# Media and Pluralism in the Information Society Taiwan as a Model

# Takehiko Daikoku (Meiji University)

#### e-mail: kyoro@da2.so-net.ne.jp

Funding Statement: The study was supported by MOFA Taiwan Fellowship grant from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China.

Conflict of Interest declaration: The author declares that they have NO affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.

Abstract: Countries around the world are currently engaged in a fierce struggle to realize digital transformation (DX), including cryptocurrencies, electronic payment systems, and e-government. However, most of these efforts are either focused on creating a new digital divide in order to prioritize the economy, or else they are heading in the direction of developing top-down tools to monitor the public, with little hope of realizing a new ideological paradigm for the information society.

It is noteworthy that the Taiwanese government has clearly identified pluralism as a new value to be realized by the digital society. This policy can be clearly seen in President Tsai Ing-wen's policy of prioritizing local areas in digitalization and the appointment of Audrey Tan, a sexual minority, as a cabinet member in charge of digitalization.

The Internet, a horizontal network, does not have a centralized structure or privileged location like the mass media, and it originally has a high structural affinity with pluralism. Therefore, pluralism is not only a political governing principle that comes into its own in the information society, but also has the potential to become a universal principle for the information society that pervades the economy and culture.

In this study, based on the principle of pluralism, we would like to trace the history of how Taiwanese society came to link digitalization with the realization of pluralism, and explore what kind of pluralization has actually been realized or is being realized in the political, economic, and cultural spheres today.

Keywords: pluralism, broad-cast, net-work, nationalism, nation-state

# 0-0 Introduction

First, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Taiwan for generously facilitating a year-long scholarship grant for me who can hardly

speak Taiwanese Chinese, to the National Library for serving as the point of contact for the grant and for giving me various considerations during my stay in Taipei, and to the Faculty of Philosophy of Taiwan University for being the host institution during my stay in Taiwan.

Originally, the author's specialty was philosophy, especially Western philosophy centered on modern and contemporary German philosophy, such as German idealism, neo-Kantian school, and phenomenology, and the theme I set up after returning from my eight-year stint at a television station was also a social and technological philosophy study focusing on "media" and "information society", none of which are directly related to Taiwan. Therefore, I believe that it would be useful to show in advance the author's awareness of the problems in this research project and the outline of the rationale of the argument, including why I dared to establish a research base in Taiwan this time.

As I mentioned earlier, I have been working on the themes of "Philosophy of Media" and "Philosophy of the Information Society" for the past decade or so<sup>1</sup>, and found that the period from the end of the last century to the beginning of this century was a turning point for the leading media from mass media to network media. This is because the author recognizes that society itself, which is based on the media, is also undergoing rapid structural changes, that is, the original "information society" is taking shape.

In the course of the above work, the problem of "pluralism" emerged<sup>2</sup>. The author has already examined the possibility of the establishment of ethics in the information society era from the angle of "pluralism" that is at issue here<sup>3</sup>. But in this research, I would like to expand the problem of "pluralism" to the political realm and consider the present and future of the "World Society" (Welt-gesellschaft)<sup>4</sup> while also covering the problem of "globalization".

In the past, the problem of "pluralism" was inevitably intertwined with the problem of "nation-state" and the problem of "nationalism". This is because "pluralism" as a political concept first appeared in history as a political science term in the early 20th century in relation to the problem of governance and sovereignty within the "nation-state" as a matter of fact. "Nation" also appeared in the early days in the struggle between these "nation-states" and later in the "imperial-colonial" subordination to the "colonial powers". The concept of "nation" has been precipitated, constituted, and foregrounded as the "subject" of "governance" or "resistance" in the process of friction and bargaining caused by the discrepancy between the actual situation of the life of a homogeneous population group and the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The results can be found in *Philosophy of Media: The Scope and Limits of Luhmann's Social System Theory* (2006, NTT Publishing) and *Philosophy of the Information Society: Google, Big Data, and Artificial Intelligence* (2016, Keiso Shobo).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> "Pluralism" must be carefully distinguished from the concepts of "multiplicity" and "diversity". The details of these differences will be discussed in this paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> "Is Ethics Possible in an Information Society?" (included in *Philosophy of the Information Society*, cited above).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The concept of "World Society" will be explained in detail in this paper.

national territorial arrangement (i.e., national borders). Therefore, "nationalism" can be reinterpreted as a "pluralistic" resistance to imperial monistic rule. The above should be easily affirmed when considering the movements of Europe before and after World War I; Japan, China, Taiwan, and Korea during the Sino-Pacific War and the Pacific War; and African countries after World War II.

In the postwar period, a different kind of "pluralism" emerged as an issue through the problem of "immigration" in a context different from that of imperialism. This too is based on the obvious premise of the framework of the "nation-state"—strictly speaking, the "welfare state"—in the sense that the focus is on the equitable distribution of resources, services, status, and goods to the multiple "ethnic groups" that constitute the nation—that is, ethnicity as distinct from "nation". In this sense, the concepts of "nation" and "ethnicity" and "pluralism" cannot be considered separately. This kind of "pluralism" became a prominent theme in the immigrant nations of the United States, Canada, and Australia, as well as in Germany and France from the latter half of the twentieth century onwards, when they actively pursued immigration policies.

However, in the 21st century, it seems that signs of the emergence of a third "pluralism" that is different from "pluralism"s that share a horizon with imperialism or are derived from immigration policies. This third "pluralism" is different from the previous "pluralism" in that it does not have common roots with the concept of "nation-state" or the "ethnic" problem. In addition, this "pluralism" differs markedly from the "pluralism" of the past in that it has the network medium of the Internet as an indispensable material condition for its existence.

This third "pluralism" is often equated with "multiculturalism", but the two should never be confused. "Multiculturalism" is only one possible aspect within the framework of the second "pluralism" derived from the "immigration" problem, or its evolutionary colorary, no matter how high it is estimated, and it still remains within the old paradigm. Restated from a media-theoretical angle, "multiculturalism" is not an ontological category but at best a category that pertains only to the phenomenal dimension, in the sense that it shares material media conditions with conventional "pluralism". On the other hand, the third "pluralism", is an excellent ontological category that involves a drastic shift in the media infrastructure (from mass media to network media), which is the condition for its feasibility. In other words, this implies a paradigm shift in "pluralism".

At this point, we can finally return to the Taiwan issue, which I mentioned earlier. Taiwan is a pluralistic country that enshrines the principle of "pluralism" in its constitution (Article 10 of the Constitutional Amendment added in the fourth constitutional amendment in 1997). However, there is a marked difference from countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, which continue to advocate "pluralism" today. This is because while the "pluralism" of the United States, Canada, and Australia has as a self-evident premise, apparent or implicit, that they are "nation-states", Taiwan has been inevitably exposed to uncertainty due to the historical background of the establishment of the Republic of China and the "geographical-political" conditions. And the fact is that it is still suspended

in an undecided state as a "nation-state" both internally and externally. This fact cannot help but have an impact on Taiwan's "pluralism".

Don't get me wrong, but of course, Taiwan also has an "ethnic" problem in the form of the "aborigines"(原住民) problem, a hegemony problem over "governance-sovereignty" in the form of "foreigners-mainland people(外省人-本省人)", and in recent years, an "immigration" problem in the form of "new residents(新住民)", and in this respect, the situation is superficially the same as that of other "pluralistic" countries. Nonetheless, because Taiwan does not have a single framework of a "nation-state" that binds these issues together, its "pluralism" must also be alien in comparison with other countries. In other words, due to the uncertainty of the framework of the "nation-state", the substance of "ethnicity", "governance", "sovereignty", "immigration", and "pluralism" cannot but undergo a transformation in Taiwan.

However, this transformation is not necessarily negative in Taiwan. This is because, as a major trend, the world is currently moving toward a decline in the presence of the "nation-state" (accompanied by its reactionary phenomena, of course), and in this sense, Taiwan is at the forefront of "pluralism" — including the fact that Taiwan is a mecca for semiconductor manufacturing that supports network media — and it functions as a good lookout point for viewing a new "pluralism" that is emerging. Therefore, Taiwan was chosen as the base for this research.

### 0-1 Structure of this article

This study is comprised of five sections. In the first section, as a preliminary work, I would like to explore the meaning of the word "pluralism" from a general perspective, and highlight the multilayered implications of this concept from a political angle, focusing on the involvement of the "nationstate". In the second section, based on the connotations of the word "pluralism" identified in the previous section, we will consider the relationship between "pluralism" and "media" in the real world, using several theories as a starting point. In particular, it focuses on the changes in "pluralism" from the time when mass media was the leading media until the last century to the current century, when the Internet, which has now come to cover the entire world, has become the main media. Section 3 provides an overview of the various forms of "pluralism" that can be seen under "globalization", which is a new international political environment realized by Internet media, specifically forms of "empire", "cosmopolitanism", "world society", and "multiculturalism". I also point out the changes that occur in the substance of "ethnicity" as globalization progresses. Section 4 traces the circumstances under which the Republic of China, which has been forced to be estranged from the "nation-state" due to the historical circumstances of its establishment, has paradoxically fostered its own "pluralism", which is the most compatible with globalization because it is free from the shackles of the "nation-state", mainly in relation to the "media". Finally, in Section 5, we envision the future of pluralism with reference to Taiwan's unique "pluralism".

### 1 Nation-States and Pluralism

In this section, we will highlight the multilayered implications of the concept of "pluralism" from a political angle, particularly in relation to the concept of the "nation-state". Before we do so, we define what "pluralism" means from a general perspective, including etymological considerations, as preliminary work.

# 1-1 What is pluralism?

"Pluralism" implies "plurality", as evidenced by the fact that the opposite of the adjective "plural", which is the source of the word and frequently used as a technical term in English grammar, is "singular". Nevertheless, this plurality should not be confused with "multiplicity". This is because "multiplicity" is considered to mean that the elements that make it up are homogeneous or that differences between them can be ignored, whereas the elements that make up "pluralism" are must be mutually dissimilar in nature. It is also impossible to equate "diversity" which emphasizes the heterogeneity of elements, with "pluralism". This is because the elements that make up "diversity" mean the dispersion of attributes based on the sharing of a certain "essence = main body", the system of differences premised on commonality, and thus coexistence beyond the differences of various elements, while "pluralism" implies the essential heterogeneity of individual "elements=fundaments", or more precisely, the incompatibility with each other based on the self-identity of each individual "element = fundament". Therefore, in "pluralism", even if "elements=origins" coexist, they do not coexist in a state of appeasement, but rather in a state of antagonism.

The above etymological considerations provide a theoretical basis for the unjustifiability of the attitude of confusing "pluralism" with "multiculturalism" or equating the two. The "multi-" in "multiculturalism" refers to "diversity", where "sameness" is secretly anticipated before "difference" is recognized. In other words, the focus of "multiculturalism" is not on the "differences" of "different cultures" but rather on their "coexistence". Namely, "multiculturalism" assumes the existence of a single principle that presides over an existing stable environment in which various "different cultures" can coexist, which is regarded as self-evident from the beginning. On the other hand, what is at issue in "pluralism" is the mutual coordination of a plurality of incompatible principles that stand side-byside. Unlike the case of "multiculturalism", in "pluralism", the possibility of a single principle is abandoned from the outset. What is at issue here is the problem of "justice", or more precisely, what Aristotle called "distributive justice" ( $\delta(\alpha\alpha \kappa \mu\eta\tau tk \delta v \delta(\alpha \alpha \omega)$ , iustitia distributiva) — that is, the realization of balance among several different principles. This is where the dangers and politics of "pluralism" come into play when compared to "multiculturalism". The dangers and politics of this "pluralism" are radicalized in the operation of state governance.

#### 1-2 Pluralism in national governance

"Pluralism" in national governance is positioned as a counter-idea to, and an alternative to, "monistic" domination in state governance. For example, if we take the Roman Empire as an example, we can say for the time being that imperial dictatorship and oligarchy, i.e., dictatorship of small groups, are "monistic" forms of government, while republics and democracies are "pluralistic" forms of government. Why say I "for the time being"? It is good as long as the "people"( $\delta \eta \mu o \varsigma$ ) who constitute the elements of "pluralism" in "democracy" are secured by systems such as representative (e.g., public elections by election, random lots or rotation systems) and direct democracy (e.g., the "people's assembly" ( $\dot{\epsilon}\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma(\alpha)$  in Athens). However, when each person begins to shout his own presumptuous claims and act in accordance with his or her personal beliefs, the plurality of principles explodes into enormous explosions, causing the principles to collide and create a state of anarchy in which "the struggle of all against all" is waged on the ground. On the other hand, when demagogues skillful in gaining the emotional support of the people turn them into amplified "soundboard" and homogenized into a crowd that is merely a mass", or when some people awakened to class consciousness exercise dominion over those who belong to (allegedly) other classes (e.g., the dictatorship of the proletariat), the "pluralism" of democracy can easily be turned into "monistic" governance.

What is important for "pluralism" in this case is not the nature of the polity or the form of governance, but the mission to realize the coordination and control of the "pluralistic" principle, while preserving "plurality" as "plurality", that is, without being transformed into "monism" or entangled in it. From this perspective, compared to a "republic", which assumes a limited number of "groups" or "organizations" as the element of "plurality", a "democracy", which places the element of "plurality" at the level of "individuals", has as many "principles" as there are individuals, which makes it extremely difficult to adjust and control to achieve equilibrium among principles in that multiple principles can stick to a single principle or, conversely, diverge, causing an inflation of principles. This innate incompatibility between "democracy" and "pluralism"(i.e., liberalism) is the reason why the fusion of the two has been constantly frustrated in spite of the tireless attempts to do so to the present day.

#### 1-3 Pluralism and sovereignty

The conflict between "unitary" and "pluralistic" governance is a result of the progress of society from a feudal to an industrial society, and the growing presence of the bourgeoisie in industry through the civil and industrial revolutions. This conflict arose as a battle over the "sovereignty" of the state, that is, the legitimacy of state governance, whether it be centralized rule symbolized by the dictatorship of the "king" and an oligarchy including his vassals, the "nobility"(= monism), or a decentralized rule based on consultation among various groups and organizations with different interests (i.e., parliamentary system), rejecting unipolar rule (i.e., pluralism).

In centralized governance, although there are different views on what is the ultimate subject of governance, such as "king" or "kingship" or "state reason", by centralizing the governing entity, (1) the governing entity is identified with the state itself (Louis XIV's famous "I am the state(L'État, c'est moi)"), and (2) the "purpose" of the state is defined a priori in the governance of the state, and (3) Regarding individual cases, emphasis is placed on the "decisions" of the subject of governance. In other words, in monistic governance, a "state" is conceptualized and substantiated, and this is equated with the governing entity — whatever name it may be called, such as "king", "royal authority", or "state reason".

On the other hand, in pluralistic governance, various variations can arise on how to think about the "terms" that make up "pluralism" — for example, in the "tripartite" of the Ancien Régime before the French Revolution, the three statuses of "clergy", "nobles", and "commoners", and in guild socialism, various professional associations, etc. — and the pluralization of governing entities leads to the fact that (1) The subject of governance is placed at the level of "society" rather than at the level of the "state", resulting in a dual system of "state-society" in which the "state" encompasses "society". (2) In governing, "factuality" and "positivity" are more important than "purpose". (3) The "procedure" and "process" of reaching a consensus on a decision are emphasized rather than a "decision".

What is important is that in pluralistic governance, a new level of "society" is incorporated within the "state", and the subject of "governance" is placed at this level of "society". Furthermore, in this system of governance, the "sovereignty" of the state is not granted to a single person or entity, such as a "king", who is identified with the "state", but to the various groups and organizations that make up the "society". As a result, a single sovereignty is decentralized at the level of "society", and consequently, the "state" and "society" become increasingly dissociated and divergent. In the 21st century, "society" finally overflows the framework of the "state" and surpasses the "state", which will be discussed in detail in the next section. Before that discussion, we must consider the question of the relationship between "pluralism" and "nation" as a preparatory work.

### 1-4 Ethnicity and Nation

There are various views on what "ethnicity" really is, ranging from the essentialist argument (although it has now lost most of its support) that it is based on the biological racial dimension, to the argument that it is a complete fiction, a concept based on social or political constructs. This paper has no intention of treading into the tricky realm of giving in to one or the other, or inventing new definitions. For our part, since it is sufficient to discuss the relationship between "ethnicity" and "nation" in relation to "pluralism", we would like to substitute the definition of "ethnicity" with a number of indications that various arguments will agree with—or at least not oppose it.

Let us ask again, what is a "nation"? First and foremost, it is defined as a group rooted in a shared "tradition" that includes (1) discourses of origin (myths and heroic legends), historical experiences,

lifestyle, religion, and spirituality. (2) Therefore, it is essential for a group to live together in order to share and transmit its "traditions". In other words, a "nation" must be reproduced through settlement. (3) Consequently, it has a strong connection with land. This is because reproduction of "nation" is impossible without "land" for settlement.

Now, I hope that there will be no objection to (1), but with regard to (2), it may be argued by citing the Jewish people (especially those before the founding of the State of Israel) as a counter-proof example and (3) by citing nomadic tribes as a counter-proof example. However, in the case of the Jewish people before the establishment of the State of Israel, as long as they formed small colonies in various places, the principle of "settlement" is unshakable, and the very existence of the Zionist movement is a perfect evidence that the "people" are inherently inclined to "gather". However, in the case of nomadic tribes, the focus is on grasping the concept of "land". Nomadic tribes are constantly moving from place to place and do not settle on fixed "land". However, when "land" is interpreted not as a place of residence but as a living environment that includes the natural environment, it can be assumed that nomadic tribes are also bound by the "land" of the steppe zone. What we would like to focus on most in the current discussion is the last issue, (3), the close connection between "ethnicity" and "land", but let us proceed with the discussion carefully. What we would like to discuss in this section is the so-called "ethnic problems".

Now, "ethnicity" emerges as a problem when the "state" intervenes in "ethnicity." Conversely, if multiple "ethnic groups" simply compete against each other or fight each other, even though it is a conflict between "ethnic groups," it does not constitute an "ethnic problem". For example, consider the case in which two ethnic groups are in conflict with the use of common land. In this conflict, the focus remains on the convenience of using "land" and not on "ethnicity." In other words, in terms of conflict, "ethnicity" is only a secondary factor. However, the situation changes drastically as soon as the "ethnicity" is covered by the "nation-state". This is because the conflict over "land" then becomes a border dispute over "territory." If the countries involved in the conflict are "nation-states" made up of different "ethnic groups", the situation takes on the aspect of an "ethnicity" and the range of "ethnic = national" territory defined by "national borders" are generally incompatible, and the gap between the two causes the "ethnic" problem. Rather, the "ethnic problems" are nothing but another name for this gap.

However, the above-mentioned cases of "ethnic" conflicts, although they are a part of the "ethnic problem", are actually only budding and special cases of the "ethnic problem". This is because although the above cases assume that the national powers of the two ethnic groups are equal, in many cases, contrary to this assumption, there is usually a clear difference in national power between the two ethnic groups. In this case, border disputes develop into situations in which one dominant ethno-

nation annexes or swallows another inferior ethno-nation<sup>5</sup> or a single inferior ethno-nation is partitioned by a group of superior ethno-nations. What cannot be overlooked at this time is that the "ethnicity" that constituted the inferior "ethnic group = nation" is incorporated into the dominant "ethnic group = nation", and the "majority-minority" disparity between ethnic groups is artificially constructed within the "nation=state". The emergence of so-called "ethnic minorities" created by the "majority-minority" gap within the "nation-state" constitutes the second "ethnic problem".

Now, when a dominant ethno-nation continues to expand its territory, and expands its reach on a global scale, annexing not only neighboring inferior ethno-nations but also distant ones, the dominant ethno-nation became an "empire," a "suzerain state," and incorporated various inferior ethno-nations as its "colonies." This is the emergence of so-called "imperialism." What is characteristic of the "nation-state" in the "imperialist" phase is that the "empire" almost without exception constitutes a so-called "multi-ethnic state" that includes the predominant "nation-state" that constitutes its "suzerain state". Before World War I, it was evident that the legitimacy of governance, or "sovereignty", belonged to the "suzerain state". However, when the so-called "national self-determination" principle, which advocates "one people, one nation" began to be advocated during the interwar period, the principle of exclusive "sovereignty" belonging to the "suzerain state" began to waver, and the attribution of "sovereignty", which should be inherent to colonial "nations", became a subject of debate. After World War II, various struggles, or "national independence" movements, were launched by colonial "nations" to acquire "sovereignty" as independent "nations" in accordance with the principles of "national self-determination" and "one people, one nation". This "national independence" constitutes the third "ethnic problem".

Through the above three overviews of the "ethnic problem", I would like to emphasize that, first, the "ethnic problem" is constituted only through the intervention of the "nation=state", that is, the "ethnic problem" does not exist independently of the "nation-state", and second, the connection between "ethnicity" and "nation" has become stronger with the progress of the "ethnic problem". The framework of "nation=state" is an indisputable and self-evident premise when discussing "ethnicity".

1-5 Ethnicity and pluralism in the post-colonial world

The inextricable relationship between "ethnicity" and "nation-state" that was discussed in the previous section was argued from the viewpoint that "ethnicity" occupies a pivotal position in the formation stage of "nation", or that "ethnicity" is an essential element of the composition of a "nation". However, a movement such as the "rush" to create a "nation state" like the one immediately after World War II cannot be expected today, despite the fact that phenomena such as the disappearance,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Note that in the diaspora of the Jewish people and the abduction and trafficking of black slaves, the state is not involved on the side of the inferior "ethnic=racial" group, but on the side of the superior "ethnic" group, the "nation-state" is involved.

annexation, and creation of nations can be seen even now. At this point, the "ethnic" issue entered a fourth new stage.

The new stage of the "ethnic" problem can be characterized by the "dissociation-divergence" between the "ethnicity" and the "nation". In other words, when discussing "ethnicity", it is no longer necessary to refer to the "nation". This is because the "state" has become self-evident and transparent as a framework that accepts "ethnicity" to the point where it is no longer necessary to re-examine the relationship between "ethnicity" and "nation". And in this new stage, when the "state" is diminishing its relative presence, what is emerging in place of the "state" is nothing less than the problematic of "pluralism".

Now, despite the "rush" to create "nation = state" that arose immediately after World War II, there are not many "nations" that can be regarded as realizing the ideals of "national self-determination" and "one people, one nation" in the current "nation = state" group. In other words, a considerable number of existing "nations" in the world are "multiethnic states". However, this does not mean that the inferior "peoples" belonging to the "multi-ethnic state" will start an independence movement with the aim of gaining "sovereignty" from now on. Such assumption is unrealistic in the current international environment. The world's "nations" are currently in a state of "freeze" with no small number of "multi-ethnic nations" in their midst.

If this is the case, the next best thing is to accept for the time being the postcolonial status quo of the "multi-ethnic state", which is a remnant of the "empire-colonial" system, and then aim to improve the human rights, status, and welfare of multiple "ethnic groups" within the "nation-state", protect their culture, and allocate resources (including "land") in a way that is appropriate to their rights. Here, within the framework of "nation-state"—paradoxically—the dimension of "ethnicity" detached from the concept of "nation-state" (i.e., not an essential element of the "nation-state" structure) comes to the foreground, but at this level "ethnicity" is different from one that was inseparably linked to the essence of "nation-state", and is a relative "ethnicity" that exists within the "nation-state".

As described above, the fourth "ethnic problem", while premised on the framework of the "nationstate", which has increased its obviousness and transparency and at the same time decreased its presence, is committed to the problem of how to realize the cohabitation of various "ethnic" groups within the framework, in other words, to "pluralism."

### 1-6 Pluralism and Multiculturalism

The framework of "nation-state" that constituted the frame of reference in the old "ethnic" issue– and the principles that maintained this framework were "governance" and "sovereignty"—underwent a drastic shift in the fourth phase of the "ethnic" problem to "(various) ethnicities—pluralism". The principle driving this new framework is "coexistence".

At this point, "pluralism", the theme of this paper, has finally emerged as the subject of the debate

over "ethnicity" and "nation-state", and we would like to draw the reader's attention to a few points, keeping in mind the later discussion. The first thing to keep in mind is easily seen from the fact that the principle of maintenance of the old framework of "nation-state" is "governance" and "sovereignty", this system is nothing but a formulation of the "unitary governance" form of the previous section from the viewpoint of "ethnic groups". Therefore, even if the "nation-state" in question has "other-multiple" ethnic groups, the inferior "ethnic groups" other than the "sovereign" "ruling ethnic group" are subordinate to the only superior "ethnic group", that is, they are positioned as the "governed." Thus, the "ethnic = national" framework is a three-dimensional and hierarchical system. On the other hand, in the "ethnic = pluralist" framework, "peoples" are considered mutually equal, regardless of their reality, and at least in principle, the goal is to achieve such a state of affairs. In this sense, this system is a type of "pluralistic governance", defined in the previous section as the opposite of "unitary governance". Thus, this system can be imagined as a state of coexistence of various "peoples" on a two-dimensional plane.

The second point is noteworthy. As can be seen from the fact that all of the "ethnic" problems from the first one to the third one, which are based on the framework of "nation = state", occur without exception in the dimension of the establishment of the "nation" itself, "ethnicity" is an indispensable element in the composition of the "nation-state" within this framework. In other words, the absence of "ethnic groups" immediately means the collapse of the "nation-state". However, this is not the case in the framework of "ethnic=pluralism". The absence of one "ethnic group" does not necessarily mean the collapse of the "nation-state" to which that "ethnic group" belonged. An example of this situation is "immigration". The existence of "immigrants" is based on the pre-existence of established "nationstates", and refers to "ethnic groups" who move in and out of them. The majority of modern "multiethnic nations" are made up of such ethnic "immigrants". This fact also shows that the importance of the "nation-state" is declining in the current "ethnic problem".

A final note. Although the presence of the "nation-state" is certainly declining in the "ethnicpluralist" system, this does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of politics in the "pluralist" system. The decline in the presence of the "nation-state" is the result of transparency resulting from the trivialization of the framework of the "nation-state", and the framework of the "nation-state" itself is still valid. Nevertheless, in recent years, there has been a tendency to talk about "pluralism" in a nonpolitical way, ignoring the "nation-state" factor. A typical sign of this is the equation of "pluralism" with "multiculturalism". "Multiculturalism" bleaches and neutralizes the political elements contained in "pluralism" and reduces the politics of "pluralism" to an apolitical and depoliticized "cultural" phenomenon. However, these two concepts are completely different, and should not be confused.

Nevertheless, this phenomenon of identifying "pluralism" with "multiculturalism" in recent years is not completely unreasonable. This is because the Internet, a new medium that emerged rapidly from the end of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century, led to its identification. To focus on this issue, in the next section, I would like to change the angle and approach "pluralism" from the perspective of "media".

#### 2 Pluralism and the Media

In this section, we will examine how "empire", "governance", "nation", "people", "ethnicity", and "pluralism", discussed in the previous section, relate to "media", using various academic theories to establish the relationship between the concepts. Based on the results of this study, I would like to move beyond mere concepts to consideration at the level of the things themselves.

# 2-1 Media and Governance

It was H. Innis of the Toronto School, the founder of the discipline of "media theory", who first theorized the role of "media" in the "governance" of the "state", or more precisely, the "empire"<sup>6</sup>.

Inniss, who began his academic career in the interwar period by researching Canadian specialties, published a rapid succession of historical studies after World War II that focused on analyzing the relationship between "governance" and "media". His research deals with the historical emergence of "nations"—which he calls "empires"<sup>7</sup>—over a long period of time, from ancient times to the present, and over a geographically large area of the globe, beginning with the ancient Egyptian and Persian empires, through the Roman Empire, and ending with the modern-day imperialist "nations" led by the British Empire<sup>8</sup>.

According to Innis, the political structure and fate of an "empire" on the table of analysis are determined by what the empire used as its primary "medium". Inis clearly defines "media" as materials, and then recognizes two polarities in "media" as materials. One is the polarity recognized for media such as "stone" and "clay", which are generally less portable due to their large mass, but have superior preservation properties as a trade-off. Innis calls this media polarity the "time-bias" of the media. Another polarity is found in media such as "papyrus" and "paper", which, contrary to the media mentioned earlier, are superior in portability because they are lightweight, but in turn they are inferior in preservation. He calls this media polarity the "space-bias" of the media. Innis argues that all material media must be within a continuous "spectral space" set by these two polarities, and thus exhibit different mixing ratios of both biases.

What Innis has extracted from his research is the techno-deterministic effect of the above-mentioned bipolar "media" characteristics on "empires". The more the media used by a particular "empire" are biased toward the "time-biased" side, the greater the secrecy, or monopoly, of knowledge and the more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Innis, H., *Empire and Communications*, Clarendon Press, 1950. *The Bias of Communication*, University of Toronto Press, 1951.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Innis, H., *Empire and Communications*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ibid.

pronounced the emphasis on tradition, resulting in a culture that stagnates without any change over a long period. In return, however, governance is stable and long-lasting. Inis cites the ancient Egyptian kingdom as an example of this. Conversely, when the media used by the "empire" is skewed toward "space-bias", the propagation and distribution of information becomes easier, and the country is filled with an enterprising spirit and a flurry of inventions and innovations (including military technology), rapidly expanding its territory. However, the threshold for leaking classified information and plotting conspiracies also lowers, and the empire generally falls quickly. A good example is the Persian Empire. Thus, the constitutive function of the "media" in relation to the "empire" is discussed.

# 2-2 "Nation-State" and Media

On the other hand, M. McLuhan, who belongs to the same Toronto School as Innis, focuses on the role of print media in the formation of the "nation-state". In the case of Innis, "media" was understood as a material necessary for "communication" as "knowledge transport", but for McLuhan, "media" has a strong connotation of a "form" in which "knowledge" and "content" are contained rather than a material. In the case of Innis, it is assumed as a correlation of "media" and is regulated by "media" is the operation and governance of "state = empire", but in the case of McLuhan, it is the formation of "nation = state". There was a significant difference between the two groups in this respect.

The "nation" that constitutes the entity of the "nation-state", is not a ready-made entity but an artificial product of its own composition. In other words, the members of various organizations and geographical communities are organized into a homogeneous "nation" as an afterthought. The most effective means of homogenization is the "national language", which is used to equalize deviations among groups, communities, and individuals. The "national language" is not just a language, but a system established and controlled by the "state", and even when its use is not compulsory for the "people", it is made the de facto standard as the "official language". As individuals belonging to various organizations and communities become homogenized through the use of the "national language becomes unconscious and physicalized, the user becomes a "nation" in both name and reality.

The national language, which is the medium of homogeneous creation of the "nation", must be materially homogeneous, and must be stable and robust enough to exhibit "rigidity" against deterioration, even if it is not immutable. In addition, it is necessary to have diffusivity that allows the "national language" to be propagated to the "people" scattered throughout the country without compromising homogeneity. The media that materially realizes the homogeneity, stability, robustness,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> McLuhan, M., *The Gutenberg Galaxy: the Making of Typographic Man*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962. *Understanding Media: the Extensions of Man*, McGraw-Hill, 1964.

and diffusivity required by the "national language" is nothing less than "print press".

Gutenberg invented the art of typography in the mid-fifteenth century, which led to the weakening of Catholicist religious communities and the reformation in the 16th century by enabling the typographic dissemination of the Bible to individuals. In the same 16th century, the humanist Petrus Rams brought a large number of uniform textbooks printed in print to the educational field, thus creating the conditions for the establishment of a "national language" from the educational scene. From the 17th century onward, "nation-states" were established one after another in Europe, in which "nation-states" were considered to have sovereignty over their own people. It was distributed throughout the "land" in the form of textbooks, news reports, official documents, etc., to reproduce the "nation" and to strengthen the consciousness of the "nation".

In that case, we must keep in mind that the "national language", which was originally created as a medium to create a "nation", has become an "institution" integrated with the print media, which has also become a means of "governance". Therefore, the "national language" inevitably has a centralized character that can be imagined as a cone with the governing structure at the top and people at the bottom.

#### 2-3 Ethnicity and Media

Karl Deutsch and Benedict Anderson have discussed the relationship between "nation" and "media" in the postcolonial stage, when "ethnic groups" who were incorporated into the ruling system of the suzerain state during the "imperialist" era awakened themselves as "nation=people" in accordance with the ideals of "national self-determination" and "one people, one nation", and aimed to break free from the shackles of the imperialist system presided over by the suzerain state and to become "independent=autonomous" as "nation=state". Let us begin with Deutsch's theory.

Deutsch was a political scientist who immigrated from the Czech Republic to the United States, which was dismantled by the Nazis. Because of this background, he originally specialized in the study of nationalism. His aim was to elucidate the mechanism by which a specific ethnic group forms its own "(ethnic)nation=state" and maintains, sustains, and develops it based on "information and communication"<sup>10</sup>.

From the viewpoint of information science, Deutsch views the substance of nationalism as a "message" for the realization of "national" integration, including history, religion, customs, traditions, and so on. The social communication system is viewed as a media infrastructure for the distribution, circulation, and storage of the "message" to the individual members of the ethnic group. Conversely, an "ethnic group" as a community can exist only by sharing "message" through the social communication system. In this case, each member of the "ethnic group" plays the role of an effector

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Deutsch, K., Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 1953.

that outputs "actions" in response to the input of "message". In this way, the ethnic group integrated with the social communication system (media) advances toward the formation of a "nation-state".

Deutsch developed the theory outlined above in *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (1963) were based on cybernetics, but just 20 years later, B. Anderson published *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1983) with an awareness of the problems that overlapped with Deutsch. Anderson also shares the post-colonial manner of rethinking imperialism from the perspective of governed peoples and theorizing the process of their independence movements around "media." However, while Deutsch focused on the communication infrastructure of "media", Anderson's focus is on the institution of "publication". This is because print publications such as newspapers and magazines are the "medium" that overcomes the dispersion of ethnic diasporas and regional deviations and confirms ethnic identities.

What is important is that Anderson (and Deutsch as well) views the term "(ethnic) nation= state" as having its origin in a terrestrial community and as its evolving form. In other words, they believe that "message" and "publishing" can secure "national" identities by serving as alternative functions when "local affinity" is lost from an ethnic community due to dispersion or immigration. However, as McIver, a sociologist who has made a comprehensive study of the community, says, the essence of "community" is the communal nature of "life" through the sharing of the same terrestrial land. It is impossible to replace the community of "life" by the mere sharing of "information.<sup>11</sup>"

This is the reason why Anderson negatively defines the "(ethnic)nation=state" that has developed from a terrestrial ethnic community through the medium of "information" as nothing more than an imaginary "pseudo-community" rather than an actual formal "community". By analyzing the fragility of communality based on "information" and the process of the career path that ethnic elites follow while traveling through empires, which he calls "secular pilgrimage", Anderson also exposes the imitative kitsch of "nation=state" that will be carried out by ethnic elites. It also exposes the essential fictionality of the original Western "nation = state" itself.

# 2-4 From unified "Broad-Cast" to pluralistic "Net-Work"

Now, we must be aware that McLuhan's "print-press", Deutsch's "message", and Anderson's "publishing", which I mentioned in the previous section, are all media technologies that converge into so-called "mass media".

Mass media is an information distribution system that was established in the early 19th century or, at the earliest, in the mid-18th century. Mass media will replace the specific media technologies that are responsible for this one after another (such as "newspapers"  $\rightarrow$  "movies"  $\rightarrow$  "radio"  $\rightarrow$  "television") but as long as these media technologies are mass media, they will not lack the following three

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> MacIver, R., *Community, A Sociological Study: Being an Attempt to Set Out the Nature and Fundamental Laws of Social Life*, Routledge,1917.

characteristics.

First, they have a single source of information, that is, the apex of the cone, and the information is broadcast simultaneously to the masses at the base of the cone. This information transmission is one-sided and transmission from the public to the source is not performed. Second, because of the one-way nature of information transmission mentioned above, "information" becomes a rare good and becomes a "commodity" that is purchased and consumed by the masses. In other words, mass media forms a market as an "information industry". Third, due to the identity of the "information" being distributed and the huge number of "masses" who receive it, the "masses" form a homogeneous and collective social stratum. From a different perspective, it can be said that the existing "public" does not receive the same "information", but, on the contrary, the reception of the same "information" (= public opinion) that sources issue to the "masses".

We refer to the three-dimensional, hierarchical information distribution system characterized by the three characteristics described above as a "Broad-Cast" system, which is imagined as a cone with the central source of information at the top and the "masses" receiving the information at the bottom(see Fig.1).

It is obvious that McLuhan's print, "print-press", Deutsch's "message", and Anderson's "publication" are all technologies that are integrated with this kind of "Broad-Cast" broadcast


information distribution system. It goes without saying that such a hierarchical structure of the "Broad-Cast" technologically enables and supports the unitary system of "nation-state" governance.

From the end of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century, the information distribution system experienced a drastic landslide shift. Mass media, with television as the last technology, has lost subsequent media technologies, and its influence has been gradually declining. New media devices, such as personal computers and smartphones, which use the Internet as their infrastructural environment, are now achieving explosive diffusion, but these new media essentially differ from the mass media that flourished in the previous century in the following respects.

First, they form a network with nodes that are individual media users, and the exchange of information between nodes is bidirectional. This network can be extended indefinitely in two dimensions, and does not constitute a three-dimensionally closed hierarchy like a "Broad-Cast" system. Second, due to the interactivity of transmission, "information" loses its scarcity and has the characteristics of gift goods. Therefore, here, "information" itself does not form a market, but rather the business model is the enclosure of a group of nodes that guarantees matching between nodes when giving and receiving "information". Third, the heterogeneity of the "information" exchanged and received within the network and the timing of the information being emitted change the network from

moment to moment, and as a result, it is impossible to grasp the entire network, and the grasp is always accompanied by uncertainty.

From now on, we will call the multidimensional (reception = transmission) system of information, which are characterized by the three characteristics mentioned above, "Net-Work" in contrast to "Broad-Cast", which I have already characterized. "Net-Work" is a two-dimensional system that is



constantly in the process of generation(See Fig.2).

What we would like to focus on is the fact that the media system of "Broad-Cast" is extremely compatible with the "unitary"governance mentioned in the previous section because of its hierarchical

and closed structure. On the other hand, the "Net-Work" system is more compatible with "pluralism" because of the miscellaneous nature of its nodes and its indefinite two-dimensionality without a pinnacle for control. Of course, "pluralism" is not impossible within the "Broad-Cast" system, but in such a case, "pluralism" must necessarily be a "pluralistic" governance in which "unitary" governance is downsized and pluralized. However, "pluralism" itself changes its nature by shifting from a "Broad-Cast" system to a "Net-Work" system.

In addition, the "Net-Work" has gradually expanded in scale owing to its flexibility and unstoppable extensibility, and now covers the entire globe. So-called "globalization" is just another name for the globalization of "Net-Work". In the next section, we consider the relationship between "globalization" and "pluralism" based on the findings of this section.

3 Pluralism in Globalization

Since the end of the last century, the global distribution of people, goods, money, and information across national borders has become common, and this phenomenon has been called "globalization". There are two aspects of this phenomenon. One is that the presence of the "nation-state", which had been a major player in international negotiations, including distribution, has declined, and multinational corporations, stateless NGOs, and other organizations have taken its place, gaining importance. This shift in players has rendered national borders only nominal, and in turn, "borders" are becoming an impediment to activities and negotiations. Another aspect is that the material condition that made "globalization" possible in the first place and spurred its expansion is the media infrastructure of "Net-Work", specifically the technological environment of the Internet, which was the subject of the latter part of the previous section. In other words, even if a "nation-state" closes its borders politically, the movement of "globalization" will never cease as long as the media infrastructure of "Net-Work" is functioning.

Globalization is currently redrawing the internal reality of various political entities and concepts such as "empire", "nation", "ethnicity", and "governance". Pluralism, which is the subject of this study, is no exception. In this section, I would like to examine how "pluralism" is being transformed in the midst of "globalization" that has been in full swing since the beginning of this century from various perspectives.

### 3-1 Globalization and the Decline of "Nation = State"

Even if it is true that globalization has reduced the presence of the "state", this does not mean that the "state" will disappear in the future due to the rise of globalization. In international politics, the United Nations, which is a political organization "higher" to "states", does not currently have the authority to take regulatory or coercive measures against existing states, and is at most a forum for coordinating interests among states, so the main player is still the "state".

However, once they leave the formal arena of international politics and become concerned about individual issues, various international NGOs, such as Greenpeace on environmental issues, Médecins Sans Frontières in medical matters, and Save the Children in Children's Rights issues, have developed international activities independently of the state, have achieved some results, and have a certain amount of influence. In the economic sphere, multinational corporations are gaining power to the point where they can slip through the web of state regulation or engage in international commerce beyond the head of state policy and, in some cases, even influence the formulation of national policy. In other words, under globalization, international relations have undergone pluralism and functional differentiation, and players with different functions and dimensions have come to play a role. The "state" is only a player in charge of a political dimension and political function. Here, the phenomenon of relativization of status, in which the "state", which had previously assumed the position of "subject" in international relations as the only entity with "sovereignty", lost its privileged position and was downgraded to a mere node of the network when it was embedded in a global pluralistic network of "communication".

If we look at the situation from a different angle, what has occurred is that the system that was based on the self-evident premise of the existence of the "nation-state" and that only the "nation-state" to which the "sovereignty" of the "people" was entrusted was allowed to be a player in international negotiations, has been forced to include various forms of "organizations" including corporations and NGOs as players in the process of the progress of globalization. As a result, "organizations" have increased their presence as players more than "states", and eventually even "states" have come to be regarded as a special form of "organizations".

Let us consider the same situation from the viewpoint of "governance". In the "nation-state" system, the "nation" is both the unit of "governance" and the subject of "governance" (in other words, the object of "governance" is the "people"). When this hierarchical relationship of "nation-

state $\rightarrow$ governance $\rightarrow$ people" is slid directly into international relations, it becomes "international polity $\rightarrow$ governance $\rightarrow$ nation-state". In this case, it should be noted that the so-called "international polity" is regarded as the only political "subject" with "sovereignty" in international relations. In other words, the current "United Nations", which has only a mediation function, does not deserve the name of "international polity". Nevertheless, the ideal of international relations, including the United Nations, has always been a "world government" that governs all these "nation-states". However, as we have seen earlier, international relations in the context of globalization are based on "organizations" rather than "states", so it is no longer possible to grasp them in terms of a model such as "governance by the state". Now that we have acknowledged that "international relations" do not consist only of "states", we must refrain from even calling them inter-"national" relations in the first place. Under globalization, there is a need for a shift from the "central" model of "governance by the state" to a network-based "pluralistic control" model in which "organizations" are the players.

#### 3-2 Empire, Cosmopolitanism, or World Society?

Currently, three theories have been proposed as network-based models for understanding the world under globalism. One is the "Empire-Multitude" theory by Negri = Hart, the second is the "cosmopolitanism" theory advocated by Ulrich Beck, and the last is the "World Society" theory advocated by Niklas Luhmann. What these three theories have in common are, first, that they view the current state of the world that has been subjected to globalization as a network, second, that they reconsider the "nation-state" as a by-product of the network without materializing it, and third, that they reject the schema of "unitary" governance and present a "pluralistic" theoretical structure as an alternative. However, there are also differences between the three, which cannot be overlooked. In this section, the characteristics are described sequentially based on these differences.

We begin with Negri=Heart's theory. They see the Empire and Multitude as two antagonistic forces in a globalized world. "Empire" is modeled on the "empire" in so-called "imperialism", but it is not a maximization of the "nation-state" based on territory, people, and military, but the embodiment of network power or information power that has spread over the world. However, in the fact that Negri = Hart regards the "Empire" as a "unitary" "sovereignty = subject" in the network, the "Empire" still retains the tailbone of the old "Empire", that is, the "nation-state." Alternatively, the Empire can be seen as the "negative" of the dystopian reversal of the idealized "world government". On the other hand, the "Multitude" is a "pluralistic" force that is exploited by the "Empire" but opposes it in order to regain the "sovereignty = subjectivity" from the "Empire." Therefore, for Negri = Hart, globalization is a transitional process of struggle in which the world transitions from "unitary" to "pluralistic" governance.

The problem with their understanding of the world, apart from the fact that their theoretical structure is an almost caricatured dualism of good and evil, similar to Star Wars' "Imperial Forces vs. Rebels" rather than Marx's "Capital vs. Proletariat", is that their theoretical structure still sees "pluralism" as a form of "governance"—that is, as an object of recapture from the "empire" over who holds the "sovereignty = subject". This implies that they remained trapped within the framework of the "state" model. Furthermore, the teleological concept of liberation from the exploitative system of the Empire through Multitude is naïve.

In the case of Negri = Hart, "pluralism" was understood in a dualistic opposition in the form of "monism" of "Empire" versus "pluralism" of "Multitude", but in the case of Beck, which we see next, the world under globalization is simply set as a single "stage" for "pluralistic" conflict or bargaining. The way of understanding the world that Beck names "cosmopolitan" does not necessarily imply the original meaning of "world government", that is, "the government of governments" that regards the world itself as a "nation". Rather, it implies, if not the exit of the "nation" from the "stage", at least its side character. In other words, Beck's term "cosmopolitan" refers to an extremely relativistic understanding of globalization that sees the world as a "stage" for a game in which corporations, NGOs, and other "organizations" are players, and "nations" are only one of those players.

In Beck's understanding, "pluralism" appears as a plurality of players. This inevitably leads to plurality in understanding the world held by each player. Simply put, this is nothing more than anarchism. Negri = Hart's Multitude also implicitly had an element of anarchism, as long as it was a counterpart to the "unitary" rule of the Empire, but it was brought to the fore in Beck's composition. The anarchism evident in Beck's composition is also related to the fact that teleology prominent in the composition of Negri = Hart has disappeared, and in its place, the uncertainty of the world—the infinite extension of the goal in the game—has emerged.

What is common to both Negri = Hart and Beck is the introduction into the theoretical composition of some kind of "subjectivity"—"Empire" and "Multitude" in the case of Negri = Hart, "player" in the case of Beck—and some "normativity"—"purpose" in the case of Negri = Hart, and "rules of the game" in Beck's case. As a result, "subjectivity" and "revolution" (Negri = heart), or "winning and losing" and "loss of ideals" (= "anarchism" = "nihilism") are mixed in with the theoretical structure. On the other hand, Luhmann's theory of "World Society", which we will see next, is characterized by its dedication to the "description" of "society" under globalization.

Luhmann's theory reflects the declining status of the "state" in the current society under globalization, and he takes the same measures as Beck to regard the "state" as a special form of "organization". Unlike Beck, however, Luhmann does not regard the various "organizations" as "players in the game", each with its own "subjectivity". For Luhmann, "organization" is a node in the chain of "communication", and is therefore only a secondary entity that constitutes "society". It is communication that constitutes society. Rather, "society" is nothing more than another name for the "communication" chain. World society, as Luhmann calls it, is the result of the global expansion of this chain of "communication".

Three points should be noted: First, there is a fundamental difference between the "state" and "society". The "state" is a patch of "organization", but "society" is not. Society is a network that includes "organizations" as nodes within it. World society is the totality of such a global network, and there is only one. In this sense, the "nation" is not an "organization" but a "society".

Second, the "World Society" is a conceptual apparatus for pure "observation and description". Therefore, it does not direct itself to "revolution", "criticism", or "interpretation" of society, nor does it imply any particular ethical attitude such as "anarchism" or "nihilism". It should be noted that the "observation-description" of "society" is also a node of "communication" and therefore must be included in "society". In other words, it is not possible to "observe and describe" "society" from the outside. Thus, "society" and therefore "World Society" also emerge as a self-regulating body that "observes and describes" in a self-referential manner. This is the first time that the shift from a "governance" model modeled on the "state" to a "control" model specific to "society" has been achieved.

Third, "pluralism" in the "World Society" is "functional" pluralism. Communication, which is the substance of "society", can be talked about as any content, but subsystems tend to differentiate according to the content. For example, "economic communication", "law-politics communication", "academic communication", "religious communication", "aesthetic communication", etc. This differentiation of each function in "communication" is the essence of "pluralism" in "World Society".

In this way, Luhmann changed the traditional structure of "monistic governance" by the "state" into a theoretical structure that describes the characteristics of society as "pluralistic control" in "World Society". However, how has the issue of "ethnicity" changed under globalization? In the next section, we address this issue based on the discussion in this section.

#### 3-3 Globalization and Ethnicity

The issue of "ethnicity" is now polarizing in the midst of globalization. One is the stubborn adherence to the old formula of "ethnicity = nation". That would be fine if that were the case, but under the belief (delusion) of supremacy of one's own (ethnicity = nation), which was tied to the Nazi ideology of "geopolitics = living sphere", they suppressed ethnic minorities within the territory, and even further invaded other "nations". It would be almost "sick". To put it simply, this trend can only be described as an anachronistic behavior that can be described as "neo-imperialism", but when we look at the situation impartially from a macroscopic perspective, it can be seen as a kind of regressive reactionary phenomenon in the progress of globalization. In this case, this phenomenon is only a transitional phenomenon of globalization, along with the "control-dictatorship" system of "governance", and it is a movement that should be weeded out.

Another movement is the dissociation of "ethnicity" from the trinity of "ethnicity = nation = state" and the movement of "ethnicity" to become an "organization". This trend is in line with the declining presence of "ethnicity = nation = state" and the trend of "nation" becoming an "organization" under globalization. The idea of "one people, one nation", in which each "ethnicity" should form a "nation", is unrealistic under globalization. By positioning the "ethnicity" as a subordinate "organization", the issue of "ethnicity" can be divided into two types: vertical adjustment with the "nation", which is a superior "organization", and horizontal adjustment with other "ethnic groups", which are "organizations" at the same level. This opens the door to seeing this as a problem of  $\langle \text{control} \rangle$ .

The second trend constitutes the ethnic problem inherent to globalization in its original sense, but four points must be noted. First, in this new horizon of the ethnic problem, it is formulated as the distribution of national resources. Therefore, the right of independence of the "nation" (i.e., the creation of a new nation) as Kymlicka argues—since the "state" is also an "organization" like the "nation"—is less important (but not completely denied). Second, the focus of the "ethnic" problem has shifted from the traditional issue of "ethnic independence" based on the assumption of indigeneity, to the issue of "immigration." As "ethnic groups" become "organized", their ties to the "land" also become weaker. In other words, "ethnic groups" become mobile or communities based on mobility. This is evidenced by the current situation in which, under globalization, various ethnic groups have left their own countries and formed "immigrant" communities in developed countries, causing friction in various places. Thirdly—and this may be a redundant confirmation—the close connection between "nation" and "state" will be dissolved, the two will diverge, and the relationship between "nation" and "society" will come into the foreground instead. In other words, "ethnic groups" will be incorporated into "society", which is the totality of the "communication" network, as one of its nodes. Finally, the problem of "ethnicity" under globalization gives birth to a new problematic type of pluralism, namely "multiculturalism". Since this last issue involves factors other than "ethnicity", I will discuss it in a separate section.

#### 3-4 Multiculturalism and pluralism

The "organization" of "ethnicity" shifts the issue of "ethnicity" from the realm of "politics" to the realm of "culture". This is because, in the course of globalization, "ethnicity" is separated from "land" and "state" and reorganized into a question of "identity" as a single cultural unit. Such restructuring is also linked to the shift in the main axis of the "ethnic" issue under globalization to the "immigration" issue. In other words, ethnic "identity" on a cultural level that is maintained despite changes in place of residence is at the core of the "immigration" problem, a new phase of the "ethnic" problem under globalization.

And when the coexistence of multiple ethnic groups within the "nation", the organization above the ethnic group, is thematized, the problem of "multiculturalism" is constituted. From our point of view, "multiculturalism" is a position that (1) assumes the existence of the framework of the "state" as a self-evident premise, (2) insists on the coexistence of multiple "cultures" within that framework, and

(3) the equivalence of the values possessed by these "cultures". In addition, the following three points must be noted in "multiculturalism" The first is its apparent apolitical nature. Because the "nation" is assumed to be the superordinate organization that forms the framework, the framework itself is not subjectified, and its existence becomes transparent. In other words, by making the framework invisible, the politics inherent in "multiculturalism" is bleached out, and its politics become hidden. Second, relativism is within the framework. Once we accept the existence of a framework (=state), there is no recognition of superiority or inferiority among the various "cultures" within the framework. Conversely, this means that the "nation" as a framework is tacitly endowed with privileged superiority. In other words, "multiculturalism" combines the absoluteness of the framework (= "state") with the relativity within the framework (=  $\langle culture \rangle$ ). Third, the spread of the Internet has further diluted the connection of "culture" to "land" or geography/spatial factors, and with it, various fractions of "culture" have emerged, ranging from "ethnicity" to "gender", "taste", "hobby", "generation", and so on. This diversification and expansion of the substance of "culture" has further spurred the transparency of the framework. Here, the group principle of "ethnicity" itself is relativized.

However, as I have already suggested at the beginning of this study, the new "pluralism" we are considering is completely different from the "multiculturalism" described above. The latter is an idea of self-referential "control" in the "communication" network of "World Society" that does not assume some dominant, privileged social entity. In order to explore new possibilities of "pluralism", the next section will examine the nature of "pluralism" in Taiwan.

## 4. Pluralism in Taiwan

Taiwan is a country that advocates "multiculturalism", but it shows a slight deviation in its position toward "multiculturalism" or "pluralism" with Canada and Australia, which are also immigrant nations whose national policy is "multiculturalism". In the author's view, this deviation seems to have its roots in its history as a "nation-state" and its position in the international community. This deviation has cast a shadow over the nature of "nationalism" in Taiwan, as well as its response to "globalization". This section describes the special Taiwanese way of "pluralism".

#### 4-1 National Consciousness and Pluralism in Taiwan

It is widely believed that Taiwan's involvement with the modern "nation-state" began in the 17th century, when European absolutist states such as Spain, the Netherlands, and Portugal began to extend their tentacles to the Far East's resources. However, it is unlikely that the Taiwanese people had a clear sense of nation (including anti-national consciousness) in the first half of the 17th century, when the Dutch effectively controlled southern Taiwan as a trading post with China and Japan. This is also true of the period of Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Jing (late 17th century), when the Ming dynasty was destroyed by the Qing Empire on behalf of the Dutch, and the period from the end of the 17th century

to the end of the 19th century, when the Qing expelled the Zheng clan and absorbed Taiwan into the empire. This is because, under the ruling system during this period, Taiwan was seen as a mere trading base and counter-offensive base, and the rulers had little awareness that it was their "territory". For this reason, apart from the indigenous peoples<sup>12</sup>, the Dutch, the Zheng family, the Qing Dynasty, and the Hakka and Fujian people who immigrated from the mainland seem to have lacked a sense of "governance" or "rule", that is, a sense of "sovereignty". In other words, Taiwan during this period was located on the periphery of the so-called "nation", and therefore its relationship with the modern "nation state" is likely to have been vague and indirect.

Such a lukewarm and indirect relationship with the "nation" changed drastically at the end of the 19th century, when Taiwan was forced to face the "nation-state" after the defeat of the Qing Dynasty in the Sino-Japanese War and its cession to Japan, which struggled to follow Western imperialism.

During half-century Japanese rule, Taiwan must have directly experienced the modern "nationstate", as it was inspired by the strong national consciousness of the "Empire of Japan". Generally speaking, the establishment of a "nation" requires "others". In order for the "other" to exist, there must be a "subject" who confronts the "other". In Taiwan, before the Japanese occupation, there was neither such a "subject" nor an "other". Although there were skirmishes between the aborigines who were Taiwan's inhabitants and the Hakka and Fujian people, in general there was no capitalized "Taiwanese" subject, and the ruling Zheng family and the Qing dynasty were the same Han Chinese as the Hakka and Fujian people, and they were not the "others" to the Hakka and Fujian people. The aborigines and the Dutch are not "others" to the Taiwanese. The aborigines and the Dutch are too small in terms of area and population to claim to be the "subject" or "other" of Taiwan.

It was only after the emergence of the "other" of Japan that the Taiwanese people, whether aborigines, Hakka, or Fujian, who were ruled by Japan, should have developed a latent "national" consciousness of Taiwan in opposition to Japan, which imposed the "nation" consciousness of Japan—through the imperialize-movement and making Japanese the official language. This sense of "nation" was not merely subjective and baseless, but was backed by the international law of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which also meant that "Taiwan" was included in the web of international relations of the time as part of the "nation" of the Empire of Japan. A "nation" must have international recognition as a prerequisite to its existence.

Taiwan's sense of "nationhood", which had emerged in line with the emergence of the "other" in Japan, also plateaued at the end of the war. Even after Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government moved its base to Taiwan, Taiwan's suspension as a "state" was not resolved at all. This can be clearly seen in the fact that Taiwan's status has not yet been determined, as in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which stipulated Japan's return to the international community after its defeat in the war, although

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Even for aboriginal peoples, as long as they lack a sense of "nation", a sense of "oppression" and "discrimination" may develop, but a sense of "subjugation" and "sovereignty" should be absent.

Japan renounced all rights and interests in Taiwan but did not indicate where Taiwan should be returned.

The international community officially recognized that "Taiwan" was in a state of suspension as a "nation". In particular, in the 1970s, the United States became close to the Chinese Communist Party. Japan also decided to break off diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan while normalizing diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations as a sacrifice for China to join the United Nations. As a result, Taiwan's isolation from the international community became decisive. From this point on, Taiwan was frozen between the "two Chinas" and remained less than a "state". The suspended state of Taiwan continues to this day.

However, from the perspective of "pluralism", Taiwan's "suspended" status as a "nation" does not necessarily mean misfortune or bad luck. Canada and Australia, both immigrant nations advocating "multiculturalism", were internationally recognized as "nation-states" in 1931 (Canada was recognized as a self-governing territory in 1867 and became independent within the Commonwealth in 1931; Australia was a self-governing territory in 1901 and became independent in 1931), nation-state status is the indisputable premise of the "multiculturalism" policies of both countries. In contrast, Taiwan's pluralism does not have the premise or shackles of a "nation-state". This is what makes Taiwan's "pluralism" unique. In the next section, we consider the characteristics of Taiwan's "pluralism" from the perspective of "nationalism".

### 4-2 From ethnic multiculturalism to pluralism based on digitalization

The lack of a "nation-state" framework in Taiwan, which was confirmed in the previous section, prevents the issue of ethnicity from becoming an "ethnic problem" directly linked to the nation-state, as discussed in section 2. This does not imply that there are no "ethnic" issues in Taiwan. The problems of disadvantage and status that aborigines have suffered have been smoldering since the Dutch settlement, and in recent years, the problem of discrimination against the so-called "Taiwanese new immigrants(新住民)" cannot be ignored<sup>13</sup>. Moreover, even after Taiwan was defined as a federation of ethnic groups, the Han Chinese-centered ideology propagated by the CCP remains a hidden current.

Nevertheless, Taiwan has not experienced a situation in which the "ethnic problem" has emerged as the most intolerable issue in governing, as is the case with the "Quebec problem" in Canada. This is because, in terms of legislation and administration, the so-called "multiculturalism" clause concerning aboriginal peoples was already stipulated in the ninth and tenth paragraphs of the tenth amendment to the Constitution in 1997, when the KMT was in power, and in the field of education, the establishment of undergraduate and graduate schools related to multiculturalism in universities since the mid-1990s and the establishment of a "locality studies" program(the compulsory study of Minnan, Hakka, and aboriginal languages) in elementary education in 1997 have all contributed to the emergence of Taiwan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The recent documentary film Nine Spears 『九槍』 (2022), by 蔡崇龍, deals with this issue.

as an ethnically diverse country. However, as I pointed out earlier, at the root of this is the fact that "ethnicity" is not connected to "national rights" —more precisely, there was no strong sense of "nation" in Taiwan that could be linked to "national rights".

Under the DPP government led by Chen Shui-bian, who became president in 2000, the whole of Taiwan was redefined as a federation of ethnic groups, which was a turning point in the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system, with the creation of a new identity and subject called "Taiwanese" using ethnic multiculturalism as leverage. However, in the process, multiculturalism was politicized and held a hostage as a tool of party strife in some aspects.

It seems that the DPP administration led by President Tsai Ing-wen, established in 2016, has taken a step toward a new pluralism that goes beyond the ethnic multiculturalism of the past. New pluralism is pluralism based on digital media, premised on the social infrastructure of the Internet, which has become fully-fledged in the 21st century.

### 4-3 The Taiwanese Media and Pluralism

The connection between pluralist thought and the media in Taiwan was already seen in the late 1980s. The lifting of martial law by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1987 and the liberalization of the media encouraged the entry of private capital into the media industry and the emergence of various underground media (especially cable TV as the "fourth platform(第四台)"), as if in reaction to the media monopoly and strict censorship regime of the "Oligopoly of Two Papers & Three TV stations(二 報三台)" until then. What is noteworthy here is that this diversification of media played a role in technically supporting a multipolar democracy that opposed the unipolar tyrannical system of rule of the KMT regime up to that time. Thus, in the era of mass media, Taiwan skillfully linked media with pluralist thought.

In the 21st century, as network media replaced mass media as the communication infrastructure of society, the tendency to embrace media and pluralism became even more pronounced. This was symbolized by the use of the Internet during the Sunflower Student Movement of 2004. The Sunflower Student Movement(太陽花學運) was not only a political incident that arose over cross-strait relations, but also a landslide transformation of the media paradigm, as it marked the replacement of the previously centralized mass media information distribution system, which had forced a single set of values on the public, with the pluralistic information distribution system of the Internet, which technically realized and guaranteed the expression of a variety of values.

Mass media, which played a leading role in information technology infrastructure from the mid-19th century to the end of the 20th century, has the potential to serve as a means of information control and is easily linked to dictatorial governance. This is because the mass media is controlled by privileged actors who monopolize or oligopolize information, and by unilaterally distributing the same information to the masses, they homogenize the people, as defined in 2-4. This is because it has a structure that can be characterized as "Broad-Cast".

In fact, when the Nazis effectively took power in Germany in 1933, the first thing they did was take over radio stations, and in 1936, young officers of the former Japanese army, Even during the February 26 incident, which was a coup attempt, occupied newspaper offices first. Bringing the mass media under control in the event of a revolution or coup d'état means monopolizing information and controlling public opinion, which directly leads to forced unification of thought. Because of these risks, mass media must constantly self-verify and monitor third-party organizations.

In contrast, the Internet, which came into full swing in the 21st century, is a flat network that continues to expand worldwide by connecting scattered nodes. It is important to note that because Internet media is a global network that grows in two dimensions, there is no privileged place within the network that allows for the concentration of power or dictatorship, and it is technically possible to achieve pluralism that guarantees individuality and uniqueness. In that sense, the Internet can be said to be a technology that implements pluralism.

In an information society based on the Internet as a technological base, a top-down information distribution system called "Broad-Cast" is not suitable. The "Sunflower Student Movement"'s full use of Internet media—the "Net-Work," which I characterized earlier in comparison with "Broad-Cast" goes beyond the meaning of a simple protest against a centralized government. This can be viewed as an exploratory attempt in pluralistic governance. While the world is currently searching for a form of governance that is compatible with the Internet, it can be said that Taiwan is building a pioneering model centered on "pluralism".

# 4-4 Globalization and Taiwan's Unique Pluralism

The Internet, a digital medium unique to the information society, creates social and cultural communities that transcend traditional geographical communities and address specific issues. One such community included sexual minorities. Sexual minorities, who are geographically scattered and isolated within geographical communities, can use the Internet to organize communities that share the same issues across locations—and, of course, across borders. Here, pluralism can be extended not only to the issue of ethnicity but also to the issue of sexuality. The combination of sexual pluralism and digital society is symbolized by Audrey Tan, an engineer and sexual minority appointed by Tsai Ingwen as the political commissioner in charge of digital affairs. Tan also left the nine-year national education program in the middle of her studies, mastered programming on the Internet through self-study, and became a world-class programmer, thereby demonstrating the potential of alternative education using the Internet and paving the way for pluralism in the field of education through digitalization. Pluralism in the field of education also cannot be completed in Taiwan alone.

Regional communities are also being reorganized as actors in digitalized pluralism. With President Tsai Ing-wen's announcement of a policy to prioritize the digitalization of social infrastructure in rural areas, a channel will be established for regional communities to independently express their opinions on an equal footing with large cities. These measures have created a technological infrastructure that allows local communities to connect directly to the global "Net-Work" without having to go through a national transit point.

Taiwan was thrown into stormy waves of globalization before it could establish its international status under the existing framework of nation-states. However, this seems to have provided Taiwan's pluralism with a chance to win internationality and universality.

The Taiwanese government's swift and accurate response, based on the experience of SARS that struck Taiwan in 2002-2003, has been highly praised during the current coronavirus pandemic, including its active efforts to share its experience internationally. The uniqueness of Internet media, which has not been found in previous media, is that local information spreads in the blink of an eye, not artificially but spontaneously, on a global scale. The digital pluralism that Taiwan is currently promoting will spread worldwide through the Internet, similar to Taiwan's coronavirus countermeasures. This is because "pluralism" is not just a governance policy for Taiwan alone, but is also the most promising governance policy for the future information society as a whole.

# 5 Conclusion: Possibility of pluralism

The "pluralism" that is being realized in Taiwan as a result of circumstances rather than by design is different from ethnic pluralism based on Nationalism, or from so-called "multiculturalism" that assumes the existence of a nation-state framework and regards it self evident. This can be characterized as the functional "pluralism" mentioned in 3-2.

Functional "pluralism" is differentiated by function, such as politics, economics, academia, gender, and art, and each function is not allowed to be defined by other functions. It is functionally closed, but there is no restriction on the scope of each function, that is, it is open to the world as a whole without being hindered by the framework of the state. For the new "pluralism", "globalization" means that each function is not only valid within the framework of the nation-state, but is open to the world. And it is technically guaranteed by the "Net-Work" system backed by the media technology of the Internet.

I agree with Masatake Wakabayashi's assertion of the so-called "Taiwanization of the Republic of China" or the orientation toward a "Taiwan as it really is".<sup>14</sup> However, this does not mean the creation of a Taiwanese identity based on the so-called "four major ethnic groups", nor does it mean the confinement of "subjectivity" to the geographical space of Taiwan. The new "Taiwanese" identity under the banner of "pluralism" should not be centered on the pluralism of "ethnicity", but should be such a "pluralism" that makes the "World Society" fruitful by appealing to the whole world for the pluralism of "functions" beyond the boundaries of nations.

<sup>14</sup> 若林正丈『台湾の政治 増補新装版:中華民国台湾化の戦後史』東京大学出版会、2021。