

**The "Anti-Communist" Alliance between the
Republic of China Government and the Japanese
Liberal Democratic Party Lawmakers, 1955-1988**

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Topic of Research

The "Anti-Communist" Alliance between the Republic of China Government and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party Lawmakers, 1955-1988

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Introduction

In 1955, a conservative merger between the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party of Japan resulted in the birth of the Liberal Democratic Party, which was characterized by

its anti-communist ideology¹. The anti-communist conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had been the ruling party of Japan until the end of the Cold War, and for the Republic of China (ROC), which was opposed to the Chinese Communist government, the Cold War structure provided the ground for an alliance with Japan under the anti-communist. How did the ROC government and the LDP politicians of Japan establish relations during the Cold War, with the major turning point of severing diplomatic relations?

Studies on the history of Japan-Taiwan relations have progressed in recent years with the disclosure of diplomatic historical archives in both Japan and Taiwan². It is clear that

¹ The Liberal Democratic Party 自由民主党 (LDP), which has become the ruling party since 1955 the conservative merger of the Liberal Party 自由党 and the Democratic Party of Japan 日本民主党, functioned as a collection of factions. For this reason, the mainstream and non-mainstream factions always existed in the party, and there was a quasi-regime change in the one party, sometimes showing intense factional conflicts.

² Kawashima Shin, Shimizu Urara, Matsuda Yasuhiro, and Yo Eimin “Nittaikankeishi 1945-2020” (A history of Japan-Taiwan relations, 1945-2020), Tokyo University Press, 2020; Shimizu Urara “Taiwangaiko no keisei”, Nagoya University Press, 2019; Chen Feng-Lin “Zhanhouritaiguanxishi” Hong Kong Social Sciences Publishing 2004; Xu Hang “Sengonikkakeizaigaikoushi 1950-1978” (Economic Diplomacy and Postwar

unofficial channels have been frequently used since the time of diplomatic relations between Japan and ROC, and that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not been able to unify the diplomatic channels. However, against the progress of research that uses foreign ministry officials as key factors, there are not many studies that focus on “informal factor” in the “China issue”. The role played by LDP lawmakers has not been a subject of research.

The Liberal Democratic Party was a huge ruling party in postwar Japan, and as indicated by the term “party within a party”, multiple factions within the party developed their own presence. Among them, is the Kishi - Fukuda faction which is generally regarded as the “pro-Taiwan” by both Japan and Taiwan³. Previous research has pointed out that the Fukuda faction and the Tanaka faction had different ideological orientations and that the Fukuda faction had strong connections with South Korea and Southeast Asian countries and was strongly anti-communist.⁴ It is noteworthy that within the LDP, which

Japan-Taiwan Relations, 1950-1978), Tokyo University Press, 2019, etc.

³ In this paper, "China" in "pro-China" means the People's Republic of China, and "Taiwan" in "pro-Taiwan" means the Republic of China.

⁴ Miyagi Taizo, ‘Jimintonaihabatsu to ajiagaikou; Fukudaha Tahakaha wo chushinni’ (LDP factions and Asian diplomacy – centered on the Fukuda and Tanaka factions), in “Sengoajia no keisei to nihon”, Chuokoron-Shinsha 2014; Wakamiya Yoshibumi

shared the same ideology, certain factions had particularly close ties to Taiwan. However, studies that have touched on the pro-Taiwan have developed discussions based on the assumption that the Kishi-Fukuda lineage was pro-Taiwan, and thus the process by which the specific faction or lineage within the LDP developed relations with Taiwan has not been discussed.

In this report, I examine how the ROC side observed the LDP, which shared the same anti-communist ideology, what lineages they expected to find, and what kind of relationship they developed in relation to the ideology, using the method of political and diplomatic history.

The ROC side tried to build relationships with politicians within the LDP, an anti-communist party, by considering ideological elements and being aware of their lineage, but in the 1980's, on the eve of the end of the Cold War, anti-communism faded away and ideological elements within the LDP also became diluted.

※ **This report is part of the results of the Taiwan Fellowship.**

The research yield during the stay is so great that the full results will be presented

“Sengo 70nen hoshuno Asia kan” (70 Years After the War, Conservative Views on Asia), Asahi Shimbun Publishing, 2014.

in the author's doctoral dissertation.

※ No part of this report can be cited, quoted, or referenced by any mean of communication. It is just a raw draft.

1, Lineage of the Liberal Democratic Party

It is said that the two main figures in the postwar conservative movement, Yoshida Shigeru 吉田茂 of the Liberal Party and Hatoyama Ichiro 鳩山一郎 of the Democratic Party, were the founders of the conservative mainstream and the conservative fringe. In Japanese politics, the former Yoshida faction was often regarded as a representative of the bureaucratic faction and the latter Hatoyama faction as a representative of the partisan faction. While Yoshida focused on relations with the U.S. and Japan's economy, Hatoyama sought to establish an independent constitution and restore relations with the communist state. The Yoshida faction later split into the Ikeda and Sato factions⁵.

⁵ Around the time of the 1958 general election for the House of Representatives, there were eight factions: Ikeda 池田, Sato 佐藤, Ohno 大野, and Ishii 石井, formerly of the Liberal Party; Kishi 岸, Kono 河野, Matsumura 松村/Miki 三木, and Ishibashi 石橋,

Chang Chun, Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石's right-hand man⁶, praised Hatoyama's insight on rearmament and other issues more than Yoshida.⁷ In 1955, just before Hatoyama took office as prime minister, Chiang Kai-shek said in a meeting with the Japanese ambassador Yoshizawa Kenkichi 芳澤謙吉 that Hatoyama's campaign for restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was probably for elections⁸.

Although Hatoyama later established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the ROC government did not take Hatoyama's anti-communist stance lightly. Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek appealed to Yoshizawa that a merger of the conservative parties between the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party was essential. The ROC government had high

formerly of the Democratic Party; and Kishi, Sato, Kono, and Ohno, mainstream factions at the time of the Kishi Cabinet, with Ikeda, Ishii, Matsumura/Miki, and Ishibashi mixed in the anti-mainstream factions.

⁶ Chang-Chun (Zhang Qun 張羣 1889-1990) was born in Sichuan Province and graduated from the Japanese Military Academy. He studied abroad with Chiang Kai-shek, then acted with Chiang at the Xinhai Revolution and the Northern Expedition. The Foreign Minister (1935 -37), President of the Executive Yuan (1947 -48), the Secretary-General (1954 -1972).

⁷ Chang Chun “NikkaFuunno70-nen” (70 Years of Japan–ROC and winds-clouds), Sankei Shuppan, 1980, pp.158-159.

⁸ “對日本外交（二）”（002-080106-00065-020）, Academia Historica, Taiwan.

hopes for Kishi Nobusuke 岸信介, a descendant of the Hatoyama faction, probably because of his reputation as a leading figure of the internal anti-communist stance among anti-Yoshida faction and the united conservatives⁹.

Taiwan's expectations for Kishi were high, and the same expectations were placed on Yoshida's disciple, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku 佐藤栄作, in anticipation of his older brother Kishi's influence. Sato, however, observed the international situation and relations with Taiwan more coldly than Kishi did, and although ROC requested him to visit Taiwan, his visit was considerably late¹⁰. He also worked hard to establish connections with the

⁹ “岸信介訪華案” (012.22/73) , The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.

¹⁰ Sato urged Chang Chun to stay at the United Nations and advised not to self-destruct (‘總統府張秘書長與日本佐藤總理談話記錄 August 1, 1971’ in “台湾を主とする国防・外交・宣伝指導等に関する文書”, The Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, Tokyo University). During the Ikeda administration, Chiang Kai-shek told Yoshida that he wished to have a friendly relationship with Sato, and Yoshida promised Chiang Kai-shek that he would encourage Sato to visit Taiwan (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Disclosure 2004-609). Yoshida continued to recommend Sato's visit to Taiwan, but it took a long time to realize it.

Chinese Communist government¹¹.

The difference between the ROC side's later disappointment and the Kuomintang (KMT)'s expectations of Tanaka Kakuei 田中角榮, who was a member of the Sato faction, is striking. In 1970, the KMT, while placing its trust in Tanaka, then secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party, attempted to actively engage in exchanges with Tanaka¹². When Sato Eisaku was elected president for the fourth time, the KMT sent a congratulatory telegram to Tanaka, who was a member of the Sato faction. When the “Parliamentary Association for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations 日中国交回復促進議員連盟” was established, it was proposed that the ROC strengthen cooperation with Tanaka Kakuei in order to strengthen diplomatic relations with Japan¹³.

However, it is well known that Tanaka achieved normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and Chinese Communist government after becoming prime minister, and was severely criticized by the ROC and pro-Taiwan of the LDP. This may have reminded the ROC of the Yoshida and Hatoyama lineages in the LDP. In the first

¹¹ Inoue Masaya “Nicchukokkoseijoukanoseijishi” (Political History of Japan–China Diplomatic Normalisation), Nagoya University Press, 2010, chapter 8.

¹² “總裁批簽” (59/0085), KMT Archives, Taiwan.

¹³ “總裁批簽” (59/0091), KMT Archives, Taiwan.

place, Tanaka was one of the “13 members” of the Yoshida faction when the conservatives were merged.

Although LDP members were not recognized as partisans or bureaucrats until around the time of the Sato cabinet within the party¹⁴, in 1974 the ROC government focused on whether Japanese Diet members had belonged to the ex-Democratic Party or the ex-Liberal Party, and whether they had belonged to “Yoshida School”¹⁵. According to this observation, Ikeda, Sato, Tanaka, and Ohira 大平 were from the conservative mainstream, while Miki, Fukuda 福田, and Nakasone 中曾根 were from the Democratic Party of Japan, a branch of the Liberal Democratic Party.

When Miki Takeo 三木武夫, who was seen as pro-China within the LDP, became prime minister, the ROC side's assessment of the Miki administration was that even though Miki was a leftist politician, and ROC predicted that relations with the ROC would not deteriorate because of Fukuda Takeo 福田赳夫's checks and balances in the Miki and Fukuda's Coalition, observing that the “Yoshida School 吉田学校” era was interrupted and that this meant a major unification of the fringe Democratic Party of Japan factions.

¹⁴ Former LDP lawmaker, personal communication, 2021, March.

¹⁵ “日本政情 1974-01~1975-09” (11-01-02-02-01-033), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.

The ROC side had high hopes for the Democratic Party lineage that had been in place before the conservative unification.

Even in 1980, the ROC analyzed that Kishi Nobusuke still had a great influence on Japanese politics, and his son-in-law, Abe Shintaro 安倍晋太郎, was the successor to the Fukuda faction, looking forward to Kishi's influence and expecting the lineage of the Fukuda faction¹⁶.

2, Waterd Down Anti-Communist Ideology

(1) Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro

The KMT already had a good impression of Nakasone Yasuhiro 中曾根康弘 as early as 1971, before the severance of the diplomatic relationship. It can be inferred that this included the expectation for the fringe of conservatism by the ROC mentioned above.

Within the KMT, based on an explanation from Nakasone's secretary Yoda Minoru 依田美, Nakasone was an anti-communist, he had special feelings toward Taiwan from his

¹⁶ “日本雜卷（十八）” (020-010199-0116), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Academia Historica, Taiwan.

experience in Kaohsiung before the war, and he planned to visit Taiwan after assuming a key position in the LDP. Although he had not publicly interacted with the ROC while serving as Defense Secretary to avoid criticism from the Chinese Communist Party, opposition parties, and the media, he was looking forward to coming to Taiwan and getting to know key government officials of ROC and anti-communist comrades¹⁷.

In addition, in the year 1974, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs predicted that Nakasone would become prime minister, under the Tanaka administration, and that Nakasone would become prime minister in less than five years. Although the actual inauguration of Nakasone was delayed, it can be said that the inauguration of Nakasone as prime minister did not come as a surprise to the ROC¹⁸.

The ROC also had high expectations when the Nakasone administration was established. This was due in part to the fact that several members of the Sino-Japanese Legislators' Council 日華議員懇談会, an LDP parliamentary organization that was pro-Taiwan, had joined the cabinet. Miyazawa Kiichi 宮澤喜一, the finance minister, was a member of the Kochikai 宏池会 which was considered to be pro-China faction, but he

¹⁷ “總裁批簽” (60/0007), KMT Archives, Taiwan.

¹⁸ “日本政情 1973-12~1974-05” (11-01-02-02-01-031), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.

attracted attention from ROC because of his contribution to the restoration of Japan-Taiwan air routes¹⁹.

In fact, the lineage and ideological issues within the LDP were already watered down during the Nakasone administration. Nakasone faction, which had been a small faction, needed the cooperation of other factions even when its leader became president, and the Tanaka faction, which was effectively the largest faction, became a major influence. In the first place, Nakasone's faction included representatives of the pro-China and pro-Taiwan, respectively. As Nakasone faction had no training sessions and no ideological unity among its members, Nakasone was evaluated as a person who transcended ideology²⁰.

(2) Differentiation between pro-Taiwan and pro-South Korea

During the Cold War, the ROC envisioned an anti-communist alliance, including Japan,

¹⁹ “日本政情”, (A303000000B/0075/001.2/0006), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, National Archives Administration, Taiwan.

²⁰ Former member of the Nakasone faction, personal communication, 2021, March.

to counter mainland China²¹.

In the 1960s, there was an overlap between the pro-Taiwan and pro-South Korea in Japan, as evidenced by the partnership between the Japan–ROC Cooperation Committee 日華協力委員会 and the Japan–ROK Cooperation Committee 日韓協力委員会, both of which were informal organizations with the ROC and South Korea. Pro-Taiwan and pro-South Korea lawmakers were considered to be conservative with the same anti-communist views. However, after the establishment of the Chun Doo-hwan 전두환 administration through a coup in 1980, there was a clear breakdown in the human ties between Japan and South Korea — that is, the channel between the pro-South Korea and the South Korean side —, and the pro-South Korean and pro-Taiwan of the LDP differentiated. This distinction became more obvious during the Nakasone administration as the historical disputes became more serious.

During the Nakasone administration, the LDP's conservatives, who were originally pro-South Korea, resisted South Korea's harsh criticism of Japan over the historical

²¹ Xu Hang “Sengonikkakeizaigaikoushi 1950-1978 (Economic Diplomacy and Postwar Japan-Taiwan Relations, 1950-1978), Tokyo University Press 2019; Mi Duo “Chukaminkoku no ‘Ajjiahankyodomei’ kousou” (Concept of "Anti-Comintern League of Asia" of the Republic of China), “International Relations” 2017(3).

disputes. Minister of Education Fujio Masayuki 藤尾正行 was recognized as pro-South Korea by South Korea in the 1970's²², but South Korea responded harshly to Fujio's statement that South Korea had some responsibility for Japan's annexation of Korea. The ROC, on the other hand, responded to Japan differently from South Korea and China. The ROC defended Fujio, saying he was a good friend of ROC²³. Thus, while the pro-South Korea and pro-Taiwan diverged, a phenomenon emerged in which pro-Taiwan and pro-China lawmakers, who had previously been clearly distinguished by Taiwan and China, overlapped.

The "Association to Honor the Legacy of Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石先生の遺徳を顕彰する会", founded in 1986 and initiated by pro-Taiwan Kishi and Nadao Hirokichi 灘尾弘吉, became a major meeting of the pro-Taiwan and the ROC side at the time. The fact that the association used Chiang Kai-shek as its symbol without the inclusion of anti-communism indicates that the possibility of an anti-communism alliance had virtually

²² “한국의 대일본 의회 안보외교 활동방안 1975” (721.1JA 1975: 17992), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea.

²³ “本邦歴史教科書検定問題／中国” (2018-0225), Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan; “日本政情” (A303000000B/0075/001.2/0006), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, National Archives Administration, Taiwan.

disappeared. At that time, Kishi, Kanemaru Sin 金丸信, and Fujio, who were pro-Taiwan, were supposed to visit Taiwan by the invitation of the ROC government, but Prime Minister Nakasone and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami Takao 藤波孝生 persuaded them to cancel the visit because it would not be convenient for the three senior LDP officials to visit Taiwan. Pro-Taiwan argued that the government was not involved in the matter and that they were doing it in their private capacity, but Kanemaru eventually stepped down as an initiator. It can be said that within the stable LDP political dynamics, LDP members were able to balance their consideration for both China and Taiwan.

Conclusion: The Flaw of the Anti-Communist Alliance

This report gives an overview of the lineages and lawmakers within the Liberal Democratic Party that the ROC, which used the anti-communist ideology as its banner during the Cold War, placed its expectations on as counterparts, and traces the changes that took place until the 1980's, when anti-communism elements of the LDP became less pronounced.

The ROC side tried to build relationships with politicians within the LDP, an anti-communist party, with an awareness of their lineage, while considering ideological

elements. However, in the 1980's, on the eve of the end of the Cold War, the anti-communist nature of the LDP was fading, and the ideological elements within the LDP were also diluted. The ROC had consistently placed its hopes on the lineage of the former Democratic Party of Japan, which started with Hatoyama, not to mention, Kishi. Because of Kishi's influence, Taiwan's impression of Tanaka Kakuei, who belonged to the faction of Kishi's younger brother Sato Eisaku, was not bad, but the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China reminded the ROC that Tanaka was also of the Yoshida lineage. There were high expectations for Nakasone in the ROC as he had belonged to the Democratic Party of Japan, but in fact, the Tanaka faction had a great influence during the Nakasone administration and Nakasone and the Nakasone faction were characterized by having no specific ideology. The idea of allying with Japan in the name of anti-communism disappeared, and Taiwan and Japan increased the density of exchanges through personal relations.

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