSSR, France does not officially declare its vital interests. The President of the French Republic has discretion to determine vital interests and France's nuclear deterrence capabilities protect France's vital interests.⁸⁰ The 2017 DNSSR states:

The concept of 'interests' has primarily been addressed in the French doctrine in terms of vital interests, closely connected with nuclear deterrence. These vital interests have never been precisely defined, for it is ultimately the supreme responsibility of the President of the Republic to constantly assess threats in any circumstances, and to

79 Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, The Pentagon Must 'Campaign' Against China, Not Hope for a Goal-Line Stand", *Defense One*, 2022/04/10, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/04/pentagon-must-campaign-against-china-not-hope-goal-line-stand/365453/> (Search Date: 2022/04/21)

80 France, *Defence and National Security Strategic Review* (DNSSR), 2017, https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/rs_2017_eng.pdf?1655/e62af4457c8083874e86aad76a32408c5baf82f7, p. 6 (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

decide on appropriate responses on a case-by-case basis. The integrity of our territory and the protection of our population are central to our vital interests. Whatever the means used by the state adversary, we must preserve the life of our Nation. Furthermore, the definition of our vital interests cannot be restricted to the national scope, because France does not conceive its defence strategy in isolation, even in the nuclear field.⁸¹

We now examine the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Strategy.

5 CCP and the PLA Strategy

5.1 CCP Core Interests

The CCP uses "core interests" (核心利益) as the equivalent of vital interests.⁸² In 2002, the PLA Academy of Military Sciences published an essay regarding "Dialectics and the Study of Grand Strategy - A Chinese View" which stated that in "China we take economic development as the core at the present time. 'Core' means the strategic focal point at the highest level. In economic area we take agriculture, energy, transport, education, science, and technology as the focal points."⁸³ Jiang Zemin was the Chairman of the CCP from 1989-2002.

The CCP's core interests focus began to change during the rule of Hu Jintao (2002-2012). In July 2009, Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo provided a list of China's core interests: "for China, our concern is we must uphold our basic systems, our national security; and secondly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity; and thirdly, economic and social sustained development."

⁸⁴ In September 2011, a CCP white paper expanded and refined China's core interests: "China

81 France, DNSSR, 2017, p. 52 (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

82 Several sources discuss the evolution of the CCP use of core interests: J. Zhou, 2019/04/21. "China's Core Interests and Dilemma in Foreign Policy Practice," *Pacific Focus, Inha Journal of International Studies* Vol. 34, Issue 1, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/pafo.12131>, 31-54; J. Zeng, Y. Xiao and S. Breslin, "Securing China's Core Interests: The state of the debate in China," *International Affairs* 91(2) (2015), p. 245-266, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/66152/1/WRAP_revised%20core%20interests%20paper%20for%20intaff.pdf; Z. Feng, *What Are China's Core Interests?* (China-US focus, 2014), <https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/what-are-chinas-core-interests-2>; M. D. Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior. Part One: On 'Core Interests'," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 34 (2011), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM34MS_FINAL.pdf (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

83 Wu Chunqiu, "Dialectics and the Study of Grand Strategy- A Chinese View," Air University - China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2021/12/08, original Chinese document published by PLA's Academy of Military Sciences, 2002, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2021-12-09%20Dialectics%20and%20the%20Study%20of%20Grand%20Strategy-%20A%20Chinese%20Perspective.pdf?ver=6iCNZjxKfbGYulHZ7CpCaA%3d%3ds> (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

is firm in upholding its core interests which include the following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China's political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development."⁸⁵ In both cases, economic and social development are the least important on the list and Taiwan ("territorial integrity and national reunification") is more important than economic and social development. Many argue that the CCP would not invade Taiwan because of the economic turmoil that would result—clearly this is not based on the repeatedly stated prioritization of their core interests which is that "reunifying" Taiwan is more important than the CCP's economic interests.

5.1.1 CCP's Evolving and Expanding Core Interests

The top three core interest areas of state sovereignty, national security, and territorial integrity the CCP includes issues related to Taiwan, Tibet (including the Dalai Lama), Xinjiang,⁸⁶ and, most recently, Hong Kong.⁸⁷ References to the South China Sea (SCS), Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea, and Arunachal Pradesh have also been tied to these core interests.⁸⁸ Towards the end of former Chinese President Hu Jintao term in office, the South China Sea became more significant and following the nomination of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in late 2012, SCS became a core interest.⁸⁹ According to a Global Times article on 7 March 2021:

84 Caitlin Campbell, Ethan Meick, Kimberly Hsu, and Craig Murray, "China's 'Core Interests' and the East China Sea", U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, 2013/05/10, <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Core%20Interests%20and%20the%20East%20China%20Sea.pdf>, p. 3 (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

85 "China's Peaceful Development", Information Office of the State Council the People's Republic of China, 2011/09/29, <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgjed//eng/xgxw/t863432.htm> (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

86 Prakash Nanda, "China's Demand to Respect Its 'Core Interests' Is an Ugly Manifestation of Its Newly Acquired Power," *First Post*, 2017/05/21, <https://www.firstpost.com/world/chinese-demand-to-respect-its-core-interests-is-an-ugly-manifestation-of-its-newly-acquired-power-3345154.html> (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

87 Zhang Han, "Sovereign security 'untouchable' core interest, allows no concession: observers", *Global Times*, 2021/05/07, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217613.shtml> (Search Date: 2022/04/12)

88 Prakash Nanda, "China's Demand to Respect Its 'Core Interests' Is an Ugly Manifestation of Its Newly Acquired Power," *First Post*, 2017/05/21, <https://www.firstpost.com/world/chinese-demand-to-respect-its-core-interests-is-an-ugly-manifestation-of-its-newly-acquired-power-3345154.html> (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

89 Eyal Propper, "China's Core Interests and the Rising Tension with the United States: Implications for the World Order," *Institute for National Security Studies* (Israel), Policy Analysis, Volume 23, No .4, 2020/10, <https://strategicassessment.inss.org.il/en/articles/chinas-core-interests-and-the-rising-tension-with-the-united-states-implications-for-the-world-order/> (Search Date: 2022/04/12)

Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Sunday expressed China's firm stance on topics of sovereignty and security, including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang and the South China Sea, making the red line clear and sending an alarm to countries that have used China's core interests as leverage to jeopardize the nation's development, analysts said.⁹⁰

Economic interests are less important than sovereignty and territorial integrity. The CCP is willing to make economic sacrifices to gain sovereignty over Taiwan, South China Sea (SCS), Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea, and Arunachal Pradesh. CCP hostility to the Dalai Lama points to a core territorial interest related to the PRC's 1951 annexation of Tibet. The Xi regime's views Uighur accusations of genocide by the CCP as challenging the CCP's claim to Xinjiang / East Turkestan.

Some argue that the West would not risk sanctions against China of the sort applied by the anti-Russian coalition to Russia because China is more integrated into the world economy than is Russia. Sanctions would damage the PRC economy. Sanctions would also damage the global and many national economies. Yet the argument that economic factors deterring China from invading Taiwan is not valid; the core interests of sovereignty and territorial integrity are more important than the economy to CCP leaders. Moreover, Western regimes are reluctant to suffer negative economic consequences from loss of Chinese-made products.

The CCP's international engagement focuses on emphasizing their core interests and making other countries acknowledge them. President Obama acknowledged the CCP's core interests during his 2009 visit to China in the China-US Joint Statement which stated: "The two sides agreed that respecting each other's core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations."⁹¹ Citing references to respecting each other's core interests, the CCP is building a precedent of legitimacy of CCP's core interests in the international community. International precedent setting measures is a hallmark of legal warfare or lawfare that was declared by the CCP Central Committee and the CMC as an official policy in 2003, along with media warfare and psychological warfare as part of the Three Warfares.⁹² Additionally, by

90 Zhang Han, "Sovereign security 'untouchable' core interest, allows no concession: observers", *Global Times*, 2021/03/07, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217613.shtml> (Search Date: 2022/04/12)

91 "U.S.-China Joint Statement", 2009/11/17, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement> (Search Date: 2022/04/12)

92 United States, *Annual Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010*, Department of Defense, 2010, p. 26, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf (Search Date: 2022/04/12). Also found in Aaron Eitan Meyer and Guermantes Lailari, "Lawfare: An Emerging Threat to National Security," *American Strategy and Purpose: Reflections*

using the phrase "core interests", the CCP can modify and expand these interests while claiming that prior mutual agreements to "core interests" also cover these modified and expanded "core interests."

5.1.2 Norway Case Study

The CCP decided Norway violated its first two core interests when the Nobel Prize Committee (a non-governmental organization) awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 to the Dalai Lama and to Liu Xiaobo in 2010 for his "for his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China."⁹³ In 2010, the government of Norway agreed to apologize for the actions of a non-governmental organization. Norwegian-Sino relations were not fully restored until 19 December 2016, when Norway and China issued the joint "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on Normalization of Bilateral Relations" which re-emphasized the validity of the CCP's core interests: "The Norwegian Government reiterates its commitment to the one-China policy, fully respects China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, attaches high importance to China's core interests and major concerns, will not support actions that undermine them, and will do its best to avoid any future damage to the bilateral relations."⁹⁴ These three CCP core interests have been repeatedly used as the reference points for those countries, government officials, companies, groups, and individuals that deviate from the CCP's key interest areas. The CCP forces those violating CCP's core interests to recant their past misbehavior before economic relations are reestablished. In the case of Norway, the CCP paused full diplomatic and economic trade relations for six years.

5.2 CCP Military Power

The military power aspect of the US-PRC balance of power is changing in significant ways. First, the PLA Navy (PLAN) has more surface combatant ships today than the US Navy and the difference will continue to favor the PLAN for the near future:

The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) has concluded that China has the largest navy in the world-by the end of 2020, it had an estimated 360 battle force ships, compared

on Foreign Policy and National Security in an Era of Change, William Natter (ed): Council for Emerging National Security Affairs (CENSA), 2014.

93 "Liu Xiaobo," <https://www.hrw.org/tag/liu-xiaobo> (Search Date: 2022/04/12)

94 People's Republic of China, "Full Text: Statement of China and Norway on normalization of bilateral relations", https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/cn_eu/2016-12/19/content_27714255.htm and also at https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/statement_kina.pdf (Search Date: 2022/04/12)

with 297 for the United States. ONI projects that China will have 400 battle force ships by 2025 and 425 by 2030. More worrisome for U.S. planners: Chinese warships are increasingly capable, reducing the quality gap that is the traditional wellspring of U.S. confidence as it contemplates emerging adversaries.⁹⁵

The PLA has become a modern military and has conducted military operations and exercises beyond its borders:

- Mediterranean Sea: during the 2011 Libyan civil war, conducted non-combatant evacuation operation of 36,000 Chinese nationals,⁹⁶
- Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden: since 2008 conducted counter-piracy operations,⁹⁷
- Yemen: In 2015, evacuated six hundred Chinese nationals,
- Djibouti: in 2017, established a military base in Djibouti⁹⁸ (and pursuing other military bases around the world in parallel with the CCP's Belt and Road Initiative),
- Russia: Between 2003 and 2021, conducted more than thirty joint military exercises with the Russians⁹⁹, and other exercises with Iranians, Pakistanis, Saudis,¹⁰⁰ and South Africans,¹⁰¹
- UN peacekeeping operations: through 2018, 38,000 Chinese soldiers have participated in twenty-four different operations,¹⁰²
- Miscellaneous exercises: "thirty-six disaster relief operations, twenty-eight joint exercises, and thirty-four joint training sessions abroad,"¹⁰³ and
- NATO: in 2010, the PLA Air Force participated in the Anatolian Eagle exercise.¹⁰⁴

95 Alexander Wooley, "Float, Move, and Fight: How the U.S. Navy lost the shipbuilding race," *Foreign Policy*, 2021/10/10, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/10/us-navy-shipbuilding-sea-power-failure-decline-competition-china/> (Search Date: 2022/04/22)

96 Andrea Ghiselli, *Protecting China's Interests Overseas: Securitization and Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, 2021, p. 59.

97 Andrea Ghiselli, p. 5.

98 Andrea Ghiselli, p. 1.

99 Alec Blivas, "Sino-Russian Military Exercises Signal a Growing Alliance," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 2021/06, <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/june/sino-russian-military-exercises-signal-growing-alliance> (Search Date: 2022/04/16)

100 Joris Teer, Tim Sweijts, Paul van Hooft, Lotje Boswinkel, Juliëtte Eijkelkamp, Jack Thompson, *China's Military Rise and the Implications for European Security*, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2021/11, <https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Chinas-Military-Rise-2021-Nov.pdf>, p. 84.

101 Alec Blivas (Search Date: 2022/04/16)

102 Andrea Ghiselli, p. 204.

103 Andrea Ghiselli, p. 204.

Nuclear Warhead Inventories (estimated) ¹⁰⁵

5.2.1 PLA Nuclear Forces

Currently, nuclear weapons stockpiles are increasing their numbers in the nuclear armed authoritarian governments (China, Russia, North Korea, Pakistan). The United States is decreasing its active nuclear weapons stockpile.

The PLA is rapidly increasing its nuclear forces in numbers of warheads and increasing its capabilities by developing a nuclear triad - sea launched, air launched, and ground launched (mobile launched and silo-based). More details are below:

"Prior to this rapid build-up, China was estimated to have 350 warheads ¹⁰⁶ on operational missiles. With the additional 300 ICBM silos, the PLA could add 900 more warheads ¹⁰⁷ -the DF-41 ICBM (silo version) is expected to have three independently targeted warheads for each missile. These silos give China the potential of having 1,200 nuclear warheads within a few years. Additionally, according to a recent DOD report ¹⁰⁸ on China's military, China has a "nascent triad" meaning it can deliver nuclear weapons by land (ICBMs), by sea (SLBMs) and

104 Andrea Ghiselli, p. 204.

105 "Status of World Nuclear Forces," *Federation of American Scientists*, 2022/02/23, <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/> (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

106 "Status of World Nuclear Forces," (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

107 Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, "Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 2021/11/15, <https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-11/nuclear-notebook-chinese-nuclear-forces-2021/> (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

by air (ALBMs). Most importantly, no international agreement restricts the PRC's number of nuclear warheads nor its number of delivery systems. Unlike the Russians and the US, China can continue to build an unlimited number."¹⁰⁹



China's Silo-Based ICBMs¹¹⁰

5.2.2 The PLA and Cross Strait Relations

PLA strategic documents call attention to cross strait relations. For example, the tenth Defense White Paper (DWP), published in July 2019 entitled *China's National Defense in the New Era*, identified Taiwan as a particularly prominent issue for the PLA and the CCP. Previous DWPs also identified Taiwan as prominent issue for the PLA and CCP.¹¹¹ The 2019 DWP mentions Taiwan twelve times and the DWP mentions US twenty-seven times-both in a negative context. The following are some examples of references to Taiwan:

The fight against separatists is becoming more acute. The Taiwan authorities, led by

108 "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," Annual Report, Department of Defense, 2021/11/03, p. 91, <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF> (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

109 Guermentes Lailari, "Nuclear bomb domino effect: Nuclear umbrella, make your own bomb, or be afraid?," The Sunday Guardian, 2022/04/02, <https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/nuclear-bomb-domino-effect-nuclearumbrella-make-bomb-afraid> (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

110 "Section 2: China's Nuclear Forces: Moving Beyond a Minimal Deterrent", 2021 Annual Report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2021/11, [https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/2021 Annual Report to Congress.pdf](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/2021%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf), p. 352 (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

111 People's Republic of China, China Defense White Papers-1995-2019, Andrew Erickson's Web Archive, 23 July 2019, <https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/china-defense-white-papers-1995-2019-download-complete-set-read-highlights-here/> (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), stubbornly stick to "Taiwan independence" and refuse to recognize the *1992 Consensus*, which embodies the one-China principle. They have gone further down the path of separatism by stepping up efforts to sever the connection with the mainland in favor of gradual independence, pushing for *de jure* independence, intensifying hostility and confrontation, and borrowing the strength of foreign influence. The "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and their actions remain the gravest immediate threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the biggest barrier hindering the peaceful reunification of the country...

China's national defense aims:

- to deter and resist aggression;
- to safeguard national political security, the people's security and social stability;
- to oppose and contain "Taiwan independence" ...

[author's note that Taiwan is the third listed item on a list of nine total areas ahead of the separatist movements of Tibet and East Turkestan, South China Sea, and economic interests] ...

To solve the Taiwan question and achieve complete reunification of the country is in the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation and essential to realizing national rejuvenation. China adheres to the principles of "peaceful reunification," and "one country, two systems," promotes peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and advances peaceful reunification of the country. Meanwhile, China resolutely opposes any attempts or actions to split the country and any foreign interference to this end. China must be and will be reunited. China has the firm resolve and the ability to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow the secession of any part of its territory by anyone, any organization or any political party by any means at any time. We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is by no means targeted at our compatriots in Taiwan, but at the interference of external forces and the very small number of "Taiwan independence" separatists and their activities. The PLA will resolutely defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China and safeguard national unity at all costs..... Aiming at safeguarding national unity, China's armed forces strengthen military preparedness with emphasis on the sea. By sailing ships and flying aircraft around Taiwan, the armed forces send a stern warning to the "Taiwan independence" separatist

forces...

China resolutely opposes the wrong practices and provocative activities of the US side regarding arms sales to Taiwan, sanctions on the CMC Equipment Development Department and its leadership, illegal entry into China's territorial waters and maritime and air spaces near relevant islands and reefs, and wide-range and frequent close-in reconnaissance.¹¹²

Given the above and previous PLA's statements and similar declarations by the CCP, Taiwan will continue have the challenge to avoid provoking the CCP to precipitous actions while maintaining the freedoms enshrined in its Constitution.

Next, a discussion of the Israeli national security concept is presented including the historical evolution of the defense strategy.

6 The Informal Path: The Israeli National Security Concept

Israel has not officially published a national security strategy for public or international consumption. Countries that live in fear of an invasion or under threat do not publish a full NSS. Taiwan would be wise not to publish a comprehensive NSS except for selected sections that help Taiwanese citizens understand the intent and plans of Taiwanese government-what, when, why, where, and how-and to message allies and adversaries regarding key issues. This information is potentially useful for political purposes (such as unity of effort by whole of government, educating and training the public, messaging allies and adversaries, elections).

Israel and Taiwan share salient features; they are democratic countries, populations live mostly on the plains along a long coastline, technologically advanced, and "small in area and population, and forced by a lack of natural resources to stress education and the development of human capital... Both are in 'tough neighborhoods,' but have become success stories by excelling in high-tech and science-based industries."¹¹³

6.1 Israel's Vital Interests

Since Israel does not have an NSS, one must infer Israel's vital interests from writings and quotes from the Israeli leadership. One aspect of Israel's vital interests is its desire to maintain

112 "China's National Defense in the New Era," 24 July 2019, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-07/24/content_10053011.htm (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

113 Sobol, Mor. 2018. "Israel-Taiwan Relations: The Pursuit of Establishing a Modus Operandi." Unpublished paper cited in Don Shapiro, "Taiwan: A Postwar Jewish Community without Deep Roots," *Jewish Communities in Modern Asia*, Cambridge University Press, [forthcoming] 2022.

discretion to conduct actions that protect its vital interests and deter others from threatening them. Eisenkot and Siboni write:

The principle of self-reliance is vital for freedom of operation and reflects the continuous desire to increase Israel's might in a broad range of fields, especially that of security, to ensure the state's ability to defend its vital interests without help from foreign troops or agreement from foreign nations.¹¹⁴

Depending on others for one's security has had disastrous results in Jewish and Israeli history.

General Israel Tal, former Assistant Defense Minister, tank warfare expert, and leader in the development of Israel's Merkava tank, wrote about vital interests in his book, *National Security: The Israeli Experience*: "Vital interests are a subjectively determined element in the totality of a nation's goals, and they derive from such background factors as the nation's political culture, dominant ideology, traditions, prevailing conditions, aspirations, and circumstances."¹¹⁵ Even though each countries' listed vital interests appear to have similarities, ultimately, each country will make decisions about their respective vital interests-which determine what they are willing to fight and die for.

A better method to understand Israel's national security framework is to use terminology that Israelis use when discussing national security issues. Israelis use the term "doctrine" in national security and defense discussions. Next, the article will discuss a series of Israeli doctrines from an historical perspective.

6.2 Ben-Gurion Doctrine

"700,000 vanquished 30 million and this occurred because in the prevailing conditions, the 700,000 Jews possessed greater willpower than the 30 million Arabs." David Ben-Gurion, on Israel's War of Independence¹¹⁶

The founding father of Israel was David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel (1948-1963) who developed the first version of an Israeli national security strategy concept.¹¹⁷

114 Eisenkot and Siboni, vi.

115 Tal, Israel (Translated by Martin Kett), 2000, *National Security: The Israeli Experience*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, p. 3.

116 Charles D. Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change*, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 14.

117 Charles D. Freilich, p. 6.

Charles Freilich, a former member of Israel's National Security Council, summarizes Ben-Gurion's assumptions concerning the strategic setting for the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors:

- a uniquely long and bitter conflict,
- an existential conflict,
- a conventional military threat,
- a nation dwelling alone.¹¹⁸

The context of the modern Arab Israeli conflict is long and enduring. The CCP-Nationalist conflict can be described in the same manner. The conflicts have similar durations: the Chinese communist party was founded in 1921 and the Chinese civil war began in 1927 and continues today; the Arab Israel conflict started in the early 1900 and continues today. Freilich summarizes the Arab Israeli conflict:

"The conflict has been all-encompassing: diplomatic, military, territorial, economic, ideological, national, and religious. For decades, the Arab countries refused to recognize Israel's existence and to have any contact with it whatsoever, pursuing a policy of total negation."¹¹⁹

Switching Israel for Taiwan and Arab countries for the CCP, the similarity is stunning.

Ben-Gurion assumed that the conflict would continue for generations and each war was another phase of the conflict. Freilich notes that "[f]acing multiple threats at any one time, Israel has long perceived its external environment as one of perpetual low-level tension, punctuated by brief outbreaks of larger-scale and major hostilities, necessitating a need for constant vigilance."¹²⁰ Again, the similarity to Taiwan is telling.

Ben-Gurion (and others after him) viewed the Arab countries, and (now) Iran, and Islamic terror groups (such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda affiliated groups) as seeking to annihilate or kill all Israelis. The CCP wants to destroy Taiwan's democracy and apply CCP control over the island, its people, and destroy any person or group in opposition to its goal.

Freilich identifies Israel's strategic constraints:

- Geography as a Strategic Nightmare

118 Charles D. Freilich, pp. 14-17.

119 Charles D. Freilich, p. 15.

120 Charles D. Freilich, p. 15.

- A Vulnerable Frontier State
- Absence of Natural Border
- Indefensible Borders
- Fundamental Asymmetries with hostile neighbors
 - Territorial Size
 - Absence of Strategic Depth
 - Population Size
 - Economic Resources
 - Staying Power
 - Military Objectives
 - Overall Military Power and Number of Fronts
 - Diplomatic Asymmetry¹²¹

Ben-Gurion assumed that the great powers would interfere with Israel's actions whether the actions were defensive or offensive. Freilich provides the following supporting examples:

- The United States forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai in 1949 and once again in 1956.
- The United States pressed Israel not to launch a pre-emptive strike in 1967 and 1973, and with the Soviet Union prevented clear victories in the War of Attrition in 1970 and Yom Kippur War in 1973.
- The great powers might also intervene directly on behalf of the Arabs, as the Soviet Union threatened to do in 1973, and the United States might impose sanctions or suspend aid.
- Intervention in the fighting might come before Israel had succeeded in achieving its objectives, or worse, after the Arabs had achieved some of theirs, freezing the situation on the ground and making them permanent.
- Israel could win the wars, but the great powers might deprive it of victory, and it would lose the diplomatic battle.¹²²

Missing in the above list were constraining actions of the great powers during the 1948 War of Independence when the powers imposed an arms embargo that greatly disadvantaged Israel and forced Israelis to scrape for arms clandestinely. In the meantime, most of Arab armies had

121 Charles D. Freilich, pp. 17-22.

122 Charles D. Freilich, p. 22.

stockpiles of weapons provided during WWII.

In response to these challenges, Ben-Gurion believed that Israel could not allow any initial success of Arab armies for fear that the great powers would force a ceasefire that would be disadvantageous to Israel. Consequently, he insisted on a doctrine that pushed the IDF to achieve maximum advantage quickly before the great powers could intervene. He believed that Israel's security situation would worsen and could become catastrophic, leading to national destruction. This doctrine led Ben-Gurion to conceive of "political time" which Freilich describes as "the period it would have to conduct military operations before external intervention forced a ceasefire."¹²³

To emphasize the Ben-Gurion Doctrine and vital interests, James McDonald, the first US Ambassador to Israel, recalls in his autobiography that during his first meeting with him, Ben-Gurion stated that the US President and Department of State "would be gravely mistaken if they assumed that the threat or even the use of United Nations sanctions would force Israel to yield on issues considered vital to its independence and security."¹²⁴

Besides the Ben-Gurion Doctrine that formed over time as a result of his focus on creating a state and keeping it safe, he also strongly emphasized the importance of military education: "military training must be accompanied by rooting the soldier in the cultural values of the People of Israel, the love of the homeland and the state, the removal of ethnic partitions, and the integration of longstanding residents and new immigrants" and that victory requires a "unified nation."¹²⁵ Due to the fact that Israel is an immigrant society, the IDF took on the role of instilling civics into the soldiers. Israel and the US are two of only a few countries that assigned to the military the role of instilling civics in its citizenry.¹²⁶ This approach using the military to bolster national patriotism has strong applicability and implications for the Taiwanese armed forces and society.

6.3 Dayan Doctrine

Moshe Dayan was the IDF Chief of Staff (1953-1958) during the 1956 Suez Crisis and later was the Defense Minister (1967-1974) during the 1967 and 1973 Wars. In a speech given in 1955, Dayan explained his view on how Israel should fight:

123 Charles D. Freilich, p. 22.

124 James G. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel 1948-1951*, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1951), <https://archive.org/details/mymissioninisrae002443mbp>, p. 49 (Search Date: 2022/04/27)

125 Adi Sherzer, "Israeli Military Education: Historical Overview of a Unique Phenomenon (1941-2004)," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 2021/02/22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2021.1890546>, p. 8 (Search Date: 2022/04/26)

126 Adi Sherzer, p. 11 (Search Date: 2022/04/26)

We do not have the means to prevent the murders of [Israeli] workers in orchards or of families sleeping in their beds at night. What we can do is set a very high price for our blood, so high that no Arab locality, Arab army or Arab government will want to pay it...

Our victories and failures in the minor skirmishes along the border and even beyond, have great influence on our 'ongoing security' and on the Arab world's assessment of Israel's power and Israel's belief in its own strength...

The Arabs will decide not to start up with us only when they realize that if they do so, they will encounter harsh reprisals and drag us into a conflict in which they will be at a disadvantage.¹²⁷

Dayan's doctrine addressed guerrilla warfare and terror attacks conducted against Israel. His doctrine reinforced the mindset in Israel that there should high costs for these attacks and the IDF would use this offensive doctrine against the perpetrators and those that supported them.

The Ben-Gurion Doctrine focused on overall military preparedness for a large-scale war and the importance of quality versus quantity. Arab nations had the advantage in quantity and, for a while, in quality of their armaments. While western countries boycotted arms to both sides in 1948 and in 1967, Russia sold the Arab countries weapons without constraints. These boycotts forced Israel to develop solutions for weapon systems as well as seek out other sources to enhance their capabilities. Ben-Gurion framed his doctrine in a conventional war context because none of the Arab countries had unconventional weapons until at least the 1980s. Complementarily, the Dayan Doctrine dealt with violence below the level of war that kept the Israeli population under fear of attack that often murdered and maimed civilians.

6.4 Begin Doctrine

The Begin Doctrine was named after Prime Minister Menachem Begin who was Prime Minister from 1977-1983. Most scholars refer to the Begin Doctrine as the Prime Minister's efforts against the unconventional weapons threat to Israel, especially nuclear weapons. Less frequently referenced is the other part of his doctrine which was to decrease the potential of conflicts and to work for peace when possible.¹²⁸ Although Begin might be remembered for

127 Yagil Henkin, "A High Price for our Blood: Israel's Security Doctrines," Jerusalem Institute for Security and Strategy, 2018/06/07, <https://jiss.org.il/en/henkin-high-price-blood-israels-security-doctrines/> (Search Date: 2022/04/24)

128 Yoav J. Tenenbaum, "40 years since Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor," *Jerusalem Post*, 2021/06/09, <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/40-years-since-israeli-attack-on-iraqs-nuclear-reactor-opinion-670558>, (Search Date: 2022/04/26).

ordering the attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, he should also be remembered as the Israeli leader who made peace with Egypt in 1978, the first treaty with an Arab neighbor.

Begin ordered the destruction of the French-built Iraqi nuclear power plant (before technicians had installed the nuclear core) in 1981. Israel was internationally condemned for this action including by the Reagan administration. However, a decade later, the H. W. Bush administration praised Begin and Israel for destroying the nuclear power plant because they recognized that Saddam Hussein could have produced a small nuclear weapons stockpile by the time of the 1991 Gulf War. A nuclear weapons armed Iraq would have presented the US with a much different intervention calculus to force the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.

The Begin Doctrine became Israel's counterproliferation doctrine; it stated that Israel must "prevent any hostile state in the region from acquiring a military nuclear capability."¹²⁹ The Begin Doctrine has continued to be one of the most important Israeli national security concepts. In 1981, Begin said that "another Holocaust would have happened ... we shall defend our people with all the means at our disposal. We shall not allow any enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction turned against us."¹³⁰ Israel most likely invoked this same doctrine when it destroyed the Syrian nuclear research facility in 2007. In both cases, the nuclear cores had not been installed thereby preventing nuclear fallout.

The concern of another Holocaust continues to haunt Israel as Iran moves closer to a nuclear weapons breakout capability along with its psychopathic and genocidal belief that it must annihilate Israel. There is wide agreement within Israel's security establishment that the Biden administration's attempt at reconstituting the Obama era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Russia and China as Iran's interlocutors is a disaster. Iran's ambitions to build nuclear weapons creates fear amongst its Arab neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia.

Since 2011, Saudi Arabian officials have stated to foreign diplomats that "[w]e cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and we don't. It's as simple as that. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit."¹³¹ Their promise has been repeated many times and as recently as 2020, Saudi Arabia's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Adel al-Jubeir, noted that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, a Saudi nuclear option was "definitely an option."¹³²

129 Charles D. Freilich, p. 249.

130 Charles D. Freilich, p. 249.

131 Jason Burke, "Riyadh will build nuclear weapons if Iran gets them, Saudi prince warns," *The Guardian*, 2011/06/29, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/29/saudi-build-nuclear-weapons-iran> (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

132 "Saudi minister says nuclear weapons 'an option' for kingdom if Iran gets them", *Times of Israel*, 2020/11/18, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/saudi-minister-says-nuclear-weapons-an-option-for-kingdom-if-iran-gets-them/> (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

6.5 Other Attempts for an Israeli National Security Concept

Between 2002 and 2018, the various Chiefs of Staff of the IDF developed their own IDF strategies. The IDF doctrine published one unclassified strategic document and others discussed obliquely due to classification. An excellent summary of the evolution of the IDF strategy is the study by Meir Finkel in "IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018: On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF" by the IDF's *Dado Center*, published on 24 November 2020.¹³³

6.5.1 The IDF Strategy-2015

In August 2015, General Gadi Eizenkot published for the first time in the history of Israel a 46-page unclassified version of The IDF Strategy.¹³⁴ The IDF Strategy 2015 (TIS) document was part of a five-year proposed plan called "Gideon" which included the following components: strategic framework, strategic and operational environment, IDF's use of force, command and control concept and the IDF's order of battle, and IDF force buildup. For the purposes of this paper, vital is mentioned four times in the context of vital national interests (two times) or descriptions of what is vital: "vital national infrastructure and government institutions"¹³⁵ and "Cyber defense during emergency and war is vital, both to allow the continuous functionality of state institutions during the conflict and to enable effective network-based operation of the IDF."¹³⁶

Regarding vital national interests, TIS presents the following national goals which are probably Israel's vital interests:

National Goals: The following are the national goals of the State of Israel:

- a. Safeguarding the existence of the State of Israel, and protecting its territorial integrity and the security of its citizens and residents.
- b. Preserving the values of the State of Israel and its character as a Jewish and Democratic state and the home for the Jewish People.
- c. Securing the State of Israel's social and economic power.
- d. Strengthening the international and regional status of the State of Israel, while striving for peace with its neighbors.

133 Meir Finkel, "IDF Strategy Documents, 2002-2018: On Processes, Chiefs of Staff, and the IDF," Dado Center, 2020/11/24, <https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/dado-center/research/idf-strategy-documents-2002-2018-on-processes-chiefs-of-staff-and-the-idf/> (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

134 Gadi Eizenkot (IDF Chief of Staff), *The IDF Strategy*, 2015/08, <https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/04/IDF-Strategy.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

135 Gadi Eizenkot (IDF Chief of Staff), *The IDF Strategy*, p. 26 (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

136 Gadi Eizenkot (IDF Chief of Staff), *The IDF Strategy*, p. 26 (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

The Israeli government published for the first time the list of national goals which are Israel's purported vital interests. The list is like other countries' vital interests with the additional aspects that make Israel unique: Jewish, democratic, and striving for peace in a difficult neighborhood.

6.5.2 The Momentum Multiyear Plan and the Operational Concept for Victory: 2019-2020

The IDF announced two classified publications: The Momentum Multiyear Plan and the Operational Concept for Victory. These documents were the brainchild of General Aviv Kochavi, the current IDF Chief of Staff (2019-present). The most important change in the operational environment is the diffuse, rocket-based armies of non-state Islamist groups.¹³⁷ Hezbollah has a reported stockpile of more than 150,000 rockets and missiles; Hamas has more than 20,000 rockets and missiles. The IDF plans to use three "fourth industrial revolution" tools to counter the threat of these rocket-based armies: (1) operating in a multidomain environment, (2) employing fourth generation smart systems, and (3) negating enemies' capabilities-especially their ability to conduct continuous fires (missiles and rocket attacks).¹³⁸

6.5.3 Guidelines for Israel's National Security Strategy

In 2019, after retiring from the IDF, Gabi Eisenkot (former Chief of Staff of the IDF) and Gabi Siboni authored an article called Guidelines for Israel's National Security Strategy¹³⁹ which provides useful observations about Israel's vital interests. These vital interests could be analogous to Taiwan's:

The nation's values reflect its characteristics at a profound level, serving as a type of fundamental declaration expressing the nation's identity, vision, and *raison d'être*. They serve as the broadest, immutable common ground for all inhabitants. Derived from them are *Israel's vital national interests and vital security interests*. *The supreme security interests of the State of Israel are to **maintain its sovereignty, guard its critical assets, and ensure the safety of its inhabitants.***¹⁴⁰

137 Eran Ortal, "Going on the Attack: The Theoretical Foundation of the Israel Defense Forces' Momentum Plan," Dado Center, 2020/10/01, <https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/dado-center/vol-28-30-military-superiority-and-the-momentum-multi-year-plan/going-on-the-attack-the-theoretical-foundation-of-the-israel-defense-forces-momentum-plan-1/> (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

138 Eran Ortal (Search Date: 2022/04/23)


139 Eisenkot, Gabi and Gabi Siboni, *Guidelines for Israel's National Security Strategy*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2019, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/4613?disposition=attachment> (Search Date: 2022/04/06)

140 Eisenkot and Siboni, p. iii.

Taiwan does not have terrorist groups operating inside or along the border of the country causing fear, death, and destruction at irregular intervals as Israel faces. Yet, Taiwan does contend with CCP's cognitive warfare operations being conducted at every level of government, in all industrial sectors, and throughout the general society. In some respect, these CCP threats could be more threatening since the CCP, a world superpower, attacks the core concepts of democracy, citizenship, and patriotism.

7 Risk Assessments and Challenges: Threat Sources

A country has vital interests and desired end-states of a national strategy to protect; spoilers can prevent a country from achieving these end-states. Part of the process to develop an NSS is to conduct a risk assessment to identify situations or challenges that might diminish the feasibility of achieving desired goals. Just as a government will expend resources (labor, funding, materials, time) to achieve objectives that enhance vital interests, there are other factors that can counter these efforts such as delaying, denying, deterring, deceiving, and even sometimes destroying a nation's ability to protect its vital interests.



Risk Assessment Process ¹⁴¹

141 United States, *Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments*, NIST Special Publication 800-30 (Revision 1), 2012, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-30r1.pdf>, p. 23 (Search Date: 2022/04/20)

The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed a useful risk assessment model that a nation-state can apply. As shown in the Risk Assessment Process figure above, the first step in the process is to prepare for assessment. The second step is to identify threat sources. The NIST's *Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments* developed a solid taxonomy of threats for conducting risk assessments, initially for information security. The threat taxonomy is also relevant to a national security strategy concept.

Several other references discuss risk assessments such as Stolberg's comparative research on "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents."¹⁴² Cancian's "Formulating National Security Strategy: Past Experience and Future Choices"¹⁴³ discusses risk.

8 Taiwan National Security Strategy Concept Examples

The US National Security Council uses speeches, writings, and other references made by the President during the presidential campaign as well as while in office to build the NSS. President Tsai Ing-wen's 1 January 2022 New Year's speech, "Resilient Taiwan, One with the World," provides an example of material suitable for a Taiwanese NSS. In her speech, she delineated four pillars for stable governance: "continuing our global engagement, maintaining our economic momentum, strengthening our social security network, and safeguarding our nation's sovereignty."¹⁴⁴ Her staff and her ministers could refer to these four pillars as the foundation of Taiwan's vital interests and develop a path with achievable objectives and actions to enhance each pillar.

8.1 Taiwan Challenges

In her 2022 New Year's speech, President Tsai Ing-wen's highlights the main challenges that could interfere with maintaining and enhancing the four pillars for stable governance:

"...many challenges still lie ahead. The pandemic continues to pose a serious challenge for countries around the world and fuel uncertainty around the global economic recovery. Inflation, property prices, and the possibility of another COVID-19 outbreak

142 Alan G. Stolberg, "How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents," Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, US Army War College, 2012/10, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2201.pdf> (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

143 Mark F. Cancian and others: "Formulating National Security Strategy: Past Experience and Future Choices," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017/10/06, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/171006_CSIS_NationalSecurityStrategyFormulation_FINAL_0.pdf (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

144 Republic of Taiwan, "President Tsai delivers 2022 New Year's Address", 2022/01/01, <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6209> (Search Date: 2022/04/09)

are all issues we must seriously address during this period of economic growth.

On top of this, we are faced with the challenge of how to maintain steady political and economic progress amid the fierce competition that the election scheduled for the second half of this year will bring. With constantly increasing military and diplomatic pressure from China, how to uphold our freedom, democracy, and consensus to connect with the world is also a challenge that Taiwan will have to face in 2022."¹⁴⁵

President Tsai's staff could add detail to these challenges.

8.2 Think Tanks Observations

Think tanks also influence national security policy and strategy. Political parties in Taiwan consult think tanks on policy and strategy. Other think tanks around the world connect to Taiwanese think tanks and influence each other on policy and strategy issues.

In many democratic countries, think tanks-sometimes referred to as a "holding pen"-are places where people in the opposition work until their party returns to power. When these people return to government service, think tanks often benefit from their former employees, by receiving government funding for research on assorted topics. Funding brought to a think tank from government and business contacts is often a measure of one's value.

9 Summary

No country is exactly like another; similarities exist, and the differences can be useful in guiding a country to avoid pitfalls and to interpret and translate experiences into meaningful strategy. The paper discussed the US and Israel national security concepts as cases studies for Taiwan-the former was formal and the later was informal.

The US case study revealed declassified documents from the Reagan and Trump administrations that could prove useful in constructing a comprehensive NSS concept for Taiwan. The Israeli case study demonstrated that even without a formal NSS, a country can develop its own national security concept that survives the test of time, of war and peace, terrorism, and tensions with adversaries as well as with allies. Both case studies provided examples of vital interests that changed over time based on the circumstances and conditions that challenged the respective national leaderships.

The author did not conduct an analysis of Taiwan's national security strategies and defense doctrines since the audience of the report is well-aware of them. The paper did discuss Cross

¹⁴⁵ Republic of Taiwan, "President Tsai delivers 2022 New Year's Address", 2022/01/01, <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6209> (Search Date: 2022/04/09)

Straits relations and highlighted the CCP's core interests. Those seeking a deeper understanding of a national security concept should consult the reference section containing sources from several countries and research sources.

10 Recommendations and Considerations

As a result of the result of the research conducted, the author extracted five recommendations and three considerations that the Taiwanese government, military, industry, and public may find useful.

10.1 Recommendation #1: Create a document to elaborate Taiwan's vital interests to frame the national priorities but not a comprehensive NSS. A minimalist NSS is better for Taiwan because providing detail limits policy makers' options to counter unanticipated events or surprises posed by the adversary and provides talking points for domestic political opposition. Broad statements of national and vital interests facilitate their acceptance by a wide variety of people and can instill and foster national patriotism. Vital interests could be discussed in at least two ways. Use the French method of allowing each President discretion to determine those interests given current events. The other approach is issue vague or ambiguous statements about vital interests to not provide the adversary insight into Taiwanese leaders' most valued capabilities or assets.

A national security policy or strategy would help guide a national military strategy (NMS). Without a NSS concept that identifies vital interests, the Ministry of National Defense's focus on defending those specified vital interests might not be addressed effectively and efficiently.

10.2 Recommendation #2: Enhance the population's concept of self-defense and nationalism. Taiwanese leaders should consider the Israeli approach to self-defense.

An Israeli vignette: A year later after the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear site, then-Senator Joe Biden threatened to cut aid to Israel and to try to force Israel to stop building settlements in Judea and Samaria. Begin reminded Biden why the Israeli defense doctrines exist in a spontaneous moment during Begin's testimony in the US Senate's Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting:

Don't threaten us with cutting off your aid. It will not work. I am not a Jew with trembling knees. I am a proud Jew with 3,700 years of civilized history. Nobody came to our aid when we were dying in the gas chambers and ovens. Nobody came to our aid when we were striving to create our country. We paid for it. We fought for it. We died for it. We will stand by our principles. We will defend them. And, when necessary, we

will die for them again, with or without your aid...Take note: we do not want a single soldier of yours to die for us.¹⁴⁶

Taiwan should seek a similar spirit where it welcomes the support provided and does not expect another country to fight for its defense. Recent articles about Taiwanese becoming more patriotic are reassuring, but ideally, this should be more systematic and organized.

10.3 Recommendation #3: Enhance symmetric and asymmetric capabilities in defense and in other elements of national power along with the respective training sourced from domestic and international defense industries to deter or delay the CCP and the PLA from conducting an attack. As a recent research paper pointed out, Taiwan should not only plan for an invasion but also for a possible protracted war in the urban environment where 90% of the population reside.¹⁴⁷ The recommendation of enhancing symmetric and asymmetric capabilities is especially important because the US may be deterred (by a nuclear confrontation with the PLA) from sending military aid to Taiwan during a cross straits conflict with the PLA.¹⁴⁸

10.4 Recommendation #4: Develop a comprehensive human resources plan that takes advantage of the Taiwanese population's talent. Israeli human resource national security programs such as Atuda, Psagot, Havatzalot, and Atidim should be considered for adaptation for Taiwan's defense and for long term national security.

A simple step towards this direction is to create a recommended reading list for Taiwan's security organizations personnel to build knowledge and experience in the many areas of national security and leadership. Each US military services' leaders creates a reading list for their personnel. At least two English books for understanding the CCP threat should be on the list-Political Warfare and Media Warfare by Kerry Gershaneck.

10.5 Recommendation #5: Develop a methodology and the means and ways to ensure that national security organizations operate effectively and efficiently. This can be accomplished

146 Judah Waxelbaum, "American Jews should reject Joe Biden," *Jerusalem Post*, 2020/09/20, <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/american-jews-should-reject-joe-biden-643781> (Search Date: 2022/04/23)

147 Elsa Kania and Ian Burns McCaslin, "The PLA's Evolving Outlook on Urban Warfare: Learning, Training, and Implications for Taiwan," *Institute for the Study of War*, 2022/04, https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20PLA%20Outlook%20on%20Urban%20Warfare%20ISW%20April%202022_0.pdf (Search Date: 2022/05/07)

148 Patrick Tucker, "China Likely to Use 'Nuclear Coercion' in Bid to Take Taiwan by 2027, STRATCOM Chief Says," *Defense One*, 2022/05/05, <https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/05/china-likely-use-nuclear-coercion-bid-take-taiwan-2027-stratcom-chief-says/366551/> (Search Date: 2022/05/09)

by initially investigating on how national security organizations operate especially how they learn, pass on knowledge, and adapt. The literature review includes useful references for such an investigation.

10.6 Consideration #1: Recently, Japan, a nuclear weapons-phobic country based on its WWII experiences with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is now debating whether it should ask the US to "share" nuclear weapons-similar to the example of Germany and other NATO countries' that allow the US to store nuclear weapons on their territory and use them if the host nation and the US agreed to their employment in a war.

Sweden and Finland have come to realize the importance of being under a nuclear umbrella and are requesting to join NATO. NATO has put them on the fast track due the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a non-nuclear armed (formerly nuclear armed with 3,000 warheads) and non-NATO country. The challenge is that the approval process is bureaucratic and might not occur until sometime after the summertime. In the meantime, the UK has agreed to mutual security agreement (political declarations) with Sweden and Finland as of 11 May 2022.¹⁴⁹ However, the agreements are a bit vague regarding boots on the ground or a nuclear umbrella and are not automatic security agreements.

An article¹⁵⁰ written by the author of this essay argued that just as Sweden and Finland are racing to join a nuclear umbrella due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and as a result of the Islamic Republic of Iran progresses towards building a nuclear weapons stockpile, countries without nuclear weapons and not under a nuclear umbrella will (1) scramble to join a nuclear alliance, (2) make their own nuclear weapons, or (3) be scared. Those countries near aggressive authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran (soon) will be scrambling to join an alliance or possess their own deterrent capability. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and others near Iran have already declared their intent to pursue nuclear deterrence should Iran possess nuclear weapons. The same challenge applies to those countries near China; almost all of them have signed nuclear weapons free zone treaties. Taiwan has not signed a nuclear weapons free zone agreement since the UN does not treat Taiwan as a sovereign nation. However, since Taiwan uses nuclear power, "Taiwan signed an IAEA-ROC-USA 'trilateral' safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/158) at Vienna in 1964, thereby transferring the responsibility of safeguarding nuclear materials from the U.S. to IAEA".¹⁵¹ In another letter with the IAEA in

149 Katya Adler, "UK agrees mutual security deals with Finland and Sweden," *BBC News*, 2022/05/12, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-61408700> (Search Date: 2022/05/12)

150 Guermentes Lailari, "Nuclear bomb domino effect: Nuclear umbrella, make your own bomb, or be afraid?", *The Sunday Guardian*, 2022/04/02, <https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/nuclear-bomb-domino-effect-nuclearumbrella-make-bomb-afraid> (Search Date: 2022/04/17)

1998, Taiwan agreed to apply more rigorous standards to nuclear material tracking. Therefore, "the IAEA applies safeguards in Taiwan to all nuclear material and nuclear facilities *as if it were an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state Party*; it conducts regular inspections including Additional Protocol verification activities."¹⁵²

Taiwan should seek to be part of a nuclear umbrella alliance to deter the CCP from ordering the PLA to invade it. Unfortunately, this action is fraught with challenges due to constraints the CCP has imposed on multiple dimensions of the conflict, especially economic and military power in the region. The CCP and PLA declarations have stated that any attempt to place Taiwan under a nuclear umbrella or for Taiwan to have nuclear weapons could be a *casus bello* since it prevents the CCP-Taiwan unification (violates one of the CCP's core interest). If Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and other allied governments decide to build a nuclear weapons capability due to the CCP nuclear threat, there are several options to consider such as recessed deterrence that India and supposedly Israel employ. If Taiwan cannot be a part of a nuclear umbrella, then Taiwan should pursue other solutions.

10.7 Consideration #2: Taiwan has not recently faced the challenge of continuous guerrilla warfare and terrorism as has Israel. Yet, guerrilla warfare and terrorism could become a challenge for Taiwan. According to the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the University of Maryland, Taiwan suffered 38 attacks from 1991-2000 (ten years) with 33 killed and 65 injured, while from 2001-2019 (twenty-year period) Taiwanese suffered 14 attacks killing two and injuring 22.¹⁵³ The CCP funded and continues to support terrorist warfare by funding and training communist insurgencies and terrorist groups.

The CCP also pursues anti-CCP activists worldwide through a variety of legal and coercive means. Insidious CCP actions could come from the CCP's Anti-Separation Law,¹⁵⁴ passed in 2005, and the 2021 law that criminalizes any person or entity for life for having pro-democracy tendencies for Taiwan; a blacklist has already been drawn up.¹⁵⁵ Once CCP feels enabled, the

151 IAEA, Taiwan's *Atomic Energy Council*, 2022/01/14, <https://www.aec.gov.tw/english/Administration-Regulations/IAEA-84.html> (Search Date: 2022/05/08)

152 "Nuclear Power in Taiwan," *World Nuclear Association*, 2021/12, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/nuclear-power-in-taiwan.aspx> (Search Date: 2022/05/08)

153 Global Terrorism Database, Taiwan, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=perpetrator&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&country=201&count=100 (Search Date:2022/05/16)

154 People's Republic of China, Anti-Separation (Secession) Law, 2005/03/15, <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm> (Search Date: 2022/04/27)

155 Yew Lun Tian, 2021/11/06, "China spurs Taiwan anger with criminal liability threat for independence supporters," *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-it-will-hold-supporters-taiwans-independence-criminally-responsible-2021-11-05/> (Search Date: 2022/04/27)

threat of the CCP finding dissidents or cooping locals could become a serious threat to freedom. As seen by the current pursuit of Uyghurs and the use of INTERPOL's "Red Notices" as a sort of lawfare tool, this is not a far-fetched idea.¹⁵⁶

10.8 Consideration #3: The US 2017 NSS offers a final note of advice relevant to Taiwanese national security:

A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation.¹⁵⁷

Replace the words Russia with China and American with Taiwanese and it becomes clear why a national security strategy concept can help guide Taiwan to maintain and grow its democracy.

156 Bradley Jardine and Natalie Hall, "The International Community Must Resist China's Abuse of Interpol," *Newsweek*, 2021/11/19, <https://www.newsweek.com/international-community-must-resist-chinas-abuse-interpol-opinion-1650890> (Search Date: 2022/04/27)

157 United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, 2017, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, p. 14 (Search Date: 2022/04/25)