Evaluation of the role Subnational Units' Involvement in Paradiplomacy: Nigeria and Taiwan in Focus

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1.1 Introduction

The increasing interest among scholars of international relations in the study of paradiplomacy is due to the fact that non-state actors are becoming more active in international affairs and possess the ability and capacity to influence how their governments formulate and implement foreign policy. They are now agenda-setters in the modern international system using paradiplomatic techniques to further their individual foreign policy agendas (Gürbey et al., 2023). We cannot be ignorant of the coexistence of states and non-state actors on the international scene going forward. This goes against the previous approach, in which the sovereign states acted as the only actors in foreign policy. This radical departure from state-centric to a more poly-centric world is due to changing nature of international relations and globalization phenomenon. The appearance of new players in national and international policy processes is indicative of this significant departure from state-centrism (Nye and Keohane 1977). The number of non-state entities that are active participants in the global arena, including global cities, transnational corporations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have come to add value to the conduct of international relations. In other words, the new global trend reshaping international relations includes sub-states and sub-regional players looking for strategies to advance collaboration, trade, investment, and cooperation on a variety of fronts. To advance and safeguard their interests, they have integrated politically and economically.

We cannot agree less with International Relations theorists that the unique standing of nation-states in international relations has been undermined in recent decades by the growth of multinational firms, integrative processes, and free capital flows (Ohmae, 1995). It is no longer debatable the decline in the influence of nation-states in international affairs after the end of Cold War while they continue to strive to overcome political and economic challenges. As multinational firms have grown, nation-states' role as "middlemen" between businesses and worldwide markets has been surpassed. These corporations are manifested in cross-border exchanges of people, capital, information, and commodities (Ohmae, 1995). According to Baylis et al. (2008), regionalization has also sped up this process while subnational governments around the world are growing increasingly as autonomous entities from national governments and proactive in international affairs in contrast to old global setting (cited in Liu & Song, 2020). The heavy burden on the shoulder of the central governments has been transferred to subnational governments through decentralization of political authority.

The problematic of the study is why these two political entities have not been able to utilize the instrument of paradiplomacy to advance their relationship. Nigeria as a federation has not encouraged the component units to forge and foster close relationship with Taiwan and other sovereign states. This attitude of the federal government stem from the constitutional provision that only allows the central government to engage in foreign diplomacy. This inadvertently negates the principle of true federalism which enjoin the component units to exercise certain degree of autonomy on certain issues. The practice of federalism in Nigeria is different from other federal states such as United States, Canada, Australia, etc. However, the constitution set certain limitations on where foreigners can participate in economic activity in Nigeria. Just the same, way it imposes limitations on the subnational units' involvement in foreign relations under the exclusive legislative list.

In the case of Taiwan (as this study chose to adopt instead of Republic of China, Taiwan) is a unitary state that devolve political authorities to the component units. From the inception, Taiwan has maintained paradiplomatic relations with United States subnational units with the signing of Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979. The component units are not deeply involved in paradiplomacy as it is practiced in order Asian countries like China, India, Japan, Indonesia, etc.

This study argues that the time has come for Nigeria and Taiwan to change their approach to international relations by involving the subnational units in paradiplomacy. The constitutional encumbrance that inhibit the participation of foreigners in the economic activity and subnational units' engagement in foreign relations should be amended enable them act on behalf of national government without assume the status of sovereignty. In any case, the essence of paradiplomacy is to build distinct model of development based on close linkages between government and government, government and private business, and people to people, on one hand, and on the other hand launch the subnational units into the global economy. Besides, Taiwan current diplomatic status requires new and more pragmatic approach through the involvement of subnational units in foreign relations, especially with a country like Nigeria. China has employed paradiplomacy method despite its authoritarian style of governance by involving the provincial governments in foreign diplomacy which has correspondingly paid off.

In an atmosphere of true and cooperative federalism, the sub-units are not supposed to be subordinate to the national government but coordinate. The legal framework binding various component units in the federation which may not have allowed the subnational units to exercise

full autonomy in the area of foreign relations. Thus, the issue of regional autonomy and power of subnational governments have not been vigorously interrogated. In the making and implementation of foreign policy of the state, the central government is vested with the power to formulate and implement such policy without recourse to the states. Under international law as it relates to diplomatic relations, the central government is accorded recognition to establish diplomatic mission as a hallmark of statehood. It is how to deal with these problematic that the research questions attempt to address.

The study's motivation stems from the fact that, despite Taiwan and Nigeria's long-standing relationship, subnational diplomacy has not been used to promote stronger people-to-people and economic linkages. Even while cities all over the world are playing a bigger role in international politics, the establishment of new subnational alliances may be a crucial component of the institutionalization of connections between Nigeria and Taiwan.

The study has made invaluable contributions to the literature on paradiplomacy and on Nigeria and Taiwan relations. First, it offers a critique of the paradiplomacy on Nigeria and Taiwan in view of the fact the subnational units in these countries are not deeply involved in paradiplomacy. Second, it broadens the geographical scope of the study of paradiplomacy by looking at one sovereign state (Nigeria) and a *defacto* state (Taiwan). Third, their origins in distinct regional locations – Africa and Asia – render the study of both entities particularly compelling. Fourth, Nigeria and Taiwan are democratic with well-established political orders that show similarities and differences in terms of their participation in international affairs in different ways and with varying degrees of intensity. In addition, Nigeria international relations and foreign policy activities have increased significantly while Taiwan is towering in the area of economic and technological advancement over the last two decades. Fifth, that paradiplomacy is studied from the prism of non-Western, centralized and decentralized political systems. Sixth, it thoroughly examines and advances the analytical framework of paradiplomacy as provided by earlier studies (Kuznetsov 2015; Duchacek, 1990). The assessment of previous works has been extremely helpful in understanding the role of subnational governments in paradiplomacy but those works did not address the two cases – Nigeria and Taiwan. However, this study seeks to improve on existing framework by incorporating the most relevant variables thereby developing a framework that can better reflect the most essential dimensions of international actorness in its theoretical analysis of paradiplomacy.

1.2 Aim/Objectives

The broad aim of the study is to explore the involvement of subnational units in paradiplomacy in Nigeria and Taiwan. The specific objectives are to:

i. Examine the factors that can favour the growth of paradiplomacy between Nigeria and Taiwan and potential benefits;
ii. Investigate why the SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan are not deeply involved in paradiplomacy;
iii. Explore paradiplomatic role of SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan in global governance and international collaboration; and
iv. Analyse the opportunities and challenges of SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan in their involvement in paradiplomacy.

1.3 Research Questions

This study attempts to address the following questions:

i. What are the factors that can favour the growth of paradiplomacy between Nigeria and Taiwan and potential benefits?
ii. Why are SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan not deeply involved in paradiplomacy?
iii. How did SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan play paradiplomatic role in global governance and international collaboration?
iv. What are the opportunities and challenges of SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan in their involvement in paradiplomacy?

1.4 Conceptual/ Analytical Framework

Paradiplomacy is a term used in describing such activity by subnational units within the federation having diplomatic intercourse with another sovereign or non-sovereign subnational units in different geopolitical region. The international actions of regions and non-state entities might be regarded as paradiplomacy. "Paradiplomacy" describes how non-state players participate in the international arena, their capacity, and their general foreign policy and international operations to further their own particular objectives. A distinction can be made between diplomacy and paradiplomacy. Diplomacy is simply the practice whereby sovereign states relates among themselves for their mutual benefits. It is the art and practice of building and maintaining relationship among sovereign states for their mutual benefits. This exclusive right enjoyed by these states is now shared at the international level with the non-states actors (SNGs) (Gürbey, et al., 2023).The sharing of this exclusive role played by sovereign states with subnational units is what is referred to as paradiplomacy.

Historically, Rohan Butler in 1961 defines paradiplomacy as “personal and parallel diplomacy complementing or competing with the regular foreign policy of the government” (Butler, 1961, p.13, cited Cornago, 2010, pp.93-94). According to Aldecoa and Keating (1999), paradiplomacy is an analysis of federal states subnational entities participation in international diplomacy in the developed world. In other words, it is regarded as a type of diplomacy that sub-state units engage in alongside or in addition to the sovereign state's diplomacy. These subnational units inadvertently become global players in the international system. Although paradiplomacy is typically thought of in relation to the operations of regional administrations in federal states, it is increasingly being used in areas or nations with highly decentralized unitary states, such as China, Scotland, and others.

"Paradiplomacy" refers to trans-border interaction, networking. To put it simply, the participation of national state constituent entities in international affairs. According to Kuznetsov (2015), it is "a form of political communication for reaching economic, cultural, political, or any other types of benefits, the core of which consists in self-sustained actions of regional governments with foreign governmental and non-governmental actors" (Kuznetsov 2015, pp. 30-31). The Kuznetsov analytical framework is used in this discussion to provide light on Nigeria and Taiwan’s paradiplomacy. This is presented below in fig.1.

Fig.1. Conceptual Framework for Paradiplomacy

Causes	**i. Globalization ii. Regionalization iii. Democratization iv. Foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics, v. Federalization and decentralization, vi. Problems with nation building processes, vii. Central governments' insufficient effectiveness in foreign relations, viii. Influence of external factors, ix. Asymmetry of constituent units, x. personality of leaders and ideology of political parties, xi. Borders.**
Legal Framework	That allows the SNGs to engage in treaty-making and the involvement of the SNGs in foreign policy issues
Motives	i. Political ii. Economic iii. Cultural iv. Cross-border housekeeping
Institutionalization	The SNGs establishing foreign affairs ministry; have offices; pay official visits to countries; attend foreign exhibitions/forums; global and trans-border multilateral regional networks; participation of regional authorities in international events as part of central government's official delegations.
Attitude of the central government	Paradiplomacy as a challenge for the whole nation; Provide opportunity for the whole nation; Cooperative-coordinate pattern; Cooperative-joint pattern; Parallel-harmony; and Parallel- disharmony.
Consequences	Rationalization of the national foreign policy; Democratization of the decision-making process in the national foreign policy; and Disintegration and secession of the state.

Source: Kuznetsov (2015) 50–51, 100–116)

This table provides explanatory framework of six variables for paradiplomacy such as the causes – globalization, regionalization, democratization, foreign policy domestication and internationalization of domestic politics, federalization and decentralization, problems with nation building processes, central governments' insufficient effectiveness in foreign relations, and influence of external factors, asymmetry of constituent units, and personality of leaders and ideology of political parties, and borders; legal framework – that will allow the constituent units to engage in treaty-making and in foreign policy issues; the motives which could be political, economic, cultural and cross-border house-keeping; institutionalization by establishing foreign affairs ministry at the constituent units, subnational units having offices in foreign countries; the attitude of central government – in terms of challenges of paradiplomacy, the opportunities, cooperative-coordinate pattern, cooperative-joint pattern, parallel-harmony, and parallel-disharmony ; and consequences – in terms of rationalization of the national foreign policy, democratization of the decision-making process in the national foreign policy, and disintegration and secession of the state. .

According to Soldatos (1991) who came up with the idea of paradiplomacy, there are four formulas: Cooperative-joint Coordinator *(*where the Central Government is the dominant actor in foreign relations), cooperative-joint formula, and parallel-harmony and parallel disharmony.

> Cooperative(supportive) action in foreign policy is possible when subnational units' actions on the part of federated units are coordinated by the federal government (e.g. through umbrella-agreement or through federal-state as in Canada federal-provincial-relations, permanent or ad hoc) or developed in a joint fashion(joint missions, joint approaches vis-a-vis a foreign actor, etc.) …. Parallel (substitutive) action is also possible. This can be developed in a harmonious climate, where the federal government accepts the rationality of federated unit's independent action in external relations, with or without federal government monitoring. On the other hand, such action can be in conflict with the federal government, the latter opposing such as action or its content or form (1990, pp.38-40).

This is to amplify the ways paradiplomacy can work both in a federal and unitary states by the involvement of the subnational units in several areas including trans-border regional paradiplomacy, trans-regional paradiplomacy and global paradiplomacy. He recognizes the fact that several factors influences paradiplomacy such as globalization, regionalism, democratization, domestication of foreign policy and internationalization of domestic interests, federalization and decentralization, nation building process, the role of the central government which is not good in external relations, the role of border areas, external stimulus, central and regional relations and the role of quality local governments. (Kuznetsov, 2013 cited Laode 2021, pp. 306-307).

Schiavon (2018) has gone a step further to propose framework by applying two variables aid our understanding of paradiplomacy: the degree of inclusion/exclusion of sub-state governments(SSGs) in national foreign policy decision-making and implementation, and the degree of powers granted to SSGs to engage in international relations. Consequently, Schiavon defines four types or models of paradiplomacy from restrictive to more open:

i. Exclusive-central government controls foreign policy-making and implementation and SNGs have no constitutional powers to conduct international relations;
ii. Consultative-central government consults SNGs in foreign policy-making and implementation, even if they have no explicit constitutional powers in this regard;
iii. Complementary-central government controls foreign policy and implementation, however, SNGs have constitutional powers to conduct international relations in certain policy areas; and
iv. Inclusive-SNGs not only have constitutional powers in the field of international relations, they also participate in national foreign policy-making and implementation.

Schiavon argues that paradiplomacy must not be cooperative or conflictive. The institutional and legal features of the domestic systems determine this. The country's internationalization strategy and, consequently, paradiplomacy contribution to national foreign policy are more inclusive when the constitutional powers of sub-state governments (SSGs) are well-defined and intergovernmental mechanisms for cooperation between levels of government in international affairs are more advanced (Schiavon, 2018, p.28 cited Ksenicz, 2023, p.60).

Governance and Economic Globalization

This bring us to the concept of governance and economic globalization as key variables in paradiplomacy discourse. According to Zepeda (2017), governance entails the actors and procedures that are a part of a strategy that involves coalition building, political discussions, advocacy (lobbying), persuasion, and threats that come along with the creation and application of public policies. However, studies on multi-level governance have rekindled interest in departments, cities, and subnational entities. In a multi-level setting, subnational levels are seen as "poly-centric" governance structures or as capable, overlapping functional jurisdictions that are crucial (**Zürn et al., 2010, p.7)**.

Scholte (2005, p. 186) argues that regional and transnational supra-state regimes that function with a certain amount of autonomy from the State are involved in governance, according to. Furthermore, a large number of local and provincial sub-state governments have direct involvement in areas outside of their national borders. Stated differently, governance has become notably multilayered and interwoven in the worldwide world of the twenty-first century. Connections between international, regional, national, provincial, and local contexts are where regulation takes place. As was the case with the State's precedence over sub-state settings in territorial conditions, no level is more important than the others. To describe its unique feature of originating from several locations simultaneously, this multilayer situation and diffusion of governance could be referred to as "polycentrism" **(Scholte, 2005)**. In this sense, the State's reconstruction in the context of political decentralization and economic globalization is largely responsible for the increased involvement of subnational actors in the international arena (Zepeda, 2017, pp.27-28).

Constituent diplomacy is the best approach to characterize subnational governments that are active in international issues. According to Kincaid (1990), these organizations "may represent local or regional, and sometimes national public sentiment more accurately than the elected leaders of opposition parties and the unelected leaders of interest groups to whom democratic pluralism accords a policy role." States, provinces, municipalities, cantons, Länder, and port

authorities are all referred to by him as "constituent governments." While interest groups and multinational corporations (MNCs) are permitted to engage in foreign policy advocacy, Kincaid believes that lawmakers and legislation shouldn't be able to restrict the participation of constituent states. In fact, he challenges the justification for interest groups and MNCs.

A scenario where the social, commercial, and governmental domains progressively dominate the landscape and the states and their various levels of government appear incapable of directing societies through governance. Their separate roles and functions have altered, regardless of the belief that this reality signifies society growing stronger and the state becoming weaker. "The exercise of control and coordination and the authoritarian allocation of resources, where government actors are not necessarily the only or the most important participants" is what is commonly understood to be governance (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 877 cited Oddone, 2023). To accomplish effective governance, a widely accepted framework that institutionalizes communication between interest groups, settles disputes, and negotiates conflicting interests must be established. This will dictate the implementation of agreements for the use of authority and decision-making (Brenner, 2010, cited Oddone, 2023). Numerous studies that highlight the significance of paradiplomacy have been established because of the division of decisions and interests caused by organizational and bureaucratic studies (Oddone, 2023). The rise of new players on the global scene has made a new approach to governance necessary, as the neoliberal globalization road has diminished the nation-state's ability to act alone. As a result, new networks of engagement with their equivalents in other regions have been facilitated by the rise of subnational administrations.

Economic globalization and governance have rebuilt the role of subnational governments in several ways. Globalization could be a challenge but at the same time offers an opportunity for subnational governments to strive for economic development in our increasing asymmetric international economic system. Globalization may lead to unequal economic development among cities and regions, including the subnational governments. It leaves cities and regions less protected from the vagaries of international economic system and international policies such as tax cuts, deregulation policies, etc. These neoliberal policies of central government and removal of subsidies on essential commodities from central governments put pressure on the subnational governments to explore other sources of income and economic development, including networks abroad. Globalization has led to an institutional restructuring that generates processes such as subnational internationalization, and the emergence of regional or transnational governance agreements. Subnational internationalization is clearly linked to globalization as it encourages cities and regions to seek strategic alliances abroad and indirectly

through the neoliberal policy of inspiring competition between cities and regions (Pierre, 2013). Globalization is changing the rules of the game for all players, and this situation is creating space for new strategies, new operating methods and new possibilities for governance (Zepeda, 2017).

1.5 Literature Review /Justification for the study.

Paradiplomacy is gaining scholarly attention in comparative politics, comparative federalism and international relations in recent time. This review focuses on general scholarly works on paradiplomacy, Nigeria and Taiwan. The works on paradiplomacy were largely from the prism of North America and European perspectives therefore, this present study attempts to close that gap by looking at paradiplomacy of two political entities in Africa and Asia.

Kuznetsov (2015) provides the first comprehensive scholarly work that organizes and summarizes different theories that have been used to study this phenomenon. Kuznetsov constructs an "explanatory framework of paradiplomacy" of six variables (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 116). This serves as a supplementary tool to analyze and compare cases of subnational units in the countries in this present study of Nigeria and Taiwan paradiplomacy.

The first variable in the framework are causes for the growth of paradiplomacy. Kuznetsov, argues that subnational entities have more option to pursue their economic goals both within and outside of national geographical frontier due to globalization. This has inadvertently weakened cultural and economic barriers between states. Paradiplomacy can promote the growth of regionalization by the transfer of authority from federal government to local units in the regions where non-central entities are more effective. It is argued that the transition from autocratic to free regimes or democratization was often accompanied by a markedly expanded involvement of constituted local entities in foreign affairs.

The rise of paradiplomacy is often associated with "domestication of foreign policy" and "internationalization of domestic politics," or the growing overlap between "domestic policy" and "foreign policy" and "low politics" and "high politics". Federalization and decentralization could accelerate constituent entities' global engagement while subnational units' participation in international diplomacy may bring about assertive transnational networking because of nation-building concerns, especially in multicultural, multiethnic, or multilingual nation-states. Local entities are likely to become more proactive in defending their own interests within the international system because of the central government's inefficiency in foreign affairs. Paradiplomacy may arise from asymmetry among constituent units, as it often acts as an additional tool for highly industrialized and tradable regions to promote their own economic

development; Examples of outside influences or stimuli that may contribute to or encourage paradiplomacy include the following: The degree and direction of subnational involvement in international affairs can be influenced by foreign powers or international organizations; local political party ideologies and leader personalities can affect this; and regions that share physical borders with other nations are naturally more motivated and incentivized to travel overseas to address certain international cross-border related policy issues and communication.

The second issue has to do with legal ground of constituent units engaging in paradiplomacy. This is important in view of the role that sovereign states play in treaty-making and international negotiation. The constitution of most states (federal or unitary) vested power of treaty-making to central government. This brings the issue of incongruity to subnational units' engagement in foreign affairs when it is obvious they lack power to enter into treaty agreement with other foreign entity, the author pointedly argued. The other variable in the framework is the motives for paradiplomacy.

The third issue is the motive. There are four motives for likely involvement of constituent units in paradiplomacy: political, economic, cultural, or cross-border housekeeping. The author explains that constituent units may wish to pursue political goals by pushing towards secessionist agenda for the purpose of the regions gaining their own statehood or at least a high autonomous status; or thy may wish to perform political role in the international arena. The economic motive has to do with subnational governments' willingness to engage with international entities in order to maximize their benefits from the global liberal market while also pursuing cultural and linguistic agenda, particularly in areas with their own language, distinctive cultural practices, and a preference for collaboration with foreign entities who share similar cultural and linguistic identity or characteristics; and subnational governments may be in a better position to solve common but important problems like the environment, transportation logistics, disaster management, education, or migration as part of the cross-border housekeeping responsibility.

In the fourth explanatory variable is the institutionalization. Kuzentsov presented six options for the institutionalization of paradiplomatic activities in the framework for paradiplomacy: a sub-state could establish a special ministry or department to handle the foreign affairs of the constituent unit; the subnational government could choose to open permanent subnational offices abroad; officials from local authorities could travel to foreign regions and countries; sub-states could take part in international forums and exhibitions; subnational governments could establish and participate in global and trans-border multilateral regional networks and working groups on specific policy domains like agriculture, sustainable development, energy,

and transportation; and local authorities could also take part in international events organized by foreign entities within the official delegation of their central government.

The fifth variable is the central government‘s attitude to paradiplomacy of constituent units. Two-dimensional explanatory framework is presented as summarized in the table below.
Fig. 2.

Perceptional dimension	Practical dimension
Paradiplomacy as a challenge to the whole nation	Cooperative-Coordinated pattern. This model assumes regional involvement in international affairs under a formal or informal coordination with federal government.
	Cooperative-Joint pattern. This model assumes formal or informal inclusion of paradiplomacy within national foreign policy.
Paradiplomacy as an opportunity for the whole nation	Parallel-Harmony pattern. This model presumes that regional government act independently in the international arena in accordance with their competency; at the same time, however, their actions are harmonized and do not contradict national foreign policy.
	Parallel-Disharmony pattern. This is a situation whereby regional external authorities’ actions oppose national government policy. The central government lack administrative mechanism to control subnational government entities’ performance in the international arena and its essence the paradiplomacy *defacto* shifts to diplomacy.

Adopted from Kuznetsov, 2015 cited Kaminski, Tomasz, 2018, p.32.

Lastly, the three consequences or outcomes for paradiplomacy of constituent units which could be how it causes the country's foreign policy to become more rational. This could refer to the application of the pro-federalist principle of subsidiarity, which holds that the national government should assign all tasks to subnational authorities that they can do more efficiently. Paradiplomacy could benefit national polities by introducing additional democratization and plurality into the processes of foreign policy decision-making; and subnational diplomacy may accelerate the centrifugal process that could eventually cause the nation as a whole to disintegrate.

Kuznetsov's approach is to aid in the study of paradiplomacy, as explanatory framework to organize the information in this work. He summarizes from the point of different interdisciplinary perspectives – ranging from legal studies, to comparative politics, international relations, public policy, sociology, and economics. First, he analyzes the two central concepts in the study of paradiplomacy: on one hand, the sub-State, subnational or regional actor on the other, the international action of this actor, called paradiplomacy, micro-diplomacy, and constituent diplomacy, among many others. For the actor, he prefers the concept of region, defined as the "territorial and administrative unit on the first level of authority after the central government in both federal and unitary state systems, like Ontario in Canada or Hokkaido in Japan" or the Mexican states.

Some scholars like Schiavon, (2004) are less enthused about Kuznetsov's labeling when compared with sub-state or subnational diplomacy because not all subnational governments have enough experience with democratization to be able to fit into Kincaid's vision of component units. Paradiplomacy is growing in new democracies in Africa and Asia, especially in China, South Africa, India, and Nigeria. Paradiplomacy has also occurred in nations that have weakened their commitment to democracy and entered authoritarian environments, like Russia. These nations cannot be disregarded. Schiavon (2017) provides an explanation of the impact paradiplomacy has had in authoritarian-past Latin American governments as well as in nations like Brazil that are going through political unrest. Business and political elites' perceptions of subnational leaders are influenced by their legitimacy in an increasingly globalized and information-rich environment. Additionally, opinions about subnational leaders are shifting.

Gurbey et.al (2023) put the paradiplomatic activities of Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine as de facto states into focus and compare both regions. Their common regional location in the Middle East as well as their common historical roots makes an examination of both entities particularly appealing. Both de facto states emerged from violent conflict and established political orders that show similarities and differences. The book analyses how both defacto states are involved in international affairs in different ways and with varying degrees of intensity. In addition, how their international relations and foreign policy activities have increased significantly over the past two decades. The book comparing paradiplomacy of two de facto states in the Middle East is quite interesting and exploring and expanding scholarly knowledge on how, why and when defacto states as non-state actors develop paradiplomacy. Iriqat (2023) argues that de facto

states from the perspective of paradiplomacy is the logical consequence of the existing mechanism of recognition of states in world politics.

Practically speaking, paradiplomacy is supposed to be implemented by sub-national governments as "territorial daily bread," meaning that paradiplomacy will only address matters that the sub-national government handles that are not military or diplomatic, such as trade and economy, cultural exchanges, and health-related issues (Duchacek, 1990, p. 2). Duchacek (1990: 15-27) describes different forms of participation of non-central governments by proposing a typology of three different types of international relations of regions based on their geopolitical dimensions: 1. Trans-border regional paradiplomacy; 2. Trans-regional and paradiplomatic contacts; 3. Global paradiplomacy (Duchacek, 1990, p. 16). Trans-border regional paradiplomacy concerns the formal and informal interactions across the border in order to manage the common issues and seek possible solutions. This is exemplified by immigration issues such as smuggling of goods and illegal migration across US and Mexico borders (Duchacek, 1990, p. 19-20). Trans-regional and paradiplomatic contacts describe the interactions and collaborations of non-neighbours sub-national governments which both the central governments are neighbours (Duchacek, 1990, p. 25).

The international actions of sub-State governments whose jurisdictions are not contiguous territorially. For instance, Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec have sub-national interactions with New York City (Duchacek, 1990, p. 19 & p. 26).For the global paradiplomacy; it represents the extensive exchanges and cooperation of economic development, cultural dialogue and industrial collaborations between sub-national governments. For instance, there are more than 100 collaborations between some of the major US cities and Canadian provinces and they mainly manage the issues such as environmental protection, cultural interchange, scientific and technological development and education and training (Duchacek, 1990, p. 27).

Leffe (2021) in his article lays out seven basic principles of city diplomacy which are norm violation and enforcement, city diplomacy as social justice, autonomy, regime type and city diplomacy, democracy beyond the sovereign nation-state, local constituents- official alignment, economic capacity, competition and risks and overlapping of global urban governance and economic systems. The author argues that City and state governments often engage in diplomacy as a direct response to national government transgressions in foreign policy, including the violation of universal norms or the failure to sufficiently enforce them. The author provides a sociological explanation using world system theory, which assumes human rights norms diffuse internationally and implemented by nation-states, even when the subnational

authorities may intervene and independently enforce said norms if the nation-states is unable to do so.

According to the author the accelerated globalization of the 20th century has brought about a new global consciousness at the city level which had brought issues such as human rights within the doorstep of subnational authorities (Leffe, 2021).The justification for the subnational authorities' intervention in foreign policy is based on the fact that when national government is unwilling or incapacitated in enforcing the human rights norms as contained in the United Nations Charter and Nuremberg principles then the subnational government can fill in that gap. The author observes how city diplomacy can promote social justice through inclusivity which city diplomacy represents by bringing about democratization of foreign policy.

Democratization of foreign policy is possible in democratic regimes as such system gives greater political autonomy to subnational authorities to participate in foreign policy decision-making process such as codifying universal norms using local legislative power. He argues that non-democratic regime like China constrain by allowing defiance but use city diplomacy as an extension of national diplomacy. In authoritarian regimes subnational governments do not engage in international diplomacy without the permission of the national government and the view they may express on foreign policy must not be different from that of the national government. However, this is not peculiar to authoritarian regimes; even in democratic regimes, subnational governments cannot take a different stance on foreign policy issue. They may disagree on some issues or approach by the national government that does not mean they will adopt a different foreign policy principle. The older federal states like Canada, United States; with democratic ethos, their subnational governments can express contrary views on foreign policy issue. China uses city diplomacy to advance its foreign policy therefore adopts a different approach dissimilar to other authoritarian regimes. China has institutionalized city diplomacy through Foreign Affairs Offices (FAOs) at the municipal and provincial level, overseen by the central government. These offices provide the cities platform to engage in range of sister city relationships, trade missions, and other international activities for local economic growth and in furtherance of Chinese foreign policy goals.

The author further observes that the principle of modern city diplomacy is based on an alignment of foreign policy views between local constituents and the local officials implementing such policies. This condition enables city diplomacy activity to thrive under democracies, where strong civil society allows direct constituent interaction with officials. The author concludes that institutionalization of city diplomacy should also involve advancements in how local authorities engage the constituents units. This is why city officials should establish

consultative mechanisms with local constituents on global affairs identify foreign policy areas of local importance and understand potential alignment or misalignment with officials. These mechanisms enable city diplomacy to operate beyond a whole-of-government approach and reach a whole-of-society approach, drawing on civil society that strengthens city diplomacy. By these means, the practice of city diplomacy can more fully integrate social justice and inclusion into its purview, integrating other underrepresented voices such as indigenous communities into international affairs. This can bring city diplomacy closer to grassroots social movements, closer to redressing grievances spurring these movements, and closer to dismantling systems of oppression upheld by national government or other actors, of domestic or foreign origin. In this way, the evolving agency of cities may develop a new system of checks and balances against abuses of power by the nation-state, and solutions to broader problems that transcend national borders.

Tubilewicz (2017) this article contributes to the contemporary understanding of paradiplomacy as practiced by subnational units in unitary, Westphalian states. Thus far, paradiplomacy scholarship has focused primarily on federal, postmodern states, where constituent governments—in response to globalization—search for cooperative contacts and compacts beyond national borders in order to either claim institutional autonomy or secure economic, cultural, or ideational opportunities abroad. Central governments, for their part, either embrace paradiplomacy as an element in their multifaceted diplomacy at both domestic and international levels or seek to contain paradiplomacy, considering it as a challenge to their authority on foreign policy matters. This article demonstrates that globalization prompts both central and sub-states—rather than merely sub-states—to construct new partnerships in the diplomatic arena to prepare constituent economies for an increasingly more competitive regional and global economic environment. In the context of this partnership, the central state does not lose its authority on foreign policy issues, whereas the provincial state—rather than primarily seeking foreign capital and export markets—manipulates the processes of cross-border co-operation to lobby the central government for preferential policy treatment in order to maximize its particular local interests. Thus, domestic political economy perspectives must supplement an international system-level analysis in order to fully account for the dynamics behind the foreign relations of Chinese provinces as examples of a unitary Westphalian state's subnational actors.

Zhimin and Junbo (2009) argue that the engagement of Chinese provinces helps to strengthen China presence in Africa. The provinces as non-sovereign and 'low politics' actors in the

continent and they are seen as traders, project builders, investors, aid providers, and subnational intergovernmental actors.

Qu, & Wang, (2024) see sub-state actor as an entity that has a degree of autonomy and initiative in international affairs, and its status is somewhere between that of a traditional sovereign state and a non-state entity. Unlike traditional state actors, sub-state actors may be local governments, cities, regional organizations, or non-central government entities (p.177). The introduction of this concept reflects a growing awareness of international actors' diversity in international relations (Dellepiane & Reinsberg, 2023 cited Qu and Wang, 2024). The autonomy of sub-state actors in itself contrast to traditional sovereign states, sub-state actors have relatively independent decision-making and management powers in several areas (Dijkstra et al.,2023, cited Qu and Wang, 2024). The autonomy the sub-state actors enjoy in some areas in international affairs, make them not only seen as state implementers but also as participants in international behavior. Sub-state actors may exhibit some characteristics that are unique in areas such cultural, economic, or political that will make them to be involved in paradiplomacy. They may be more concerned with the public interest than the country as a whole, but at the same time, they represent a particular local identity in international affairs. Such characteristics give sub-national actors the potential to play a unique role in transnational affairs, allowing them to respond more flexibly to local problems and challenges (Egel & Obermeier, 2023 cited Qu and Wang, 2024).

Pietrasiak and Slowikowski (2018) in a well-researched book on three regions in Asian countries of India, China and Far East (which is Russia). The center-regions model in relation to the effects of regional internationalization based on Kuznetsov's paradiplomacy model assists local communities in supporting the national government in foreign policy, either voluntarily or through compulsion, by attending to local community requests and resolving central government dysfunction during the state-building process. The authors argue that rather than being completely coordinated, the interests of specific subjects and the federal center frequently conflict in Russia. They think it prevents the Far East from developing and participating in regional affairs.

The book concludes that local authorities' international participation is mostly driven by their economic interests in each of the three regions under investigation. As a result, the development of trade and efforts to draw in foreign investment are paramount. Regions are used by the national government as a tool to carry out its policies. The authors were fascinated on how the local government actions were tightly tied to the global activities of state firms and private-public companies, particularly in the Far East (Russia). In the thinking of the authors, the

geographical location and economic capacity of the three regions of the countries they studied had an impact on the growth of paradiplomacy. To them,, the proximity of the border and sea of the regions facilitated their development. Although, they acknowledged the variations in every nation in terms of human variables (the character and inclinations of local political leaders) are important in the case of India. Since they are the ones who encourage it, political elites have a significant influence on how international cooperation takes shape. Since the Chinese central government employs a variety of incentives for peripheral or less developed regions and provinces with less expertise in foreign relations, its influence is much more evident there.

Subnational entities around the world now have more options to explore think-thanks to the phenomena of globalization. Global cities are regarded as prominent players on the international scene, able to come up with creative solutions to shared problems. As Hall (1984) alluded that "world cities" have a significant impact on global trade, industrial projects, transportation, and communication networks. The argument that subnational governments engagement in paradiplomacy is because of the failure of the national government to address certain concerns, such as energy, human rights, climate change, immigration, border security, and environmental protection among others on its own may be correct, especially in federal states. Thus, subunits engage in paradiplomatic activities ranging from collaboration in the fields of education and technology to economic and cultural interaction, as well as development issues like looking for investment possibilities. Furthermore, leaders in our interconnected world are beginning to recognize the advantages and disadvantages of globalization and are attempting to take advantage offer by it for their own gain.

Jerzewski, (2022) argues that subnational diplomacy remains an underutilized tool in fostering closer economic and people-to-people ties between Taiwan and Central Eastern Europe. While cities around the world are increasingly becoming key actors in global affairs, the development of new subnational partnerships could constitute an important dimension of the institutionalization of Taiwan-CEE ties. Taiwanese cities' ties with their overseas counterparts are poorly diversified and heavily concentrated in the United States (102 of Taiwan's approximately 250 sister city ties are with US municipalities). While subnational diplomacy can take shape in a variety of ways, bilateral sister city agreements constitute one of its most common forms. Focused on fostering people-to-people exchanges, these grassroots partnerships are particularly conducive to expanding Taiwan's international outreach. Being concluded at the subnational level, often without intervention from the national government,

these partnerships can avoid the usual controversies arising from debates about the countries' respective "one-China policy." A primary feature of Taipei's outreach to its sister cities is the emphasis on the role of education. The Taipei City Chinese Language Scholarship Program subsidizes occupants of the capital's sister cities in Mandarin language training programs, thereby developing Taiwan literacy overseas. This partnership is expected to produce tangible support for Taiwan and its interests overseas. The author argues, while China has sought to exert political pressure on subnational authorities with whom it has active paradiplomacy agreements, including requests to terminate ties with Taiwanese partners, subnational cooperation can stem from the distinct, decentralized agency of municipalities rather than the governments to which they are subordinate, effectively circumventing the concerns about legitimizing (or not) the ROC authorities in Taipei. Besides, transnational city networks also provide important venues for amplifying Taiwan's voice internationally.

The author concludes that the scope of formalized sub-national linkages between Taiwan and Central Eastern Europe remains limited, the current positive trajectory in Taiwan-Europe ties, paired with concerns about Chinese coercion exerted through paradiplomacy, serves as a window of opportunity for the expansion of such relations. Subnational diplomacy is becoming increasingly important for Taiwan and beyond, as cities are emerging as increasingly influential actors, capable of designing and implementing solutions necessary for resolving global challenges. Such a dynamic manifests itself, among other ways, in calls to establish an office of subnational diplomacy at the US State Department. In the specific context, Taiwan, city-to-city links could provide a platform for strengthening economic, social, and cultural linkages, which would otherwise be difficult to build up due to the looming specter of Chinese intimidation and the island nation's constrained international space. The willingness and capacity of Taiwanese local authorities to engage in internationally-oriented work remains one of the key lingering issues in initiating and institutionalizing subnational partnerships with CEE. Currently, the paradiplomacy ties remain poorly diversified, with large cities in Taiwan demonstrating a considerably more proactive approach to international outreach.

Thomas &Williams (2016) analyze the bilateral sub-national relations within the broader international relations rule and explore Taiwan's paradiplomacy, highlighting the fragmentation that has resulted from multiple domestic actors on both Taiwan and Japan developing transnational contacts outside of the established foreign policy order. The authors sought to understand the role of the quasi-governmental actors in both countries responsible for managing the relationship, to illuminate the actors and motives behind the establishment of sub-national relations between Taiwan and Japan. Both Taiwan and Japan are constrained in

their relationship by their respective political relationships with China, especially Japan's diplomatic recognition of China.

The article further explores the impact of China and what the recognition of "one China" means at the sub national level. They argue that Japan-Taiwan para-diplomatic ties have served as a conduit for greater people-to-people contacts between citizens of both countries, creating a social basis for ongoing relations between the two countries. As the Taiwanese policy on this issue stated, "Working from a basis of mutual trust, we pursue 'economic and trade diplomacy', 'cultural diplomacy', and 'image diplomacy' in order to reduce spending and improve our international image" (Office of the President n.d.). This approach can be seen as an evolution of Taiwan's long-running "pragmatic diplomacy" policy (Hsiung, 2000) but more theoretically, it places Taiwanese diplomatic efforts firmly within the milieu of para-diplomacy.

It is clear from the authors' analyses of the desire of the subnational authorities to use "consciousness-raising measures" to affect the central government's decision-making process from within the state. Such measures include education, research and lobbying. According to them, lobbying is the most common, highly directed, politicized form of consciousness-raising measures, and is manifested in several ways. First, elected representatives to the parliament can lobby for the central governments to give greater priority to regional issues. Second, many subnational public authorities have their representatives in the national capital, serving as both the eyes and ears as well as the spoke persons and lobbyists with the organs of government responsible for foreign policy. Third, various groupings of subnational units can combine to promote their common interests vis.-a-vis. the central government. These writers believe that subnational authorities' ability to pursue interests is further enhanced by the ambiguous status bestowed upon them. According to them, subnational governments "have a quasi-diplomatic status to rely on when useful, but because these are not elements of national government they do not have diplomatic baggage that can at times be a hindrance in their international pursuit." Because of Taiwan's vulnerable position in the international system, the writers went on to criticize its diplomacy as being fractured. It therefore practices public diplomacy. In their assessment, Taiwan uses both official and informal channels, which enables it to grant diplomatic character to all actions and give its partner states a quasi-diplomatic conduit to Taiwan without requiring the governments of those states to designate the activities as such. Taiwan's official approach to policy is that "working from a basis of mutual trust…, we pursue 'economic and trade diplomacy', 'cultural diplomacy', and 'image diplomacy' to reduce spending and improve our international image". Taiwan's cities can take part in multilateral initiatives in addition to bilateral ones by establishing sub-national relationships. For instance,

Taipei City Council (TCC) participates in the greatest number of global multilateral organizations. The authors contend that managing the complexities between a recognized state in international affairs and a non-recognized state — in this case, Taiwan and China — is Japan's main issue when dealing with Taiwan. The authors contend, however, that China restrained Japan's actions with Taiwan because of its desire to avoid upsetting China while also avoiding upsetting its long-standing ties with Taiwan.

Fitrisia, & Margo, (2019) discuss Taiwan's engagement in international relations from the viewpoint of the practical performance of its foreign activities. Taiwan carries out official diplomatic activities concerning those foreign states with which it has established diplomatic relations. Unofficial, quasi-diplomatic, or para-diplomatic activities carried out by Taiwan concern the states with which it does not have diplomatic relations. The authors shed light and place some emphasis on their institutional backgrounds, legal regulations, and other conditions for their practical performance. The conclusion they arrived at is that the differences between the diplomatic and para-diplomatic dimensions of Taiwan's foreign activities are rooted mainly in their formal and protocol aspects. From the viewpoint of their organization and practical performance, these differences are minimal (**Pajtinka, 2017).**

Newland (2023) provides a clear understanding of the relationship between Taiwan and the United States as Taiwan's most strategic global partner, even though the relationship between them is on a shaky foundation. He argues that the US does not recognize Taiwan as a country and has no formal obligation to aid it in the event of military conflict with China. The author argues that Taiwan uses paradiplomacy with US localities for three reasons: as a 'hedge' against weakness in the central-level US-Taiwan relationship; as a tool for developing long-term relationships with rising political stars; and as a performativity strategy for asserting Taiwan's statehood by showing others that it acts like a state. No doubt, paradiplomacy enables Taiwan to strengthen ties with US policymakers; these efforts have become increasingly complicated as mainland Chinese influence on local US politics increases.

McMillan (2017) provides a good analysis of paradiplomacy and raises methodological issues that may confront scholars. To him, the history of paradiplomacy illustrates the prevalence of economic linkages due to economic globalization as an explanatory variables which is line with the liberal theory. He argues that international relations scholars have applied theory of complex interdependence and studies of transnational relations to shape research questions and measurement of techniques. In many studies, key variables were economic data (global trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), the movement of people and cultural exchanges),

diplomatic interaction among subnational officials. He points out that liberal ideology is predominant in case studies and in the methodical analysis of quantitative data. The argument he presents in relations to the application of realist theory in unitary state is that it cannot be applied because of the emphasis on hard power, particularly given the constitutional rules that vested power on central government to control military power. National security concerns are rest squarely on the central government from the constructivist perspective. However, realist approaches to the study of paradiplomacy can be accommodated given the increased focus on security issues by many national and subnational governments (especially in Europe and North America) and coupled with the problems of immigration and border security which are the concerns of subnational leaders.

McMillan further undertakes a comparative analysis of practice of paradiplomacy in the six continents of the world by summarizing their paradiplomatic activities – North America, Australia, Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Unlike subnational foreign relations in many other parts of the world, which are more affected by subnational leaders and their agendas, in North America (Canada and the United States), all provinces in Canada have a level of institutionalization that is less affected by changes in leadership at the level of premiers. He makes the observation that occasionally, in an effort to oppose protectionist economic policies, Canadian Premiers work with American Governors. Activities with an economic focus have broadened to include field trips exploring cultural and educational connections, establishing connections with political stakeholders (such as ethnic or religious lobbies), or tackling policy matters ranging from environmental concerns to border security and immigration. He observes that beginning in the 1970s, governors of US states bordering Canada and Mexico collaborated with their counterparts to establish alliances. These cover a number of topics or particular issues (like trade or climate change).A few governors have emerged as outspoken supporters of specific stances on trade policy, the deployment of the National Guard and the US military, human rights, divestment, and even peace in the Middle East.

Thus, the main distinction between U.S. states and Canadian provinces is that the latter lack sophisticated agencies, while the former frequently engage in "single-themed paradiplomacy," concentrating on economic matters or even branching out to include trans-boundary issues with their counterparts in Mexico or Canada. In contrast, Canadian provinces are involved in "global paradiplomacy", pursuing a variety of global goals and interests. Only a few U.S. states are significantly affected by this kind of activity (Tavares, 2016, pp. 33–37).

The author observes that decentralization, democratization, and growing globalization at home propelled Mexico's subnational administrations into international politics. Even though they

have "very limited participation in the design and implementation of federal trade policy," the most economically viable Mexican states have been active in international affairs, making economic power a significant variable. Globalization and interdependencies have influenced and increased Mexico's paradiplomacy over time. Although Mexican states go abroad and have varying degrees of international activity, they are not nearly as active as Canadian provinces or US states in terms of overseas offices and leaders embarking foreign trips. Instructively, just nine Mexican states are represented overseas, and the majority of these positions are in the US. Omiunu &Aniyie (2020) traces the evolution of subnational government's involvement in foreign economic relations in Nigeria, it did not address the issue of why subnational units not deeply involved in foreign diplomacy like other older federal states in North America, Europe and Australia. In another work, Omiunu & Aniyie (2022) look at the subnational units' involvement in Nigeria's foreign relations law by appraising the heterodoxy between theory and practice. The authors did not address the limiting factors in Nigeria federal system, those centrifugal forces inherent in the system that posed greater challenge to the practice of paradiplomacy.

In discussing Nigeria's foreign relational law (FRL), they argue that there has been an increase in external interactions by Nigeria's SNGs in the area of FDI since 1999. More importantly, these external interactions by Nigeria's SNGs in the FDI sector are a deviation from the conventional constitutional configuration for Nigeria's foreign relations law (FRL). This emerging trend contradicts the extant constitutional position in Nigeria, which allocates plenary powers for foreign relations to the Federal Government (FG) as provided in the Federal Republic Constitution, 1999 as amended. The interaction between the federal and subnational government is well depicted by two set of relationships – the horizontal and vertical relationships. The horizontal relationship depicts interactions between the federal government and the international system, while the vertical relationship captures the internal interactions between the federal government and SNGs. This vertical relationship determines the extent the SNGs can participate in the international system.

Omiunu &Aniyie (2024) provide some illustrations of how subnational sovereign boundaries percolate in Nigeria. They argue that SNGs are beginning to compete to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into their states to bring economic development. They consider access to capital as a critical component of economic development. However, they pointed out that FDI-related activities are within the framework established by the federal government. Besides, the engagement in attracting FDI, the SNGs are beginning to be involved in implementing foreign

policy goals of the Nigerian State. These authors describe how SNGs infiltrate sovereign boundaries through any or all of the following: opening offices abroad, sending heads of SNGs on well-publicized, well-organized trips abroad, conducting professional scoping missions for short periods of time, hosting trade and investment exhibitions showcasing SNGs' technological know-how and manufacturing capabilities, creating foreign/economic trade zones, and participating in international conferences and organizations.

In contrast to Duchacek's (1990:14-15) earlier classification of six instruments of paradiplomacy: (1) the establishment of permanent offices in foreign capital cities or centres of commerce and industry to represent sub-state governments abroad; (2) foreign trips for leaders widely covered by local and international mass media; (3) short-term professional fact-finding missions sponsored by sub-state units; (4) trade exhibitions and investments featuring technology, tourism, investment and other advantages of a region or municipality; (5) the establishment of free trade zones; and (6) the participation of representatives of sub-state governments in international conferences or official delegations sponsored by the national government. Others include concluding non-binding, sisterhood and inter-institutional agreements, to participating in local, regional, and international networks and organizations. Local executive conduct public diplomacy, receive visitors from around the world, and organize international events; they also travel to foreign countries in trade and investment missions, to strengthen relations with their diaspora, to conclude cooperation agreements or to participate in regional or global meetings.

They made eight broad classification of the instruments for paradiplomacy which are summarized as follows: First, conducting expert scoping missions, promoting commerce internationally, and organizing trade and investment exhibitions showcasing SNG's technological know-how and manufacturing capabilities. The federal government is the only entity authorized to conduct international commerce and other associated trade promotion operations under the Foreign Relations Law. Second, signing of Memorandum of Understanding Agreements with foreign entities and multinational enterprises and SNGs in Nigeria. Since this agreement is binding, the authors argue that the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) should provide a framework for the engagement between SNGs and foreign entities. Third, the adoption of special economic zones as incentive to attract foreign investors into respective states as exemplified by Lagos and Ogun States under the framework of the Nigerian Export Processing Zones Act (NEPZA). According to these authors, this Act of the central government established an agency responsible for administering any export processing

zone in Nigeria. Thus, the SNGs use the framework established by the NEPZA of the federal government to achieve their separate sovereign boundary. Fourth, establishing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) aimed at attracting FDI is one of the ways the SNGs are involved in external economic relations. Records have it that on the global scale in 2018, SOEs accounted for 20% of investments, 5% of employment, and up to 40% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In their view, China uses this channel for outward investment. The Chinese investors in Nigeria used this channel to interact with the SNGs. For instance, the Lekki Free Trade Zone project in Lagos State in Nigeria. Fifth, the Nigeria SNGs have adopted the establishment of specialized Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) that will focus on FDI. For instance, the Kaduna State government established of Kaduna State Investment Promotion Agency (KADIPA) which is to formulate economic policy, develop, and implement comprehensive strategy and action plans to attract and facilitate new investments in the state. The Imo State government established the Ministry of Foreign and International Affairs which is meant to attract FDI to the state, to nurture, and cultivate robust bilateral and diplomatic relations with the international community. (Imo State Ministry of Foreign and International Affairs, 2020). Sixth, the SNGs could source for loans and aid to execute infrastructure projects in their states. The state government could receive short-term loans and technical assistance without necessarily the involvement of the federal government or seek approval from it. This was similar to the practice in the first republic as they were competing for development. Seventh, the SNGs are beginning to receive foreign envoys and dignitaries which are usually given wide publicity by the state in question. This kind of visit provides a platform for bilateral talks, interactions, and exchanges of views. Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, 34 SNGs have engaged in paradiplomatic activities in the following ways: receiving trade delegations, ambassadors, international organizations officials, and foreign SOEs. For instance, in 2011, the Lagos State received the British Prime Minister, while Chinese Ambassadors visited different Nigerian Governors 18 times within the period 2015-2017. These visits were geared towards exploring investment opportunities available within the respective SNGs. Eight, as part of the paradiplomatic activity some schools in Lagos State have introduced the teaching of Mandarin language. This is to strengthen the bilateral relationship between China and Lagos State. In the same manner, Abia State government sent some artisans for training in China on the art of shoemaking in 2018. Bayelsa State government has established international offices known as Bayelsa Development and Investment Corporation (BDIC) in New York, London, Dubai, and Johannesburg to promote the state's trade and investment potential.

Gambari (1991) discusses how federalism in Nigeria has affected the management of its external relations. Specifically, an analysis will be made of the role of state and local governments in external affairs and how the constitutional arrangements of the Nigerian federation as well as other factors, such as internal politics, relative resource endowment of the various governments, and the leadership of the federal government, affect the management of external relations. The analysis can be understood within the context of past and current practice of paradiplomacy. The author notes that various constitutions from 1963 to 1979 accorded primacy to the federal government management of external relations. However, the exclusivity granted has been tempered by the perceived need to obtain the consent of states that fall within their legislative competence and to provide for state on federal bodies responsible for treaty-making. The author argues that what has happened since independence has been an increasing curtailment of direct activity by the component units in the federation and its replacement with attempts to influence policy at the center. He did not fail to point out that the motives for subnational units' engagement in external affairs vary. Nonetheless, it is possible to categorize such motives into broad groups. The first set of motives arises from an invitation from or cooperation with the federal government. The other group of reasons derives from a dissatisfaction with the national government's policies because they are inadequate or indeed, contrary to the states' interests, as they perceive them (Gamberi, 1991, p. 119).

Lecours and Moreno (2003) analyzed sub-State nationalisms, and argued that paradiplomacy could be a purposeful projection of these governments to seek greater autonomy or the recognition of their cultural distinctiveness both nationally and internationally, thus being of conflictive nature with national foreign policy. By developing significant theoretical frameworks for regional engagement in international affairs, Lecourse and Moreno (2001) concentrate on the nationalistic aspect of paradiplomacy. They identify three primary processes – national identity construction and consolidation, regional interest definition and articulation, and social mobilization – through which nationalism can be rationally linked to paradiplomacy. It is believed that the first process involves forming national identity through a variety of paradiplomatic endeavours, including cultural exchange. The second has to do with highlighting ethnic and political uniqueness, which is reflected in shared regional interests that may conflict with those of a state. The third process is a type of power politics that focuses on using shared interests to mobilize regional societies politically. They argue, "Regional leaders gain prestige from this mobilization that can be leveraged in constitutional and institutional change negotiations." In addition to the nationalistic aspect, regional foreign actions began to be examined from a legal standpoint in the 1990s. To comprehend the range of powers held by

regional and municipal administrations, the researchers looked at national constitutions and other legal documents.

According to Trone (2001), who offers a thorough comparative analysis of several federal states (including Australia, Germany, Canada, the United States, and others), subnational authorities' involvement in external relations primarily consists of two factors: the degree of legal authorization that the regions are given to negotiate treaties with foreign parties and the procedures for consultation between regional and central authorities.

Hocking (1993) in his study of the 'localisation of foreign policy', argues that local or subnational governments' involvement in foreign affairs is part of the evolution of the national foreign policy process and 'represents the expansion rather than the rejection of foreign policy'. (p.26). For Hocking, local or subnational governments should not be regarded as autonomous actors acting separately from and in parallel with national governments. It is more helpful to see this relationship in terms of a multilevel political structure and multilevel processes that embrace all levels of political activities from the local, through the national to the international. These levels intersect with one another in a variety of ways, and demand that decision makers operate in a number of political arenas simultaneously (Hocking 1993, p.11).

1.7 Justification for the study

This study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on the role of subnational units in Taiwan and Nigeria, which was not extensively discussed in previous paradiplomacy publications. The few articles on Nigeria did not explore subnational engagement in foreign diplomacy in the same manner as this study. In light of Nigeria's dire economic circumstances, the new study takes a more thorough approach to examining the potential advantages of paradiplomatic tactics for both sides. Through the states, the country can use Taiwan's technical innovations to work with subnational organizations.

However, the works on Taiwan, particularly those on the paradiplomatic interaction between Taiwan and the US, concentrate on Taiwan as a state rather than as a subnational entity interacting with US states. The main study by Newland (2023) only examines Taiwan's relations with US states following Taiwan's denial of recognition as the Republic of China's legal representation, as it had asserted prior to UN General Assembly resolution 2758 of 1971. Thomas and Williams' (2016) study on Taiwan's subnational government ties with Japan examines the paradiplomatic interactions between several subnational units in Japan and Taiwan. This present study takes a different approach by being futuristic about how Nigeria and Taiwan's subnational units can relate together in view of the PRC's overbearing and

bullying diplomatic strategy towards countries that are overly dependent on it for infrastructural development and financial assistance.

The goal of the study is to significantly advance the body of knowledge on paradiplomacy and the relationship between Taiwan and Nigeria. First, given that the subnational units in Taiwan and Nigeria do not engage in paradiplomacy largely, it provides a critique of paradiplomacy in both nations. Second, by examining one sovereign state (Nigeria) and a de facto state (Taiwan), it expands the study of paradiplomacy geographic breadth. Third, they come from different parts of the world—Africa and Asia—and because of their historical origins, it is very interesting to look at both. Fourth, Nigeria and Taiwan are democratic and developed political systems that exhibit both parallels and divergence, in terms of how and to what extent they participate in international affairs.

Additionally, over the past 20 years, Taiwan has led the world in economic and technical growth, while Nigeria has seen a major expansion in its international contacts and foreign policy actions. Fifth, paradiplomacy is examined through the lens of centralized and decentralized political systems that are not Western. Sixth, it thoroughly analyzes and develops the paradiplomacy analytical framework offered by previous research (Kuznetsov, 2015; Duchacek, 1990). Although the evaluation of earlier works has been very beneficial in comprehending the function of subnational governments in paradiplomacy, the two situations of Taiwan and Nigeria were not covered in those works. In order to create a framework that can more accurately represent the most crucial aspects of international actorness in its theoretical analysis of paradiplomacy, this study aims to enhance the current framework by adding the most pertinent elements.

Schematic representation of paradiplomatic relations



1.8 Theoretical Perspectives of Paradiplomacy

There are three dominant schools in international relations in which we can view paradiplomacy. These are realist, liberal, and constructivism. However, in this study, we explore other theories such as complex interdependence and actorness to give broader theoretical perspectives on this subject matter. Although, they may not have satisfied all the explanations for paradiplomacy, but they provide array of analytical options for understanding why subnational units or regions engage in foreign relations. Because of the nature of this study, no single theoretical explanation will capture the varied reasons or factors behind paradiplomacy hence, the adoption of multi-theoretical approach which is justifiable and appropriate.

As the presence and importance of sub-state governments in world affairs increased, internationalists became enthusiastic to study their activities in the late 1970s. The first IR theory that was used to explain the external actions of local governments was Keohane and Nye's Complex Interdependence Theory (CIT) (1977). In the contemporary globalized world, the term 'interdependence' is frequently used. It is a situation in the world politics where all the actors including states as well as non-state actors, are dependent upon one another. Complex Interdependence Theory (CIT) is a theory which stresses the complex ways in which as a result of growing ties, the

transnational actors become mutually dependent, vulnerable to each other's actions and sensitive to each other's needs. Complex Interdependence is defined as:

> An economic trans-nationalist concept that assumes that states are not the only important actors, social welfare issues share center stage with security issues on the global agenda, and cooperation is as dominant a characteristic of international politics as conflict (Genest, 1996: 140).

In general, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence, most simply defined as mutual dependence. In world politics, "interdependence refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries."(Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 8).Under this mutual dependence, the relationship between the actors involved, including states as well as other transnational actors, is characterized by both cooperation and competition. In interdependence world, there are costly reciprocal effects of transaction among the actors. The policies and actions of one actor have profound impact on the policies and actions of the other actors and vice versa. Interdependence does not only mean peace and cooperation among actors, but a relationship between actors characterized by cooperation, dependence, and interaction in a number of different areas, and conflict as well.

This theory explained the increasing activities of sub-State governments as a result of the increasing interdependence in the international system, which opened the door for a multiplication of actors, instruments, agendas, and communication channels in world affairs, changing from a system dominated by the nation-state, concentrated in security issues and the use of military force, where international regimes are irrelevant, to a system where multiple actors (governmental, both at the central and sub-State levels, and non-governmental, like transnational enterprises and civil society organizations), participate in multiple agendas (not only for security, but economic, cultural, and, diplomatic, among others), using multiple instruments (since the use of military force is not very efficient, other instruments, like financial, trade, diplomatic and cultural are implemented), under a network of international regimes (Keohane & Nye 1977).

The key characteristics of the theory of complex interdependence is that there are multiple channels of among state and non-state actors. That is, multiple channels connecting societies including all the interstate, trans-governmental and transnational transactions. This is contrary to realist assumption of unitary nature of the international system. In our complex interdependent world, formal and informal interaction between governmental elites and subnational units exist and serves as channels of connecting societies. These non-state actors such as Multinational Corporations (MNCs), International financial institutions, NGOs, subnational units, etc. have great impact on the domestic and as well as interstate relations.

They pursue their own interests and as well, as "act as transmission belts, making government policies in various countries more sensitive to another." (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.26 cited Rana, 2015, p. 292). Second characteristics, is that there is no hierarchy among issues in the complex world of interdependence. There is no dividing between domestic and foreign policy and no clear agenda in interstate relations. Among other things, "military security does not consistently dominate the agenda."(Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 25).The foreign affairs agendas have become more and more diverse now. As opposed to the realists' assumption where security is always the most important issue between the states, in complex interdependence, any issue-area might be at the top of the international agenda at any particular time. The third characteristic is the minor role of military force. As opposed to the central role that force is given in realist's world, i.e. an ultimate necessity to guarantee survival, Complex Interdependence assumes that in international relations force is of low salience. When Complex Interdependence prevails, military force could be irrelevant in resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an alliance, however simultaneously the alliance's political and military relations with its rival bloc. According to Keohane and Nye, intense relationships of mutual influence may exist but force is no more considered an appropriate way of achieving other goals such as economic and ecological welfare which are becoming more important, because mostly the effects of military force are very costly and uncertain. (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 28) In fact, due to modern nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, all the actors are aware of the maximized costs of war.

One very significant aspect of the 'Complex Interdependence' is that it is a combination of two opposite views, i.e. it integrates both the elements of power politics and economic liberalism. It takes into consideration both the costs and benefits of interdependence relationship. In the world of 'Complex Interdependence', despite the increasing economic cooperation and ecological interdependence, the possibility of international military conflicts cannot be ignored. However, unlike the traditional power politics, in 'Complex Interdependence' this may not be the zero-sum game. "The politics of economic and ecological interdependence involve competition even when large net benefits can be expected from cooperation."(Keohane & Nye, 1977, p.10). However, this theory has been criticized just like any other theory as new paradigms are emerging old ones gives way. Some theorists may criticize theory of complex interdependence on the basis that relations between industrialized and lesser developed nations always work in favour of the former to the disadvantage of the latter. Despite this criticisms of

the theory, it will enable us to understand how interactions among state and non-state actors is mutually beneficial to global economy and enhance international economic diplomacy.

The realist theory of international relational is concerned about the state security and power defined in terms of interest relationship with other states in the international system. Keohane &Nye (1974) in their liberal view of international politics believe that state-centric analysis of the realist is about state security in relations with other states in the international system which they describe as 'high politics'. The realist perspective of paradiplomacy do not agree with the liberal school of thought that state-centric paradigm of global politics has become anachronistic rather the state would want to maximize their interest through subnational units. Realists do not see the subnational units as autonomous entities that chooses to pursue independent interests outside the central authority or above power allotted to them by the constitution. To the realists, the existence of these subnational units is based on the rational decisions of nation states aimed at using them to reach or achieve their national policy goals. As Kamiński, puts it "use them as derivatives of the foreign policies of national states and not as independent actors" (Kamiński, 2018, p.19).

Looking at paradiplomatic activities from the prisms of realists is simply the rationalization of the foreign policies of the central governments by the regions and cities which they consider as beneficial to their interest rather than see it as antithetical. It means therefore that paradiplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy of states. Notwithstanding the relative autonomy of the subnational units either in federal or unitary states, regions participation in international relations is with the formal or informal approval of the state government to promote state's interests. Realists are not oblivion of the growing concern for decentralization and delegation of responsibilities, freedom and autonomy which regional governments exercise. In their view, this process has been possible because it serves the national interests of states.

The state-centric approach to diplomacy has been challenged since the end of the Cold War, following the acceleration of globalization and regionalism. This is why scholarly interest has shifted to examining the participation—both direct and indirect—of non-state actors in international relations. Given that not many studies have sought to account for the external activities carried out by subnational governments, the literature on paradiplomacy provides an alternative lens through which to understand this phenomenon. This leads us to the issue of actorness which reiterate the traditional realist position that the state is the main actor in international relations.

Hocking (1999) was the first to apply the theory of actorness to the analysis of subnational governments (SNGs) and provides five dimensions for international relations players – motivation, extent of involvement, resources, level of participation, and strategy. The analysis of theory of actorness hinges on the recognition of who exercises power and influence in international politics. The concept of actorness from international relations perspective is about exercise of autonomy and capability to act without restrain. The subnational units may have the capability to engage in external relations with others but with restraint from the central government. The subnational actors such as autonomous regions, federated states, non-autonomous provinces, and the provincial level, municipal units are bearing the bandage of actors. In this case, actorness is understood as the group of characteristics requisite for subnational units to be actors in international relations (Liu and Song, 2019).What underscores the actorness is the autonomy and capability of subnational actors.

There are basic characteristics to determine the actorness of a political and economic entity as an actor in the international system (Liu and Song, 2020). Allen and Smith (1990), identify the essential elements of actorness such as credentials and legitimacy, the capability to act and mobilize resources, the place it occupies in the perceptions and expectations of policy makers (Allen and Smith, 1990, p. 21 cited Liu and Song, p. 2020). There are dimensions for actorness which include opportunity and capability. Opportunity refers to the external environment where actor operate. This environment may enable or prevent the engagement of subnational units in international relations, while capability is measured according to availability of policy instruments and effects of policies (Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler, 2006 cited Liu and Song, 2020, p. 8).

Petr Kratochvil (2013) defined four dimensions of actorness: legitimacy, external recognition, attractiveness, and the power to frame policy. Oddone (2023) identifies self-perception and international cohesion as characteristics of actorness which invariably affect the capacity of subnational units to act in the international system as autonomous entity (Oddone 2023, p.8). The subnational entities as actors with the capacity to mobilize resources to achieve objectives and exert influence in the international system. These non-state actors are capable of affecting the course of international events; they become actors and, therefore, enter into competition with the Nation-States (Oddone, 2023). Cities today, play important role in global politics that facilitate interconnection with the central government. Thus, the characteristics of actorness can be sum-up as – autonomy, capability, opportunity, capacity, credentials, legitimacy, mobilization of resources, power, motivation, external recognition, attractiveness, level of participation, extent of involvement, strategy, the place it occupies, self-perception and

international cohesion. For instance, Hong Kong is one of the primary players in the international system of global paradiplomacy, having a vast global network that links it to subnational governments in places like Quebec, Maine, and New York (Duchacek, 1990, p. 19). It has the capacity and ability to engage in paradiplomatic activity, looking at its institutional and normative frameworks in which its "global actorness" is situated.

Cities, particularly those that house a sizable portion of a country's GDP or are the epicenter of global migration, play a crucial role in defining not only a nation's power resources but how it presents itself to the outside world. Sassen's work shows the growing autonomy of these global cities from the States of which they are part. In her view, "non-state actors now have operational and legal avenues to enter international arenas that were hitherto the domain of nation-states but for globalization and the international human rights regime" (Sassen, 2002, p. 217). She argues that in today's globalized world, the increased connections between global cities are "creating a strategic cross-border geography that has bypassed national States" (**Sassen, 2002)**. In other words, cities are beginning to develop capability to operate within the international system as individual actors without relying on their countries' official foreign policy machineries (Jerónimo, 2017, pp.29-30).

The liberal theory of international relations recognizes the interstate relations as the only component in world politics. For them world politics is not a system of political relations for states alone but political interaction between non-state actors of significant importance that can contribute in a way that will bring harmony and promote understanding. Liberal theorists' argument is that paradiplomacy is a logical consequences of major changes in the international system, presumably the diminishing role of state actors and the rise of non-state actors (Kamiński, 2018).The subnational units which include the regions, cities, municipalities, districts, etc., liberals see them as the beginning of autonomous actors in international relations. In contrast, the liberal understanding of "low politics" are domestic issues like health, education, sustainable development, and climate. These issues are seen by liberals as "low politics," despite the fact that they are becoming more and more significant worldwide and require international attention. In essence, the regions must deal with these issues on a daily basis, and as a result, they must build international connections as a vehicle for doing so. For example, an organization like C40 supports and collaborates with them, share knowledge and carry out meaningful, measurable and sustainable action on climate change (Kamiński, 2018).

Interstate interactions are acknowledged as the exclusive element of global politics by the liberal theory of international relations. International politics is a system of political interactions between states and important non-state actors that can foster understanding and

harmony rather than as a system of political relations for state actors including subnational units seen as autonomous participants in international relations.

Constructivism in international relations is about identity of a group constructed by the political and cultural elites (Wendt, 1999).The constructivist school see state behavior as being influenced by what may be referred to as inter-subjective structures rather than material capabilities. Inter-subjectivity is constituted by collective meaning systems in which states participate and which they reproduce through their practices (Kamiński, 2018, p. 20). Paradiplomacy from the constructivist perspective is about constructing regional identity as a state. As Sharafutudinova (2003) noted:

> If a region has the goal of constructing its identity as a state, it would attempt to engage in foreign activities with the aim of 'signaling' its statehood to the outside world and with the ultimate aim of having other international actors reciprocate and recognize the entity as a sovereign state. Thus foreign activities might constitute politics of representing a region in a certain image and could be an essential part of the identity construction project, through which the regional government attempts to incorporate elements of sovereign statehood in the regional identity (Sharafutudinova, 2003, cited Kamiński, 2018, 20).

Constructivists look at external activities of regions as a form of "identity- constructing." In countries where there are groups agitating for an independent status, they adopt paradiplomacy method in search of external recognition and self-recognition for the region (identity-building). Thus, social constructivists see paradiplomacy as a way of pursuing sovereign statehood and not as a functional response to globalization and economic interdependence as the liberals may claim or as an instrument of a state's foreign policy by realist. We can therefore develop theoretical model that offer broad explanation of paradiplomatic activity of subnational units by establishing the relationship existing between or among them and how they differ. In particular, it is important to consider the ways in which complex interdependence might be regarded as complementary or contradictory to more established paradigms such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

Complex interdependence differs from realism in international relations in a number of ways, including multiple actors which are states and non-state actors. In contrast, realism assumes a unitary state but maintains that there are issues that 'high' (security) and 'low' politics(climate change); complex interdependence does not differentiate between 'low' and 'high' politics, and there is no clear hierarchy among states; and it emphasizes how transnational actors become mutually dependent and vulnerable to each other's actions. Realism, on the other hand, focuses

on the role of the state, national interest, and power in world politics. However, realist states pursuit of power to maintain order is based on liberal conception of cooperation and harmony for economic and other interests which state pursue. Realists acknowledges the growing decentralization of states and the delegation of freedom and autonomy to regional governments but with the caveat that it only serves the national interests of states.

Liberalism and Complex interdependence are aligned in the pursuit of states' interests. This is in view of the fact that cooperative behavior and harmony of interests can be achieved through regional institutions and economic interdependence. The view that cooperation is likely to occur in the absence of political hegemony.

The link between complex interdependence and constructivism is that both are theories in international relations but they are distinct conceptually. Complex interdependence analyses the interconnectedness of states through economic and social ties, thereby reducing the military power, constructivism emphasizes the social construction of norms and identities that shape state behavior. In other words, constructivism focuses on how states' identities and norms, which are socially constructed, influence their interactions and power dynamics. Complex interdependence holds the view that states are increasingly reliant on each other economically and socially which lead to cooperation and reduce the use of military force. However, the two can be used together to analyze how shared norms and identities influence the level of interdependence between or among states in the international system. Both theories can explain why states might cooperate from different stand point. Both theories acknowledges the growing importance of non-state actors like international organizations, NGOs, and by extension the subnational units within a state in shaping global interactions. Constructivism is also linked with liberalism on the issue of the rise of regions as transnational actors and the strengthening of subnational identity.

Thus, quintet theoretical model is presented in the diagram showing the relationship among the theories to aid our analysis of paradiplomacy. Complex interdependence theory, realism, liberalism, constructivism, and actorness are germane to the analysis of paradiplomacy. From the standpoint of realism power dynamics in international relations of subnational units can be enhanced through their engagement in paradiplomacy, and mindful of the competition that exist and rivalries among regions and security challenges that might confront the sub-units and how they can respond to those security threats occasioned from national policies. Liberalism emphasis on cooperation among international actors (state and non-state actors) in terms of partnerships and networks among regions, which shows the interdependence among these actors in shared economic and cultural ties, the important roles of international institutions and

how the subnational actors participation in international frameworks can enhance global governance and cooperation. Constructivism focus on identity formation in terms of regional identities shaping actions, and acknowledging that norms and values are guiding principles in diplomacy, social context in which actors establishes relationships thereby influencing international engagements. Actorness in terms of capacity, autonomy and resources to operate in the international system possessing economic and political capabilities, legitimacy of actors (subnational entities) being accorded recognition as legitimate international actors even though there are variations of actorness at every level across regions. The relationships among these theories are illustrated in this multi-theoretic model below

Multi-Theoretic Model


Complex Interdependence
Paradiplomacy
Realism
Actorness
Liberalism
Constructivism

1.9 Methodology

This study adopts a case study methodology that enables us to understand the practice of paradiplomacy in these two countries. This approach is descriptive so that generalizable conclusions can be reached. It is also a comparative case studies as it deals with understanding the activities of subnational governments in Nigeria and Taiwan and drawing lessons from other federal and unitary states that have been engaged in paradiplomacy. It is a qualitative methodological approach based on observation and content analysis. The qualitative method remains a valuable tool in this study as it enables us to understand the paradiplomatic activities of subnational units. In this case, elite in-depth interviews are conducted in both Nigeria and Taiwan, especially with practitioners and policymakers. Scholars, officials of government, non-governmental organizations, and civil society were contacted via email with structured questions and some were interviewed in Taiwan. Archives and other secondary sources were examined to answer the research questions in relation to the evolving role of subnational units in paradiplomacy.

The first dimension is conceptual and empirical review, which enable us to explore the transnational operations of subnational governments, particularly the concept of paradiplomacy. It is also required a theoretical review of the idea of paradiplomacy and the three main theories of international relations that try to explain these events. A detailed analysis of official government reports, and information from primary sources created by governments—both national and subnational—makes up the second component. Utilizing subnational governments' accounts of their overseas activities as contained on the official websites of the governments and regional organizations.

A collection of four generic questions, set of ten and another set of fifteen questions which are slightly different for practitioners and scholars in these two countries help to validate the findings of the literature, even though their opinions may not be sufficiently representative. It's also important to remember that conducting interviews presents logistical and accessibility issues. It's crucial to consider who is genuinely willing to participate and what is realistic while selecting procedures. Consequently, some individuals were sent a Google survey form and semi-structured interview questions over email. Notably, 10 contacts of respondents were made using email and a Google survey form, and two interviews were held in Taiwan.

Of the ten individuals who were engaged via email, half were subject-matter experts and practitioners, and the other half were scholars in international relations, political science,

history and law. However, as the interviews report showed, the distinction between the "academic" and the "practitioners" is frequently blurred. As a result, academics have frequently adequate real-world experience of paradiplomacy, and vice versa. In order to create an analytical framework, this study, in general, uses a variety of paradiplomacy-related experiences and narratives, utilizing recurrent or noteworthy patterns.

Triangulation technique was adopted which involves using multiple research methods, theories and data sources to study a phenomenon. Therefore, the research data are triangulated in order to increase their validity, reliability and soundness of research findings by combining different perspectives and methods. This triangulation method helps to improve the generalizable experiences of the researcher. The investigation is not predicated on a broad theory; the choice of a qualitative, empirically based methodology becomes justifiable. It seems essential to incorporate the experiences and viewpoints of both researcher and practitioners in order to broaden the analytical scope of the earlier works of paradiplomacy scholarship. While practitioners display their immediate work environments, scholars allude to conceptual inequalities and provide insights into their own empirical studies.

Triangulation of Qualitative Research



2. 0 Nigeria- Taiwan Political and Diplomatic History

2.1. Nigeria Political and Diplomatic History

Nigeria is a federation of 36 States and Federal Capital Territory, Abuja with 774 local government councils. Nigeria is located in the Gulf of Guinea West Africa, is the tenth largest country in Africa, with a landmass of 924, 000 square kilometers (Africa Economic Outlook, 2003, Country Report), 853km long coastline. Nigeria practices a presidential system of government and bicameral legislature at the federal level (Senate of 109 members and House of Representatives of 360 members) and unicameral at the subnational units (Houses of Assembly). It has three arms or branches of government – Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary. The President is the Head of State and Chief Executive and Commander-In- Chief of the Armed Forces. At the state level, the Governors are the head of the executive. A well-structured judiciary system – Supreme Court at the apex, Appeal Court, Federal High Court, High Court, Magistrate Court and Customary. Nigeria practices multi-party democracy since the return to civil rule in 1999.

Nigeria diplomatic engagement began before political independence with establishment of Foreign Service in 1957. In 1960, Nigeria attained political independence on the 1st October 1960 and was admitted as the 99th member of the United Nations on the 7th October 1960. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth relations were created to manage the country's external relations. At independence, it opened few diplomatic missions – 11 overseas missions (eight and two consular posts and one permanent delegation to the United Nations. In 1963, five missions at War Saw brought the number to sixteen. Increasingly, between 1965 and 1966, Nigeria had thirty-nine overseas missions (of the thirty-nine, thirty were diplomatic missions, five consular posts, two area office, one permanent delegation to the United Nations and one Office of Commissioner General for Economic Affairs in Washington (Chris, 2021 cited Enyindah & Kia, 2023,pp.187-188). In the 1970s, Nigeria's diplomatic missions increased to forty-six (thirty-nine diplomatic missions, four consular posts, two area offices and one delegation to UN. By 1982, Nigeria had ninety diplomatic missions and ninety-seven as at 1999. As at 2015, Nigeria had more than two hundred and nine missions and over two thousand officials abroad (**Enyindah &Kia, 2023)**. **See the Appendix for map of Nigeria.**

2.2 Taiwan Political and Diplomatic History

The Republic of China popularly known as Taiwan is situated in the Pacific between Japan and the Philippines. Its jurisdiction extends to the archipelagoes of Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu as well as numerous other islets. The total landmark of Taiwan is 36, 192.8 square kilometers, with a population of 23 million (M.O.F.A, 2022).

Historically, in 1885 Taiwan was declared a province of the Qing Empire. Following the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Qing government signs the Treaty of Shimonoseki by which it ceded sovereignty over Taiwan to Japan which rules the island until 1945 after Japan surrendered at the end of W.W.11. The Chinese revolution of 1911-12 the Qing government was overthrown and the Republic of China (R.O.C.) was established. In 1943, as the World War 11 was going on, the ROC leader Chiang Kai-Shek met the United States President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Cairo. After the conference, a Cairo Declaration was issued stating that "… Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu islands) shall be restored to the Republic of China." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). They agreed that territories taken from China by Japan, including Manchuria and Taiwan, would be returned to the control of the Republic of China after Japan was defeated (the Allied forces of the Second World War had been fighting Japan in the Pacific region since December 1941) (Curtis, 2024). In 1945, following the defeat of axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) in the World War 11, the ROC, Britain and United States made a joint Declaration calling for Japan's unconditional surrender and the carrying out of the Cairo Declaration.

After the World War 11, ROC government representatives accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in Taiwan. The Chief Executive of Taiwan Province Chen Yi sent a memorandum to the Japanese governor-general of Taiwan, stating that "As the Chief Executive of Taiwan Province of the ROC, …I restore all legal territory, people, administration, political, economic and cultural facilities and assets of Taiwan (including the Penghu Islands". (M.O.F.A, 2022). In 1948, the ROC Constitution is promulgated Jan.1 and is scheduled to take effect Dec. 25. In March and the following months, ROC troops dispatched from China to suppress a large scale uprising of Taiwan residents sparked what was popularly referred to February 28 incident. In 1948, a full scale war rages in China between the Kuomintang (KMT)-led ROC government and China Communist Party (CCP). In 1949, the ROC relocated to Taiwan in 1949 after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War. Since then the ROC has continued to exercise effective jurisdiction over the main island of Taiwan and a number of outlying island, leaving Taiwan

and the Chinese mainland each under the rule of a different government. The People Republic of China (PRC) that is, the mainland is under the rule of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (KMT) rule the island China (ROC) Taiwan.

The ROC practices a unitary system of government with a President and Vice President is directly elected every four years and may be reelected for one additional term. The President is the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who represents the nation in foreign relations, and is empowered to appoint heads of four branches of the government, including the premier, who leads the Executive Yuan who reports regularly to the Legislative Yuan (Legislature). The national government comprises the presidency and five major branches, or yuans – Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Examination Yuan, Judicial Yuan and Control Yuan. The Legislative Yuan, or parliament, is the unicameral legislature of Taiwan. Members are voted for four-year terms as part of the general elections that also choose the President. The number of seats in the Legislative Yuan was halved from 225 to 113 and legislators' terms were increased from three to four years. Each electoral district elects just one seat.

The heads of ministries, commissions and agencies are under the Executive Yuan are appointed by the premier and form the Executive Yuan Council, commonly referred to as the Cabinet. To improve administrative effectiveness, the Executive Yuan is undergoing restructuring to reduce the number.

The local governments at present include those of six (6) special municipalities, Thirteen (13) counties and three (3) autonomous municipalities with the same hierarchical status as counties. Special municipalities are top-level administrative entities that fall under the direct jurisdiction of the central government. The six special municipalities are, in order of population, New Taipei, Kaohsiung, Taichung, Taipei, Taoyuan and Tainan. All heads and representatives of local governments are popularly elected simultaneously in cities and counties across Taiwan every four years. Special municipalities are top-level administrative entities that fall under the direct jurisdiction of the central government. The ROC operates a multi-party system democracy. There are two major political parties – the Kuomintang (KMT)—or Nationalist Party and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Other political parties are Taiwan People's Party and the New Power Party.

The ROC was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945 and one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. After the Chinese Civil War in 1949 between the Communist Party of Mao Zendong and the Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang's government continued to represent China as the Republic of China at the UN even after relocation of the

government to Taiwan. As the disagreement ensued between the PRC and ROC over who was the legitimate representative of China in the UN. The US made efforts to block the recognition of PRC but with increased membership of the UN following the decolonization of countries of Asia, South America, and Africa, in the 1950s and 1960s the PRC was supported as the sole representative of China.

In December 1961, the General Assembly passed resolution 1668 (XVI), noting the "serious divergence of views" that existed over the representation of China, and resolved that the issue be designated as an "important question" under Article 18 of the UN Charter, meaning that any resolution to settle the question would require a two-thirds majority vote in the UN's General Assembly (Curtis, 2024). In October 1971, the General Assembly passed resolution 2758 by the required two-thirds majority, which recognized the People's Republic of China as the only lawful representative of China at the United Nations, and expelled the Republic of China's delegation (Curtis, 2024). Taiwan has continued to make effort for its admission to the UN but for PRC influence among members it has become increasingly difficult. In 993, Taiwan submitted application to the UN membership under the name ROC. In 2009, it submitted under the name Taiwan. All these applications were rejected (Drun, and Glaser, 2022 cited Curtis, 2024, p. 17).

2.3 Pre- and Post- United Nations Resolution's Nigeria –Taiwan Relations

Nigeria and Taiwan connection started as early as 1960s when the World Bank endorsed a Taiwanese scientist, Sun Yun-Suan, the then leading personality in the Taiwan Power industry, to work as CEO and General Manager of the Nigeria's Electricity Corporation between 1964 and 1967. The absolute aim was to revive the power sector in Nigeria. This attempt had later on, established trade and economic relations between Nigeria and Republic of China (ROC). The Sun's engagement ensured additional amount of the electricity supply by around 87 percent, therein **(Yueh, 2009)**. However, in 1990, both Nigeria and Taiwan ratified on a Memorandum of Understanding on certain issues including trade and investments that led to the establishment of trade missions in Taipei and Lagos in April 1991 and November 1992 respectively. Additionally, the Taiwan Consulate General was opened on August, 1993 in Calabar city of Nigeria as an attempt to help in processing Nigeria's exports. As this effort have not attracted Taiwanese investors, Taiwan terminated the agreement and closed down its office in Calabar after nearly four years **(Tseng, 2008).**

Taiwan-Nigeria relations of almost three decades are seen under probability after Nigerian authorities demanded Taiwan to relocate back to Lagos somewhere in 2017. Many experts

believe that economic consideration 'is one of the main reasons behind this straightforward action taken by the Nigerian government. Taiwan-Nigeria diplomatic connectivity has officially started in 1991, when Taiwan established its trade office in Lagos, the then Nigeria's Capital of Administration during a military junta of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida (rtd.). Coincidently, Nigeria's capital was moved to Abuja at the same year, by the same regime of Babangida. The Trade Office was therein relocated to Abuja in 2001 after consecutive ten (10) years of its establishment. In January, 2017 the Taiwan-Nigeria relations seems underneath the standard level due to what is believed as under the sway of heavyweight Chinese Dollar'. The PRC's great campaign of 'One- China Policy' strives by all the means to overtake the twenty seven (27) years old Taiwan-Nigeria ties through juicy businesses, bilateral agreements, financial aids, projects and cultural exchange programs offered to Nigerian students, academic staff and government officials with direct impact (Ghazali, 2023)

Perhaps, this might be the typical scenario in Taiwan-China Nigeria pyramid relations. Nigeria, the most populous Black Country in the world, has since declared her paramount desire and candidacy for the permanent seat in the UNSC where PRC already is a member with veto power. Secondly, in 2016 the Nigeria's president, Muhammadu Buhari paid a state visit to Beijing and Chinese minister of external affairs, Wang Yi, visited Nigeria in early days of 2017. During this visit, Mr. Yi and Jeoffrey Onyeama, his Nigerian counterpart signed communiqué that re-echoed Nigeria's backing One-China policy. Mr. Yi asserted that his government is ready to invest US$ 40 billion in Nigeria.

2. 4 China factor in Nigeria-Taiwan relations

A reflection of five decades of Nigeria –China relations on one hand and Taiwan on the other hand. After the United Nations resolution 2758 recognizing PRC as the legitimate representative in the United Nations, Nigeria adopted a conventional diplomatic wisdom to support PRC and derecognize Taiwan. In this regard, successive Nigerian government has accepted since 1971 "One China Policy" and it pursued the policy of accommodation in dealing with Taiwan and not recognition. Nigeria has adopted and maintained pragmatic approach in its foreign policy towards Taiwan; hence, Nigeria is the third trading partner in Africa after Angola, and South Africa (Seteolu, & Oshodi, 2018 cited Oshodi et al., 2022, p. 247).

Taiwan has been Nigeria's trading partner since 1960s when Taiwanese traders were in Nnewi in the southeastern region of Nigeria (Oshodi, et al, 2022). It must be stated that despite the shift to China, Nigeria-Taiwan trade relations continued years after recognition. For instance, volume of trade between Nigeria and Taiwan reached "788 million USD in 214, 195 million

USD in 2015, 363 million USD in 2016, and 460 million USD in 2017, 290 million USD in 2028." (Oshodi, et al, 2022, p. 247). According to the Taiwan Ambassador and Head Trade of Mission in Nigeria, Mr. Andy Liu acknowledged that the trade relationship between the two countries have grown. In 2021, the volume of trade was $1 billion which was a remarkable increase of about 200 per cent. The trade is an indication of how the countries needed each other. Taiwan import Nigeria's agricultural products such as sesame and groundnut while Taiwan export its technology, petrochemical products, information technology. Nigerians assembled car and motorcycle parts from Taiwan (Business Day, 2022, 20 September, p.26).

From the inception of Nigeria-China, relation is guided by six basic principles as mutually agreed. These are peaceful mutual co-existence, non-aggression commitment, and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. Political and economic relations are among other historical ties that China has with Nigeria. These principles however underlined Nigeria's foreign policy ((Ghazali, 2022)

First, the Nigeria's civil war experience which China supported the secessionist Biafra group based on China's believe at that time for liberation movement in Africa. The government of Nigeria did not want to support Taiwan who is seen as secessionist group which Nigeria itself had fought for. The Nigerian civil war just ended one year before the UN resolution of 1971 the memory of the war was still fresh it was unreasonable to a secessionist Taiwan. Again, Nigeria is still confronted with separatist agitation in some regions, Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), the Niger Delta militants, the insurgency in north. Taiwan with neither support any of these groups nor support Nigeria but China may support them to liberate themselves from Nigeria.

Second reason, the Communist Party of China's foreign policy of non-interference in the internal affairs was heartwarming to Nigeria military regimes. It could be recalled that during the Abacha's military rule, Nigeria was quarantine by Western countries and some African countries including South Africa and Zimbabwe. The government of Abacha fell back to China who was ready to provide Nigeria with much needed assistance for its development and for international support. China being one of powerful few in the UN Security Council, Nigeria may have reasoned that allying with China will offer it diplomatic coverage in case of any possible sanction there will be a country like `China to veto it The Western allies of the United States have placed embargo on the importation of Nigeria's crude oil. China opened the door for Nigeria. The regime of Abacha wittingly established the Nigerian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce to improve bilateral relations. The regime went further to sign an agreement with

the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECCC). The point to be made is that military regime of Abacha was comfortable with China who was not ready to interfere in Nigeria' political logjam following the annulment of Presidential election of 1993 then Taiwan who promotes democracy in line with ideology of the West. Nigeria also envisioned that switching to China offers it the best opportunity of a country will be back its quest for one Africa' seats for the UN Security which was canvassed. China being one of the permanent members of the Security will support Nigeria's candidacy. However, Nigeria is not the only country in Africa interested in that seat therefore all possible contender decided to switched diplomatic support to China.

The third possible explanations for the shift is for the fact that Nigeria has been dealing with the issue of national question, which was one of the reasons causes of the civil war. This national question is full of ambiguity but its basic pillar is about citizenship and statehood which is a major challenge to nation building (Oshodi et al., 2022). These issues are likely to dismember the union. China considers Taiwan as breakaway region, Nigeria is still grappling with centrifugal forces, and it does not want to support a breakaway region like Taiwan. This is just we noted in the above paragraph on civil war. The government must have also learned from the civil war that China supported Biafra. It does not want China to support any of the agitators that want a separate independent state.

The fourth explanation that can be deduced because many African countries overwhelmingly supported and voted for China in the true spirit of pan-Africanism. They believed rightly or wrongly that China shared that sentiment with them. Nigeria being a voice in Africa would not to go contrary to this popular position. Nigeria has maintained from inception the foreign policy of Afro-centrism which will be a contradiction if it did not support the views of other African countries that have shifted allegiance to China. As pointed out else that many African countries voted to support China. It was reasonable for Nigeria to go along with other African countries. This may be a contradiction of Nigeria' foreign policy posture of reassessment in line with the principle of sovereignty. Arguably, shifting to China is because of its economic power as which has motivating or motivated African countries. This position cannot be debated because China has been able to use its policy of Belt and Road Initiative to capture many Africans. In the case of Nigeria, China has been involved in the areas of infrastructure development. All these have overshadowed Nigeria that led to the shift to China.

Lastly, Nigeria is surrounded by countries in the sub-region that have witnessed Chinese presence. The ingenious policy of instituting the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is one way China has captured the minds and souls of African leaders who can easily be led by

the nose by China. Nigeria would not want to be excluded from the gathering of countries in Beijing where a lot of promises are made by China on how to turn Africa continent to a new industrial hub.

The Chinese factor becomes important in Nigeria-Taiwan relations. Nigeria have to deal with Beijing‘s dollar in one hand and Taipei‘s soft power diplomacy of promoting democracy. The realists would always assume that power is the critical determinant of inter-state relations. This is correct because China hold yam, knife, and choses whoever it want give. It gives conditions to countries that needs it assistance that they must not establish diplomatic tie with Taiwan that explained why there was wave of diplomatic switch to its side from Taiwan.

From the foregoing reasons for the Nigeria shift to China, there are ample of opportunities for the two countries to deepen their relationship despite China’s bully posture. The government of Nigeria to renew the mutual investment protection agreement with Taiwan which was signed in 1994. According to the Head of the Trade Mission, Mr. Andy Liu, “investment will drive more job opportunities into Nigeria” ((Business Day, 2022, p.26).

3.0. Evaluation of Subnational Units’ (SNUs) Involvement in Paradiplomacy in Nigeria and Taiwan

We incorporate viewpoints from the literature on paradiplomacy, foreign policy restraints, soft power diplomacy, and the dynamics of power in international politics to examine the function of subnational units in foreign relations between Taiwan and Nigeria. The function of SNGs in international cooperation and global governance, as well as the opportunities and difficulties these organizations face under centralized foreign policy frameworks, must also be taken into account. Although certain elements encourage paradiplomatic involvement, their actual use is constrained by constitutional, political, and geopolitical issues. A critical evaluation of subnational units' participation in paradiplomacy in Taiwan and Nigeria is given by the questions and answers that follow.

3.1. What are the factors that can favour the growth of paradiplomacy between Nigeria and Taiwan and potential benefits?

SNGs participate in international relations for a variety of reasons. These are crucial to the development of Taiwan-Nigeria paradiplomacy.

(i) Globalization

One of the main forces for paradiplomacy is globalization. According to Nigerian respondents, globalization gives the regions more chances to participate in global networks. Paradiplomatic is supported by the drive for global integration, particularly in Taiwan, where both nations depend on international ties. Paradiplomacy is accelerated by globalization, which makes cross-border interactions possible. In order to improve their economic development and competitiveness, subnational organizations seek to engage in international trade, investment, and cultural interaction as the world grows more interconnected. In addition to improving marketing and information sharing, globalization fosters the expansion of paradiplomatic endeavors.

It facilitates the development of the economy, draws in foreign investment, boosts exports and trade, creates sister city ties, encourages tourist and cultural interaction, engages in international organizations and global city networks, and influences policy and decision-making. Cities like Taipei and Lagos, for instance, are important centers of the economy. Thus, maintaining a competitive edge in the global economy requires paradiplomatic. The responders note that:

> Because SNGs respond to global issues like migration, climate change, and trade liberalization, globalization has increased the role of subnational entities in international relations. Globalization makes the globe more interconnected,

> and local problems frequently reflect global ones. This encourages SNGs to look for international partnerships in order to address specific difficulties. Growing economic interconnectedness and globalization encourage subnational units and international engagements (Field Survey, 2024).

Taiwan is a prime example of paradiplomacy; although being bound by international diplomatic standards because of the One-China policy, it uses paradiplomacy to indirectly maintain foreign relations by setting up trade offices and vibrant civil society networks. This case demonstrates how globalization and political restrictions encourage subnational actors to create alternative diplomatic channels, hence strengthening paradiplomacy and diplomatic relations. Kuznetsov 2015: 50–51; 100–116; Der-Yuan Wu, n.d.). As one respondent puts it: "SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan can leverage the world of globalization to reach out and advance the interest of their countries." The Internet, online meetings, and social media have strengthened worldwide connections and enabled more face-to-face interactions because of globalization and technical improvements. Global identity recognition, which is a result of cultural nationalism, is a soft power that allows a country like Taiwan, which is struggling with international isolationism, to use paradiplomacy to connect with people who understand its situation and share its goals. In order to get international recognition, the pursuit of this identity/cultural nationalism would encourage travel and diaspora involvement.

Despite having little official acknowledgment, nationalism may be a factor in Taiwan's subnational units using paradiplomacy to establish their identity and win international recognition. Subnational actors look for ways to further their financial interests in a globalized economy without the central government's intervention. Accordingly, Globalization facilitate and accelerate paradiplomacy in so many ways. The second is cultural. Cultural homogenization is one of the obvious consequences of globalization, and it is frequently seen as a bad aspect of the entire process (Kamiński, 2018, S. 24).

The power to conduct diplomatic relations is typically regarded as a sovereign state's exclusive attribute; nevertheless, in our increasingly globalized world, local and regional governments' participation in international relations is becoming increasingly important. However, the shift to a global economy and the increase in global connection have given it new relevance in recent decades (Cornago, 2018). Through the neoliberal policy of encouraging competition between cities and regions, globalization indirectly pushes cities and regions to look for strategic partnerships overseas (Pierre, 2013 cited Zepeda Martinez, 2018, p. 29). Globalization is the most frequently cited topic, according to Oddone (2023).

ii. Decentralization of governmental authority

Respondents in Taiwan and Nigeria support SNGs using paradiplomacy to decentralize foreign diplomacy. Simply said, decentralization is the distribution of authority and resources among various SNG entities, including states, municipalities, districts, and regions (Wunsch, 2014, p. 1). Decentralization and para-diplomacy go hand in hand since they will support regional economic growth. By granting them greater autonomy and promoting their participation in external relations, it is the transfer of power from central governments to SNGs. As subnational government start to exercise more autonomy and responsibility aimed at fostering their own development, it is recognized that decentralization has resulted in a transfer of power from central governments.

This gives the SNGs the ability to take charge of their economic futures, make choices that benefit their people, interact with other countries without necessarily depending on their national government, and create their own international connections and plans. For example, in Taiwan, cities like Taichung have been able to establish their own international connections and relations thanks to the decentralization of power from the central government to municipal governments. According to Zhimin and Junbo (2009, p.6), decentralization allows the central government to retain its leadership in terms of policy direction while also relieving it of administrative and operational obligations.

One important determinant of the extent and efficacy of paradiplomatic is the degree of decentralization within a state. Subnational entities (such as states, provinces, or cities) have greater autonomy in decentralized political systems, which allows them to interact with the outside world more autonomously and proportionately than the national government. The realist view that states are becoming more decentralized and that giving sub-state governments autonomy through freedom delegation is supported by the literature (**Munir and Purnomo, 2019)**. According to the conventional democratic reasoning, decentralization is a good process for democracy since it brings decision-making closer to the people. This argument should also be applied to foreign policy (Lecourse, 2008).

The discussion cites the United States, Spain, and Canada as instances of countries with decentralized political systems that enable active subnational diplomatic endeavors, including trade missions and cross-cultural interactions. On the other hand, paradiplomacy is restricted by centralized foreign policy systems, such as Nigeria. The decentralization of power outlined in the Constitution is incompatible with the consolidation of foreign policy authority at the national level. Under reality, paradiplomacy is more practical under federal or decentralized systems than in centralized ones that restrict the diplomatic sovereignty of subnational entities.

By increasing regional autonomy, paradiplomacy enables SNGs to participate more actively in global issues. Increased regional self-governance, cultural identity, and economic growth may result from this.

This brings up the federalization vs. decentralization debate. Decentralization of power and authority to subnational units is made possible by federalism as a form of government. The subnational units get unintentionally involved in foreign affairs via this practice. The constitution exclusively gives the central government authority over foreign policy. Decentralizing the foreign policy apparatus to subnational entities is intended to increase public interest in, knowledge of, and participation in foreign policy activities while bringing diplomatic procedures closer to the people. While sub-units in more recent federal states, like Nigeria, do not exhibit a strong interest in paradiplomacy, they do in more established ones, such the United States, Canada, Australia, and others.

Nonetheless, under the new democratic regime, some SNGs in Nigeria are becoming more conscious of their role in paradiplomacy. Their participation is contingent upon their capacity, interest, and willingness to engage in para-diplomacy, as noted by Chatterji and Saha (2017). As some respondents have noted, the capability issue is crucial because:

> In Nigeria, certain Sub-Units lack the necessary manpower, resources, and administrative framework. As part of their autonomy, some SNGs, including Lagos, Imo, Kaduna, Bayelsa, and Cross River, have started paradiplomatic endeavors (Field survey 2024).

Since Nigeria gained its independence, efforts have been made to federalize its foreign policy. The importance of constituent entities in the conclusion and execution of the contract is recognized by the post-independence constitutions of 1960 and 1963. According to the Nigeria-Niger Commission agreement, the federal governors of Northern states that border the Niger Republic are permitted to meet with their Niger counterparts on issues of shared interest, like reforestation and desertification control (Gamberi, 1991). By involving the component entities in international activities, a federation can foster paradiplomacy. In a similar vein, federal delegations frequently include state representatives in bilateral meetings that may affect their states Thus, apart from states participating in joint commissions held with neighboring countries, civil authorities from the states also take part in talks with foreign partners.

The constituent units are able to progress at their own pace when foreign relations operations are federalized. This further bolsters the case for paradiplomacy, which holds that it can be

applied to encourage more rapid and extensive regional economic development. To put it another way, in a federal system, component units can use paradiplomatic tactics to engage provinces, establish sister-city relationships in other nations, attract investment, encourage connectivity and trade, and boost tourism. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), decentralized governance can significantly improve local people's quality of life and, when properly planned, executed, and managed, can strengthen human development over time (cited in Zepeda, 2018). It is believed that paradiplomacy is compatible with democratization and decentralization. The reason for this is that it makes diplomatic activities more accessible to the public, who are interested in, knowledgeable about, and involved in foreign policy activities (Chatterji & Saha, 2017).

iii. Democratization of Governance

In addition to allowing the constituent entities to engage in paradiplomacy, democratization of international relations will foster collaboration and result in much-needed economic growth. Democracy will enable the constituent units to take part in the formulation of foreign policy, just as decentralization can ease tension and conflict between the center and the constituent units. The respondents noted that in a federal system of government, an overabundance of power concentration frequently causes conflict and increases friction. International peace will therefore be aided by constituent units' involvement in foreign policy decision-making. Along with the central government, democratization grants the constituent entities the flexibility to engage in international economic interactions.

Civil society or non-governmental organizations will become involved as foreign diplomacy becomes more democratic. Particularly in Taiwan, where NGOs and the public play a larger role in information diplomacy, NGOs actively promote paradiplomatic participation. Although not to the same extent as in Taiwan, NGO participation supports soft power measures in Nigeria as well.

Additionally, democratization generates financial incentives for local and regional governments as well as for private citizens and businesses. In highly decentralized unitary nations, democratization has typically also resulted in decentralization of governance and administration. As a result, constituent diplomacy is used in a democratically elected national government, elected regional and local government representatives, rival national and/or regional political parties, and the defense of human rights, including property rights (Kincaid, 2010, p. 16). The respondents argue that sister-city links will support Taiwan's international

relations during a period of international isolation and that democratization of foreign policymaking will open up more opportunities for Taiwan's municipal and county authorities to participate in paradiplomacy.

According to Chatterji & Saha (2017), governments use formal diplomacy to pursue both cooperative and conflicting goals with other states. Therefore, there is a larger likelihood for international peace if there is more paradiplomatic activity in the international arena since it creates more opportunities for cooperative exchanges. Sub-units of two states can only cooperate and support one another when they are in a relationship. Since Nigeria is not allowed to have diplomatic ties with Taiwan under the current international political system, they could encourage their subnational units to do the same.

According to Kincaid (2010), the freedom of action brought about by democratization and market liberalization is the main cause of component diplomacy. Regardless of the degree of globalization, there is little or no constituent diplomacy where democratization and market liberalization are either nonexistent or restricted. Incentives and even demands for self-government are also produced by democratization and market liberalization, and they apply not only to private citizens and businesses but also to municipal and regional governments. In general, administrative and governmental decentralization within nation-states has also resulted from democratization and market liberalization. Accordingly, nations with a market-based economy, a democratically elected national government, elected regional and local government representatives, rival national and/or regional political parties, and protections of human rights, including property rights, are more likely to practice constituent diplomacy.

The motivations behind the subnational administration's engagement with the international arena and improvement of its IR include globalization and democratization (Effendi, 2022). Local democracy seeks to enhance decentralization and local governance in a democratic nation (Sisk et al., 2001 cited Effendi, 2022). A regional actor gets more involved in foreign diplomacy because of decentralization brought about by democratization (Magone, 2006, cited in Effendi, 2022). The democratization of foreign policy is subsequently impacted by decentralization, as residents and their administration become more conscious of and interested in improving their involvement in global issues (Nganje, 2014, cited in Effendi, 2022). On the other hand, because of globalization, the process of making foreign policy decisions becomes more inclusive and involves a variety of players (Chatterji & Saha, 2017).

iv. Economic, Trade, Investment and Business opportunities

The main motivator is economics, since both nations have strong economic development values. 85% support Taiwan's economic progress, whereas 75% support Nigeria. Paradiplomacy promotes regional economic interests, including commercial alliances and trade agreements. SNGs draw in international investment by highlighting the distinctive qualities of their area, such as its natural resources, highly qualified workforce, or advantageous location. Increased competitiveness, economic expansion, and job creation may result from this. For instance, a partnership with Taipei can be established in Lagos, which is the economic center for international investment. Additionally, the city of Port Harcourt may be able to draw in foreign investment from Taiwanese semi-conductor industries, which would enhance the local economy and provide jobs.

One of the things that could encourage subnational units to use paradiplomatic is the possibility of investment. Sadly, despite years of commercial ties, Taiwan has not considered those with Nigeria. China is a vital partner for Nigeria, as evidenced by the rise in its contributions to the country, which is frequently linked to infrastructure and economic development. The SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria can relate by investing in several crucial areas of mutual benefit because these are some of the strong arguments for the move to China. When compared to China's aggressive investment initiatives, it is clear from the data that Taiwan has not done enough to encourage investment in Nigeria.

By forming global alliances and agreements, SNGs aim to draw in foreign direct investment, encourage exports, and generate employment. To put it another way, SNGs use paradiplomacy to further their economic objectives by luring in foreign capital and generating employment, encouraging exports and boosting trade, building infrastructure and enhancing transportation systems, and fostering business-friendly conditions to draw in entrepreneurs and startups. For example, in order to draw in investment and foster economic growth, the Taiwanese city of Kaohsiung has partnered with American and Japanese cities. For example, Nigerian SNGSs' involvement in trade promotion, particularly at international trade shows. The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) arranges these types of official travel (Omiunu and Aniyie, 2018). The SNGs are currently creating their own plans for forming alliances or taking part in these kinds of global endeavors. The Lagos State government has been actively promoting trade. The lack of a clear model for cooperation between federal and state entities on promotional activities is one of the main issues that have been recognized as impeding SNGs' participation in foreign commerce (Omiunu and Aniyie, 2018).

The economy has a crucial role in determining foreign policy, much like in traditional diplomacy. Economic interests have a major role in how nations interact with one another. The respondents agreed that Taiwan could use diplomacy to its fullest economic advantage over Nigeria, which it does not do, whereas China used it to its advantage by offering financial incentives to numerous African nations. For example, China improves economic relations and provides infrastructure, which are appallingly poor between Taiwan and Nigeria. In order to strengthen the transportation industry, which is essential for economic growth, Taiwan can invest in Nigeria's key commercial centers. According to the interviewees, "economic interests, including infrastructure development and trade, are largely driven by China's diplomatic relations with African countries" (Field survey, 2024).

The ability of the subnational units to participate in paradiplomacy is greatly aided by their economic and resource capacities. To put it another way, the degree of economic and resource capacity dictates how much paradiplomatic activity a region may undertake. Subnational units with robust economies, like California, have the means to take the lead in international projects on their own, organizing trade delegations and establishing alliances. Although having a strong economy is beneficial, the discussion also shows that, when driven by urgent needs or strategic interests, resource-poor regions can nevertheless pursue paradiplomatic objectives in specific fields, including cultural or educational exchanges. For instance, while lacking substantial resources, Midwest U.S. states use paradiplomatic with China to assist local government.

To overcome Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, these nations will be encouraged to embrace paradiplomatic by the possible business prospects in Taiwan and Nigeria. Nigeria offers Taiwan a sizable market for its goods, and Nigeria may benefit from Taiwan's technical innovation to grow its own economy. SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria can connect to certain areas, such agriculture, education, and health, among others. Technology exports from Taiwan will help the country's development. Without strict political restrictions, Taiwan can offer development assistance in fields like agriculture, health, and education, which will appeal to Nigerian decision-makers. Taiwan could gain from concentrating on areas like health and education where China is less active in order to improve relations with African countries.

SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria can use paradiplomacy to boost exports, promote trade agreements, and open up new commercial prospects for regional firms. Through the current trade missions set up by the two governments since 1991, SNGs can encourage entrepreneurs and advertise the goods and services of their region. When compared to China and Nigeria, the trade data between Taiwan and Nigeria indicates a decrease. One respondent from the Nigeria's

Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the amount of trade between Taiwan and Nigeria demonstrates that there are disparities between the two countries' trade volumes. In his opinion,

> Trade with Taiwan has remained relatively modest, with figures fluctuating between $200 million and $400 million annually from 1999 to 2022, whereas trade with China skyrocketed, exceeding $20 billion by 2022 …. Similarly, percentage of export between China and Nigeria exports is stated at 30-40%, mostly in crude oil, while Taiwan's share is low (less than 1%), underlining the imbalance in economic relations (Field survey 2024).

Michelmann (1990), Keating (2000), Gallardo Pérez (2007), and Schiavon (2019) state that the main driver of paradiplomatic is usually economic incentives (cited in Oddone, 2023, p. 4). Subnational governments are driven by economic factors to use paradiplomacy to foster economic growth in their areas, encourage trade, and draw in foreign direct investment (Kuznetsov, 2015). According to Keating (2000), economics has undoubtedly been the most persuasive justification for paradiplomacy in recent years. As national economies have grappled with the consequences of globalization, centralized regional development initiatives have diminished. A critical stage of economic innovation and development, regions are increasingly being compelled to participate in global markets without the protection of the national state.

Economic development can be accelerated and expanded with para-diplomacy. Through para-diplomatic strategies, such as establishing sister-provincial or sister-city links with other nations, the constituent units and even cities can attract investment; encourage trade and connectivity, and increase tourism (Chatterji & Saha, 20217, p. 282). According to Omiunu & Aniyie (2018, p.379), the primary reason Nigerian SNGs are intruding into the international relations policy area is to draw in foreign investment to support their (economic) growth requirements. In addition to fostering paradiplomacy, the establishment of trade missions between Taiwan and Nigeria will provide provinces with a useful venue for showcasing their enterprises, goods, and services on a global scale (**Zahidi, & Othman, 2025)**. In addition to the central government's political goal, paradiplomacy can be used between Taiwan and Nigeria only for economic purposes. In order to get international support, it is crucial to promote trade, tourism, cultural linkages, and even post-conflict reconciliation to local political activism. Subnational relations can also be used to recruit and encourage investments looking for region-specific economic benefits, like foreign direct investments, and to engage in trade promotion through an annual trade show. The SNGs of the two nations can support international collaboration and global governance in this way through their paradiplomatic efforts.

SNGs can search outside of their immediate surroundings for markets for their goods, investment possibilities, and technology to access resources. Despite the associated security risks and reliance on outside funding, Keating (2000) asserts that inward investment is a way to achieve employment, growth, and entry into new economic sectors. To promote exports, local businesses will look for infrastructure support and financial incentives. The internationalization of economies and the growth of local businesses and markets through outward investment are the results of regions encouraging inward investment (Keating, 2000). In order to encourage exports and draw in foreign direct investment (FDI), many U.S. states have established international offices and governor-led overseas missions, according to McMillan (2008). States are in charge of luring FDI because the US government does not get involved. State governments, the U.S. Department of Commerce (via the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service), chambers of commerce, nonprofit international trade centers, and business consultancies are all part of the complex network of actors on the export side (Kline 1983; Posner 1984; Whatley 2003, cited in McMillan, 2008).

v. Social factors such as Culture, Education exchanges and Tourism

Programs for cultural exchange can encourage and support paradiplomacy. Programs for cultural exchange that might foster interregional collaboration and understanding. Increased cultural diversity, creative cooperation, and educational exchange may result from this. For instance, the cities of Calabar and Taichung in Cross River State could collaborate on art projects, foster cultural understanding, and collaborate on education through a cultural exchange program. Both nations have important cultural heritage programs, with Taiwan having a somewhat higher percentage (70%) than Nigeria (65%). Interaction at the cultural level will foster mutual understanding and international ties as soft power. Cities and regions aim to promote people-to-people diplomacy, draw tourists, and highlight their distinctive cultural history.

According to the respondents, cities and regions use paradiplomacy to promote tourism and cultural exchange by showcasing their historical landmarks and distinctive cultural heritage, creating artist residencies and cultural exchange programs, encouraging eco-tourism and sustainable tourism practices, and forming sister city relationships to promote people-to-people diplomacy. To encourage cultural exchange and tourism between the two cities, Tainan, Taiwan, and Sendai, Japan, have formed a sister city relationship (Field survey in Taiwan, 2024).

SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria might consider tourism development to market their areas as travel destinations, drawing tourists and making money from tourism-related businesses. Cultural interaction, job development, and economic progress can result from this. For instance, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, has made significant investments in its tourism infrastructure to showcase its breathtaking natural beauty and thriving cultural scene. The Canadian province of Quebec has created a tourism plan to draw tourists from abroad with its natural and cultural assets. In Los Angeles County, Taiwan is the eleventh-largest foreign travel market. Among all foreign visitor categories, the average amount spent per tourist is one of the highest.

This increase in Taiwanese tourism has had a direct impact on the San Gabriel Valley's economy through visitor spending and investment. The ensuing surge in new construction has tremendously benefited cities like San Gabriel, and the San Gabriel Valley's "Little Taipei" draws Taiwanese tourists seeking genuine Taiwanese cuisine and services. The San Gabriel Valley serves as a base for many Taiwanese visitors who want to visit the major tourist destinations in Southern California, such as Disneyland, Universal Studios, Sea World, upscale retail establishments like the Grove, Americana at Brand, Westfield Santa Anita Mall, Rodeo Drive, Beverly Center, and South Coast Plaza, as well as nearby casinos. Cultural sites including the Griffith Observatory, the TCL Chinese Theatre, the Huntington Library and Gardens, and Santa Monica also attract Taiwanese travelers. Another well-liked destination for Taiwanese travelers is the Hsi Lai Temple in Hacienda Heights, which is the second-largest Buddhist temple and monastery in the western hemisphere. New commercial developments, such as hotels, restaurants, shopping malls, and luxury retail, have been prompted by the tourism industry's explosive rise (Guerra, 2015, p. 26).

Exchanges in research and education are essential to any significant advancement. SNGs from Taiwan and Nigeria can collaborate on research and education by forming collaborations with their respective institutions. Knowledge exchange, creativity, and economic expansion may result from this. For instance, the US state of California has partnered with Chinese colleges to support scientific cooperation and exchange initiatives. At UCLA, there is a growing scholarly desire to enhance and promote Taiwanese culture, history, language and way of life. UCLA's goal is to research, teach and show the riches of Taiwan to the local community and to the rest of the world. UCLA has created different programs that enable UCLA students and faculty to learn about and research Taiwan. In addition, UCLA enables Taiwanese professors, undergraduate and graduate students to study and conduct academic research at UCLA (Guerra, 2015, p. 78).

California has drawn more international and Asian students (including Taiwanese) than any other state in the union. With USC and UCLA at the top, Los Angeles County has the highest concentration of Taiwanese students of any county in the United States. Tuition, living expenses, and real estate investments made by these kids' parents all have an economic impact on the area. Significant cultural and network relationships are among the numerous personal connections between the two regions, in addition to the educational ones. More people of Taiwanese heritage reside in the Los Angeles area than in any other part of the country. Actually, the largest concentration of Taiwanese outside of Taiwan is found in Los Angeles County. Network linkages include important national groups that focus on strengthening and supporting U.S.-Taiwan relations and local organizations that serve as a bridge between Taiwan and the Los Angeles region. Taiwan and Los Angeles County become more integrated because of the helpful services these organizations offer (Guerra, 2015, p. 2).

90% of those surveyed in Nigeria think that programs that foster educational exchange can improve governance. The Nigerian federal government would be encouraged to support subnational paradiplomatic efforts with subnational units in Taiwan. In contrast to China's aid that is more extensive and educational support programs, 70 % of respondents thought that the impact of educational exchange with Taiwan was extremely insignificant. The Taiwan Ministry of Education and Ministry of Foreign Affairs' scholarship program is a good first step, but it raises the question of how many Nigerians travel to Taiwan for degree programs and how many Taiwan students travel to Nigeria for university degrees. Many Chinese institutions have memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with some Nigerian universities, despite China's lack of emphasis on education in Nigeria. The Taiwanese government can improve bilateral connections and mutual understanding by increasing technical training and scholarship possibilities for Nigerians. Since it is consistent with national strategy, any policy that seeks to achieve economic development, cultural interchange, and regional cooperation is more likely to be supported by Nigeria's central governments.

The sharing of best practices in social welfare, health care, and education, as well as collaboration in fields like humanitarian aid and disaster relief, can be facilitated by paradiplomacy. By creating international programs for student exchange and capacity building in the form of teacher training, exchanging expert knowledge in social welfare and community development, working together on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and exchanging best practices in healthcare and education, cities and regions engage in paradiplomacy to

advance human development. To encourage academic cooperation and international student exchange, the city of Taichung, for instance, has partnered with institutions in the US and Europe. The Taichung municipal government can collaborate with SNGs in Nigeria in the areas of education, tourism and culture.

One component of soft power that aids in enhancing a nation's reputation among international audiences is its culture (Scoproni, 2016, pp. 235-236, cited in Kania, 2019, p. 67). A strong global image combined with economic competitiveness draws a variety of audiences, including residents, business and industry, tourists, and highly qualified workers, claims Kania (2019). Global human rights advocacy is one of the most concrete ways that SNGs are fostering soft power (Government of Flanders, 2016; Scottish Human Rights Commission, 2013, cited in Kania, 2019, p. 67).

When SNGs travel overseas, cultural diplomacy is crucial, as demonstrated by Barcelona and the Catalan area. With cultural paradiplomacy, Barcelona's transition to a service economy in the 1980s started to draw in possible foreign players. Because it was centered on a national identity, which boosted Barcelona's political activity, and because it was instrumental in the sense that it became a "instrument for the construction of a New State," the cultural diplomacy that the city of Barcelona carried out in political practice supported its image as a stateless nation (Zamorano, Morato, 2015, pp. 569–570, cited in Kania, 2019, p. 67). In light of its international diplomatic position, Taiwan is utilizing culture as a key soft power tool to win over foreigners. For example, Taiwanese food, fashion, fine arts, performing arts, media products, and films are all worth imitating. With its global appeal, Taiwanese pop culture—that is, its music, movies, and entertainment—has served as a soft power tool that might influence Taiwan's relations with other nations, particularly China. Pop culture, though, might also contribute to its identity (Delman, 2024). As stated by Delman (2024):

> In order to garner support for Taiwan's claims to autonomy, the status quo, and improved international influence and representation, Taiwan's soft power strategy has shifted from primarily competing with and resisting China's soft and hard power to concentrating more on interacting with politicians, if not political leaders, as well as commercial and social actors in states that support Taiwan (p. 9).

Taiwan has been a popular destination for international students interested in educational research exchange. Approximately 103,000 international students came to Taiwan in 2022. Although it was more than in 2021, the figure was still less than the roughly 129,000 international students that attended Taiwan's universities in 2019 prior to COVID. Official

statistics show that 492,185 foreign students attended Chinese universities in 2018. Taiwan's educational system possesses soft power attributes, according to a Taiwan International Cultural and Educational Exchange Association (AICEE) study of potential international students.

According to the respondents, there are three main benefits of studying in Taiwan over other nations: excellent education (24.75 percent), a secure living environment (15.4 percent), and the chance to learn Chinese (14.47 percent). Additional benefits were Taiwan's strategic location (4.49 percent) and reasonably priced tuition (10.4 percent) (Delman, 2024, pp. 9-10). Cross-cultural understanding through education is to see students as cultural ambassadors who can engage in a genuine and humanistic dialogue, reduce ignorance, and act on behalf of the common good, according to a summary of the findings from literature supports the opinions of those interviewed and who answered semi-structured questions about culture and educational exchange (Akli, 2012, p. 46).

vi. **Environmental concerns**

To address trans-boundary environmental concerns like climate change, air and water pollution, natural catastrophes, sustainable development and disaster relief, and biodiversity and natural resource protection, SNGs may use paradiplomacy. Since SNGs can exchange resources, best practices, and knowledge, paradiplomacy can help to promote environmental protection and sustainable development. To share best practices in lowering greenhouse gas emissions and advancing sustainable development, for instance, the city of Taipei has partnered with cities in Asia and Europe. The city of Copenhagen, Denmark, relationship with the city of Malmo, Sweden, fosters urban growth and environmental cooperation. The province of British Columbia, Canada, has established a partnership with the state of Washington, USA, promoting environmental cooperation and conservation in the Pacific Northwest.

SNGs can offer impacted areas humanitarian aid and disaster relief. This may result in enhanced international collaboration and more efficient catastrophe response and recovery. For instance, after Hurricane Irma in 2017, the US state of Florida sent humanitarian relief to the Cuban government. Cooperation on social welfare concerns including social justice, poverty alleviation, and health care can also be facilitated via paradiplomacy. SNGs can exchange resources, knowledge, and best practices, advancing human growth and social welfare. This is exemplified by the Netherlands' Amsterdam, which has partnered with Uganda's Kampala to

promote healthcare exchange and collaboration initiatives. The Canadian province of Alberta and the Chinese province of Guangdong collaborate on healthcare initiatives and exchanges.

Cities and regions are viewed as the entities in charge of carrying out environmental policies, which are frequently developed at the supranational level. Three arguments were presented by Happaerts et al. (2010) for the inclusion of subnational units in environmental studies:

> […] First, because subnational entities are significant spatial entities, their actions have implications for resource usage, ecosystems, and other areas. Second, they frequently oversee the execution of national and international policies, particularly in the EU where they are in charge of overseeing the administration of initiatives crucial to sustainable development, such the Structural Funds. Thirdly, the proximity of subnational organizations to individuals is often highlighted as a critical factor for stakeholder participation and the success of sustainability processes (quoted in Kamiński, 2018, p. 25).

Increasing economic globalization and interdependence, which encourage subnational units to pursue international engagement; decentralization of governance and devolution of powers to regional/local levels; globalization; decentralization; democratization of governance; federalization; economic development; trade; investment; tourism; cultural exchange; environmental cooperation; social welfare, etc., are some of the main factors that respondents believe have contributed to the growth of paradiplomacy. If subnational units' paradiplomatic efforts support national foreign policy objectives like luring in foreign investment and exports, promoting cultural and educational exchanges, tackling common regional and local development issues, and fortifying relationships with strategic partner nations, the central governments may be more inclined to authorize them.

The rise of paradiplomacy has been largely fueled by globalization, which has expanded the chances and incentives for subnational entities to interact with other countries. Nationalist feelings can in fact motivate paradiplomacy, particularly for stateless countries or those vying for more autonomy, as it gives them a way to express their unique identity and interests around the world. Because it gives subnational units more authority and resources, the decentralization of governmental authorities in federal systems like Nigeria might support the establishment of paradiplomacy. Likewise, increasing subnational international participation through paradiplomacy may be made possible by the de-concentration of power in unitary governments like Taiwan

Factors contributing the growth of paradiplomacy in Nigeria and Taiwan

Factors	Nigeria	Taiwan

	%	%
Globalization	Increased interaction with global markets and international organizations; Local governments seeks foreign partnerships to enhance trade and investment	Active participation in global networks and forums despite diplomatic isolation; local governments promote cultural exchanges and tourism to enhance Taiwan's global presence
Decentralization	Devolution of powers to state and local governments allows for more localized decision-making. Subnational governments can in international relations independently	Local governments have significant autonomy to pursue international collaborations. Decentralization facilitates tailored responses to local needs through international partnerships
Federalization	Nigeria's federal structure allows states to engage in paradiplomatic activities, reflecting regional interests. States can negotiate agreements with foreign entities to address local needs	Taiwan's local governments operate within a quasi-federal system, allowing them to engage in international relations despite limited formal recognition. Local governments can advocate for their interests on the global stage
Democratization	Growing democratic practices empower local governments to represent their constituents' interests internationally. Increased public participation encourages local leaders to seek international partnerships for development	Democratic governance allows local governments to engage in paradiplomacy, reflecting the will of the people. Local leaders can advocate for Taiwan's interests in international forums.
Economic, Trade, Investment and Business opportunities	Economic challenges drives subnational governments to seek foreign investment and partnerships to stimulate local economies. Local governments promote trade and investment initiatives to enhance economic growth	Economic development is a priority leading local governments to pursue international trade agreements and investment opportunities. Local governments actively participate in global supply chains and seek to attract foreign businesses.
Social factors such as Cultural, Educational exchanges and Tourism	Cultural exchange programmes that can promote cross-cultural understanding and cooperation between regions. Ethnic diversity and regional identities motivate SNGs to engage in paradiplomacy to address local social issues. Local governments seek international support for social programmes and community development.	The interaction at the cultural level will encourage international connections as soft power and promote mutual understanding. Cities and regions want to showcase their unique cultural heritage, attract tourists, and foster people-to-people diplomacy. Social cohesion and cultural identity drive local governments to promote Taiwanese culture abroad. Local governments engage in social initiatives that foster international understanding and collaboration
Environmental Concerns	Local governments address environmental challenges through international collaboration on sustainability initiatives. Partnerships with global	Environmental sustainability is a key focus, with local governments collaborating on conservation and climate action initiatives. International partnerships enhance local efforts to address

	organizations help tackle issues like deforestation and climate change	environmental challenges and promote sustainable practices.

Author's compilation (2024)



The bar chart provides a comparative analysis of how various factors influence the growth of paradiplomacy in Nigeria and Taiwan. Here's a breakdown of the chart:

Key Features:

1. **X-Axis**: Represents the seven influencing factors: Globalization, Decentralization, Federalization, Democratization, Economic Factors, Social Factors, and Environmental Issues. **Y-Axis**: Represents the "influence score," which is a relative measure of how strongly each factor contributes to paradiplomacy in the two regions.
2. **Bars**:**Sky Blue Bars**: Represent Nigeria's influence scores for each factor. **Orange Bars**: Represent Taiwan's influence scores for each factor.
3. **Scores**: Each bar is labeled with its respective score, making it easy to compare values visually and numerically.

Insights from the Chart: Globalization: Both Nigeria (8) and Taiwan (9) exhibit high influence scores, highlighting the significant role of global interconnectedness in driving paradiplomatic activities. **Decentralization**: Taiwan (8) scores slightly higher than Nigeria (7), reflecting Taiwan's effective use of decentralized governance in promoting regional and international relations. **Federalization**: This factor has a moderate influence in both cases but is stronger in Taiwan (7) compared to Nigeria (6), possibly due to the differing degrees of regional autonomy. **Democratization**: Democratization strongly influences paradiplomacy in both regions, with Taiwan (9) showing a slightly higher impact than Nigeria (7). **Economic**

Factors: Both Nigeria and Taiwan score high (8 and 9, respectively), indicating that economic opportunities and global trade significantly drive their paradiplomatic initiatives. **Social Factors**: Taiwan (8) again scores slightly higher than Nigeria (7), suggesting a greater emphasis on leveraging cultural and social dynamics in Taiwan's paradiplomacy. **Environmental Issues**: This factor shows the least influence in both regions, scoring 5 for Nigeria and 6 for Taiwan, indicating that environmental concerns are less prioritized compared to other factors.

Overall Observation: Taiwan generally scores higher across most factors, demonstrating a more pronounced impact of these influences on its paradiplomatic activities. **Nigeria** shows substantial influence from factors like globalization and economic considerations, but lags slightly in areas like federalization and democratization.

3.2. Why are SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan not deeply involved in paradiplomacy?

It has become more challenging for subnational units to actively engage in paradiplomacy due to obstacles in Taiwan and Nigeria. The underutilization of paradiplomacy in Taiwan and Nigeria can be attributed to a number of factors.

i. Lack of Institutionalization of paradiplomacy

80% of respondents identified lack of established legislative structures that would enable subnational entities to participate in international interactions. Without well institutionalized structure for paradiplomacy, local governments might not have the legal capacity to sign agreements, negotiate treaties, or take part in international organizations. In other words, there are no clear frameworks, rules, roles, or obligations for SNGs with relation to international engagement in the absence of established institutions. In the words of one of respondents,

> The ambiguity that results from the absence of an institutional framework, according to the respondents, frequently causes uncertainty. The absence of institutional structures is further explained by the varying degrees of engagement by SNGs in these two countries (Field survey 2024).

Put differently, several subnational governments may take disparate stances when it comes to paradiplomacy. There could be a disjointed and disorganized global presence because of some people participating actively and others staying inert. SNGs' inconsistent foreign policies may arise from a lack of institutionalization, which could jeopardize the central government's overarching foreign policy goals and cause misunderstandings with foreign allies. A large number of SNGs do not have official institutional frameworks, policies, or directives for conducting international diplomacy. This refers to the institutional frameworks that are used to organize international interaction with both domestic and foreign governments. Subnational

actors often lack the institutional and legal structures required to practice paradiplomacy. This lack of institutionalization restricts their capacity to formally establish partnerships and makes it difficult for them to negotiate complicated international waters. In the US, for example, some states have set up foreign offices (like California) to interact with other countries, but many others do not have the legal right to do so, which limits their ability to actively engage abroad. Reduced coordination may result from these institutional barriers to U.S. states' wider involvement in foreign affairs.

The participation of subnational governments in paradiplomacy is not well supported by Nigerian institutions. According to Okeke (2018), Nigeria has not established strong institutional frameworks that permit states to interact with foreign organizations on their own. Although Taiwan has some subnational international cooperation, primarily in the areas of trade and cultural exchanges, the absence of a formalized paradiplomacy framework for local governments suggests that their engagement in international affairs is restricted and heavily reliant on the policies of the central government **(Chien, 2017)**.

There are no formalized frameworks for immunity and diplomatic procedure for subnational actors, either domestically or internationally. Knowing that they are not covered by international diplomatic practices may make SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria less inclined to actively participate in international diplomacy. According to one respondent:

> When interacting with foreign governments, SNGs may face difficulties because they lack the diplomatic etiquette and immunity enjoyed by national governments. For instance, officials of SNGs might not be granted diplomatic immunity, which could restrict their capacity to conduct business internationally. SNGs could also lack the same degree of diplomatic etiquette, such as formal dignitary visits or formal ceremonies. Some SNGs do not have the same level of diplomatic protocol as national government officials, even if they have established foreign relations offices and diplomatic procedure for their officials (Field survey, 2024).

Official recognition of subnational governments as sovereign entities is frequently lacking. This implies that they are frequently constrained by diplomatic procedures that are exclusive to nation-states when they participate in international operations. Negotiations and agreements may become difficult if there is no recognition. National representatives are frequently given preference over subnational ones in diplomatic protocol. As a result, subnational leaders may be limited in the kinds of interactions they can engage in. For instance, presidents of state or selected national ministers are usually the only ones allowed to attend diplomatic sessions.

During international discussions, subnational delegates might not have the same privileges or access.

International law, such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, grants diplomats specific immunities. When interacting with foreign organizations, subnational officials may not have the same protection, leaving them open to political and legal fallout. Subnational governments may be discouraged from pursuing foreign policy too vigorously as a result (VCDR, 1964). Subnational governments may unintentionally clash with the foreign policy or legislative framework of the national government when they use paradiplomacy. This can result in legal disputes that could endanger future projects in addition to diplomatic issues. Subnational governments' paradiplomatic initiatives may be viewed by national governments as dangers to diplomatic unity or territorial integrity. As a result, subnational governments may be pushed to restrict their options while closely monitoring their interactions with the outside world. Essentially, diplomatic procedure and immunity erect obstacles that may restrict subnational governments' capacity to act successfully, even while paradiplomacy gives them the chance to interact with the world. These subnational entities' ability to actively pursue their international interests may be hampered by obstacles such as recognition difficulties, protocol limitations, possible legal weaknesses, and the overall influence of national foreign policy.

The major goal of Nigeria's foreign policy is to preserve both its worldwide presence and its regional influence in Africa. Because the central government is in charge of foreign affairs, subnational governments are not viewed as autonomous players in this process (Adebajo, 2018). SNGs find it difficult to join and express their interests on the international scene in the absence of such institutional frameworks. Nonetheless, Nigeria has institutionalized paradiplomacy in a few ways. First, calls for true federalism in Nigeria have been made repeatedly. True federalism includes the participation of subnational entities in international affairs. The idea to create these institutions has come from a few state governments. States that have done so include Bayelsa, Cross River, Imo State (Ministry of International Affairs and Development), and Lagos State (Department of Global Affairs). A very other matter is how well these institutions are working to achieve the purpose for which they were established.

In Nigeria, it is evident that a large number of state governors travel abroad to either attract foreign investors or to take part in international events such as exhibitions. States that share borders have discussed ways to strengthen border region security with one another. For example, border communities from the various surrounding nations (Nigeria and Niger) create

a cooperative security patrol in response to the increasing criminal activity in northern Nigeria. To put it another way, subnational entities engage in trans-boundary and international multilateral regional networks on particular issues that impact them in border regions, without necessarily enlisting the help of the federal government. The federal government's official delegation to international events hosted by foreign organizations may include subnational units (Gamberi 1991; Omiumu and Aniyie 2024).

In the case of Taiwan, the signing of an agreement with the Deputy Speaker of the Slovak National Council and the City of Kaohsiung is a way to institutionalize bilateral cooperation and promote people-to-people interactions. The Taiwanese government has transferred International Communication Programs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Two new departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the Department of International Communication and the Coordination Council for Public Diplomacy. Implementing reciprocity agreements for driver's licenses is another strategic paradiplomatic move Taiwan has made with a few US states. In order to recognize the other's license procedure as evidence of a driver's proficiency, a reciprocity agreement was signed.

In conclusion, SNG paradiplomacy in Taiwan and Nigeria is severely constrained by the absence of institutionalization. The obstacles brought about by ambiguous institutional frameworks and policies, inconsistent diplomatic practices, a lack of expertise and resources, poor coordination and cooperation, political change susceptibility, difficulties gaining legitimacy and recognition, and bureaucratic structure. Strong institutional frameworks can improve SNGs' capacity to participate in international affairs, leading to more cogent and significant paradiplomatic initiatives.

ii. Limited Capacity and Resources

60% of respondents, subnational governments in Taiwan and Nigeria are severely hampered in their efforts to engage in paradiplomacy by a lack of resources and capacity. The issue of a lack of institutional structures required to gain funds and resources for international efforts is intimately linked to the shortage of skilled individuals in SNGs. The SNGs are not actively engaged in paradiplomacy because of their limited resources and lack of established institutional structures to get funds and resources for international engagement. According to the respondents:

> SNGs find it difficult or difficult to allocate the human and financial resources required for paradiplomacy. The two nations' respondents agree that one of the

> main barriers preventing SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria from participating in international diplomacy is a lack of funding (Field survey, 2024).

International diplomacy frequently necessitates large financial outlays for people, travel, and promotional efforts, all of which may be beyond the means of local governments. Furthermore, knowledge and experience are necessary for international diplomacy. For example, the SNGs in the two countries lack the specialized abilities needed for cultural diplomacy and international negotiation. They find it challenging to set up and maintain international offices or staff because they lack the financial, human, and technical resources required to practice paradiplomacy. According to a Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs respondent:

> Not to mention SNGs, which frequently rely on the federal government to carry out some of their developmental initiatives, the federal government lacks the financial resources to support all of the foreign missions. SNGs might not have the funds necessary to establish and sustain foreign offices and employees. Once more, SNGs might lack the requisite knowledge or background in trade, international relations, or cross-cultural interaction. Due to their reliance on federal funding, which can be erratic and insufficient, SNGs frequently suffer significant budgetary restrictions (Field survey, 2024).

States frequently have tight funds, which makes it difficult for them to support programs aimed at fostering international participation, according to the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, 2020). As a result, many municipal governments place a higher priority on essential services than on foreign affairs.

> Despite having a sizable economy and population, a state like Lagos State still has trouble allocating funds for international participation, such as hiring workers and opening offices abroad. It will need assistance from the national government because it lacks the resources to participate in international operations. SNGs may be diverted from international participation by Kano State's strong internal concerns, which include infrastructure development, poverty alleviation, and insecurity (Field survey 2024).

SNGs frequently have tight operating resources that put local needs and services ahead of global partnerships. It costs money to take part in paradiplomacy initiatives like trade missions, hosting foreign delegations, or joining international organizations. These expenses could be viewed as unnecessary in many smaller or less developed areas, especially when they are dealing with urgent local issues like infrastructure, healthcare, or education (Simeon, 2000). The focus of local governance in Nigeria is frequently determined by political forces. SNGs might put internal political stability and taking care of pressing local problems ahead of

paradiplomatic initiatives. Foreign diplomacy attempts are frequently neglected because of this emphasis on pressing local issues (Bassey, 2018).

Taiwanese respondent observes that:

> Large municipalities like Taichung, Kaohsiung, and Taipei City Government frequently depend on the central government for assistance because they lack the resources necessary to participate in international activities. This can make it difficult for them to participate in international activities like trade missions and cultural exchange programs since it may restrict their capacity to set up their own foreign offices or personnel. It is more difficult to draw in foreign investment or tourists because of their low level of international awareness and visibility (Field survey, 2024).

The idea that many subnational governments lack the technical know-how necessary to handle complex international interactions is supported by documentary evidence. That is to say, there is a limited capacity for international engagement in terms of expertise and the ability to engage in international diplomacy effectively requires specialized knowledge and skills, but many local governments are unable to invest in international relations due to financial constraints. This entails being aware of diplomatic etiquette, international law, and strategic negotiation methods. According to research, local governments find it difficult to adequately represent their interests in the absence of professional staff. Paradiplomacy frequently necessitates substantial financial outlays for people, travel, and marketing. Okafor (2016). Additionally, SNGs could have to strike a balance between their obligations to serve the local community and deal with local problems and their involvement in international affairs.

The respondents also believed that skilled professionals with knowledge of international law, diplomacy, and negotiation were necessary for efficient paradiplomacy.

> Because SNGs' human resources are largely concentrated on local government, they frequently lack specialized personnel for international concerns. Smaller municipalities, for example, might not have staff members versed in the intricacies of global politics or an office dedicated to international relations. Furthermore, national legal systems may limit subnational' autonomy and the extent of their participation in international affairs (Field survey, 2024).

The political climate of a nation may also have an impact on SNGs' paradiplomatic efforts, particularly when the national government does not encourage or support subnational entities' foreign endeavors. Even if such projects will contribute to the nation's overall development, SNGs may be discouraged from pursuing them. Since they believe that topics like public welfare and economic development are more pertinent to their voters, many SNGs give local matters precedence over international ones.

Budgetary restrictions may also affect Taiwanese SNGs. Due to a lack of finance, subnational organizations are frequently compelled to prioritize public welfare and local growth over global outreach (Liu, 2019). The operational capability required for successful paradiplomatic initiatives is limited by this resource gap. Effective international relations efforts by local governments may be hampered by the administrative complexity of Taiwan's political structure. Different levels of government may have conflicting interests, which could weaken efforts and make it more difficult to take proactive paradiplomatic measures (Huang, 2020).

The political climate in Taiwan has an impact on SNGs' capacity to practice paradiplomacy successfully. In other words, its capacity to practice paradiplomacy is severely constrained by its special international standing. In other words, Taiwanese SNGs encounter challenges when trying to establish international alliances or participate in international forums due to their complex connection with China and lack of widespread international recognition (Wu, 2018). Their motivation and ability to carry out effective paradiplomatic operations are weakened by this lack of acknowledgment.

SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria have to allocate their resources between priorities at home and abroad. Economic development and job creation may have to take precedence over international participation for the states and counties of Taiwan and Nigeria. The state administration must strike a balance between its foreign involvement strategy and its home priorities. Due to a lack of funding, urgent home concerns including infrastructure, healthcare, and education are being given priority over foreign involvement.

Their constituents' immediate needs come first. In the grand, scheme of things, international participation is pushed to the side as SNGs prioritize and allocate their limited resources in these sectors—education, healthcare, infrastructure development, etc. Because the possible advantages might not be immediately apparent or pertinent to the local population, this prioritization frequently leads to a reluctance to engage in paradiplomacy.

Respondents in both nations agree that paradiplomacy necessitates a strong infrastructure, which includes diplomatic ties with other governments, international organizations, and a wide range of international contacts. Smaller subnational governments frequently lack the funding necessary to keep up and grow this kind of network. Travel, staff, and diplomatic representation are just a few of the high costs associated with paradiplomacy. Due to their already tight budgets, SNGs could find it difficult to set aside funds for paradiplomatic initiatives. In most federal systems, SNGs have limited autonomy to participate in paradiplomacy on their own. They may require authorization from national or central governments, which could limit their autonomy.

The idea that SNGs must possess the ability to rule and diplomatically participate in paradiplomatic active engagement is supported by documentary evidence. To put it another way, paradiplomacy calls for specific diplomatic abilities, an understanding of international relations, and proficiency in governance. It may be difficult for SNGs to engage in paradiplomatic activities successfully if they lack these abilities. The likelihood of successful paradiplomacy can be increased for nations with strong subnational diplomacy mechanisms, such as partnerships with neighboring areas or consulate posts. Many SNGs, nevertheless, lack the infrastructure required to support this kind of interaction. Establishing and sustaining international partnerships becomes more difficult in the absence of a network of contacts or pre-existing structures for cooperation. In conclusion, subnational governments' limited capacity and resources make it extremely difficult for them to properly practice paradiplomacy. Their ability to engage in international affairs is significantly shaped by a number of factors, including financial limitations, a lack of human resources and experience, regulatory frameworks, local priorities, and inadequate infrastructure.

iii. Weak Coordination and Collaboration

The lack of formalized procedures for SNGs' active participation in paradiplomacy was cited by 50% of respondents as a contributing factor to poor coordination and collaboration. SNGs frequently undertake foreign policy on their own without a clear plan. To put it another way, they function in a disjointed way that may cause them and the federal government to have competing interests. They lack the administrative and financial resources necessary to engage internationally. SNGs interest may conflict with that of central government which them not to be allowed to engage in international diplomacy so deeply.

Weak intergovernmental cooperation between the federal, state, and local levels of government is another consequence of a lack of institutionalization. Lack of formalized procedures could result in poor communication and cooperation, which would have the unintended consequence of squandering chances for cooperative projects or pooled resources for SNGs' global engagement. "Weak coordination also results in difficulty building international networks that are required for effective paradiplomacy," one respondent noted in an interview conducted in Taiwan. SNGs frequently depend on forming alliances and networks with other institutions and governments in the majority of developed states (Interview, 2024). According to one Nigerian respondent,

> Poor coordination and cooperation between subnational governments because of fragmentation, a lack of institutional frameworks, budget limitations, central authorities' lack of interest, and inadequate networks exacerbate the difficulties of paradiplomacy in Taiwan and Nigeria. These highlight the difficulties subnational actors in these nations face on the global stage. Unlocking subnational governments' potential in international diplomacy requires fostering closer cooperation, developing unified policies, and making sure, they have sufficient political and financial support. Subnational actors can increase their influence and make a significant contribution to international relations by removing these obstacles (Field survey 2024).

Taiwanese and Nigerian respondents have made it abundantly evident that the lack of institutional structures makes it more difficult for SNGs to create and preserve these relationships. SNGs may need to increase their ability to practice paradiplomacy, which includes gaining knowledge of trade, international relations, and cross-cultural interactions. This may entail creating foreign relations offices, educating employees, and creating guidelines and protocols for global interaction.

This opinion on poor coordination, which arises from disjointed strategies that can compromise regional governments' efficacy in international interactions, is supported by documentary evidence (Keating, 2013). To put it another way, SNGs' fragmented efforts frequently result in them pursuing international relations on an isolated basis, which inevitably results in a lack of common objectives and inconsistent messaging. This disarray can occasionally result in redundant work and a failure to use group negotiating power. In Canada, for example, provinces such as British Columbia and Quebec have pursued their interests independently through distinct international demarches.

This has occasionally led to conflicting messages being conveyed to foreign allies, making Canada's overall diplomatic position more difficult to understand. According to Keating (2008), fragmentation frequently results in inefficient and inadequate paradigms for regional international collaboration. Respondents noted that:

> The problems of scarce resources might also be connected to poor coordination and cooperation. It's possible that SNGs lack the informational, human, and financial resources required to fully practice paradiplomacy. This is in addition to the fact that they frequently function autonomously of the national government and lack well-thought-out plans for conducting international relations. SNGs frequently have limited funding, especially when the central government makes cuts (Field survey, 2024).

Their capacity to practice paradiplomacy is hampered by their inability to finance missions or assign staff to international relations due to a lack of funding. Municipalities and regions in Italy, for example, regularly show interest in participating in international projects, but many are unable to do so due to financial limitations. They are unable to take part in collaborative

initiatives or send delegations to foreign conferences due to a lack of funds. They contend that a major obstacle to successful local and regional participation in international diplomacy is a lack of resources.

According to Hocking (1993), the central government may be reluctant or overtly opposed to permitting or encouraging SNGs to participate in foreign affairs. Naturally, SNGs' capacity to successfully coordinate foreign contacts is diminished in the absence of political support, which results in a limited level of paradiplomatic engagement. To put it another way, policies of the central government may hinder subnational players from pursuing their global ambitions, which would undermine cooperation. Politically, the central governments may not care about the subnational' plans or actions concerning their international engagement. It may believe that subnational activities could jeopardize its sovereignty or work against their interests. Political conflicts may arise, making it challenging subnational governments to secure the backing they need for paradiplomatic endeavors. For instance, the central government of Spain has strongly opposed the Catalan administration's efforts to get recognition that is more international because it believes that doing so would undermine national cohesion. Catalonia's ability to pursue successful foreign contacts may be stifled by this possible political conflict.

Networks and connections with other subnational organizations around the world are essential for effective paradiplomacy. The chances to create these essential networks and exchange best practices are restricted by a lack of cooperation. According to Telo (2013), cooperation is crucial for subnational organizations to share policy information and acquire influence globally. For paradiplomacy to be successful, strong networks are necessary. Without regional cooperation, SNGs risk missing out on chances to pool resources, knowledge, and experience, which would reduce their global clout. One example of how cooperation between regional governments results in best practices being shared is the European Union's "Regions for Economic Change" project. However, smaller regions lacking such networks cannot boost worldwide visibility, while the lack of them can leave many SNGs at a disadvantage (Telo, 2013).

iv. Vulnerability to Political Changes

30% respondents believed that the absence of deep engagement of SNGs in paradiplomacy might have been caused by years of political instability and inconsistency. As stated by one respondent:

> Many years of military dictatorship are linked to vulnerability to political changes; governments were unable to exercise the full autonomy provided by the Constitution, and frequent changes in leadership frequently led to changes in policy. There can be a loss of continuity in overseas engagement if the incoming administration does not support or emphasize earlier projects (Field survey 2024 in Nigeria).

Similar opinions were voiced by Taiwanese respondents that:

> For many years, the nation was ruled by a dictatorship and martial law, which made it more challenging for SNGs to conduct international diplomacy. The efficiency and sustainability of international activities may be limited if paradiplomatic efforts lack institutional backing and are motivated by short-term political objectives rather than long-term strategic planning (Field survey 2024 in Taiwan).

For subnational units to engage in paradiplomacy, political stability is essential. A change in political leadership, a change in party control, or a significant change in the results of elections when a political party took over government were all examples of political instability that resulted in political changes and policy inconsistency, or lack of continuity. These disruptions in domestic policies could have an effect on subnational units' international engagement. In order to preserve foreign relations and guarantee policy continuity, SNGs typically turn to paradiplomacy when confronted with such vulnerabilities (**Chaker, 2020).**

Uncertainty in governance leads to leadership instability and policy direction discontinuities. SNGs may choose to put domestic stability ahead of foreign engagements if they are experiencing political instability (such as internal conflicts, party control of the government changes, or election-related administration changes). They might be reluctant to fully commit to foreign projects out of concern that any investment in paradiplomatic ties could be jeopardized by future shifts in leadership or policy direction (**Silva, 2019)**.

SNGs may act in paradiplomacy to emphasize their regional identities and advocate for self-determined policies because they want autonomy and self-determination, which will lead to political reforms at the national level. Perceived shortcomings or neglect in national policy frameworks may potentially be the cause of this behavior (**Ginter, 2021)**. This suggests that the national government might not be in a position to encourage the SNG's ambition to engage in global diplomacy. In actuality, this disproves the case for decentralizing international relations. It also demonstrates the mistrust that permeates the relationship between SNGs and the national government. SNG leaders who sense political vulnerability may become wary or suspicious of foreign involvement because they believe it to be dangerous or maybe at odds

with their local interests. If there is no obvious immediate gain, this mistrust may cause a reluctance to spend in establishing and preserving foreign relations (**Liu, 2023)**.

Limited financial and administrative resources are frequently linked to political vulnerability; therefore, SNGs may be hesitant to participate in intricate international relations that call for large time, staff, and financial commitments, especially when their financial stability or future political support are uncertain (**Sansom & Morgan, 2018**). SNGs may be concerned that using paradiplomacy could lead to unfavorable responses from the national government, especially in politically unstable situations. Deeper engagement in foreign affairs is discouraged by this fear, which frequently results in a retreat from actions viewed as going beyond authority or contradicting the national narrative (**Sung, 2020)**.

v. Legal and Constitutional Limitations: Domestic and International law

80% of respondents concurred that constitutional and legal restrictions prevent SNGs from deeply engaging in paradiplomacy. According to Nigeria's 1999 constitution, the federal government has sole power over international affairs and foreign policy. SNGs' ability to participate in international affairs is restricted. The concentration of foreign affairs in the hands of the federal government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, limits their ability to play a role in foreign policy. The constitution and the centralization of foreign policy limit SNGs' ability to conduct international operations. According to the constitution, the federal government is particularly in charge of foreign policy (CFRN, 1999, art. 15; Nwankwo, 2017). A major obstacle to subnational entities' ability to act autonomously in international relations is Nigeria's constitution, which gives the federal government sole authority over foreign affairs (Adebisi, 2020).

In the field of international economic relations, the CFRN 1999 demonstrates exclusivity and domination. The constitution's items 20 and 26 give the FG the authority to send and receive diplomatic, consular, and trade representation; item 31 gives the FG the authority to implement treaties pertaining to issues on the exclusive legislative list; and item 62 of the exclusive legislative list allows for "Trade and Commerce, and in particular, trade and commerce between Nigeria and other countries, including the import of commodities into and the export of commodities from Nigeria, and trade and commerce between the states…." (CFRN, 1999). In order to avoid policy fragmentation, national unity and consistency in international diplomacy are given priority in African federal systems, which is indicative of a trend toward centralization (Ogunnubi & Okeke-Uzodike, 2016).

Domestic and international laws typically restrict subnational governments' abilities to engage in foreign relations, often necessitating oversight from central governments. International law recognizes the sovereign states as the only legitimate entities to enter into treaty-making with one another. That is the major challenge that subnational units are confronted with. The constituent units in a federation may engage in external relations in a restricted way. It cannot enter into an agreement with another constituent unit without the approval of the central government. Section 12 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which deals with the implementation of treaties, provides as follows: "No treaty between the federation and any other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly" (FRNC, 1999). Respondents concurred that:

> In Nigeria, the federal government has jurisdictional authority over treaty negotiations and conclusion. Only once a treaty agreement has been domesticated by a National Assembly act can it be put into effect. A treaty may be signed on behalf of the federal government by the executive branch (the president, vice president, or minister) (Field survey, 2024 in Nigeria).

This stance is supported by CFRN 1999. As stated in section 148 of the 1999 Constitution, the executive branch gives the president, vice president, and all ministers the authority to decide on the "foreign policies of the government of the federation" (see Okunbolande, 2010). Additionally, the 1999 Constitution does not specifically obligate subnational governments to engage in treaty negotiations. Nonetheless, Section 192 gives a state's commissioners, governor, and deputy governor the authority to decide on the "policies of the state." There is no definition or qualification for the "policies of a state." This may explain why subnational executives participate in external relations activities primarily to promote investments, trade, and culture; "external borrowing"; "technical assistance"; and "manpower development" (Gambari, 1991). The tragedy of Nigerian federalism is that the president or designated minister does not consult the states when negotiating treaties. Even if a treaty is within a state's legislative purview, the states lack the authority to negotiate it. The federal government is granted exclusive legislative authority over external affairs under item 26 of the Second Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. In terms of treaty-making, the rationale is to prevent conflicts of interest while pursuing the nation's foreign policy (Oyebode, 2003).This is among the reasons why Nigerians are still advocating for true federalism. In contrast, states in the United States have the right to refuse to cooperate with the federal government on certain treaties that do not align with their interests.

Taiwan's distinct international standing has a significant impact on its political and legal structure. The central government oversees foreign policy and local governments (such as municipalities or provinces) are not allowed to conduct autonomous international relations because of Taiwan's non-recognition by many nations and its tense relationship with China (Chen, 2016). In order to preserve centralized control over international affairs, Taiwan, although not being a federal state, also limits SNGs' global activity (**Wang, 2021**).Because of its unusual diplomatic circumstances—especially in light of the PRC's opposition to Taiwanese sovereignty—Taiwan's Constitution stipulates that foreign policy must stay within the jurisdiction of the central government. The Taiwanese respondent said:

> The freedom of subnational units to engage in paradiplomatic relations with other subnational units is not made plain in the constitution. However, as Taiwan is a unitary state, it follows that the central government has authority over external relations. This explains why, in contrast to the subnational units in the United States that directly interact with Taiwan, the Central government is involved in its paradiplomatic contacts with the United States and not the subnational units. Consultations with subnational government on foreign affairs matters are not required under the constitution, even if those matters may have an effect on the subnational units (Field survey 2024 in Taiwan).

Since it is difficult for the subnational entities to reject any deal that the central government signs on their behalf, Taiwan's oddity makes sense. Since the central government alone has the legal capacity to sign international treaties and agreements, SNGs might not have this power. This restriction may make it more difficult for SNGs to participate in international accords like those pertaining to trade or cultural exchange. Furthermore, only central governments are legally able to enter into treaties on behalf of sovereign nations in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969). Even though it isn't specifically mentioned in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution's exclusive legislative list, foreign affairs, including matters pertaining to international law, fall under the purview of the central government in all federal states (Omiunu and Aniyie, 2018).In order to execute a treaty pertaining to topics outside of the Exclusive Legislative List, a bill for an Act of the National Assembly must be approved by a majority of all State Houses of Assembly before it may become law (Okeke and Anushilem, 2018).

There are no explicit rules governing SNG participation in international diplomacy. Subnational administrations are not authorized by any defined legal framework to manage international affairs. This lack of precise rules breeds ambiguity and deters local governments from engaging in paradiplomatic activities. The monitoring function of the federal government limits SNGs' ability to interact with other countries or take autonomous action in the

international arena because doing so frequently necessitates federal approval, which may be a drawn-out and bureaucratic procedure.

Political and administrative structures act as obstacles to SNG paradiplomacy. Effective international participation is hampered by weak institutional frameworks, inflexible bureaucratic systems, and a lack of funding. SNGs' paradiplomatic efforts are further complicated by bureaucratic structures that make it challenging them to negotiate the intricate international system. Additionally, the bureaucratic element may lead to a lack of coherence and coordination in SNGs' global activities, which could damage their reputation and efficacy abroad.

One Taiwanese commenter notes that:

> Strong control over foreign policy is maintained by central governments, which restricts the participation of subnational entities (counties and municipalities) in international relations. According to the constitution or national legislation, SNGs may not be able to engage in international operations in many nations since the national government has sole control over foreign affairs. For example, signing treaties or agreements without the central government's consent. States may have limited jurisdiction to participate in international activities, but the federal government of the United States is the only entity with the power to negotiate and sign international treaties. Although Canada's provinces enjoy a high degree of autonomy, the federal government retains control over foreign policy. On international accords, the province of Quebec still needs to work with the federal government even though it has its own ministry of international relations (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

Another respondent highlighted more instances, on how the constitution handed responsibility to the central government on foreign relations. The Constitution of Japan restricts the ability of prefectures and cities to participate in international affairs by giving the national government sole control over foreign policy. For this reason, Osaka is unable to enter into a sister city relationship with another city without the national government's consent. The Australian Constitution acknowledges the role of states and territories in international participation while also giving the national government control over foreign affairs. Despite having its own office dedicated to foreign affairs, the state of New South Wales still needs to work with the national governments on international agreements.

vi. Centralization of Foreign policy making

80% of respondents held the view that centralization of foreign policy making in Nigeria based on the constitutional provision which vested power on the central government to engage in external relations. According to them:

> Establishing diplomatic ties with other countries is the central government's responsibility under the exclusive legislative list or function. The federal government implicitly forbids the subnational units from participating in international diplomacy. It is up to the central government to decide and carry out foreign policy. It is thought that by "monopolizing" foreign policy, national interests are safeguarded, fragmented international positions are avoided, and the likelihood of policy inconsistencies is reduced (Field survey, 2024 in Nigeria)

However, the potential cultural and economic advantages of subnational interaction may potentially be suppressed by this centralization. Stated differently, the Constitution prioritizes national unity, particularly in Nigeria, where the SNGs' lack of administrative expertise and worries of secession make it improper to provide them the authority to engage in foreign diplomacy. According to the responders, "the colonial era's centralization practice, still remain Nigeria's post-independence governance. Instead of enjoying subnational regional autonomy as is done in decentralized federal states" (Field survey 2024).

Olufemi (2019) notes that Nigeria's historical background, which includes a long history of central government control, deters subnational governments from engaging in international activities without federal approval. This reflects Nigeria's attempts to prevent national division and preserve unity. As is currently the case in practically all federal states, the federal government felt it had an obligation to foster a single national identity, which deters subnational units from pursuing foreign diplomacy. The government's aim to maintain a consistent foreign policy position that supports national interests is reflected in Nigeria's highly centralized control over foreign policymaking (Ojo, 2018). Because of Nigeria's ethnic and regional diversity, there is a natural concern that SNGs' independent international activities may result in opposing viewpoints or jeopardize Nigeria's foreign policy objectives, particularly when it comes to delicate subjects like the "One-China" policy. The federal government is designated as the principal authority in international affairs by the Nigerian Constitution. The capacity of SNGs to participate autonomously in international interactions is restricted by this concentration.

In Nigeria, it is discussed that giving states greater authority over their foreign policies may encourage separatist aspirations or divergent foreign policy goals, which could cause fragmentation. Nigeria's federal structure might make these issues worse because different regions have different ethnic identities and economic interests, which could lead to self-serving paradiplomatic activities that deviate from national policy. Paradiplomacy was practiced by the regions in the first republic because the 1960–63 Constitutions permitted that. A certain amount of autonomy was granted to subnational units under the 1999 Constitution, but the federal

government was nevertheless given the authority to make foreign policy. States do, however, participate in international conferences, send delegations with the federal government to other nations, and sign memorandums of understanding with other governments, all of which are considered indirect forms of foreign diplomacy.

The lack of a legal framework, political and constitutional restrictions that restrict their ability to participate in international affairs, and the fact that both countries' subnational governments function within frameworks set by the central government are some of the arguments put forth in works that support the idea that subnational governments in Taiwan and Nigeria are not actively engaged in paradiplomacy. These pieces examine the broader context of paradiplomacy in federal systems and regions with little international recognition, such as Taiwan.

The federal government has strict control over diplomatic contacts, which makes it difficult for SNGs to pursue independent overseas relations. States have little room to practice paradiplomacy because of this concentrated supervision (Olaniyi 2019). Without permission from the federal government, local administrations are not allowed to form foreign relationships. Nigeria's federal structure has affected how foreign policy is conducted, which is still the federal government's responsibility and subnational governments have little influence over it (**Akinyemi 2016).** In terms of international relations and paradiplomacy, Nigeria's foreign policy framework mainly ignored SNGs (Agbaje 2012). Nigeria's foreign policy is characterized by the centralized form of foreign affairs and the lack of autonomy for states in establishing international interactions (Enemuo, 2003). Nigeria faces structural obstacles to paradiplomacy, which are political and constitutional restraints on governments' capacity to interact with other countries (Ojo 2014). Despite states' little involvement in foreign diplomacy due to the over-centralization of diplomatic authorities, the resulting friction between the federal and state governments stems from the different objectives that central and subnational governments seek in foreign policy (Mbachu, 2019).

The extent of international engagement is severely constrained by Taiwan's political history, especially its complicated relationship with the People's Republic of China. The central government's policies, which aim to prevent any action that could indicate de facto independence, severely restrict the operations of municipal governments, even when they may show interest in paradiplomacy (Lee 2021). In order to prevent diplomatic lapses that could incite tensions with China, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs strictly monitors any exterior engagement by local entities (**Tsai, 2019).** Due to Taiwan's precarious international standing, all diplomatic initiatives must be closely monitored in order to avoid any possible diplomatic

conflicts (Chen 2020). The SNGs were not allowed to operate a parallel diplomacy under Taiwan's Constitution. The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reply states that:

> The legal system grants the central government exclusive jurisdiction over international relations. According to this legal framework, the central government must approve all international interactions, including trade agreements, cultural exchanges, and diplomatic endeavors. The goal of centralizing power over international affairs is to coordinate policies and uphold a consistent foreign policy that serves the interests of the country. Giving SNGs autonomy over foreign policy could result in contradictory statements or actions that could jeopardize the diplomatic efforts of the national government. Although Taiwanese enterprises and NGOs function in an informal, paradiplomatic capacity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) controls foreign policy (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

The political centralization imposed by Taiwan's government makes it difficult for local administrations to practice paradiplomacy. With the central government serving as the only representative in international affairs, Taiwan's political system is likewise extremely centralized with regard to foreign policy. Municipalities like Taipei, Kaohsiung, or Taichung have limited ability to establish diplomatic initiatives or foreign engagements (Hsu, 2020). Taiwan's diplomatic isolation and the central government's strict control over foreign policy provide difficulties for local administrations, especially when it comes to promoting paradiplomacy (Chen 2016).

Given Taiwan's standing in the international community, it is still true that local governments in Taiwan play a small but developing role in foreign affairs, with the central government closely regulating these interactions with other subnational governments (Hsu 2020). Consequently, Taiwan's political and legal limitations, especially those imposed by the constitution, prohibit local governments from independently pursuing foreign policy or paradiplomacy (Chang 2018). Nonetheless, local governments in Taiwan have attempted to create commerce and cultural ties through paradiplomacy, but their efforts have been hampered by the tight control the central government has over foreign policy (Huang 2019). In other words, the central government mainly limits the responsibilities that local governments can play in Taiwan's foreign relations, which makes it challenging SNGs to pursue independent foreign projects (Hsu 2021). International recognition and national sovereignty are given top priority by the central government. Taiwan's approach to paradiplomacy highlights the limited role of local governments in the field of international diplomacy, particularly given its complicated international position (Lin 2017).

vii. Geopolitical Constraints and Autonomy Restriction

60% of the respondents concurred that subnational governments' active participation in paradiplomacy in Taiwan and Nigeria can be seriously impeded by geopolitical limitations and autonomy. According to respondents in Taiwan and Nigeria, geopolitical constraints that put national sovereignty first are the reason why SNGs are not deeply involved in paradiplomacy. As a result, the national governments of both nations have limited the international operations of subnational organizations. They made the decision to uphold their states' geographical integrity and retain authority over international affairs. To put it another way, geopolitical concerns about territorial integrity and national sovereignty prevent SNGs from engaging in paradiplomacy to a significant degree. According to one respondent,

> Trade agreements and economic policies can also be influenced by geopolitical concerns, which could make it more difficult for subnational governments to pursue independent economic alliances or projects that don't fit with national plans. Uneven resource allocation is prioritized by geopolitical factors; as a result, SNGs in strategically significant areas receive greater support, while others are left with little ability to practice paradiplomacy (Field survey, 2024).

Nigeria, a country with a great deal of ethnic and cultural variety, frequently faces geopolitical problems because of central governments restricting subnational entities' paradiplomatic actions. This is to keep foreign relations from being impacted by the resurgence of ethnic nationalism. "SNGs may face a backlash if their paradiplomatic efforts are perceived as promoting particular cultural or ethnic agenda and identities that are in contradiction with the central government's vision of national identity and unity," adds a Nigerian respondent (Field survey, 2024).

The respondents agreed that a strong central authority that frequently controls external contacts is a defining feature of Nigeria's federal system's concentrated power structure. The constitutional power of the federal government to manage foreign policy may restrict subnational governments' ability to practice paradiplomacy. For example, the Constitution gives the federal government the power to negotiate international accords, conduct foreign policy, and host dignitaries from other countries. This may restrict subnational governments' ability to engage in paradiplomacy (**Omeje, 2014)**. For example, the federal government stepped in and said that such relationships should be handled on a federal level when the Lagos State Government tried to establish a diplomatic relationship with the Government of Ghana in 2019 (**The Guardian, 2019)**.

Extremist organizations like Boko Haram provide a security risk to northern Nigeria, which can restrict subnational governments' capacity to practice paradiplomacy there (Human Rights

Watch, 2020). For instance, the existence of Boko Haram in Borno State limits the government's ability to use paradiplomacy. The existence of Boko Haram in the area hampered the Borno State Government's 2018 attempt to build ties with the Government of Cameroon in order to address cross-border security issues (**Premium Times, 2018**).

Resource competition among SNGs with robust economies, including Lagos, River, Delta, Ogun, etc., is one of the problems that is creating geopolitical conflict. In order to attract the federal government's attention, these states might participate in healthy competition, which would inevitably restrict their capacity to practice paradiplomacy (**Okoroji, 2018)**. For example, the Lagos State Government's capacity to practice paradiplomacy with foreign nations has been hampered by its competition with the federal government for control of the Lagos ports. The federal government's jurisdiction over the Lagos ports hampered the Lagos State Government's 2017 efforts to create a free trade zone with the Singaporean government (**The Nation, 2017)**. SNGs do have some leverage because of their economic heft and resource riches to engage in overseas diplomacy, despite the geopolitical limitations on pursuing paradiplomacy (Okafor, 2022).

As noted, geographical limitations can be linked to a lack of institutional capability, which can impede SNGs' active participation in paradiplomacy in Nigeria. Some Nigerian subnational units frequently lack the institutions and personnel needed to carry out paradiplomacy, which restricts their capacity to interact with the outside world (**Ajibade, 2017)**. For instance, many Nigerian states lack a distinct foreign affairs department and qualified staff with international relations experience. The lack of institutional capacity and international relations knowledge hampered the Oyo State Government's 2019 attempt to build a connection with the Chinese government (**Tribune, 2019).**

Nigeria's adherence to the "One-China" policy restricts its paradiplomatic interactions with Taiwan because any diplomatic actions taken in solidarity or support of the island nation could harm ties between China and Nigeria. To prevent strained relations with China, SNGs must refrain from mingling or diplomatically interacting with Taiwan, as this could be interpreted as endorsing Taiwan's sovereignty (Ogunnubi & Okeke-Uzodike, 2016).

However, given its precarious international standing, Taiwan's unique geopolitical position entails a particular kind of restraint because China constantly monitors any diplomatic interactions. Due to pressure from the People's Republic of China, which sees Taiwan as a province that has gone awry, the majority of nations do not formally recognize Taiwan (Huang, 2021). As a result, Taiwan's SNGs are severely constrained in their ability to establish official

international connections, generally confining their paradiplomatic endeavors to unofficial or informal channels (Chen & Wu, 2022).

According to one respondent,

> Taiwan has pointed out that because of its lack of legitimacy as a sovereign state and international recognition; it has been struggling with perception concerns. Given the situation, SNGs are unable to practice paradiplomacy without institutional support. It has been having difficulty obtaining legitimacy and acknowledgment from the global world. Its capacity to practice paradiplomacy successfully has been weakened as a result (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

Taiwan also faces the issue of representation, which is brought on by the absence of institutional structures that would give it a place in international organizations. The "One China" policy's international isolation severely restricts local governments' capacity to conduct foreign diplomacy. Despite this, the central government closely monitors and regulates some local government paradiplomacy programs for commerce or cultural exchanges (**Yang, 2020)**. The problem of cross-strait relations is further supported by documentary evidence as a significant geopolitical consideration for Taiwan. The paradiplomatic actions of SNGs are impacted by this. Taiwan's relationship with mainland China has a significant impact on its foreign policy, which can restrict the independence of subnational governments and encourage paradiplomacy (Dreyer, 2016). The Taiwanese government, for example, has little power to establish formal diplomatic ties with China's mainland. The Taiwanese government's worries about mainland China's One-China policy hampered the Kaohsiung City Government's 2018 efforts to form a sister city association with the City of Shanghai (**Taipei Times, 2018)**.

SNGs' lack of involvement in paradiplomacy is partly due to Taiwan's ongoing struggle with international isolation, which began in 1971. China's diplomatic activities have curtailed Taiwan's international recognition and membership in international organizations, which restricts subnational governments' capacity to practice paradiplomacy (**Shih & Wang, 2020).** For instance, Taiwan's capacity to participate in international cooperation and paradiplomacy is restricted due to its non-membership of the UN. The Chinese government prevented the Taipei City Government from attending the UNESCO International Conference on Education in 2019 (**Focus Taiwan, 2019)**. It may be more challenging for SNGs to form international relationships since they lack the same degree of international recognition and exposure as national governments. Additionally, a lack of awareness hinders SNGs' capacity to draw in foreign talent, tourism, and investment.

Taiwan has a centralized power structure for decision-making, with a strong central government that controls external relations and may restrict the ability of subnational

governments to practice paradiplomacy (**Lai & Chu, 2018)**. Subnational entities' paradiplomatic efforts may be limited by institutional hurdles erected by central governments that prevent them from engaging in international forums or discussions. For example, the SNGs lack the ability to negotiate international accords and conduct foreign policy, whereas the Taiwanese government does. The Taiwanese government's authority over foreign policy hampered the Tainan City Government's 2017 attempt to build ties with the Government of Japan (**China Post, 2017).**

Economic reliance on China is a paradox that cannot be disregarded. Because of Taiwan's economic dependence on the Mainland, subnational governments may be reluctant to participate in paradiplomacy with other nations for fear of the possible consequences for their economic relations with China (**Chen & Chu, 2020**). For instance, a lot of Taiwanese companies have stakes in China's mainland, which may restrict their capacity to practice paradiplomacy with other nations. Concerns about the possible effects on the city's economic links with mainland China hampered the Taoyuan City Government's 2019 attempt to build a relationship with the US government (**Taiwan News, 2019)**.

According to a respondent in an interview, Taiwan's diplomatic relations are complicated by its unique international status. The respondent claims that:

> Many countries do not officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state due to pressures from China. This situation creates a delicate balance whereby any SNGs' international engagement must be carefully managed to avoid provoking diplomatic collision. Besides, the Central government emphasizes a unified approach to international relations to strengthen Taiwan's position globally. SNGs engaging in paradiplomacy could inadvertently create divisions or inconsistencies in Taiwan's international posture (Field survey in Taiwan, 2024).

The historical background of Taiwan's political position, especially its complicated connection with China and the effects of the Chinese Civil War, was noted by other Taiwanese respondents as having shaped the country's current views on foreign engagement. There can be a general belief among local leaders to focus on internal stability rather than risking external conflict. Respondents expressed opinions about the public's sentiment and the political will of the political elites regarding SNGs' involvement in international diplomacy. As stated by them:

> In general, Taiwanese citizens are in favor of preserving a unique identity apart from China. However, there is also a great desire for economic expansion and stability, which might result in cautious attitudes to foreign interaction. Furthermore, rivalry between many parties, each with differing opinions on relations with China and foreign participation, characterizes Taiwan's political

> environment. As a result, opinions regarding the function of SNGs in paradiplomacy may differ (Field survey, 2024).

Given the potential for the PRC to utilize the subnational units to break away from the nationalist government, it is evident that the central government would desire complete control over all aspects of power given Taiwan's emergence as a de facto state. The counties and municipalities were not authorized to conduct international diplomacy during the martial regime. Taiwan is a political body that interacts with the United States in relation to subnational units, particularly since the United States de-recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a valid representative in the UN after the UN General Assembly resolution 2758 in 1971.

viii. Fear of fragmentation, repercussion and restriction of autonomy

60% of those surveyed in both nations agreed that the fear of secession is the reason why SGNs are not active in paradiplomacy. They determined three important variables that could prevent SNGs from effectively participating in international relations. Both respondents concurred that:

> The central government may show reluctance because to concerns about fragmentation, its consequences, and the potential for autonomy to be restricted. SNGs may believe that their use of paradiplomacy could cause national unity to break apart (Field survey, 2024).

Their political and historical backgrounds help to explain the ramifications of fragmentation. Early on after gaining independence, Nigeria went through a war of secession. It is believed that giving constituent units so much autonomy could encourage them to secede on a moral and political level. Taiwan is struggling with international isolationism, which could give the SNGs the confidence to break away and join mainland China if they are granted the autonomy to fully participate in international diplomacy.

One respondents in Nigeria noted, “central governments may perceive paradiplomatic activities as a potential threat to national unity, fearing that increased autonomy for subnational governments could lead to fragmentation or secessionist movements”. In Nigeria, the central government has historically exerted considerable influence over state and local governments leading to tension. One respondent remarks that:

> Because of Nigeria's ethnic variety and regional divides, the federal government or other regions may view any major move toward autonomy as a threat. Examples of these tensions include the Niger Delta crisis and the emergence of secessionist movements, such as those calling for the Biafra Republic (Field survey 2024).

The ability of subnational institutions to freely engage in paradiplomacy may be hampered by central governments in an effort to reduce security risks, especially in areas where geopolitical rivalry are strong. Federal government may be concerned about the implications of SNGs engagement in foreign affairs without authorization. Local leaders may be discouraged from pursuing international initiatives because of this fear. SNGs may be deterred from pursuing international diplomacy by the possibility of paradiplomacy conflicts with national policy.

The anxiety surrounding the absolute autonomy of SNGs in Nigeria is confirmed by documentary evidence. According to Ojo (2018), subnational actions that involve adopting international accords may encounter opposition or sanctions that may compromise their local autonomy and capacity to interact with outside parties. Its historical background of civil unrest and secessionist movements is the source of the dread of fragmentation, which has caused it to be careful when giving its regions autonomy in foreign relations (Adebisi, 2020). Particularly in areas with unique economic or cultural identities, the federal government's monitoring functions are intended to stop subnational activities that can strengthen separatist sentiments (Ogunnubi & Okeke-Uzodike, 2016).

In Nigeria, SNGs have severe limitations on their independence with regard to international contacts. The implementation of modest decentralization in African federations is a common tendency, as there are concerns that increased local autonomy may exacerbate regional divisions (Ojo, 2018). These limitations are further reinforced by the fact that SNGs in Nigeria lack the institutional competence and expertise necessary to manage foreign collaborations (Adebisi, 2020). It is challenging governments to act independently in international relations or accords because the Constitution establishes the boundaries of sovereign power. Okeoma (2011) points out that vague legislative frameworks and a lack of support for subnational paradiplomacy sometimes lead to ambiguity. This explains the concern that SNGs seeking autonomous international links can intensify local resentment. According to academics like Aiyede (2011), subnational governments frequently express reluctance to participate in paradiplomacy because of worries about the consequences for state sovereignty and national fragmentation.

The possibility of confrontation could limit the SGN's ability to engage in paradiplomatic activities. Another reason why SNGs are not actively engaged in paradiplomacy is autonomy restrictions. SNGs frequently function inside a framework that is characterized by stringent national laws and regulations that restrict their capacity to participate in global issues. By limiting their autonomy, this legal structure may make it more difficult for them to pursue

paradiplomatic goals. Because of geopolitical tensions, subnational governments may be deterred from participating in international affairs for fear of escalating disputes or inciting hostility from other nations. The geopolitical tension in Taiwan's cross-strait ties is one example.

Since Taiwan is a unitary state with robust central authority, its fear of fragmentation is lessened. Nonetheless, there are concerns that independent paradiplomacy can unintentionally convey division and affect Taiwan's foreign policy stance (Tsai, 2019). This anxiety may result from worries that too much autonomy could erode the authority of the central government or spark separatist feelings. Taiwan's autonomy limits prevent SNGs from freely pursuing international diplomacy. Taiwan's limitations are exacerbated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' exclusive control over international affairs, which limits local participation in paradiplomacy because it is inherited from the central government (Chen & Wu, 2022).

The concern about activities that could be seen as steps toward declaring independence in the case of Taiwan because of its special status and long-standing problems with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Tensions could rise because of the PRC's concern of worldwide acceptance of Taiwan's autonomy through paradiplomatic measures (**Tien, J. M., 2004)**. In other words, the PRC may quickly respond negatively to any major attempt to assert autonomy through paradiplomatic channels. This could include political or economic measures meant to isolate Taiwan from the rest of the world. According to Asia-Pacific Foundation studies, the PRC's One China Policy acts as a strong disincentive against Taiwanese paradiplomacy (**Mochizuki, 2006)**.

If subnational governments engage in any international relations without the central government's consent, they may be subject to consequences. If SNGs participate in paradiplomacy too much, they can also fear reprisals from the central government. This includes concerns about economic penalties, political or legislative marginalization, or even administrative repercussions for breaking national policy. Although the Taiwanese government does allow certain paradiplomacy, particularly in casual contexts, official acts are strictly regulated. The need to preserve a careful balance with the PRC frequently frames the Taiwanese foreign policy decisions.

ix. Attitude of central government

The central government's stance on SNGs' participation in paradiplomacy was recognized by 60% of the respondents. The attitude of the central government can be influenced by the

following factors: (i) A nation's constitutional structure can affect how the central government views SNG-Paradiplomacy; Certain constitutions provide SNGs greater autonomy. (ii) The central government's political beliefs can influence how it views the Paradiplomacy of SNGs; some beliefs are more centrist, while others are more pro-decentralization. (iii) The central government's stance on SNG-Paradiplomacy can be influenced by local and regional politics, with some locations or regions having greater autonomy than others. (iv). The central government's attitude towards the SNGs' Paradiplomacy can be influenced by international relations and global dynamics, such as the rise of regionalism or the increasing importance of cities in international relations.

In Nigeria, the attitudes of central governments significantly impact on the ability and willingness of subnational entities to participate in paradiplomatic efforts. Respondent asserts that lack of support from the central government may discourage SNGs from engaging in Paradiplomacy. In his words:

> By giving them the tools they need and ensuring their constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, a supportive central government may empower and encourage SNGs to practice paradiplomatic. One way to do this would be to give SNGs more authority so they may negotiate agreements with other governments and organizations and play a more active role in international affairs. By giving them the training and technical support they require to increase their capacity for paradiplomatic, the central government can help the SNGs (Field survey 2024 in Nigeria).

Rather than supporting them, they impose restrictions which inadvertently impact on their desire to participate in Paradiplomatic, as one respondent has noted:

> An overbearing central government may hinder SNGs' ability to practice paradiplomatic by requiring them to obtain permission before engaging in any international agreements or activities. A restrictive central government may retain centralized control over international relations, which would restrict SNGs' capacity to participate in paradiplomacy and negotiate agreements with other governments and organizations. This is in addition to the central government's inability to provide funding for SNGs' paradiplomacy efforts, which restricts their capacity to participate in international affairs (Field survey from Nigeria, 2024).

The central government's ambivalent stance might discourage SNGs from using paradiplomacy. The conditional support provided to SNGs' paradiplomacy initiatives demonstrates this mindset of the central government. Before they can get support from it, they frequently need to fulfill specific requirements. Once more, the lack of clear policies or processes for SNGs to adhere to

in their paradiplomacy efforts demonstrates the ambivalence of the central government and causes doubt and confusion.

When subnational governments in Nigeria engage in paradiplomacy, the federal government shows caution. Concerns over national sovereignty, unity, and the fear of fragmentation among the many ethnic groups within a country are the main causes of this. As previously stated in the preceding sections, Nigeria's federal system's centralized power dynamics theoretically permit state governments to exercise autonomy, but in practice, the central government frequently exerts significant influence over foreign relations. The Nigerian Constitution restricts state governments' ability to act internationally by giving the federal government sole authority over foreign affairs. States may be prevented from entering into bilateral agreements or international alliances because of this centralization (Ojo, 2011).

Stated differently, Nigeria's federal system's centralized governance has drawn criticism for potentially limiting state governments' authority and ability to act independently (**Akinyemi, 2014).** State governments are uncertain and reluctant to engage in paradiplomatic operations since there is a glaring lack of a clear legal framework governing subnational entities' involvement in international affairs (Ojo, 2017).

Security is another element that respondents have mentioned. The Nigerian government may forbid SNGs from engaging in paradiplomatic due to these same worries. By establishing alternative foreign contacts that can be at odds with federal interests, it is frequently asserted that subnational projects could jeopardize national security. Reluctance to embrace state-driven foreign initiatives stems from the fear of regions interacting with other countries, particularly those with whom Nigeria has a tense relationship (Ibraheem, 2020).

Political rivalry between the two tiers of government was also noted by the respondents. As a result, the central government takes a stance that demonstrates its inability to support SNGs' participation in international affairs. When it comes to paradiplomatie, the relationship between state governors and the federal government can also cause friction. The federal government may oppose state governments' activities overseas because to political rivalries, especially if those efforts are thought to be politically motivated (Ikenna, 2018). Political difficulties characterize Nigeria's relationship between the federal and state governments, with the central government occasionally viewing international engagements at the state level as a challenge to its power. Initiatives by state governors or local governments to interact with international organizations may be stifled by this mindset (Mbah, 2018).

Due in large part to the delicate subject of Taiwan's international status and relations, especially with regard to its relationship with China, the central government has traditionally adopted a

more restrictive stance toward the international operations of subnational administrations. The central government's concerns over the One-China-Policy are largely influenced by cross-strait ties, which has a big influence on how subnational governments can use paradiplomatie. The central government may react strongly to any move that seems to support Taiwan's independence, such as subnational alliances with international organizations, restricting regional efforts **(Hsu, 2016).**

Similar to Nigeria, Taiwan's constitution places a strong emphasis on the executive branch's control over foreign policy. Local governments may be discouraged from pursuing such programs independently since they frequently need permission from the central authorities to establish foreign relationships (**Wu, 2018)**.

Taiwan's internal politics are also influenced by political sensitivities, as county and municipal council leaders may be under pressure to refrain from international actions that might be seen as anti-Beijing or overly pro-independence, which would be against the interests of the central government (**Chen, 2017)**. Because Taiwan operates in a difficult international setting, mostly because of its ambiguous status and the One-China policy, the question of international recognition of Taiwan remains relevant. Because of concerns about compromising Taiwan's sovereignty and territorial claims, the central government frequently exercises caution when it comes to subnational engagements with international entities (**Huang, 2020).** Because of the perceived hazards, the central government is wary of subnational paradiplomatic actions. Taiwan's central government frequently prioritizes national security, which can result in cities and regions imposing restrictions on their international interactions. Potential consequences or criticism from the central authority may discourage local governments from seeking paradiplomatic connections (**Lee, 2019)**. In Taiwan, effective paradiplomacy frequently depends on the central government and subnational governments coordinating their policies. Subnational efforts may fail if the central government does not provide clear policy direction or support (**Chen, 2021)**.

The attitudes of the central governments play a crucial role in determining the extent and efficacy of paradiplomacy by subnational governments in Taiwan and Nigeria. While Taiwan's complicated foreign position results in security limitations and cautious oversight that limit local engagements, Nigeria's centralized authority restricts autonomy and causes friction. In both situations, subnational governments frequently have to negotiate political, legal, and diplomatic environments that are influenced by the beliefs and strategies of their respective central governments. It is crucial to comprehend these dynamics in order to address the challenges facing paradiplomacy in these regions.

Documentary evidence suggests that governments' attitudes limit SNGs' ability to engage in paradiplomacy. Political considerations are arguably the most crucial in defining the potential and constraints of paradiplomacy, claims Keating (2000). The mindset of state governments is extremely important. Some people still believe that everything that crosses state lines is an international issue and falls within their exclusive purview. Others have realized that it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw a line between domestic and foreign affairs, particularly when it comes to economic development or dealings with transnational regimes that have themselves gotten involved in issues that were once thought to be exclusively domestic or even local.



Here is the bar chart analyzing the impact of key variables affecting paradiplomacy in Nigeria and Taiwan. The highest-impact factors (rated as 3) include:

- Lack of Institutionalization
- Limited Capacity & Resources
- Vulnerability to Political Changes
- Legal & Constitutional Limitations
- Centralization of Foreign Policy
- Attitude of the Central Government

Other factors like **Weak Coordination, Geopolitical Constraints, and Fear of Fragmentation** have a slightly lower but still significant impact (rated as 2).

3.3. How did SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan play paradiplomatic role in global governance and international collaboration?

3.3.1 Nigeria's SNGs paradiplomatic role in global governance and international collaboration.

Nigeria is a federation of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and the respondents argued that these subunits play an important role in international relations just like the federal government. They noted that, more recently, SNGS Nigeria has started to engage in paradiplomatic activities, in line with a growing trend in which local entities engage in foreign relations to address regional issues and promote development.

60% of respondents believed that Nigerian SNGs could form international partnerships with foreign governments, NGOs, and international organizations to address local issues and advance development projects like bilateral agreements, as was the case in Lagos and River States, which signed agreements with foreign organizations to improve trade, investment, and technology transfer. For example, their involvement in international networks like the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) to exchange best practices and work together on challenges related to urban development.

80% of respondents agreed that SNGs might play a significant role in global governance by promoting economic development and utilizing paradiplomatic strategies to draw in foreign investment and spur economic expansion. Investment Promotion Agencies have been set up in several states, such as Kaduna, to promote the area to international investors by highlighting its prospects and resources. Similarly, some governors are setting up trade missions overseas to promote commercial relations and draw companies to their areas.

60% of respondents thought that SNGs were using international cooperation to address global concerns like health, education, and climate change locally. A state like Cross River has formed alliances in the fields of sustainable development and environmental discourse, frequently working with foreign nongovernmental organizations. SNGs can also collaborate with international health organizations to carry out health programs, especially when it comes to HIV/AIDS and malaria.

50% of respondents believed that Nigerian SNGs were practicing cultural diplomacy, which is essential for improving Nigeria's standing internationally and promoting collaboration and international relations. One respondent stated, "Nigerian states host cultural festivals to

promote Nigerian culture and draw in foreign tourists, strengthening their soft power." In order to foster research cooperation and academic exchanges, SNGs also enter into educational alliances with overseas educational establishments. (Field survey, 2024).

35% of respondents were of the view that SNGs can use paradiplomacy to further their interests internationally by speaking out on behalf of local concerns in international forums. Governors and state representatives can attend international conferences to represent local concerns, such as social development and infrastructure needs. They believe that subnational organizations can use lobbying to get foreign money and support for regional initiatives.

45% of respondents believed that SNGs might work with international NGOs to play a vital role in humanitarian operations and disaster management. States' dedication to humanitarian issues is demonstrated, for example, by their collaboration with international NGOs to offer assistance and support during natural disasters like flooding or medical emergencies. SNGs can improve their preparedness and response plans, get access to international resources, and experience by taking part in international debates on disaster risk reduction.

60% of respondents believed that SNGs might show their dedication to international norms by coordinating their activities with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the UN. They can contribute significantly to global governance through alignment. SNGs participate in international environmental sustainability initiatives, including the preservation of biodiversity. Cross River State, for example, has joined an international collaboration aimed at conserving biodiversity and encouraging sustainable land use. SNGs take part in international climate initiatives and fight climate change by coordinating their local policies with those of other countries. To one of the participants:

> States can work with international organizations to report on their progress and look for assistance in implementing policies and programs that align with the SDGs. Additionally, SNGs can obtain finance and technical help to accomplish sustainable development goals by working with international organizations (Field survey, 2024 in Nigeria).

To the respondents, SNGs can participate in global governance in the areas of conflict resolution and crisis management, which is a crucial aspect of the SDGs. For example, states may mediate disputes locally, frequently enlisting the aid of international organizations to promote communication and peacebuilding initiatives. Since community involvement is crucial to peacebuilding, SNGs can help create stability and social cohesion—two things that

are necessary for sustainable development—by incorporating local communities in conflict resolution procedures. As stated by one respondent,

> SNGs are essential for developing resilience and effectively responding to crises. This is accomplished by states working together internationally to create plans for reducing the risk of catastrophes and to improve their ability to respond to emergencies and natural disasters. SNGs can carry out initiatives that improve community resilience and make local communities more equipped to face future difficulties by collaborating with international organizations (Field survey, 2024 in Nigeria).

50% of respondents said that SNGs' paradiplomatic initiatives would improve security cooperation in the face of regional security problems. As stated by one respondent,

> States that border other nations in the West African region deal with issues like cross-border projects. For example, the northeastern states that border Cameron and the Niger Republic. They can engage with foreign partners to improve regional stability by addressing problems like trafficking and insurgency through security initiatives. To increase local security and foster community trust, they might even implement community policing techniques in collaboration with foreign organizations (Field survey, 2024).

60% said that technology was a key area where SNGs in Nigeria and other technologically advanced nations, such as Taiwan, could work together. According to them,

> SNGs are using innovation and technology to strengthen their paradiplomatic efforts. For example, Lagos State is investigating collaborations with tech firms and international organizations to create smart city solutions that increase urban administration and quality of life. In order to demonstrate their dedication to innovation, subnational organizations also use digital platforms to promote programs, draw investment, and interact with audiences throughout the world in a process known as "digital diplomacy" (Field survey, 2024 in Nigeria).

SNGs can actively participate in international health collaborations at times of public health issues, according to 50% of respondents. To ensure that local populations are protected against diseases that may be prevented, for example, states work with international health organizations to implement vaccination programs. Per the interview conducted in Nigeria in 2024, the respondents stated, "SNGs may enter into partnerships with international research institutions to address health issues specific to their regions, contributing to global health knowledge." (Interview 2024 in Nigeria)

80% of respondents agreed that SNGs paradiplomacy could be enhanced through the promotion of soft power diplomacy such as tourism, educational exchange and capacity

building, cultural fiestas, and international sporting events. According to one of the respondents:

> They are playing a vital role in global governance by participating in all of these paradiplomatic endeavors. In an effort to draw in foreign visitors and strengthen local economies, states use worldwide marketing campaigns to highlight their natural wonders and cultural legacy. To promote mutual understanding and boost tourism, states may set up cultural exchange programs with foreign nations (Field survey, 2024 in Nigeria).

SNGs are increasingly focusing on education and capacity as the catalyst for development; therefore, they collaborate with foreign educational institutions. States may offer scholarships for students to study abroad, fostering educational ties and enhancing local human capital development. Besides, collaborations with international educational institutions can provide training and capacity-building opportunities for local officials, improving governance and service delivery. One respondent observed, "Delta State, as an oil-producing state, earned a certain amount of money to give scholarships to some indigenes of the state to study abroad." Sport can serve as a powerful tool for paradiplomacy, and Nigerian SNGs have recognized this potential. States may host international sporting events, which can enhance their global visibility and foster goodwill among nations. SNGs can also facilitate athlete exchange programs with other countries, promoting cultural exchange and strengthening international ties through sports.

60% of respondents agreed that SNGs pursued collaborations with international financial institutions and development organizations in order to obtain funds for vital infrastructure projects, like public transit and roads, as part of paradiplomatic activities centered on infrastructure development. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are essential to global governance because they allow SNGs to work with foreign businesses and investors to improve local infrastructure, improve connectivity, and spur economic growth by pooling resources and expertise.

3.3.2. Some Nigeria's SNGs contributions to global governance and international collaboration through paradiplomacy.

i. Lagos State Government: To encourage economic growth, commerce, and investment, Lagos, Nigeria's economic center, has forged alliances with cities across the globe, including Dubai, London, and New York. In order to create infrastructure projects like the Lagos State Rail Mass

Transit System, the state government has also worked with foreign institutions like the World Bank and the African Development Bank. Representatives from 54 African nations came together in Lagos in 2019 for the African Clean-Up Initiative, a continental initiative to promote environmental sustainability. To encourage investments and commercial agreements with other cities and nations, the Lagos State Government formed the Lagos State Investment Promotion Agency (LASIPA). The Lagos State Government has partnered with Atlanta, Georgia, USA, to improve tourism, education, and cultural exchange between the two cities. The Lagos Economic Summit, organized by the Lagos State Government, brings together stakeholders from both domestic and foreign markets to talk about trade, investment, and economic development.

ii. River State Government: As a significant oil-producing state, River State has promoted environmental preservation and sustainable development through paradiplomatic efforts. To address environmental issues like oil pollution and the destruction of mangrove forests, the state has collaborated with global institutions such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). Additionally, Rivers State and the African Union have worked together to create a continental environmental sustainability policy. To build infrastructure projects like the Port Harcourt Industrial Park, the Rivers State Government has inked memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with international businesses. Humanitarian help has been given by the River State Government to nations hit by natural calamities, such as the West African Ebola outbreak in 2014.

iii. Ogun State Government: To foster economic progress, Ogun State, a prominent industrial center in Nigeria, has drawn alliances and foreign investment. To increase commerce, investment, and technical collaboration, the state government has forged partnerships with nations such as China, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. In order to create industrial parks and special economic zones, Ogun State has also collaborated with global institutions such as the United Nations Industrial Development (UNIDO). The European Union and the Ogun State Government have teamed up to create climate-resilient farming methods and lower greenhouse gas emissions.

iv. Government of Cross-River State: This state, which is renowned for its rich cultural legacy, has used paradiplomacy to further economic growth, tourism, and cross-cultural exchange. To encourage trade, investment, and cultural exchange programs, the state has partnered with places like Stuttgart, Germany, and Edinburgh, Scotland. Additionally, Cross-River State has

collaborated with global institutions like UNESCO to create cultural tourism initiatives, such the Calabar Carnival, which draws tourists from all over the world each Christmas season. The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Cross River State Government have partnered to improve the state's healthcare system and fight infectious illnesses like HIV/AIDS and malaria. The Calabar International Conference, which focuses on human security, climate change, and sustainable development, was held by the Cross River State Government.

v. The French and Kano State governments have worked together to create a cultural exchange program that fosters understanding and collaboration in fields including education, the arts, and culture.

3.3.3. Taiwan's SNGs paradiplomatic role in global governance and international collaboration.

To strengthen their positions in international cooperation and global governance, SNGs in Taiwan, especially its counties and municipalities, have actively participated in paradiplomacy. Given Taiwan's special international standing and the limitations imposed by its relationship with the People's Republic of China, this engagement is especially important. Here are a few ways that SNGs in Taiwan have contributed to paradiplomacy. The primary characteristic of Taiwan's paradiplomacy, according to 80% of respondents, is the vital role SNGs play in global governance through sister city relationships and international partnerships. According to them:

> Cities in Taiwan, including Taipei and Kaohsiung, have forged sister city partnerships with other cities worldwide. These collaborations promote mutual aid, economic collaboration, and cultural exchanges in a number of fields, such as public health, tourism, and education. By connecting with international cities through groups such as the Asian Network of Major Cities 21 (ANMC21) and the World Association of Major Metropolises (Metropolis), Taiwanese SNGs participate in international discussions and cooperation, exchanging best practices and tackling shared urban issues (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

70% of respondents, SNGs can play a crucial role in global governance and collaborate internationally thanks to their membership in global networks and engagement in international organizations. To them:

> Taiwanese SNGs take an active position in global networks and organizations that address public health, environmental sustainability, and urban development. To combat climate change and advance sustainable urban practices, for instance, they collaborate with the Global Covenant of Mayors on Climate and Energy. Despite Taiwan's minimal official participation in international organizations,

> Taiwanese SNGs participate in international forums and contribute to discussions on global governance concerns, including public health, disaster management, and climate change (Field survey 2024 in Taiwan).

Soft power tools were regarded by 90% of respondents as crucial paradiplomatic initiatives to advance global governance and strengthen international cooperation. These include tourism, athletic events, education exchange and capacity building training, and cultural exchange, among others. As stated by one respondent:

> In order to build goodwill and fortify international ties, Taiwanese SNGs engage in cultural diplomacy by displaying their rich culture, arts, and customs through a variety of exchange programs. International sporting and cultural events are frequently held in Taiwanese cities, promoting local culture and raising Taiwan's profile internationally (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

A key component of Taiwan's paradiplomatic initiatives continues to be cultural diplomacy via the arts and sports. SNGs promote cultural interchange and improve Taiwan's reputation internationally by planning international art shows and performances that highlight Taiwanese culture. Through worldwide marketing efforts, Taiwanese SNGs promote Taiwan's natural features and cultural legacy in an effort to draw in foreign tourists and strengthen local economies. This is an example of paradiplomatic tourism. To promote mutual understanding and increase tourism, SNGs may set up cultural exchange programs with other nations. Additionally, Taiwanese SNGs promote sports as a way to promote international collaboration and goodwill by holding international athletic events and competing globally.

As stated by a further respondent,

> SNGs work with young people and local communities to support international exchange programs, foster cross-cultural understanding, and foster friendships amongst younger generations. In order to improve local ownership and promote a feeling of global citizenship, local governments support community involvement in international projects (Field survey 2024 in Taiwan).

In order to improve educational possibilities and international cooperation, Taiwanese SNGs cultivate partnerships with foreign educational institutions to support student mobility, research collaborations, and academic exchanges. International conferences and seminars are frequently held by local governments, bringing together practitioners and experts to exchange information and debate urgent global concerns. One such instance is the 2024 international conference that brought together many luminaries, including former US Ambassador to the UN Nikky Hailley.

70% of respondents, SNGs in Taiwan actively plan trade trips to draw in foreign capital, advertise domestic goods, and encourage participation in global governance. To them:

> These trade missions frequently focus on particular sectors, such as tourism, agriculture, and technology. They participate in international collaboration and global governance by doing this. By frequently working with international chambers of commerce and trade organizations, SNGs also seek to recruit foreign businesses and establish favorable business environments (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

Using the diaspora's clout in international affairs, Taiwanese SNGs interact with Taiwanese communities abroad to fortify relationships and advance Taiwan's interests. For example, Taiwanese businessmen in Nigeria assisted the trade office in obtaining housing following the federal government's 2017 order to relocate from Abuja to Lagos. According to the respondent's perspective:

> As part of their paradiplomatic efforts to encourage new enterprises by giving them access to international markets, investment, and mentorship, Taiwan's subnational governments are also concentrating on economic resilience and innovation. This is helping to promote economic growth and innovation. In order to improve local economies and advance sustainable development, SNGs collaborate with global firms to draw in investment and generate employment possibilities (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

60% thought Taiwanese SNGs had participated in worldwide public health campaigns, especially in reaction to major world health emergencies like the COVID-19 epidemic. In order to exchange resources and best practices, they have worked with governments and organizations abroad. To put it another way, the counties and municipalities have also engaged in health diplomacy in one way or another by offering medical knowledge and aid to other nations, improving Taiwan's standing abroad, and encouraging goodwill and international cooperation. As stated by one of the participants,

> In Taiwan, SNGs have also taken the lead in public health campaigns, especially in view of the world's health issues. In order to raise public knowledge of health issues, disease prevention, and healthy lifestyles, local governments frequently work with international health organizations to undertake health education initiatives. In order to explore public health challenges and to create efficient health policies and practices, Taiwanese SNGs collaborate with international health institutes (Field survey 2024 in Taiwan).

70% of respondents thought that Taiwanese SNGs collaborate internationally to enhance preparedness and response to disasters. They increase resilience by exchanging resources and

expertise with other areas vulnerable to natural catastrophes. In order to lessen the effects of climate change and natural disasters, municipalities and counties take part in worldwide programs aimed at disaster risk reduction. SNGs promote Taiwan's involvement in international organizations and forums, highlighting the significance of local governance in tackling global issues and highlighting Taiwan's global position. When faced with emergencies, SNGs play a crucial role in building resilience and responding effectively by engaging in international collaborations to develop disaster risk reduction strategies, enhancing their capacity to respond to natural disasters and other emergencies, and also partnering with international organizations to implement programs that can strengthen community resilience, ensuring that local populations are better prepared for future challenges. The respondents also believed that SNGs role in disaster management enables them to participate in global governance. According to them

> Through local governments' cooperation with foreign organizations to offer disaster response training, Taiwanese SNGs play a critical role in boosting their ability to successfully manage calamities. Taiwanese SNGs contribute to global knowledge and resilience-building initiatives by sharing their best practices and disaster management experiences with other regions (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

80% of the respondents, SNGs in Taiwan are stepping up their paradiplomatic efforts by concentrating more on innovation and technology. Smart city projects, which use technology to enhance urban living, governance, and sustainability, are being implemented in cities like Taichung and Tainan. These initiatives frequently entail working with foreign IT companies and academic organizations. Taiwanese SNGs demonstrate their dedication to innovation and contemporary governance by using digital platforms to advertise their projects, interact with audiences across the world, and draw in investment. The SGNs have made strides in the direction of digital governance because of technical innovation. One respondent was extremely excited about:

> By working with international experts to adopt best practices and deploying e-governance services to increase transparency, efficiency, and public involvement, Taiwanese SNGs are making enormous achievements. To guarantee that all citizens may profit from technological breakthroughs and increase community participation in governance, SNGs support digital literacy and inclusion activities (Field survey 2024 in Taiwan).

60% of the respondents, Taiwanese SNGs actively participate in global environmental sustainability activities, including those addressing climate change and biodiversity

conservation. Local governments frequently work with NGOs and academic groups in international alliances aimed at protecting biodiversity and advancing sustainable land use practices. In order to fight climate change and advance sustainable practices, SNGs also take part in international climate initiatives by coordinating their local policies with global climate agreements. According to one respondent,

> In order to handle shared problems, including environmental concerns and economic development, Taiwanese SNGs participate in regional cooperation initiatives by having conversations with neighboring regions. This promotes stability and collaboration in the region. SNGs take an active part in regional forums and initiatives that foster cooperation on a range of topics, such as cultural exchange, trade, and security (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

60% of respondents believed that Taiwanese SNGs use paradiplomatic measures to improve public safety and security in the face of regional security issues. By working with foreign partners to address security challenges including cyber threats and human trafficking, municipalities and counties are participating in cross-border security efforts that improve regional stability. According to one respondent, SNGs may use community policing tactics in collaboration with foreign organizations to enhance local security and foster community confidence while Taiwan faces geopolitical difficulties brought on by the diplomatic stalemate with the PRC (Field survey, 2024).

3.3.4. Some Taiwan's SNGs contributions to global governance and international collaboration through paradiplomacy.

i. Taipei City promotes trade, tourism, and cultural exchange through sister city relationships with cities such as Tokyo, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. The Taipei International Conference on Sourcing, organized by the Taipei City Government, brings together procurement authorities from all over the world to exchange best practices and foster global collaboration. The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group is an international network of cities dedicated to combating climate change, in which the Taipei City Government has taken part. In an effort to foster economic collaboration across the Taiwan Strait, the Taipei City Government opened a mayor's office in Zhongshan, China.

ii. In order to establish sister city linkages centered on commerce, tourism, and cross-cultural interaction, Kaohsiung City has sister city relationships with cities such as Houston, Texas, USA. Bangkok and Busan, encouraging collaboration in fields such as economic development, tourism, and port administration. For officials from foreign partner cities, the Kaohsiung City Government's International Training Program provides training sessions on port management, tourism development, and urban planning.

iii. The Taichung International Flower and Garden Show, organized by the Taichung City Government, draws horticulture specialists and lovers from all over the world. The International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), a global network of local governments advocating for sustainable development, has welcomed the Taichung City Government as a member.

iv. The Taiwan–Japan Bilateral Cooperation Agreement on Disaster Prevention and Relief, which promotes collaboration on disaster response and management between Japanese and Taiwanese cities. The Taiwan-US Sister County/City Relationships initiative fosters collaboration between American and Taiwanese cities in fields such as education, tourism, and trade.

v. The City of Bordeaux, France, and the City of Taian have teamed up to advance tourism, education, and cultural interaction.

vi. To address environmental issues and advance sustainable development, local governments from all around the world come together through the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI). Local governments around the world are represented by the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), which fosters collaboration on matters such as human rights, urbanization, and climate change. The Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) offers developing nation’s technical support and training in fields like education, healthcare, and agriculture. To encourage commerce and investment from Taiwan, the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) has set up trade offices in key cities across the world, such as Tokyo, Seoul, and San Francisco. To encourage cultural cooperation and exchange, the National Palace Museum has partnered with museums all over the world, such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York and the Louvre in Paris. To promote Taiwanese culture and the arts, the Taiwan Festival has been staged yearly in cities all over the world, including Tokyo, Seoul, and Hong Kong.



Here is the bar chart comparing the contributions of Nigeria's and Taiwan's SNGs to global governance and international collaboration across different sectors. Key observations:

- **Economic Development**: Nigeria leads slightly due to extensive trade missions and investment promotion.
- **Cultural Diplomacy**: Taiwan has a higher engagement level with its strong focus on cultural exchange programs.
- **Public Health Initiatives**: Taiwan excels in global health diplomacy, particularly with pandemic response efforts.
- **Climate & Environmental Sustainability**: Taiwan's SNGs are highly active in sustainability and climate change initiatives.
- **Security & Disaster Management**: Both Nigeria and Taiwan engage in regional security efforts, though Taiwan focuses more on disaster preparedness.
- **Tourism & International Partnerships**: Nigeria leads with strong tourism campaigns and sister-city collaborations.
- **Technology & Innovation**: Taiwan has a higher engagement due to smart city initiatives and digital diplomacy.
- **Education & Capacity Building**: Taiwan is ahead with extensive academic exchanges and digital governance programs.

3.4. What are the Opportunities and Challenges for SNGs in Nigeria and Taiwan engagement in paradiplomacy?

3.4.1 Opportunities for the subnational units in Nigeria and Taiwan engaging in paradiplomacy.

There are special chances for paradiplomacy in the interaction between SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria. These chances can lead to fruitful cooperation and stem from the unique advantages and passions of both areas. The reason for these prospects is that it can promote innovation, cultural interaction, and mutual development. The following topics may present chances for paradiplomacy between the two nations.

i. **Globalization and Regional Autonomy**

Globalization has increasingly encouraged regional actors to pursue autonomous paradiplomacy. As **Bursens and Deforche (2010)** suggest, globalization facilitates subnational engagement by providing SNGs with access to international networks, economic resources, and cultural exchanges, which can bolster regional economies and enrich local governance. In Taiwan's case, this trend has accelerated, with local governments participating in international trade and cultural events to enhance Taiwan's visibility and strengthen its soft power globally (Chen & Wu, 2020). Nigeria has similarly seen states interested in engaging with foreign actors to address localized economic goals, though constrained by federal control (Adebayo & Sunday, 2019). The SNGs of Nigeria, such as Lagos State with high population density, are potential markets and investment destinations for Taiwanese businessmen. The Lagos International Trade Fair, which is held annually, provides an opportunity for Taiwanese companies in Nigeria and in Taiwan to participate. For instance, in 2014, at the Lagos International Trade Fair, twenty Taiwanese companies participated.

The opening of international markets to sub-state political actors other than sovereign states during the 1980s and beyond is demonstrated by documentary evidence. Neoliberal structural changes are to blame for this. Under the directives of the World Bank and IMF at the national level, sub-state governments started to become more involved in economic activities. The emergence of sub-state governments on the global scene is a practical reaction to the potential and difficulties presented by the fast pace of economic interconnectedness and globalization **(Nganje, 2016, p. 150).** Stated differently, there are two sides to the global economy's opening to actors other than states. Sub-state governments, on the one hand, engaged in their external activities in order to increase domestic exports and reap the benefits of bilateral trade and

economic cooperation. Conversely, because more performers were involved than ever before, the atmosphere became more competitive (**Haggard, Kaufman, 1992).** Nonetheless, the logical reasoning is that sub-state governments' increased reliance on industrialized economies, such as Taiwan, could benefit their economic relations rather than jeopardize their political standing. Stated differently, there are two sides to the global economy's opening to actors other than states. Sub-state governments, on the one hand, engaged in their external activities in order to increase domestic exports and reap the benefits of bilateral trade and economic cooperation. Conversely, because more performers were involved than ever before, the atmosphere became more competitive (**Haggard, Kaufman, 1992)**. Nonetheless, the logical reasoning is that sub-state governments' increased reliance on industrialized economies, such as Taiwan, could benefit their economic relations rather than jeopardize their political standing.

There are many chances for subnational players to participate in cross-border collaboration as the global economy grows. Technical cooperation, including projects, and economic and trade cooperation, which is strongly tied to export, import, investment, development cooperation, and foreign aid activities, are some of the types of international cooperation they engage in (Asshinaz, 2024, pp. 2-3).

ii. **Economic Development and Trade**

To encourage trade, draw in investments, and create economic zones, SNGs in Nigeria can collaborate with their Taiwanese counterparts. By cultivating commercial ties and drawing in investments from Taiwan, SNGs can boost growth. Taiwan boasts a thriving economy that excels in services, technology, and manufacturing. An agreement between Lagos and Kaohsiung, for instance, might concentrate on investment and technology transfer, especially in sectors like electronics and manufacturing, leveraging Taiwan's robust industrial base. Lagos State might send a trade delegation to Taichung or Tainan, Taiwan, with an emphasis on manufacturing or information technology (IT) companies. By inviting Taiwanese investors to local trade shows or expos, Nigerian states can promote their business environments and specific industries, such as textiles or technology. The annual Lagos State International Trade Fairs is a big opportunity for Taiwanese companies and businesses to explore.

Economic opportunities are compelling reasons, as alluded to by respondents, for paradiplomacy. In their view:

> Even if SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria are restricted in their paradiplomatic endeavors, economic factors make paradiplomacy a strong case. By taking part

> in cross-border projects that can advance regional development, local governments frequently aim to promote economic growth (Field Survey in Nigeria and Taiwan, 2024).

Some states in Nigeria engage in informal paradiplomacy for economic reasons, especially in industries like trade and tourism where local communities want to draw in foreign capital (Adebayo & Sunday, 2019). Despite being restricted by constitutional limits, research indicates that local governments in Nigeria have been pushing for more autonomy in economic partnerships (Fatile & Adejuwon, 2010). Local organizations use what is referred to as "soft" or "informal diplomacy" through business associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly in culturally relevant sectors, in Taiwan, where economic interests take precedence over diplomatic recognition (Chen & Wu, 2020).

Respondents from both Nigeria and Taiwan share the view that businessmen are foreign policy actors because they can interact among themselves and influence foreign policy decisions of their government. According to one of the respondents,

> Although Lagos is Nigeria's commercial hub, the government's 2017 decision to move the Taipei Trade Mission from Abuja to Lagos was seen as unreasonable. However, the government did it to appease China, which was prepared to offer Nigeria a $40 billion investment. Taiwanese businesses will have the chance to meet with SNGs whenever they want to talk about investment prospects in their states because Abuja is the federal capital (Field Survey, Nigeria, 2024).

The respondents acknowledged that trade and corporate relationships can enable the two countries to achieve their foreign policy goals, and that businessmen from Taiwan and Nigeria can engage in discussions that will benefit both countries in addition to conducting business. "These interactions could serve as an alternative channel for paradiplomatic engagement, bypassing formal diplomatic limitations between the two countries while enhancing economic ties" (Field survey Nigeria, 2024).

Non-state players like businessmen and civil society organizations can have a significant impact on both nations' foreign policies. Business associations and public society organizations in Taiwan and Nigeria can actively work to strengthen ties between the two countries. Taiwanese business associations strongly indicated their support by assisting in obtaining the Taipei Trade Mission office in Lagos after the federal government directed the mission's relocation there. Non-state actors were able to provide this type of informal support to accomplish the foreign policy objectives. The Import and Export Bank provides $5 million in

trading guarantee loans for mutual trading to businessmen in Taiwan and Nigeria via the paradiplomatic route.

Ambassador Andy Liu promised in an interview that the Trade Mission would help with that process (Business Day, 2022, Sept. 20, p. 26). The idea that trade and economic possibilities are made available to both nations is supported by documentary evidence. In addition to being the biggest economy in Africa, Nigeria is a significant third-party trading partner of Taiwan. In 2023, Nigeria and Taiwan's bilateral commerce was US$395 million, a 36% decline from 2022. Taiwan's exports to Nigeria made up the remaining US$186 million of this total, while Nigeria's exports to Taiwan made up US$209 million. Taiwan's principal exports include petroleum and diesel, plastics, motor vehicle parts, and monosodium glutamate.

Natural gas, petroleum, crude oils, propane, butanes, refined lead, and agricultural goods like cocoa and sesame seeds are among Nigeria's top exports. This suggests that the countries' bilateral economic and trade contacts are becoming more and more successful. Foodstuffs, chemicals, car parts, and machinery and parts are the nation's top imports. Nigeria is also the founder of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a member of the African Union (AU), and a signatory to the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) (Taiwan-Nigeria Economic Relations, Trade and Statistics, 2024, www.gov.org.tw Accessed: 23/8/2024). This demonstrates that Nigeria is a market for Taiwanese goods and a nation in which Taiwan may make investments.

Bilateral Trade between Nigeria and Taiwan (2023)

- Total trade: $395 million
- Nigeria's exports to Taiwan: $209 million
- Taiwan's exports to Nigeria: $186 million



Source: (Taiwan-Nigeria Economic Relations, Trade and Statistics, 2024, www.gov.org.tw Accessed: 23/8/2024).

Taiwan has presented a compelling argument for Nigeria to extend the 1991 investment protection pact. As of 2022, Taiwan and Nigeria had a $1 billion commerce, but Taiwanese investors have expressed desire in growing their business there in a number of sectors, including technology, education, and agriculture. In an interview with Daily Trust in Lagos, Mr. Andy Yih-Ping Liu, Taiwan's ambassador to Nigeria and the representative of the Taipei Trade Office in Lagos, claims that the extension of the 1991 trade agreement is essential to increasing trade between Taiwan and Nigeria (Abdullateef Aliy, 2024, Daily Trust, 2 May). He added that, similar to what the federal government recently did with the British government; Taiwan is collaborating with the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Investment to negotiate an improved trade deal with Taiwan. "We welcome Nigerians who wish to establish businesses in Taiwan (Chiedozie et al., 2024), but we require the investment protection agreement," he stated. "The Nigerian government ought to think about establishing a more comprehensive trade and economic partnership with us if the investment protection agreement is signed today. Both the British and the British have signed with those countries. Why hasn't Taiwan signed with Nigeria? (Abdullateef Aliy, Daily Trust, May 2, 2024,).

The subnational governments of Taiwan and Nigeria would establish complete diplomatic relations free from Chinese diplomatic eavesdropping if they concentrate on investments. With

a focus on knowledge transfer, Taiwan's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria ought to be directed toward particular industries including manufacturing, information technology (IT), and agriculture. Currently, the amount of investment is negligible when compared to China. It makes sense that Taiwan's diplomatic isolation and other geopolitical restrictions have made her invisible and prevented her from working more broadly with Nigeria.

The SNGs have the opportunity to grow economically through paradiplomacy. One important factor in the formulation and execution of foreign policy is the GDP, or level of economic development. The respondents concur that the economy could be impacted by any poor foreign policy. Direct foreign investment (FDI) is how subnational units participate in global economic connections. A summary of the recorded FDI-related actions carried out by SNGs in Nigeria to promote economic development between 1999 and 2019 was given by Omiunu and Aniyie (2018, p. 12).

According to McMillan (2008), many U.S. states are involved in international affairs in two primary ways: by setting up governor-led abroad missions and international offices to encourage exports and draw in foreign direct investment (FDI). States are in charge of luring FDI because the US government does not get involved. State governments, the U.S. Department of Commerce (through the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service), chambers of commerce, nonprofit world trade centers, and business consultancies are all part of the complex network of actors on the export side (Kline 1983; Posner 1984; Whatley 2003, cited in McMillan, 2008).

iii. **Agriculture collaboration and Technology Transfer**

Taiwan's cutting-edge technological industries, such as information technology, renewable energy, and agriculture, can help Nigeria because Taiwan is renowned for its high-tech sector, which includes electronics, telecommunications, and information technology. Nigerian states can learn how to implement cutting-edge technologies and procedures by working with Taiwanese SNGs. For instance, by leveraging Taiwan's technological and innovative know-how, Ogun or Lagos State might collaborate with Taiwanese governments to create smart city initiatives. To improve local IT capabilities, Ogun State, which is home to multiple industrial parks, might collaborate with Taiwanese tech companies. A collaborative effort might create a technology park showcasing Taiwanese advancements in electronics design or computer software.

States in Nigeria can increase their agricultural output and food security by utilizing Taiwan's innovations in agricultural technology and methods. Taiwan has made great strides in

agricultural technology, especially in sustainable practices and increasing crop yields. Nigerian food security may improve because of cooperative initiatives. For instance, a partnership between Tainan colleges and Ondo State agricultural departments can concentrate on agricultural specialists' exchange programs and sustainable farming methods. In order to increase agricultural productivity, partnerships may also entail knowledge sharing. For example, Taiwanese agronomists may train farmers in Ekiti State on sustainable farming technologies.

Taiwan's industrialization was fueled by agriculture, as demonstrated by documentary proof, and Nigeria may work with this. Before descending into an electronic hub, Taiwan's industrialization process started with state-led agricultural reforms (Chevalerias, 2012; Vincent, 1999, quoted in Ogwola et al., 2022, p. 11). While Nigerian farmers focused on producing agricultural raw materials for export to Europe, such as cotton, rubber, palm fruits, groundnuts, cocoa, and lumber, Taiwan was recognized for producing rice and sugar (Ogwola et al., 2022).

iv. Innovation and Technology Hub

Nigerian respondents recognized Taiwan's technical potential and recognized the necessity of SNGs working together with SNGs in Taiwan in sectors like semiconductor manufacturing and other technological advancements that will support Nigeria's growth. Nigerian states may foster startup ecosystems and entrepreneurship by working together to build innovation and technology clusters. SNGs can promote local economic growth and entrepreneurship by setting up innovation hubs and incubators. For instance, Taiwan's innovation center may work with towns like Enugu, Abia (Aba), or Bauchi to establish startup incubators that would support local businesses and technological advancement. Additionally, Lagos State and Taiwanese technical universities might collaborate to establish an innovation hub that would promote technology companies by offering resources and mentorship to local business owners.

v. Collaborations in Education and Research, Culture, and Tourism

SNGs are able to create research partnerships, scholarships, and educational exchange programs. Programs for education exchange can promote understanding between people and open doors for faculty collaborations, student exchanges, and cooperative research projects. A collaboration between Edo State and Taiwanese universities, for instance, might encourage cooperative research initiatives, student exchanges, and the exchange of best practices in higher education. Taiwanese universities such as National Taiwan University, resulting in

collaborative degree programs, engineering or environmental science research projects and internships for students from both areas.

Cultural exchange and promotion are important paradiplomatic strategies, according to 60% of respondents. In order to foster respect for their unique customs and traditions as well as global awareness, SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria will use paradiplomacy to promote their cultures and increase cultural affluence. For example, the promotion of Benin antiquities, Nok sculptures, and other art crafts in Nigeria, as well as the Taiwan Lunar Festival and other cultural festivals. Through their participation in trade missions between the two nations and their sponsorship of various cultural events at both domestic and international exhibits, the SNGs may support the expansion of this cultural industry. SNGs can increase the global recognition of their art by presenting their important global development partners with awards that include intricate traditional artworks.

In addition to providing a stage for exhibiting customs, art, and food, fostering cultural interchange helps improve understanding and goodwill between people. Through the arts, music, and food, cultural diplomacy can deepen relationships while fostering mutual respect and understanding of one another's cultural heritage. To promote cultural diplomacy and tourism, for instance, festivals highlighting Taiwanese and Nigerian traditions may be held in places like Taipei or Abuja. Bilateral ties can be improved by showcasing Taiwanese culture in Nigeria. This result supports the claim made by Zamorano and Morato that cultural paradiplomacy encompasses more than just cultural exchange methods. Instead, it is a broad idea that includes a variety of creative and intellectual interactions between countries and areas (Zamoraano and Morato, 2015, cited in **Mulwa, 2023)**.

According to 70% of respondents polled in Taiwan and Nigeria, promoting tourism can improve both cultural understanding and economic development. They acknowledged the importance of tourism in fostering the development of paradiplomacy between the two nations they were looking into. Because it promotes local economic growth and serves to highlight each nation's unique cultural legacy, tourism has the ability to draw tourists from elsewhere. Combined tourism initiatives can draw tourists to both areas. By establishing exchange programs that let tourists experience one another's cultures and attractions, both regions can promote tourism. For instance, creating tourism partnerships that showcase Taiwanese and Nigerian cultural landmarks may help both countries by bringing in more tourists. To promote more travel and cross-cultural interaction, a Nigerian state with cultural heritage sites, like Osun State, may work with Taiwanese tourism boards to develop collaborative marketing

campaigns that showcase assets in both areas. The application of soft power, especially through participation in NGO activities and cultural exchanges.

Nigeria and Taiwan have rich culture that can be explored through paradiplomacy. In the view of the respondents,

> A component of soft power and Track 2 diplomacy, which focuses on strengthening business and interpersonal relationships as well as cultural initiatives, educational collaborations, and trade linkages, is culture. These initiatives have the potential to develop into more in-depth national conversations; emphasizing the role, that paradiplomacy plays in Nigeria-Taiwan relations (Field survey Nigeria and Taiwan, 2024).

Examples of events that foster positive relationships include the yearly Oshogbo festival, the Aregugu fishing festival in the north, the Yoruba "Eyo" celebration in Lagos, and the Calabar cultural carnival that takes place every Christmas. Taiwan hosts a number of festivals, including "Moonlight." One crucial strategy for fostering positive relationships is cultural diplomacy. Showing off cultural diversity is one of the reasons countries open diplomatic missions. Making active use of foreign cultural and information services is one approach to accomplish these objectives. The SNGs of Taiwan and Nigeria can set up organizations to spread cultural concepts that encourage pride, unity, and awareness of one's country. In paradiplomacy, which aims to foster intercultural understanding, cultural exchanges are essential. For example, the Taiwanese government founded and funds educational programs, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (M.O.F.A.) fellowship, as a tool for paradiplomacy.

This is in line with the opinions of academics who characterize tourism as a tool of soft power, such as Nye (2004). Instead of using force, it can draw people in and co-opt them, which is especially helpful when official diplomatic routes are closed or unavailable. Utomo's (2022) suggestion supports tourism as a means of drawing SNGs' attention worldwide due to its potential to grow a number of economic sectors.

Both Taiwan and Nigeria are democratic nations, and their subnational administrations can serve as effective conduits for advancing the democratic values of rule of law and human rights. In contemporary international relations, diplomatic relations and foreign policy are based upon these cornerstones. SNGs can encourage each other to use track 2 diplomacy and soft power. The respondents concurred that the cornerstone of contemporary international relations is the advancement of democracy, fundamental freedom, and the rule of law. As the fundamental tenet of Taiwan's foreign policy is the propagation of democratic values, subnational units can play a role in bringing these concepts to other nations.

Without starting official diplomatic disputes, NGOs and cultural organizations in Taiwan are essential in advancing Taiwan's culture overseas (Lin, 2014). This strategy works well in Nigeria as well, where local government and non-governmental organizations collaborate with foreign organizations to promote cross-cultural interaction and open up new avenues for collaboration (Adebayo & Sunday, 2019).

However, because of Taiwan's desire for international recognition and the strategic deployment of soft power, especially given its geopolitical context, NGO involvement in paradiplomacy works better there than in Nigeria. According to Rigger (2011), Taiwan's non-governmental organizations frequently focus on nations with little Chinese influence, forming alliances that bolster Taiwan's international standing in spite of formal diplomatic limitations. Because Nigeria adheres to the One-China policy, which limits formal contacts with Taiwan, the use of NGOs for paradiplomacy tends to concentrate more on economic alignment than political alignment (Suberu, 2001).

The effect of trade, culture, tourism, and education is recognized by respondents in Taiwan and Nigeria as a wide range of paradiplomatic involvement that might expand Nigeria's foreign policy without going against the government's official policies. This is a sensible strategy for both nations to restore extensive diplomatic ties without Nigeria upsetting China, which was against Taiwan's diplomatic recognition. According to the respondent: "Nigeria's engagement with non-state or informal actors is flexible and pragmatic, allowing it to adapt to the current international complexities surrounding Taiwan's recognition and sovereignty." Lecoure (2008, p. 3) shares this opinion, stating that sub-state administrations aim to establish a system of foreign relations that will uphold the national character, political independence, and cultural uniqueness of the community they represent.

According to one respondent, the grassroots perspective in foreign affairs is supported by the initiatives of Nigerian expatriates and Taiwanese groups. In situations where diplomatic sensitivity is present, civil society actors are thought to be more adaptable than state players in navigating both commerce and cultural exchange markets. Non-state actors may use these strategies to further their national interests and practice paradiplomacy.

In modern international relations, it is acknowledged that subnational units offer diplomatic assistance for the execution of national foreign policy. Paradiplomacy between Taiwan and Nigeria should be less symbolic and more substance, with an emphasis on developing real partnerships rather than just pursuing recognition, particularly for Taiwan. To achieve a diplomatic equilibrium in their complicated relationship, Taiwan and Nigeria will employ the paradiplomacy technique. Interacting with Nigeria and comparable countries necessitates

negotiating intricate political and historical contexts while investigating the options made available to them by subnational entities. One respondent noted that local factors play a role in the formulation of foreign policy. According to him,

> It is important to recognize that localized impact in foreign policy cannot be disregarded. Paradiplomacy enables subnational institutions to carry out aspects of foreign policy locally, particularly in sectors like trade, tourism, and cultural exchange, even though traditional diplomacy is still the purview of the central government (Field Survey Nigeria, 2024).

This is consistent with Brian Hocking's belief that the participation of local or subnational governments in international affairs "represents the expansion rather than the rejection of foreign policy" and is a component of the development of the national foreign policy process (Zhimin and Junbo, 2009, p. 4). The Chinese provinces, for example, are viewed as agents of foreign policy. A highly developed local foreign affairs management system has been established in these provinces. Usually, the party secretary or the provincial governor leads a small, influential group that handles international policy. Under this setup, the governor and party secretary serve as the primary conductors of local foreign affairs and as influential policymakers.

As they collaborate with other sub-state entities outside of their borders, SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria can act as a conduit for the central government's foreign policy goals. In order to further the national interests of their different nations, SNGs can engage with one another in a variety of international contexts, including economic, social, cultural, tourist, etc. To put it another way, the respondents thought that subnational governments could further their nation's strategic, cultural, and economic interests. By using paradiplomacy to address local issues, SNGs improve their overall visibility internationally and support the execution of national foreign policy. The respondent held the following opinion:

> Through business initiatives, NGOs, think tanks, and city-to-city partnerships, Taiwan and Nigeria's subnational engagement with international actors will provide flexibility in the implementation of foreign policy and occasionally better address particular regional needs than the central government's national policies (Field Survey in Nigeria and Taiwan, 2024).

Relationships with sub-state governments in advanced industrialized societies make sense because they can package various opportunities, according to Lecours (2008, p. 5)**,** who discusses partnerships in the context of developing country regions and countries going through political and economic transition. In this instance, Nigeria will greatly benefit from the paradiplomacy of Taiwan and Nigeria's subnational units. Through the SNGs, Taiwan, a highly developed industrialized nation, would offer Nigeria technical experience in a number of areas.

Given Nigeria's wealth of natural resources, Taiwan can collaborate with it through its subnational entities to utilize them for both nations' mutual advantage. The subnational units have the ability to establish exchange opportunities in fields including engineering, medicine, and higher education.

One of the ways paradiplomacy might become ingrained as a legitimate tool for advancing diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Nigeria is through People-to-People versus Government-to-Government Relations. People-to-people interactions contribute to the development of formal connections and cultural understanding between the two nations, which will ultimately result in the collaboration that is required to advance investment and trade. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of civil society and interpersonal connections is emphasized as a possibly less politically sensitive avenue. It is evident that political affinities and worries about international repercussions, especially from China, may make government-to-government interactions difficult.

According to the respondents, paradiplomacy could promote positive international interactions through subnational entities like states, counties, municipalities, civil society organizations, business associations, etc. According to them:

> The role of business and civil society in foreign relations as pertains to Taiwan and Nigeria cannot be ignored. The business groups and civil society actors can take proactive roles in facilitating the relationship between Taiwan and Nigeria. The support of Taiwanese business associations for the Taiwan office in Lagos exemplifies paradiplomacy, where non-state actors advance foreign policy goals informally. The efforts of Taiwanese organizations and Nigerian expatriates in Taiwan highlight a grassroots dimension in foreign relations. In situations where diplomatic sensitivity is present, civil society actors are perceived as more adaptable and capable of navigating both commercial and cultural exchange markets in ways that state actors could be limited from doing. The central government must, however, recognize paradiplomacy potential benefits and establish policies that balance regional and national objectives if it is to succeed (Field Survey in Nigeria and Taiwan, 2024).

One method of democratizing foreign policy is through paradiplomacy, which is a good thing. Given that China, which is not democratic, permits its subnational units to actively engage in paradiplomacy due to the possibility of its growing influence in international diplomacy, Taiwan, on the other hand, strongly believes in democracy but restricts the involvement of its subnational units in foreign affairs. According to Taiwanese respondents,

> Taiwan should encourage its subnational authorities to interact with others in various fields in order to democratize its foreign policy. Nonetheless, there is

> good reason to be concerned that China would use subnational entities to undermine Taiwan's central government (Field survey in Taiwan, 2024).

The respondents in Nigeria hold the view that:

> Regarding foreign affairs and external relations, Nigeria's constitution is quite explicit. The subnational entities in a federation like Nigeria have certain autonomy. The degree to which subnational governments are able to engage in international diplomacy may be more important than the fear of secession. The capability in terms of persons, resources, and everything else required (Field survey in Nigeria, 2024).

vi. Health Initiative

Public health initiatives and healthcare professional training are two health-related topics on which both regions can work together. Stated differently, cooperation on public health projects can enhance disease prevention tactics, health education, and healthcare delivery systems. For instance, a collaboration between Taiwan's health authority and the health departments of Lagos State could concentrate on disease preventive tactics while exchanging best practices in healthcare administration and public health. In order to improve general health standards, Lagos State and Taiwan's Ministry of Health could collaborate to create training programs for healthcare management or communicable disease control. In an interview, a Nigerian living in Taiwan said:

> One nation with excellent healthcare and a lower death rate is Taiwan. When compared to Nigeria, the life expectancy is high. The door to a good medical or health care delivery system is thus opened by collaborating with Taiwanese subnational units (Taiwan field survey, 2024).

vii. Collaboration on the Environment and Climate

In order to tackle issues like waste management, urban pollution, and climate change, SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria could collaborate on environmental sustainability projects. Collaborating on environmental projects can be facilitated by addressing topics such as waste management, urban sustainability, and climate change. In an effort to lessen the effects of global warming and preserve the earth for future generations, 65% of respondents believed that international cooperation is crucial to environmental conservation. For instance, Taiwanese towns like Taichung and states like Rivers or Akwa-Ibom may work together to exchange strategies for mitigating the effects of oil spills, preserving sustainable urban areas, or creating renewable energy projects. A collaboration might concentrate on exchanging waste management best practices. To improve its systems, a Nigerian state, for example, implement Taiwan's effective

recycling initiatives and environmental management techniques. A Taichung-based Nigerian noted that:

> Taichung City Government and Lagos State can collaborate on garbage management. That the majority of Nigerian states, especially Lagos State, lack the waste management efficiency of Taichung City Government. Because the local government is not carrying out its responsibilities, trash is thrown carelessly along the road, giving the impression that it does not exist (Field survey in Taiwan, 2024).

The idea that paradiplomacy gives SNGs the chance to participate in networks for climate change governance is supported by documentary evidence. Three distinct transnational municipal networks were established during the Rio United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. In order to develop city-level plans and tools for reducing GHG emissions, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the City of Toronto, and several private foundations funded the Urban CO_2 Reduction Project, which was organized by the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, now known as ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability (Bulkekley, 2010, p. 232). Founded in 1990 by European cities and indigenous peoples, the Climate Alliance now has 1,100 members across 17 European countries, with Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands being the most common countries. Municipal networks on climate change cooperation have grown in number in recent years. Regional or national campaigns have been established by transnational municipal networks, like the Cities Climate Protection (CCP) program in Australia or the Energie-Cités network in Poland. National networks, like the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, have also been established (Bulkeley, 2010, p. 232). The history of urban climate change responses revolves around the formation and expansion of national and global networks. According to Granberg, M. and Elander, I. (2007, p. 545),

> Through network participation, towns can access opportunities and become a part of the flow. Cooperation also makes it possible to improve a municipality's reputation because pioneers advancing cutting-edge concepts are in line with ecological modernization, which combines lowering greenhouse gas emissions with local economic growth. In order to promote sustainable development, networks may help its members draw in investment from the public and private sectors (Cited Bulkeley, 2010, p. 232).

Insofar as they can provide knowledge, funding opportunities, and the capacity to share and learn from best practices, municipal networks have been found to be effective in attracting and retaining members. These networks have also developed a variety of tools and mechanisms, including benchmarking, target setting, and other types of soft regulation, which allow them to

govern through their networks (Bulkeley, 2010). Environmental balances that exist as ecological continuums that transcend the areas under state sovereignty are the reason why climate changes occur beyond state borders.

viii. Resilience and Disaster Management

Thirty percent of respondents in Taiwan and Nigeria believe that resilience and catastrophe management are crucial for paradiplomacy. Nigerian states can, however, learn from and put into practice methods to improve their own disaster management systems, particularly in regions vulnerable to flooding or war, thanks to Taiwanese expertise with disaster planning and response. For instance, information exchange and training could be facilitated by a collaboration between Taiwan's Central Disaster Emergency Management Committee and Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). For instance, using Taiwan's effective methods for risk assessment and community preparedness, workshops and training sessions led by Taiwanese disaster management specialists might be arranged for Nigerian emergency response teams to improve their crisis response capabilities.

As a Nigeria respondent in Taiwan alluded to how Taiwan deals with earthquake is something that Nigeria can learn from. According to him,

> All levels of government take great initiative since they are well aware that a natural disaster of this kind could happen at any time. In the event of such an unexpected natural calamity, a presidential notice will be sent out right away, telling the locals what to do. This has lessened the effects of the natural calamity on the locals. All levels of the Nigerian government fail to demonstrate that they have the capacity to lessen or stop the occurrence of such a natural calamity. He went on to say that, Nigeria is fortunate not to experience a typhoon or earthquake. The national governments and local governments' responses to the 2024 Taiwanese earthquake were too remarkable. Because of this, there were very few fatalities and injuries (Field survey in Taiwan, 2024).

For this reason, Taiwan's big cities and Nigeria's subnational units to collaborate on disaster management. During the rainy season, flooding is a common occurrence in the majority of Nigerian cities and local government areas. Homes and farmland are damaged by the severe floods, necessitating vigorous government action at the federal and state levels.

ix. Development of Infrastructure

Collaboration on infrastructure projects is possible, especially in the areas of urban development, energy, and transportation. In other words, by utilizing Taiwanese engineering

and construction knowledge, cooperation on infrastructure projects can enhance connectivity and vital services. Using Taiwan's expertise in these areas, the Nigerian government may work with Taiwanese construction companies to create vital infrastructure projects like transportation networks, highways, or even renewable energy projects. For instance, collaborations between Taiwanese companies and governments like Delta or Lagos might concentrate on creating infrastructure for green energy or smart transportation.

An entrepreneur from Nigeria who lives in Taiwan praised Taiwan's superior transportation infrastructure. He said all levels of the Nigerian government ought to take a cue from Taiwan. When it comes to transportation delivery systems, states like Lagos, Rivers, Kano, Enugu, Anambra, etc., can use paradiplomacy. For example, during Bola Tinubu's leadership, Lagos State implemented BRT, using a large number of government-purchased buses. Babatunde Fashola, Amobode, and now Sanwolu followed his rule. The busses could not be maintained by any of them. The effects of the transportation system were not felt by the resident. In Taiwan, the pre-paid bus card was a particularly effective method of collecting. It was lowered to the lowest level of corruption in the industry because passengers pay with cash, with the exception of a few instances in which the loaded currency runs out without anyone noticing. In these situations, a penny is put into a little box that is kept by the driver's side. Everybody is carrying a bus card. The Nigerian government should take note of certain things. No other vehicle is allowed to use the bus-designated lane; if a car accidentally crosses into it, CCTV cameras placed across the city will record it. Other cars in Lagos are trespassing on the BRT lane, and the so-called Lagos State Transport Management (LSTMAN) officials are doing nothing about it.

20% of respondents, security and governance are important considerations for a possible paradiplomatic connection between Taiwan and Nigeria. According to the respondents, SNGs in Nigeria might not be able to handle the security issues that have plagued the nation. For this reason, they are looking for international collaboration with Taiwan, which has cutting-edge technology, to assist Nigerian security agents in conducting surveillance. By supporting security and safety activities, this will contribute to improving the security situation in different areas.

Gaining insight from Taiwanese governance methods helps enhance local security and governance plans, which are essential for growth and stability. Based on Taiwan's effective governance models, SNGs may exchange best practices in public administration, security tactics, and governance. For instance, a collaboration between Taiwanese governance institutions and states like Kano or Kaduna might promote information sharing on community

policing, transparency and anti-corruption initiatives, and other governance models observed in Taiwan. Global peace and security will be promoted by the two nations' SNGs working together on international security through paradiplomacy. According to Cornago (2014), paradiplomacy can promote cooperation across regions, as demonstrated by the Council of Europe following the World War 11 outbreak. It served as a tool to promote collaboration and lessen tensions between units from various military coalitions during the Cold War.

Survey Responses on Key Paradiplomacy Opportunities

- **Tourism Promotion**: 70%
- **Cultural Exchange**: 60%
- **Environmental Collaboration**: 65%
- **Disaster Management**: 30%
- **Security & Governance**: 20%

Illustrates the percentage of respondents who identified key areas like tourism promotion, cultural exchange, and environmental collaboration as important.



3.4.2 The Paradiplomacy Challenges Faced by SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria

While there are many benefits to SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria engaging in paradiplomacy, there are drawbacks as well. The difficulties are complex and situational. The longevity and efficacy of these collaborations between the two nations may be impacted by these difficulties. Notwithstanding the proactive role that SNGs might play in international relations, several obstacles limit their freedom of participation. These are issues SNGs reported by respondents and supported by academic research from numerous literature reviews.

i. **Decentralization of foreign policy decision-making**

Decentralization may provide a problem for certain constituent units that lack the institutional capacity to engage in paradiplomacy, according to 60% of Nigerian respondents. One respondent says:

> In a federal system like Nigeria, some view it as the central government's abandonment of responsibility because it fails to achieve the central government's objective of achieving equitable distribution of economic development. Decentralization tends to promote growth in unitary states like Taiwan because it relieves the central government of some problems when the constituent entities use paradiplomacy. Through institutional support, it might assist its constituent entities in engaging in paradiplomatic activities to draw in trade, investment, and tourists (Field survey, 2024).

Similar to China, the establishment of foreign affairs offices in the provinces by the central government supports the use of paradiplomatic tactics. Subnational units will find it challenging to engage in external relations, which demand certain resources, without institutional backing. In order to prevent the issue of uneven development that could cause public dissatisfaction, the central government continues to take the lead in coordinating the paradiplomacy of its units (Chatterji and Saha, 2017). Ironically, central authority has been both enhanced and damaged by the decentralization of assistance (Wunsch, 2014).

In a culturally diverse community, allowing a unit with a strong ethnic or cultural identity to practice paradiplomacy through independent representation may also result in increased ethnic mobilization and internal strife. It's possible that this will make the nation less cohesive. To guarantee alignment between the foreign policy of the central government and that of the units, the central government must coordinate and regulate the paradiplomatic activities of its components. Paradiplomacy may backfire if the central government lacks the resources and the will to implement it (Chatterji and Saha, 2017, p. 383).

ii. **Centralization of foreign policy**

70% of respondents, paradiplomatic techniques are seriously hampered by Taiwan and Nigeria's excessive centralization of foreign policymaking. As Nigerian responders note:

> Paradiplomacy has the effect of preventing subnational entities from scrutinizing the central government's foreign policy. The subnational governments will be unable to defend some of the central government's foreign policy choices. This explains why weak federal systems prevent subnational

> governments from sharing power with the central government (Field survey in Nigeria, 2024).

In order to preserve national unity in the face of ethnic and regional diversity, Nigeria's Constitution gives the federal government sole authority to make foreign policy decisions (Suberu, 2001). Given Nigeria's complicated regional politics and history of secessionist movements, including the Biafra crisis in the 1960s, the dangers of a divided foreign policy are especially worrisome (Osaghae, 1998). Nigeria is a federal state, and as such, its fear of disintegration has led it to strictly regulate its foreign policy to prevent any state from adopting a position that would contradict or weaken the national position (Suberu, 2001).

Similar to this, Taiwan has a more centralized foreign policy, mostly because of its distinct geographical location and the continuous hostility with the PRC. As Chen and Wu's (2020) study on Taiwan's international relations discusses, this centralization is frequently employed to minimize "fragmented international stances" and the potential for diplomatic inconsistencies. Although Taiwan faces distinct geopolitical challenges, the central government's control over international affairs is crucial to preventing enmity with China, which fiercely opposes any action that would imply Taiwanese independence (Wachman, 2007).

iii. Legal/Constitutional and Political Constraints

Legal frameworks were cited by 80% of respondents in Taiwan and Nigeria as a barrier to SNG participation in international affairs. Respondents in Nigeria believed that:

> Because the constitution gives the central government sole authority for foreign commitments, SNGs may be subject to restrictions imposed by the national government. Before entering into foreign agreements or collaborations, state governments in Nigeria may need permission from the federal government. This might cause delays or even completely stop such participation. Missed chances for cooperation could result from the consequences of approval delays. Additionally, SNGs could be limited in their ability to pursue collaborations that could help their local economies or communities if the government has a different diplomatic agenda. Initiatives may be delayed or made more difficult by the central government of Nigeria's possible control of international agreements or collaborations (Field survey 2024 in Nigeria).

Taiwanese respondents believed that the constitution gave the central government authority over foreign affairs due to Taiwan's unofficial recognition and standing in the international system. In other words, Taiwan's diplomatic position complicates its global presence.

iv. Problems with Diplomatic Recognition

60% of respondents, Nigerian states looking to interact with their Taiwanese counterparts may face difficulties due to Taiwan's restricted diplomatic recognition. One of the most important aspects of Taiwan's foreign policy is its standing in the world. Formal interactions are made more difficult by the One-China Policy, which is followed by many nations, including Nigeria. Thus, Taiwan's ability to interact diplomatically is restricted by the PRC's recognition as the only legitimate government. An SNG in Nigeria can encounter political pressure or opposition from the Chinese government or other countries, for instance, if it tries to build a formal relationship with a Taiwanese counterpart. This absence of official diplomatic recognition has the potential to make it more difficult to build formal, organized partnerships. According to one respondent,

> An SNG in Nigeria may experience political fallout or pressure from China or the Nigerian central government to end such bilateral relationships if it tries to establish formal contacts with an SNG in Taiwan, which could have a negative impact on the relationship (Field survey, 2024).

Nigerian SNGs' interactions with overseas partners might not always be well received by the general public or local authorities. Both political will and public opinion are important factors that might help or hurt paradiplomacy. Initiatives may fail if constituents or political leaders do not support them enough. Given Taiwan's international standing, local communities may have differing opinions about the advantages of doing business with it. Funding, political support, and general excitement for project collaboration can all be impacted by lack of support. For instance, political leaders may not be motivated to seek collaboration with Taiwan if Nigerians from the subnational units have doubts about the advantages of doing so.

v. Diplomatic and Geopolitical Tensions

70% of respondents, geopolitical factors—specifically, tensions between China and Taiwan—can cause instability for projects using SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria. In other words, the geopolitics surrounding Taiwan, especially its relations with China, impede diplomatic engagement. According to one respondent:

> With China's strong posture on its claims over Taiwan, any relationship involving Taiwan may be examined through the prism of regional politics. For instance, geopolitical pressure may cause Taiwanese governments to be less

> inclined to interact with overseas partners for fear of Beijing's retaliation. If political environments change, these geopolitical conflicts may prevent the development of deep connections and project cooperation or result in the abrupt termination of alliances (Field survey, 2024 in Taiwan).

Taiwan and Nigeria both deal with particular geopolitical issues that influence their paradiplomacy. Nigeria relies on unofficial business contacts and economic exchanges that preserve Chinese goodwill while permitting some engagement with Taiwan because of its alignment with China and adherence to the One-China policy, which restricts formal links with Taiwan (Osaghae, 1998). Maintaining informal paradiplomatic ties without intensifying tensions with the PRC, which actively opposes Taiwanese diplomatic attempts, is a concern for Taiwan (Wachman, 2007). Paradiplomacy through NGOs and business associations is a practical way to maintain some degree of international participation because of this restriction and Taiwan's absence from international organizations

We might, however, speculatively construct an alternative scenario by posing the question of whether Nigeria's economic interests would be served by Taiwan's recognition. According to Nigerian responders,

> Nigeria may be able to keep diplomatic relations with Taiwan because of China's comparatively small involvement in the country's oil industry. The strong argument is that, given Taiwan's level of interest in Nigeria; it may not be practical or wise to scarify possible economic benefits from China in trade and investment to diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Nigeria needs to consider the cost-benefit ratio when interacting with Taiwan. Nigeria runs the risk of losing China's goodwill if it chooses not to engage in dollar diplomacy, as Taiwan is not prepared to do so in the same manner as China (Field survey, 2024).

vi. Linguistic/communication and cultural barriers

Language and cultural differences were mentioned as a barrier by 60% of respondents. As Taiwanese and Nigerian respondents noted:

> Cultural differences in customs and expectations might cause conflict or miscommunication when working together. Collaboration might be impacted by the major cultural differences between Taiwan and Nigeria. Ineffective partnerships or unsuccessful negotiations might result from cultural misunderstandings or disputes. For example, it may be interpreted as disrespectful or cause confidence to be eroded if Nigerian officials are more informal whereas Taiwanese officials, in accordance with cultural norms, expect a more conventional approach to meetings (Field survey, 2024).

According to one Taiwanese respondent "Collectivism in Taiwanese culture contrasts with some individualistic values present in Nigeria, which may affect decision-making processes, negotiation styles, and general business etiquette, which might result in conflicts or decreased efficacy in joint projects," (Field survey, 2024).

Disparities in language, culture, and communication methods might lead to miscommunications or make teamwork difficult. While Nigeria has more than 250 dialects and three major languages spoken by various majority ethnic groups, Taiwan's main languages are Mandarin and Chinese. Despite being Nigeria's official language, English can have many subtleties and interpretations. In cooperative endeavors, miscommunication can result in expectations and goals that are not aligned. Inconsistent messaging can impair collaboration, erode mutual trust, and have an impact on how collaborative initiatives are carried out. For instance, language might necessitate more resources for translations, which could cause collaboration projects to lag and result in aims and objectives being misunderstood.

vii. Disparities in income and scarce resources

Significant economic differences between the two nations' SNGs, according to 70% of respondents, can result in unfair relationships, possible exploitation, and miscommunications about expectations. Taiwan is regarded as a high-income economy with sophisticated technological skills, whereas Nigeria is categorized as a developing economy. According to respondents,

> Unbalanced partnerships can arise from significant economic disparities; one side may control discussions or the decision-making process in contrast to the creation of local jobs. Divergent economic priorities can also result in conflicts between project goals, like an emphasis on exports. For instance, Nigeria and Taiwan may view the benefits of cooperation differently due to their distinct economic priorities (Field survey, 2024).

The degree of economic growth of the two nations can also be used to infer differences in paradiplomacy. SNGs in Nigeria might concentrate on encouraging economic growth and drawing in foreign direct investment for commerce, agriculture, and industry. SNGs in Taiwan can concentrate on boosting trade, investment, and tourism in the country's ports and maritime industry.

The extent of their paradiplomacy is another area of distinction. Nigeria, on the other hand, concentrates on the global south, Asia, and West and North America, whereas Taiwan has concentrated on the US. Despite all of this, the economic profiles of the two nations can be

used to explain the disparities in paradiplomatic behaviors between them. Oil is the mainstay of Nigeria's monoculture economy, whereas Taiwan's modern technology is essential to its economic development and prosperity. Due to these disparities in economic profiles, the two nations' SNGs would prioritize different paradiplomatic goals.

Insufficient administrative capacity or resources (financial, human, or technical) may prevent SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria from managing and implementing ambitious paradiplomatic initiatives. This can result in poor communication, ineffective project management, and insufficient follow-up on collaboration initiatives. As the responders summed it up:

> Coordination between departments within SNGs and between the national, state, and local levels of government is necessary for effective paradiplomacy. It might be difficult to coordinate activities across different governmental levels. Implementation issues may arise from fragmented efforts or from a misalignment of national and subnational objectives. Stated differently, fragmented activities may result from differences in priorities or a lack of communication between these institutions. It is implied that initiatives may suffer from conflicting goals, resource waste, or overlapping activities in the absence of cohesiveness. State-led health programs, for example, may clash with federal health regulations, causing misunderstandings and poor execution. Nigerian SNGs may seek a relationship with Taiwan, although there might be inconsistencies with national policy objectives or competing agendas (Field survey, 2024).

A Taiwanese local government may have restricted budgetary allocations for foreign partnerships, whereas SNGs in Nigeria may find it difficult to recruit trained individuals with international relations experience due to a lack of administrative competence. Once more, a Nigerian SNG might not have enough skilled employees to oversee a complicated collaboration, which would irritate both parties. Respondents concurred that if Nigeria and Taiwan's alliance is not based on a solid economic foundation, it will look to be shaky. The two nations' leadership can maintain their paradiplomatic alliances on a strong economic foundation, which Nigeria presently lacks. The challenges are graphically presented below.



The issues that are likely to impact the paradiplomatic ties between Nigeria and Taiwan are clearly depicted in the diagram. Because Nigeria uses a federal style of government, institutional issues are significant in this country. The problem of socio-cultural obstacles, which includes language hurdles and other cultural customs that could have an impact on the SNGs in the two nations, comes next. The problem of diplomatic recognition is the main obstacle in the case of Taiwan. Given the PRC's resistance to its sovereign status and the UN's stance after the resolution of 1971 de-recognizing the Republic of China as a formal representation to the UN, its international standing as a state is still controversial.

4.0. Findings, Conclusion and Recommendation/Policy Implications

4.1. Analysis of Findings

The results showed that a variety of circumstances could foster the development of paradiplomacy between Taiwan and Nigeria. One of these is globalization, which two nations can use to further paradiplomacy. High influence scores for decentralization demonstrate how important global connection is in promoting paradiplomatic efforts. Taiwan's successful promotion of regional and global relations through decentralized governance. In two nations, the federalization factor has a moderate impact on paradiplomacy. However, SNGs benefit from a certain amount of autonomy under a highly decentralized unitary state, such as Taiwan's political system, which draws from the PRC's experience and permits the provinces to participate in international diplomacy. Due to the highly centralized nature of foreign policymaking, Nigeria's SNGs are typically expected to take use of the federal concept, which grants the regions the right to exercise some degree of autonomy.

Together with economic considerations, the democratization of international diplomacy is one element that may encourage the expansion of paradiplomacy in both nations. Taiwan and Nigeria both receive high scores (8 and 9, respectively), suggesting that their paradiplomatic efforts are heavily influenced by international trade and economic prospects. Taiwan scores (8) in social elements, which is again marginally higher than Nigeria's (7), indicating that Taiwan places more of an emphasis on using social and cultural dynamics in its paradiplomacy. With Taiwan scoring 6 and Nigeria scoring 5, environmental issues have the least effect in both nations, suggesting that they are not given as much priority as other considerations. Overall Finding Given that it typically scores higher on the majority of criteria and shows a more noticeable influence of these factors on its paradiplomatic actions, Taiwan is more inclined to paradiplomacy than Nigeria. Although Nigeria lags somewhat in areas like federalization and democratization, it exhibits significant influence from elements like globalization and economic considerations.

The results showed that SNGs in these two nations find it more and more difficult to participate in paradiplomacy because it is not institutionalized. There are no official institutional frameworks, rules, or mandates for SNGs to follow when it comes to international diplomacy. In other words, institutional frameworks for coordinating foreign engagement with both local and foreign administrations. Nigeria hasn't created strong institutional frameworks that let governments interact with foreign organizations on their own. There are some subnational international cooperation activities in Taiwan, primarily in the areas of trade and cultural

exchanges, but the absence of a formalized paradiplomacy framework for local governments suggests that their engagement in international affairs is restricted and heavily reliant on the policies of the central government. Once more, SNGs might lack the requisite knowledge or background in trade, international relations, or cross-cultural interaction. In conclusion, subnational governments' limited capacity and resources make it extremely difficult for them to properly practice paradiplomacy. Their ability to engage in international affairs is significantly shaped by a number of factors, including financial limitations, a lack of human resources and experience, regulatory frameworks, local priorities, and inadequate infrastructure. The results showed that effective paradiplomacy, which depends on networks and partnerships with other subnational institutions worldwide, is impacted by poor coordination and teamwork. The chances to create these essential networks and exchange best practices are restricted by a lack of cooperation. Ineffective coordination also makes it harder to establish the global networks necessary for successful paradiplomacy. SNGs frequently depend on forming alliances and networks with other institutions and governments in the majority of developed states.

According to research on the subject of political change susceptibility, SNGs that experience political instability—such as election-related administration changes, party control of the government shifts, or internal strife—may choose to put domestic stability ahead of foreign involvement. They can be reluctant to fully commit to foreign projects out of concern that any investment in paradiplomatic ties could be jeopardized by future shifts in leadership or policy direction. SNGs may act in paradiplomacy to emphasize their regional identities and advocate for self-determined policies because they want autonomy and self-determination, which will lead to political reforms at the national level. This suggests that the national government might not be in a position to encourage the SNG's ambition to engage in global diplomacy. In actuality, this disproves the case for decentralizing international relations. It also demonstrates the mistrust that permeates the relationship between SNGs and the national government. SNG leaders who sense political vulnerability may become wary or suspicious of foreign involvement because they believe it to be dangerous or maybe at odds with their local interests. The results also showed that SNGs' paradiplomatic efforts are made more difficult by bureaucratic structures that make it hard for them to understand the intricate international system. Additionally, the bureaucratic element may lead to a lack of coherence and coordination in SNGs' global activities, which could damage their reputation and efficacy abroad. Since the constitution does not call for the National Assembly to ratify such an agreement, the federal government of Nigeria is free to enter into a deal with a foreign authority

on behalf of the state instead of domesticating it. Nonetheless, such an arrangement may be ratified by the State House of Assembly.

This is comparable to Nigeria's independence and republican constitutions of 1960–1963, which mandated that regional governors participate in the drafting and execution of treaties. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution grants the federal government sole legislative authority over external relations in Item 26 of the Second Schedule, Part 1. Avoiding a conflict of interest while pursuing the nation's foreign policy is the rationale behind this in relation to treaty-making. Even though it isn't specifically mentioned in the Nigerian Constitution's 1999 exclusive legislative list, foreign affairs, particularly matters pertaining to international law, are under the purview of the central government in all federal states. Because of its unusual diplomatic circumstances—particularly in light of the PRC's opposition to Taiwanese sovereignty—Taiwan's Constitution stipulates that foreign policy stay within the jurisdiction of the central government. As to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, only central governments has the legal authority to legitimately negotiate treaties on behalf of sovereign states.

It was discovered that central governments in Taiwan and Nigeria maintain tight control over foreign policy, restricting the participation of subnational entities (counties or states) in international affairs. According to the constitution or national legislation, SNGs may not be able to engage in international operations in many nations since the national government has sole control over foreign affairs. For example, signing treaties or agreements without the central government's consent. States may have limited jurisdiction to participate in international activities, but the federal government of the United States is the only entity with the power to negotiate and sign international treaties. Although Canada's provinces enjoy a high degree of autonomy, the federal government retains control over foreign policy. Despite having its own minister of foreign relations, the province of Quebec nevertheless has to work with the federal government to collaborate on international agreements.

The results also demonstrate how SNGs' participation in paradiplomacy in Taiwan and Nigeria is hampered by the centralization of foreign policy formulation and execution. SNGs' participation in foreign policy is influenced by a number of aspects that have been examined. Because of these constraints, local administrations are frequently reluctant to take an independent role in international affairs. It is discussed that giving states in Nigeria greater authority over their foreign policy could encourage separatist aspirations or divergent foreign policy objectives, which would cause fragmentation. Nigeria's federal structure might make these issues worse because different regions have different ethnic identities and economic

interests, which could lead to self-serving paradiplomatic activities that deviate from national policy. Although the subnational units exercised some autonomy, the 1999 Constitution gave the federal government the authority to make foreign policy decisions, whereas the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions permitted the regions to engage in paradiplomacy. Nonetheless, states are indirectly involved in foreign diplomacy through signing memorandums of understanding with foreign governments, attending international conferences, and sending delegations with the federal government to other nations.

The results showed that a strong central authority that frequently controls external contacts is a defining feature of Nigeria's federal system's centralized power structure. Subnational governments' freedom to practice paradiplomacy is restricted by the federal government's constitutional power to conduct foreign policy. For this reason, only the federal government is authorized under the constitution to negotiate international agreements and host officials from other countries. SNGs are unable to practice paradiplomacy since their stated autonomy is undermined. If SNGs' paradiplomatic initiatives are seen as supporting certain cultural or ethnic agendas and identities that conflict with the central government's view of national identity and unity, they may encounter resistance. Since any diplomatic actions in support of or solidarity with Taiwan could be detrimental to Nigeria-China relations, Nigeria's paradiplomatic engagements with Taiwan are limited by its adherence to the "One-China" policy. Because geopolitical factors put national sovereignty, security, and economic concerns ahead of SNG autonomy, they can severely limit paradiplomacy. In the end, these limitations may hinder local entities' ability to solve local concerns and further their interests on the international scene by limiting their ability to participate in international relations.

Any international engagement by subnational governments could be viewed through a political lens, potentially resulting in tensions or conflicts, given Nigeria's political sensitivity to its diversity, which frequently causes political tension and conflict among its diverse ethnic and political landscape. For instance, in Taiwan, the counties or municipalities are restricted by martial law and are therefore unable to participate in international diplomacy. However, centralized control of foreign relations, the political sensitivity of Taiwan's international status, fear of Chinese retaliation, resource constraints, cultural and historical factors, and the dynamics of public sentiment and political will all play a role in the limited involvement of SNGs in Taiwan's paradiplomacy. Because of the complicated environment these factors generate, SNGs are frequently reluctant to participate independently in international affairs.

The results showed that SNGs' lack of active participation in paradiplomacy was less significantly influenced by concerns about fragmentation, consequences, and autonomy

limitations. Given Nigeria's history of civil war and other fissiparous inclinations of separatist movement, it strikes a chord with a federal state like that. This is in line with a larger pattern in African federations, where some decentralization is being adopted to allay concerns that increased local autonomy would exacerbate regional conflicts. Because of Nigeria's ethnic variety and regional divides, the federal government or other regions may view any major move toward autonomy as a threat.

These tensions are best illustrated by the Niger Delta conflict and the emergence of secessionist movements, such as those calling for the Biafra republic. Because of geopolitical tensions, subnational governments may be deterred from participating in international affairs for fear of escalating disputes or inciting hostility from other nations. Take the geopolitical tension in the relations between Taiwan and the Strait. Since Taiwan is a unitary state with a powerful central government, its fear of fragmentation is lower.

Lack of institutionalization, limited capacity and resources, vulnerability to political changes, legal and constitutional limitations, centralization of the foreign policy machinery, and the attitude of the central government were among the factors that respondents identified as being important for SNGs that are not heavily involved in paradiplomacy. However, SNGs' limited participation in paradiplomacy in the two countries is still influenced by other reasons like poor coordination and collaboration, geopolitical limits, and fear of fragmentation. These problems that respondents pointed out reveal the mindset of the central government, making it one of the major puzzles in SNGs' paradiplomatic efforts.

They are: (i) A nation's constitutional structure can affect how the central government views SNG paradiplomacy; certain constitutions provide SNGs greater autonomy. (ii) The central government's political beliefs can influence how it views the paradiplomacy of SNGs; some beliefs are more centrist, while others are more pro-decentralization. (iii) The central government's stance on SNG paradiplomacy can be influenced by local and regional politics, with some locations or regions having greater autonomy than others. (iv). Global dynamics and international relations, such as the emergence of regionalism or the growing significance of cities in international relations, might impact the central government's stance on the paradiplomacy of the SNGs. Issues such as lack of support from the central government, ambivalence of the central government, constitutional framework, security concern, political rivalry between central and constituent units, Taiwan’s internal politics, cross-Strait relations, etc. Subnational governments in both contexts often find themselves navigating legal, political, and diplomatic landscapes shaped by the attitudes and policies of their respective central authorities. Understanding these dynamics is essential for addressing the challenges to paradiplomacy in these regions.

The results showed that subnational governments in Taiwan and Nigeria play a complex and paradiplomatic role in global governance, including crisis management, tourism promotion, education, cultural diplomacy, economic development, humanitarian endeavors, and alignment with international initiatives. The significance of local entities in forming Nigeria's position in international relations is highlighted by their active participation in international collaboration in these areas, which not only addresses local needs or challenges but also supports Nigeria's larger international relations, governance, and development goals. These subnational organizations increase their impact and ability to bring about constructive change on a local and global level by actively engaging in global governance and cooperation. Additionally, SNGs increase their power and ability to promote positive change locally and globally by utilizing international ties and encouraging collaborations. Their involvement shows a dynamic approach to governance that acknowledges the interdependence of local and global issues, despite a number of obstacles.

Subnational governments in Taiwan play a wide range of paradiplomatic roles in international cooperation and global governance, including technology projects, environmental sustainability, security cooperation, and tourism development. Therefore, through forming international relationships, taking part in global networks, encouraging cultural diplomacy, and pursuing economic development, SNGs are involved in paradiplomacy and advancing global governance and international cooperation. Despite the limitations imposed by Taiwan's special international status, their active participation not only tackles local issues but also raises Taiwan's profile and influence on the world scene. Taiwanese SNGs make major contributions to global governance and collaboration by utilizing their local capabilities and cultivating international relationships.

The trading relationship between the two nations demonstrates the opportunities that paradiplomacy offers them. In comparison to China's trade volume with Nigeria, the total amount of trade was $395 million. At $209 million, Nigeria's exports to Taiwan were more than Taiwan's, which came in at $186 million. The results showed that collaboration on environmental sustainability, cultural interaction, and tourism development were important areas that scored better. The two nations where SNGs are practicing paradiplomacy face institutional, diplomatic, operational, sociocultural, and economic obstacles.

4.1.2 Summary of Key Findings

First, paradiplomacy can be used for a variety of objectives, such as political affirmation, cultural spread, economic progress, and technical advancement. In this regard, enhancing one's ability to operate overseas may eventually benefit a number of interests. Taiwan and Nigeria can use paradiplomacy to advance economic development and progress.

Second, paradiplomacy offers both possible advantages and disadvantages for the advancement of democracy, a matter that is especially important for many areas in developing nations. Third, Taiwan can establish genuine diplomatic relationships with Nigeria through its connections with the subnational governments in that nation, bringing it closer to Taiwan and its goals, even though the relationship is problematic due to Nigeria's support for the "One China Policy."

Fourth, this analysis not only explains why subnational units in Taiwan and Nigeria have not used paradiplomacy, but it also demonstrates how a nation might successfully use it as a possible tool to influence the foreign policy of another nation from subnational units.

Fifth, the results show that SNGs' participation in paradiplomacy in Taiwan and Nigeria is subject to institutional and legal restrictions.

Sixth, the report shows that while the capacity to engage in diplomatic relations is typically thought of as a quality unique to sovereign nations, local and regional governments' involvement in international affairs is growing in significance on a global scale.

4.2. Conclusion

The paradiplomatic ties between Taiwan and Nigeria will serve as a hedging tactic, enabling Taiwanese officials to stay in constant communication with Nigeria. SNGs have opportunities to utilize the instrumentality paradiplomacy to engage with one another for their mutual benefits despite difficulties and complexities. Taiwan's SNGs will use paradiplomacy as a means of investing in long-term relationships with Nigeria despite the fact that some communication routes are restricted because of PRC’s diplomatic harassment. The difficulties imposed by Taiwan’s present international status can be lessened and the likelihood of fruitful partnerships increased by increasing awareness, competence, and long-term frameworks for participation. Building mutual understanding, enhancing capacities, and developing frameworks that promote productive cooperation are all necessary to address these issues. Both countries may more effectively utilize their engagements for mutual gain and build long-lasting connections. SNGs might be more successful at building global trade partnerships that are suited to their unique developmental requirement. There are issues that cannot be handled alone

by the central government, especially those that affect the subnational entities such as economy, environment, propagation and promotion of culture.

SNGs will have to resort to paradiplomacy in order to further their regional interests and bolster soft power, which will require national and international institutional and legal frameworks and guidelines. This is to prevent SNGs from committing some diplomatic blunders if they are not guided by the central government. There is the fear of fragmentation and incoherence in the implementation of foreign policy by SNGs. In an attempt to prevent contradictions or diplomatic misunderstandings, SNGs will have to deal with issues of coherence and national unity and ensuring that their actions on the international scene are in line with the central government's larger foreign policy goals. This also ensures that subnational activities do not jeopardize the national sovereignty or diplomatic cohesion of the central government, thus, central directives and the national legal frameworks specifying the parameters within which the SNGs should function at the international stage.

Overall growth and development will be improved by focused cooperation in the domains of economics, culture, technology, the environment, and tourism. The importance of the interaction between SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria due to the obvious benefits and opportunities for collaboration in a number of areas. Without a question, by focusing on common interests, SNGs may leverage their unique strengths, enhance their economies and communities, and help build a stronger bilateral relationship that benefits both regions. In addition to promoting local development, these initiatives will promote global governance, cooperation, and understanding.

SNGs will leverage on their unique economic and technological potentials for the benefits of the country. The active involvement of Taiwan’s subnational units in paradiplomacy will not only be beneficial to the units but the country as a whole. They will strengthen their influence and promote constructive change locally and globally through the partnership, they forge and foster with other subnational units. SNGs will continue to play a broad and ever-evolving paradiplomatic function that includes regional cooperation, digital governance, and economic resilience in Taiwan and Nigeria. In addition to addressing regional issues, their aggressive involvement in the strategic areas will crystalize to economic development will not only raise Taiwan’s profile internationally but fosters cooperation. SNGs contribute significantly to global governance and the resolution of urgent international challenges by utilizing their special talents and cultivating alliances.

It is acknowledged that links provided through fellowship and scholarship programmes is the right step in the right direction at some future date the beneficiaries will occupy powerful positions at the national and international stage. They will become the vanguard for the recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. This is reason why fellowship and scholarship programmes will be integrated fully in Taiwan's paradiplomacy, as the SNGs will use the opportunity to engage in a variety of cooperative activities.

Despite central government control over foreign policy, SNGs will complements it through the instrumentality of paradiplomacy. The fear of fragmentation and contradictory policy will not be the basis for not utilizing paradiplomacy to further their interests in a wide variety of areas like trade, environmental cooperation, and cultural exchange. The fear of fragmentation and diplomatic coherence can be prevented through a legal framework and policy guidelines and with proper coordination by national governments. SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria should take advantage of paradiplomacy to advance their diplomatic ties.

4.3. Recommendations

i. Strategic areas like trade, health, education exchange, tourism, agricultural research, and technology should be the focus of Taiwan and Nigeria. Since Taiwan does not have the resources to give out like the PRC, which will do whatever it takes to keep Taiwan from establishing diplomatic ties with any African nation, the focus of the conversation should be on using leverage in these areas to win favor and support through SNGs, particularly from African nations

ii. Despite the larger obstacles presented by China's influence, Taiwan's visibility and Nigeria's economic cooperation will both be improved by fostering partnerships with SNGs and advancing shared goals.

iii. The two nations' establishment of efficient paradiplomacy institutions. To prevent any ambiguity in the execution of national foreign policy, the federal government and the government of Taiwan, through their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, make sure that interactions between the subnational units align with the central government's foreign policy objectives. In order to coordinate the actions of SNGs with those of other SNGs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ought to set up a section dedicated to subnational units. The constituent units should open offices in the two nations as part of the institutionalization of paradiplomacy in those nations.

iv. Given Taiwan's diplomatic isolation and Nigeria's developmental concerns, it is most advantageous to establish a broad international collaboration at this moment. By encouraging

communication and collaboration between the two nations, the SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria should create a wide network of international cooperation.

v. By training professionals and staff at that level, SNGs can better understand the worldwide legal framework. To communicate diplomatically, the SNGs must be able to comprehend the international legal system. This is to guarantee that their international affairs activities comply with international legal standards.

vi. SNGs ought to be aware of the global context in which they function. In this sense, SNGs in Taiwan and Nigeria ought to be able to connect the issues facing their communities to the global setting and recognize how such issues are reflected in the worldwide policy agenda.

vii. Through Taiwan’s connections with Nigeria's subnational administrations, it can establish genuine diplomatic relationships with that country, bringing it closer to Taiwan and its goals despite the complex relationship that currently exists due to Nigeria's support for the "One China Policy." This paper not only explains how Taiwan's paradiplomatic subnational binding of Nigeria operates, but it also demonstrates how a nation can use this as a viable tool to influence the foreign policy of another nation from subnational units.

viii. The universities in Taiwan and Nigeria should be encouraged to establish study centres to enable the students to know more about the two countries.

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Appendix I

Map of Taiwan (R.O.C).

Map of Nigeria.

Appendix 2

List of Respondents

1. Professor Tobi Alabi Department of Political Science, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna
2. Bunor Okechime, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria
3. Uche Nwali , Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos
4. Dr. Jude Cocodia, Niger Delta University/ M.O.F.A Fellow, Taiwan
5. Mr. Adigun Olalakan Civil Society Activist/ Journalist (Abuja)
6. Dr. Elderidge Robert David Japan Forum for Strategic Studies/.M.O.FA Fellow
7. Dr. Lin Tzuli Department of Political Science, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan
8. Dr. Arun, Swati, Centre for Contemporary China Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India/ Fellow Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan
9. Dr. Richard Iroanya, University of Namibia/ M.O.F.A, Fellow
10. Fr. Justin Nnnaemeka, Fu Jen Academia Catholica, Taipei, Taiwan
11. Dr. Derek Sheridan, Institute of Ethnography, Academia Sinica, Taiwan
12. Dr. Linda Arrigo, Civil Society Activitist, Taiwan
13. Dr. Richard Atimniraye Nyelade, Canada/ Fellow M.O.F.A. Taiwan
14. Rose Civil Society Activist/ Doctoral Student in United Kingdom
15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Nigeria
16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan.